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“A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an inva-
sion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet,
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a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty
meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.”
Robert A. Heinlein (1907 - 1988)
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CHAPTER 1. MODELLING CONCEPTUAL MODELLING
1.1 Introduction
In information systems analysis and design, models are the blueprints for soft-
ware development. For example, conceptual models represent the structure of
a business domain in terms of the concepts people use to describe it. Process
models visualise relevant business processes. Alternatively, models can be of
a technical nature for use in simulation or as a basis for software engineer-
ing. Models help analysts to understand a domain, support communication
between developers and other stakeholders, provide input and feedback for the
design process and document original requirements for future reference (Wand
& Weber, 2002; Gemino & Wand, 2003; Davies, Green, Rosemann, Indulska, &
Gallo, 2006; Barjis, 2008; Renger, Kolfschoten, & De Vreede, 2008; S. Hoppen-
brouwers, Weigand, & Rouwette, 2009; Hadar, Soffer, & Kenzi, 2014; Reijers
et al., 2017; van der Linden, Hadar, & Zamansky, 2019).
The use of official modelling techniques to chart business processes increases
significantly in large organisations, due to the increasing complexity of projects
(Davies et al., 2006). Nevertheless, practitioners report “that conceptual mod-
elling is difficult and that it often falls into disuse within their organisations”
(Wand & Weber, 2002). But what the exact difficulties are is not precisely
described. We can draw inspiration from studies examining novice and ex-
pert modelling abilities (e.g., R. B. Miller, 1978; Nelson, 1991; Sutcliffe &
Maiden, 1992; D. Lee, Trauth, & Farwell, 1995; Shanks, 1997; King, 1999; Pers-
son, 2001; Sins, Savelsbergh, & van Joolingen, 2005; Wilmont, Brinkkemper,
Van de Weerd, & Hoppenbrouwers, 2010; Polotskaia & Savard, 2018). Some
prominent findings are that modelling performance is related to the ability to
scope the problem, to form a mental conceptual model of the problem domain
and to reason about and test hypotheses. Furthermore, providing cognitive
tool support during modelling may enhance model quality (Abbad Andaloussi,
Buch-Lorentsen, López, Slaats, & Weber, 2019). These findings provide very
interesting starting points for a discussion about the cognitive challenges en-
countered during modelling.
Another challenge is that as people work with models in all phases of a soft-
ware development project, a shared understanding of the models between both
the modelling experts and the domain stakeholders is essential for the entire
project’s chance of success (Burton-Jones & Meso, 2008; S. Hoppenbrouw-
ers et al., 2009; Chakraborty, Sarker, & Sarker, 2010; Hadar et al., 2014).
In many cases, shared understanding is hindered by stakeholders’ diversity
of backgrounds, the accompanying different languages they speak and their
unique perspectives (Urquhart, 1997). Another aspect might be that the us-
ability of process modelling notations is often insufficient (Reijers et al., 2017;
van der Linden et al., 2019). Additionally, individual differences in modelling
competence exist not only between novices and experts, but also among ex-
perts themselves, which can have a profound impact on the modelling process,




van der Aalst, 2010).
However, little attention has been paid to deepening our understanding of
the fundamental aspects of modelling cognition. This understanding is required
if we are to meaningfully observe and support modelling in industrial settings.
What factors contribute to the differences in both competence and style we
can observe in overt modelling behaviour (e.g., Mendling et al., 2010; Wilmont
et al., 2010; Pinggera, Soffer, et al., 2012; Claes et al., 2012; Gray & Holyoak,
2020)?
The theoretical goal of this thesis is to understand which cognitive processes
are critical for modelling and how they influence the progression of a modelling
session. Additionally, we identify, describe and clarify individual differences
that may be relevant for modelling. From a practical perspective, the aim is
to apply these theoretical insights to modelling practice, first by designing a
cognition-based method to observe modelling in practice, and second by using
the method to observe cognitive processes and individual differences as they
emerge during modelling sessions. The observation results provide input for
the creation of tailored modelling support protocols.
We use the cognitive psychological concept of executive functions to analyse
modelling behaviour. Executive functions may be described as a set of control-
ling and coordinating mental processes which regulate performance on complex
cognitive tasks as well as social behaviour. We have conducted extensive lit-
erature review on cognitive processes, and the executive function framework
encompasses many relevant processes for modelling. Firstly, we hypothesise
that the usage of executive functions will be observable in modelling practice.
Secondly, that we can deduce behavioural patterns from the ways in which
executive functions are used. Thirdly, that these behavioural patterns will be
indicative of the progress made during a modelling session. We explore these
hypotheses through several case studies conducted at a Dutch company, using
an observation model we created based on executive functions. Thus, we ex-
amine how systematic characterisations of the modelling process in terms of
executive control can contribute to increased understanding of differences in
modelling behaviour, so that this may be used to improve modelling perfor-
mance.
In this chapter, we will first discuss our conceptualisation of models, mod-
ellers and the modelling process. Then, we present our research questions and
describe the research approach. Executive functions and the cognitive perspec-
tive will be further discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
It should be noted that the type of modelling we study in our case studies
is process modelling on a conceptual level. We thus discuss the theory of
conceptual modelling in this chapter. However, as our cases all take place in
a collaborative setting, we use the term collaborative modelling to refer to the
actual process under study in consecutive chapters.
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Figure 1.1: An example of a simple process model.
1.2 What Are Models?
First of all, what do we mean when we talk about a model? We define a model
as an abstract, unambiguous representation of knowledge about a system of
interest. Essentially, it consists of a set of abstract concepts and relations. It
is designed with a specific goal in mind, such as to represent the causes and
effects of a problem variable or to describe how data flows through a system.
Alternatively, it can serve a diagnostic function, showing that existing struc-
tures, such as business processes or an IT architecture, require improvement
(Hall & Day, 1977; Dietz, 2006; Proper, Van Bommel, Hoppenbrouwers, & Van
der Weide, 2006; Wilmont et al., 2010). An example of a simple process model
is given in Figure 1.1. The process trigger is a civilian sending a data form to
the municipality for registration. The municipality’s information system checks
whether the data fields of the form are syntactically correct, such as whether a
date is truly a date, and either accepts the form if it is correct, or rejects it if
it is incorrect and sends it back to the civilian. After these tasks, the process
ends.
In order to understand where complexity in modelling comes from, we must
first consider what models represent: real world systems. A system is “any phe-
nomenon, either structural or functional, having at least two separable compo-
nents and some interaction between these components” (Hall & Day, 1977, pp.
6). A system can be viewed as a building block of the natural world, or as a
means to impart structure upon the seemingly chaotic natural world. Systems
can be considered on different levels of abstraction, which means they are both
composed of smaller subsystems, and part of a larger system. These levels are
defined by the details the modeller considers relevant given his goals (Ross,
Goodenough, & Irvine, 1975; Rasmussen, 1986). Dietz (2006) notes that any
system A can, but need not necessarily, be a conceptual, abstracted representa-
tion of B, bearing some sort of similarity to the system B such that it can take
8
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1.2. WHAT ARE MODELS?
on the role of a model. Using one system as a metaphor for the functioning of
another can be both efficient and dangerous. Efficient because it can provide
inspiration for understanding a system which may share similar characteristics
with another system, but dangerous because it can be misleading or reduce the
modeller’s alertness to notice subtle differences between the functioning of the
two systems. It is therefore important to check the model frequently against
the real system.
Systems can have many interrelations, both within-level and between-level,
and it is exactly this myriad of interrelations that make them such complex
phenomena to model. It is essential to scope the model according to its goal
to ensure that it contains only those functional system attributes necessary to
achieve its goal. A model can represent either an existing situation or a future
situation envisioned by the modeller. Most importantly, the model must be
meaningful to the domain stakeholders who must ultimately use it. Meaning
in the model is conveyed by the concepts and relations it consists of, which
must therefore be formulated based on thorough reasoning and peer review.
Concepts
The first key model constituents are concepts. What are concepts and what do
they do? In the context of logic and philosophy, the Oxford English Dictionary
defines a concept as “an idea of a class of objects, a general notion or idea”.
More concretely, Bowen (1864) describes that when we recognise something as a
concept, we recognise it “not as this tree, but as a tree.” The essence of forming
a concept is that we “unite similar objects into one class by overlooking their
points of difference and forming their common attributes into one Concept
or Thought, the name of which thus becomes the common name of all the
individuals included in the class.” (Bowen, 1864, pp. 5).
Concepts thus allow us to classify the instances we encounter in our en-
vironment into structured, meaningful categories. They enable us to “inter-
pret situations in terms of previous situations that we judge as similar to the
present” (Gabora, Rosch, & Aerts, 2008), thereby facilitating understanding
of the situation. Traditionally, concepts define themselves through a set of
characteristic attributes, serving mostly to distinguish a concept from those
nearest to it. For example, it is easy to distinguish a fish from a tree. The two
being so dissimilar, the set of characteristics capable of differentiating between
them will be rather forgiving in terms of specificity and precision. However,
things become more difficult when trying to distinguish a tree from a shrub. In
such cases, the distinctive attributes need to be precisely formulated, but only
contain the most specific and essential attributes. Addition of more common
attributes would make the concept more inclusive, but also more confusing and
less applicable to instances of the same kind (Bowen, 1864). Such categorisa-
tion, or generalisation, is a commonly used and very important application of
abstraction. The opposite and equally important operation, instantiation, sim-
9
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CHAPTER 1. MODELLING CONCEPTUAL MODELLING
ply marks an object in the real world, equipped with its entire set of essential
and unessential attributes, as a member of a certain category, or concept.
Modern views on concepts stress the influence of context on the way con-
cepts acquire their meaning, interpretation and structure (Gabora et al., 2008).
Concepts rarely manifest themselves in isolation, therefore meaning can only
be acquired in relation to both different and similar other concepts and events
(Rosch, 1999). For example, the concept fast can only be truly appreciated
in relation to a set of observations of different speeds. The other way around,
Arnheim (1969) claims that concepts must always be meaningful in their con-
texts to begin with. From this, it follows that concepts can only acquire mean-
ing from their context if they make sense within the context.
As with systems, concepts can also be viewed on different levels of ab-
straction. We can talk about a lizard, a reptile, an animal, or a living being,
depending on which message we want to convey. However, within a single
model, one should be careful to keep the level of abstraction consistent. For
example, if instances and categories are used in the same relation, one will
run into trouble populating the model when checking it against the real world.
Thus, concepts should always be tested against the modelling goal for meaning,
and then against neighbouring concepts to ensure consistency in abstraction
level.
Relations
The other key model constituents, relations, are bindings “between a relation
symbol and a set of ordered tuples of elements” (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips,
2010), such as faster(hare, tortoise). Here, the predicate faster specifies the
meaning of the intended relation between the variables ‘hare’ and ‘tortoise’,
derived from domain knowledge learned by experience.
Relations thus describe how concepts influence each other. They can be
used to construct processes or to create overviews of how concurrent concepts
are structured. In such constructions, relations may acquire different complexi-
ties. Relational complexity is determined by the “number of related dimensions
that need to be considered jointly to arrive at the correct solution” (Crone et
al., 2009). In models, multiple relations need to be considered and interpreted
jointly which greatly adds to their complexity. Because of this complexity,
relations do not become truly meaningful without a thorough, concrete-level
understanding of the participating concepts (Markovits, de Chantal, & Brisson,
2019).
Halford et al. (2010) write that relational knowledge has three core prop-
erties to ensure that relations maintain their integrity when they are being
used in reasoning. The first, structure consistency, ensures that the structure
of the relation is preserved in different representations. Secondly, composition-
ality means that entities in a compound relation retain their identities, and




ties. Also, they must be accessible. The third property is systematicity, which
implies that with an understanding of the semantics of the relation unlimited
sets of novel instances can be generated for it. When these properties are
maintained, we may assume that from a theoretical point of view, semantics
are being correctly conveyed. In order to infer the extent to which modellers
are reasoning consistently and interpreting relations correctly, we may check a
modeller’s utterances against this formal basis.
In summary, the foundation of a model are concepts and relations which
depend on each other to acquire meaning. These can be integrated to form
complex structures which in turn derive their meaning from the individual
constituent concept-relation tuples.
1.3 Modellers
Of crucial importance to the creation of a model are the modellers, who are
often forgotten as traditional modelling research focuses mainly on the final
product: the model. To begin with, modellers must create an overview of rel-
evant domain concepts and relate them in a meaningful way so that incoming
information can be worked with. In other words, a modeller must conceive a
mental model of the domain. Another aspect is that all stakeholder perspectives
have to be taken into account, which adds to the large burden of information
to be integrated. We assume that these perspectives are made explicit through
communications between people, either directly or indirectly, to which abstrac-
tions are inherent. This refines the mental model, which must eventually be
made explicit using a modelling language (Gemino & Wand, 2003). The prod-
uct is usually a graphical model. Thus, we can deduce that at the very least,
modellers must be skilled in relational reasoning and monitoring of different
perspectives and model evolution.
Mental Models
Mental models form the fundamental structures to facilitate reasoning. Rouse
and Morris (1986) define mental models as “the mechanisms whereby humans
are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations
of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future
system states.” Mental models are therefore cognitive representations, unique
to the individual. They are based on the individual’s prior experience with
similar tasks and systems (Gemino & Wand, 2003; Proper et al., 2006; Khatri,
Vessey, Ramesh, Clay, & Park, 2006), his expectations and his environment
(Hutchins, 1995). This includes both what he perceives as relevant, and what
he actively asks for from stakeholders and experts (Proper et al., 2006).
Mental models form the basis of the experiences and knowledge structures
each individual brings into a modelling session (Newcomb, 1953; Johnson &
11
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Johnson, 1991). They are a fundamental aid to describing how an individual
stores knowledge. Mental models guide behaviour, organise thoughts and influ-
ence the interpretation of information. They tend to be dynamic rather than
static, and can be manipulated by the individual to predict the outcome of a
certain problem-solving strategy. The accuracy of mental models often influ-
ences the quality of problem solutions. The reason for that may be that people
base their solutions on their mental models of a problem and a situation, and
if those mental models happen to be inaccurate or incorrect, the solution will
inevitably suffer too (Kempton, 1986). Research indicates that in collaborative
situations, teams who have shared mental models perform better than those
who do not (Van Boven & Thompson, 2003).
Model Writing vs Model Viewing
When observing modellers, it is important to note that people in a modelling
session can take on two different roles: ‘model writer’ and ‘model viewer’.
The model writer is the active role, the one who needs to translate knowledge
input into model output. The model viewer, on the contrary, is a passive
role. He is concerned with reading the model, constructing an understanding
of the domain based on the information contained in the model, the specifics of
the modelling language’s grammar and symbols (Gemino & Wand, 2003), and
his own previous experiences and available knowledge (Mayer, 1989). In this
study we focus on the model writer role in observed sessions. However, Gemino
and Wand (2003) argue that a modeller continuously switches between viewing
and writing as the model being created evolves. A modeller may write down
concepts, pause to reflect on his work, listens to feedback from others or read
what co-modellers are writing on the whiteboard. These two fundamentally
different cognitive processes each have their own unique cognitive requirements
and associated difficulties.
In this thesis, the modeller perspective focuses on unique modeller charactis-
tics that may influence the flow of the modelling process, such as capacity, back-
ground and experience (Newcomb, 1953; McGrath, 1984; Wilke & Meertens,
1994; Pohl, 1994). We observe many differences between modellers in how well
they perform their tasks (Wilmont et al., 2010; Wilmont, Hengeveld, Barend-
sen, & Hoppenbrouwers, 2013). Difficulties in modelling have been elaborately
described, in terms of behaviours where modellers go awry (e,g,. Sutcliffe &
Maiden, 1992; Shanks, 1997; Gemino & Wand, 2003; Sins et al., 2005; Kramer,
2007; Wilmont, Barendsen, Hoppenbrouwers, & Hengeveld, 2012; Mendling,
Strembeck, & Recker, 2012; Pinggera, Zugal, et al., 2012; Haisjackl et al.,
2016), or in the case where the features of the modelling language do not meet
the modellers’ demands (van der Linden et al., 2019). However, apart from
modelling difficulties and differences between novice and expert performance,
very little work was available on the cognitive processes facilitating modelling
at the onset of this research project in 2009.
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1.4 The Modelling Process
Modelling aims to represent abstract structures, for example of an organi-
sation or a business process, in terms of core concepts associated with that
organisation or business process. It is a dynamic, goal-directed and itera-
tive process, purposely creating a model based on the modeller’s conceptions
(Hall & Day, 1977; Proper et al., 2006). Recent years have seen a shift to-
wards process-oriented research on modelling in favour of product-oriented re-
search. For example, many discussions focus on describing the process from
a high-level perspective (Zugal, Pinggera, & Weber, 2011; Pinggera, Zugal, et
al., 2012; Mendling et al., 2012), or focus on the group interaction processes
(Ssebuggwawo, 2012). So how may we characterise the progression and struc-
ture of a modelling process?
In essence, modelling can be viewed simply as a ‘creative process’. Basadur,
Runco, and Vegaxy (2000) define a creative process as starting with divergent
thinking, or ideation, followed by convergent thinking, or the evaluation of the
generated options, in order to conclude the process with a coherent product.
Essentially, thinking and reasoning in this process are active processes, which
also turns out to be a prerequisite for modelling (Gemino & Wand, 2003).
Basadur et al. (2000) also describe a creative problem solving process as con-
sisting of problem finding, problem solving and finally solution implementation.
Problem finding has two main goals. First of all it is the active process of
discovering and formulating new and useful problems to be solved. Secondly,
it includes the definition and conceptualisation of new problems so that it ac-
curately represents the core problem in its context and, on the basis thereof,
that more specific challenges and insights may be identified and related to each
other. The next stage, problem solving, comprises the development of purpose-
ful, innovative and imaginative potential solutions to the predefined problems.
Finally, during solution implementation, the most promising solution is suc-
cessfully implemented. The implementation should lead to the discovery of
new problems, hence it is a continuous, cyclical process. Within each phase in
the creative process, the ideation-evaluation cycle takes place (Basadur et al.,
2000; Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012). Along the same lines, but
tailored to the modelling process in particular, Pinggera, Zugal, et al. (2012)
describe modelling as a cycle consisting of comprehension, modelling and rec-
onciliation.
This generic characterisation is sufficient to incorporate the modellers’ ac-
tions and perspectives, but might we be able to describe it in more detail
to distinguish a modelling process from other creative processes? To answer
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Modelling as Problem Solving
Modelling is essentially a creative problem solving process. Problem solving is
the process of interpreting a problem and gradually coming to a solution by
reasoning about the problem. The challenge starts with the nature of typical
modelling problems. They can be classified as ill-structured problems, in which
the initial state, the permissible operators, the optimal solution path and the
goal state are not clearly defined or described (Chi & Glaser, 1985). Rittel and
Webber (1973) call these wicked problems: they have no definitive conditions or
limits with regard to how to deal with the problem. When dealing with wicked
problems, input for the problem solving process has to be gathered from many
different sources, and afterwards integrated. Modelling can therefore be seen
as a type of ill structured problem solving. For example, imagine designing a
system which has to handle incoming data about how often employees have
taken sick leave, in order to calculate their pension. Data has to be correct,
complete and on time, so certain checks should be in place. In addition, all
sorts of exceptions to the rules have to be built into the system. Decisions
have to be made on how to represent the flow of information, about which
activities can be scoped within one flow and which ones form different flows.
Such an ill-structured problem requires a cyclic approach. Information must be
interpreted and structured, allowing the modeller to identify and comprehend
the problem so that he can form a mental representation. Abstraction helps
the modeller to distinguish which properties are shared by certain activities,
as well as to scope the information and to integrate various perspectives. At
this point, the modeller can start thinking about a solution strategy and what
resources are needed for it, monitoring and evaluating each solution step as he
proceeds (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003;
Xun & Land, 2004).
Modelling as Writing
As discussed, Gemino and Wand (2003) refer to the process of writing as an
important, independent part of the modelling process. We may therefore draw
inspiration from writing research to understand modelling. Writing research
saw the movement from a product to a process oriented approach some 60 years
ago. Research on the structure of writing processes shows that writing is goal
directed, that goals are hierarchically organized, and that writers use three
strongly intertwined processes: planning, sentence generation, and revision
(Hayes & Flower, 1986). Writers are found to comment on their goals early
in the process, and continue to define subgoals after the main goal has been
stated. Structuring according to subgoals has also been found to be important
in modelling (Ross et al., 1975; Sins et al., 2005). Then writers commence with
a period of planning in which they generate ideas and organise their knowledge,




seen as a model for the evolving text. Writing plans include self-instructions for
writers, such as cues or code words, pointing to information or possible phrases,
or overarching goals relating to the audience or general text connectivity. In
general, expert planning consists of constructing an initial task representation
and a body of goals. Goals are hierarchically organised, interconnected, have
a dynamic structure and are subject to radical modification. Next, a phase of
sentence generation follows, during and after which revision and evaluation of
the text takes place and potential adaptations to improve the draft are made.
The more expert the writer, the longer he spends on revision (Flower &
Hayes, 1981). Experts focus their attention more globally, aim to improve
the meaning of passages with concern for their readers and see it as a whole-
text task, whereas novices focus locally and aim to improve single words or
sentences, seeing revision as a sentence-level task. Revision may be triggered
by several factors, such as a detection of dissonance between a writer’s intention
and execution, by discovery of better things to say, by a negative self-evaluation
of a plan or by failure to comprehend one’s own text. Revision requires the
writer to “comprehend the goals of the text, to predict how well the text will
accomplish those goals for the intended audience, and to propose better ways
to accomplish those goals when the reviser perceives the text to be faulty”
(Hayes & Flower, 1986).
A Structure for Modelling
From this discussion, we may thus deduce that in a generic modelling pro-
cess, the modeller must identify and comprehend the problem, form a mental
representation, develop a solution strategy, integrate his knowledge with the
problem, decide what resources are needed, and finally monitor and evalu-
ate each solution step towards the goal for accuracy (Chi et al., 1981; Pretz
et al., 2003; Xun & Land, 2004; Pinggera, Zugal, et al., 2012; van Dooren,
Boshuizen, van Merriënboer, Asselbergs, & van Dorst, 2014). In Table 1.1 on
the next page we outline the phases and the activities associated with each
phase. When we analyse modelling behaviour in Chapter 5, we may associate
patterns of behaviour with modelling phases.
1.5 Research Approach
We continue to describe our research approach. Our goal is to generate in-
depth understanding of how cognitive processes interact and are expressed
during modelling, and what directly observable influences they have on the
progression of a modelling session. We are also particularly interested in unique
and possibly deviant behavioural patterns. We will first present our research
questions, then position our research and discuss the methodological approach.
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Identify purpose and set
goals
(Ross et al., 1975; Flower




(Flower & Hayes, 1981;
Pretz et al., 2003; Pinggera,
Zugal, et al., 2012)
Integrate problem knowl-
edge
(Pretz et al., 2003)
Elicitation and generation of
ideas and knowledge
(Flower & Hayes, 1981;
Burg, 1997)
Problem analysis (Sins et al., 2005)
Problem solv-
ing
Develop solution strategy (Pretz et al., 2003)
Allocate mental and physi-
cal resources
(Pretz et al., 2003)
Formulate concept for solu-
tion
(Ross et al., 1975; Pretz et
al., 2003)
Modelling and devising im-
plementation mechanism
(Ross et al., 1975; Hayes
& Flower, 1986; Burg,
1997; Pinggera, Zugal, et al.,
2012)
Describe instructions for im-
plementation mechanism
(Ross et al., 1975)
Solution im-
plementation
Revision (Flower & Hayes, 1981; Chi
et al., 1981; Hayes & Flower,
1986; Xun & Land, 2004)










(Pretz et al., 2003; Burg,
1997; Sins et al., 2005;
Flower & Hayes, 1981)





This thesis centres around the following main research question:
What are critical cognitive processes that influence mod-
elling practice?
Specifically, the aim of this research is to identify critical cognitive processes
by means of a literature review, and to develop a method to distinguish cogni-
tive processes as they emerge during a modelling process, as well as to study
the effects they have on modelling progress. In order to structure our studies
and answer the main question, we formulate the following subquestions, which
will be addressed in consecutive chapters:
1. What are critical cognitive processes to facilitate a modelling process?
(Chapter 2)
2. What fundamental cognitive processes facilitate executive control and
may provide leads for modelling interventions? (Chapter 3)
3. What are sources of individual differences in executive control that may
impact modelling performance, and which interventions may improve ex-
ecutive control? (Chapter 4)
4. Which variables are essential to observe in a method to analyse individual
variability in cognitive processes in modelling sessions? (Chapter 5)
5. How can the use of executive functions in process modelling sessions be
characterised and what behavioural differences can be observed? (Chapter
6)
6. How can the flow of constructing and using abstractions be characterised
in a collaborative modelling practice? (Chapter 7)
7. How can an individual’s modelling flow be profiled using a temporal per-
spective on executive function use? (Chapter 8)
Research and Thesis Structure
The way this thesis is organised follows the structure of our research project:
(I) Introduction, (II) Theoretical Foundations, (III) Empirical Studies and (IV)
General Discussion.
Part I introduces the research context. In Chapter 1, we define the relevant
concepts for this research and discuss the research approach and methodology.
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Part II goes deeply into theoretical validation by means of literature review,
using the systematic approach of pre-defining a search protocol but allowing
this protocol to be expanded with relevant leads. The reviews are presented
as narratives. In Chapter 2, we examine a critical set of cognitive processes
for modelling. Chapter 3 discusses the more fundamental cognitive processes
facilitating modelling, and Chapter 4 covers potential sources of individual
differences and how potentially to improve individual performance given certain
differences. The theoretical rationale provides the first line of evidence for a
relation between modelling, executive control and its facilitatory processes.
Part III concerns the empirical studies. We develop a coding method to ob-
serve and analyse modelling in practice in Chapter 5, based on the theoretical
framework. Then, we conduct a set of empirical studies to apply the theoretical
frameworks to practice. In Chapters 6 and 7, we apply our coding method to a
set of modelling sessions, recorded at a Dutch company where manual registra-
tion processes were being automated at the time. In both studies, we focus on
behaviours displayed by each individual modeller, how they interact and where
they differ from each other. We directly observe and analyse the interaction be-
tween the different cognitive processes as they are made explicit through verbal
interaction and whiteboard drawings. Chapter 6 concerns a pattern analysis
of three separate sessions, focusing on executive control use, on the basis of
which four recurring behavioural patterns are formulated. Chapter 7 further
investigates the patterns concerning the use of abstraction. In Chapter 8 we
further investigate the patterns involving executive control use. We expand
the analysis by applying the technique of process mining to qualitative obser-
vation data in order to add a temporal perspective. This is a novel application
of process mining. We analyse patterns of how different executive functions
follow up on each other as the modelling session progresses, as well as how we
can further develop process mining to make it more fitting for qualitative data
analysis.
Part IV wraps up with a general discussion of this research. In Chapter 9,
we give a summary and critical review of our overall findings, and we reflect
on the implications for practice and how to integrate the insights on modelling
cognition into a set of practical guidelines for teaching or supporting modelling.
Philosophical Positioning
A discussion on philosophical positioning requires a discussion of our chosen
research paradigm and its four comprising elements: epistemology, ontology,
methodology and axiology (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A paradigm is the “per-
spective, or thinking, or school of thought, or set of shared beliefs, that informs
the meaning or interpretation of research data” (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017). It
is a reflection of the researcher’s beliefs of the world, how data should be seen
and interpreted, and how interaction takes place with the world. It guides the




and how data should be analysed. Next, epistemology deals with knowledge:
how we come to know something, how we determine whether something is seen
as truth or not, what counts as sources of knowledge within the world, what is
the nature of knowledge, and what are the limitations of knowledge (Kivunja
& Kuyini, 2017). Underlying the knowledge perspective, ontology concerns the
study of being, of “the nature of existence or reality, of being or becoming, as
well as the basic categories of things that exist and their relations” (Kivunja &
Kuyini, 2017). The underlying belief system the researcher holds and the as-
sumptions made about when something is sensible or real are questioned and
the form and nature of our own reality can be conceptualised. Building on
this basis, the methodology refers to the entire research design; the methods,
approaches and procedures used in an investigation to gain knowledge on a
research problem (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017). This includes the question of how
data should be gathered, analysed and how limitations and validity should be
assessed. Finally, axiology addresses the ethical aspects that need to be taken
into account while conducting the research. It questions the values attributed
to different aspects of research, participants, data and the eventual audience
to which results will be reported.
We position our research within an interpretivist paradigm, with a subjec-
tivist epistemology and a relativist ontology. We use qualitative methods for
data gathering and analysis, and the criteria for trustworthiness of qualita-
tive research to assess validity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This thesis is highly
exploratory in nature. We continue to discuss further details.
Paradigm Our research can be considered from both the interpretivist and
positivist perspectives. Mostly, we view reality as a socially constructed phe-
nomenon in which there can be multiple truths, actively shaped by human
actors, in our case modellers. We do not reason based on a single absolute
truth, but we seek to understand the individuals’ behaviours based on their in-
teractions and, crucially, their context. However, when assessing the behaviour
exhibited by modellers we do look for ‘universal laws’ which govern behaviour,
which is a positivist stance. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, the neuropsycho-
logical concept of executive functioning is hypothesised to play a significant role
in facilitating modelling behaviour. Executive functioning results from brain
functioning, which can be said to be governed by natural laws. However, how
these mechanistic functions are expressed as behaviour in the end depends on
many factors, such as internal signals, signals from the environment, and signals
from other people around the individual. Together, modellers build knowledge
and construct meaning, and there is no universal law to govern that. Thus,
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Epistemology In this study, the researcher acts as a non-intervening ob-
server of different modelling realities, constructing and assigning meaning to
data through his/her own thinking and cognitive processing. We gather au-
thoritative knowledge on how to assign meaning to behaviour, namely through
literature on executive control and on interviews with experts in the field about
what they consider to be desirable modelling behaviour. We make use of em-
pirical observation data, in which we assume knowledge to be that which is
constructed by those individuals interacting in the observed world at a certain
point in time. But we construct our own meaning from the combination of
empirical and authoritative knowledge, in which we acknowledge that our ex-
periences within the natural settings we investigate, such as interactions with
participants, shape our interpretation (D. Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). Thus, we
assume a subjectivist epistemology.
Ontology We adopt a relativist ontology, in which interactions between hu-
man actors are the crucial units of study. Following Piaget, we assume that
meaning is constructed based on human experiences (von Glasersfeld, 1982).
Interactions are based on these experiences and may therefore be assumed to
construct the essential meaning of the dialogues we observe.
Methodology This research is an inductive, qualitative study, centred around
the individual, who makes small contributions to a group. Based on extensive
literature review, interviews with experts and small pilot studies on intuitive
modelling behaviour we construct a coding scheme to analyse a set of unstruc-
tured observations. We thus assume a naturalist methodology for maximum
ecological validity. We focus in particular on unstructured observation, because
studying a complex skill like modelling in isolation in a laboratory does not
generalise well to a real situation in which the same skill is applied (Singleton,
1978, pp. 36).
Axiology We asked all participants for explicit consent for interviews and
observations, and whether they agreed to audio and video recordings. We
report all data anonymously, and no participant shall appear in a recognisable
way in any figure. Video data will be viewed only by the researchers in question,
and is stored on an external hard drive kept in the Netherlands. The outcomes
are reported with respect for the participants, without assigning any judgement
to observed behaviours.
Scope and Assumptions
The variables influencing the development of models we focus on are associated




agreement, commitment and other forms of group dynamics are explicitly out
of scope for this research.
The products resulting from a modelling session can either be tangible prod-
ucts, like recordings, transcripts and diagrams, or cognitive products such as
individual and shared mental models (Rouse & Morris, 1986; Gemino & Wand,
2003; Van Boven & Thompson, 2003; Westbrook, 2006), commitment, under-
standing and the state of cognitive functions. Tangible products like transcripts
and diagrams are assumed to be valid reflections of cognitive products like men-
tal models and understanding, since there is no other way to make these explicit
to other people. For our purposes, only session recordings and transcripts are
included for analysis, since mental models are assumed to be reflected in the
modellers’ utterances.
We explicitly choose not to include the overall quality of the resulting mod-
els in our analysis for the following reasons:
1. A model is never finished after a single session. Most of the time, the
only visual results from a session are sketches, or scratches drawn on
an existing model. Final models are prepared digitally after discussion
sessions, by individuals working silently at a computer. Therefore, even
if we were to consider only model setup quality requirements such as
modularity (Ross et al., 1975; Moody, 2009; Mendling et al., 2010) and
consistency (Ross et al., 1975; Mohagheghi, Dehlen, & Neple, 2009), we
cannot determine what additional thought processes have influenced the
final product during digitisation, which would pose a threat to validity.
2. We mentioned that there is no absolute truth in our subjectivist episte-
mology. Hence, a model suffices if it is accepted and understood by all
stakeholders. Model quality goals like completeness (Ross et al., 1975;
Mohagheghi et al., 2009), correctness (Mohagheghi et al., 2009; Mendling
et al., 2010) and understandability (Ross et al., 1975; Mohagheghi et al.,
2009; Moody, 2009; Mendling et al., 2010; Cruz-Lemus, Maes, Genero,
Poels, & Piattini, 2010) become subjective in this case: it is good enough
when truth is agreed upon and discrepancies are resolved through ne-
gotiation. This can be deduced from modelling sessions, given that the
modellers work on exactly those issues that are still under discussion or
were disagreed upon during stakeholder reviews.
Qualitative Validity: Trustworthiness
For evaluation of the trustworthiness of a qualitative study, a specialised set
of validity criteria are required. We follow Lincoln and Guba (1985). They




CHAPTER 1. MODELLING CONCEPTUAL MODELLING
• Credibility
Describes the confidence in the ‘truth’ value of the findings.
• Transferability
Provision of transparency in the form of sufficiently detailed descriptions
of the findings to allow other researchers to make judgements about the
applicability of the findings in their research contexts.
• Dependability
Shows that the findings are consistent and could be repeated.
• Confirmability
The extent to which findings possess a degree of neutrality, meaning that
findings are shaped by the participants’ interactions instead of researcher
bias, motivation, or interest.
Credibility In order to establish credibility, we engage in a prolonged ob-
servation of a modelling case study of half a year. Additionally, we observe
persistently, that is, we also observe the modellers outside the session, in ca-
sual interaction and at work individually. This allows us to observe the same
modellers both on several occasions of the same type of behaviour, and engaged
in different types of behaviour. We triangulate this dataset with documenta-
tion about the project and the domain at hand. Additionally, the primary
researcher has been the only one present at the sessions. We conduct a peer
debriefing with other researchers who know of the case but are in no way influ-
enced by the concrete case settings. Finally, referential adequacy is obtained
by analysing a pilot session to finalise the codebook. Afterwards, the same
data analysis is conducted on an independent portion of our case study data.
Transferability In our case, transferability of the findings derives firstly
from literature. Modelling is a complex reasoning process that shares many
properties with other complex reasoning processes. Hence, we may infer that
our findings also have applicability for types of modelling other than process
modelling, but also for problem solving and learning in general. Secondly,
thick description is used to provide highly detailed written accounts of relevant
modelling episodes to complement the coding results with contextual data.
Dependability This criterion is covered by making use of thick description
while doing the coding. This documents exactly why the researcher decided
to assign a code to an utterance in favour of other, potentially similar and
relevant ones. This process was continued until non-ambiguous descriptions of
















Figure 1.2: Overview of the variables.
Confirmability Neutrality in the findings is achieved by triangulating data,
using a peer debriefing and achieving referential adequacy, as described under
Credibility.
Operationalisation
We give a brief overview of the variables studied in this research in Figure 1.2.
The independent variable is Executive control, which we operationalise into
the following components: Reasoning, Monitoring, Switching, Initiation, Plan-
ning and Abstraction. The dependent variable is Modelling progress, which we
assess through Shared understanding, Shared consent and Modelling process
dynamics. After a theoretical exploration of Executive control in Chapters 2,
3 and 4, both Executive control and Modelling progress will be operationalised
in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
1.6 Contributions
The primary contribution of this thesis is to develop a cognition-based frame-
work for understanding and analysing the process of modelling. The framework
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is based on fundamental concepts relevant to modelling cognition, described in
research domains such as cognitive (neuro)psychology, science education, model
quality and modelling guidelines. We integrate and critically examine them in
the context of modelling in order to use them for the development of a coding
method to analyse modelling in practice. Additionally, interviews and observa-
tions are used to refine the method. It allows an observer to pinpoint modellers’
behavioural patterns with regard to specific cognitive variables, and to examine
the progression of more and less desirable behavioural patterns throughout the
session.
The results of this method are mostly of educational value. Through un-
derstanding how modelling cognition works, modellers can use the outcomes to
reflect on their own modelling abilities and to become aware of potential points
for improvement. The method can also be used by coaches, for example, to
train groups of modellers. For this purpose, future research could transform
the method into practical guidelines for modelling education, usable in both
university and industry settings.
In Figure 1.3 on the next page we present a reading guide for this thesis.
A solid grasp of the theory of executive control presented in Chapter 2 is
minimally required to understand our method design decisions in Chapter 5.
Chapters 3 and 4 are further theoretical investigations into the facilitation
of executive control and individual differences. The method is applied to all
empirical studies, but the four behavioural patterns are formulated in the first
study in Chapter 6. The studies in Chapters 7 and 8, which each cover two
patterns, can be read interchangeably. The General Discussion finally wraps
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The Influence of Executive Control in
Modelling
“Be great in act, as you have been in thought.”
William Shakespeare (1564 - 1616)
This chapter is based on (Wilmont et al., 2010), (Wilmont et al., 2012) and
(Wilmont et al., 2013).
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Abstract
Problem Many people working in IT encounter difficulties with con-
ceptual modelling. This can have a significant impact on the resulting
product. Modelling is a complex skill making heavy demands on cogni-
tive processes. In order to provide targeted training for modellers, we
need to understand the cognitive processes associated with modelling.
Research Question What are critical cognitive processes to facilitate
a modelling process?
Method We searched for articles relating to one or more of the follow-
ing keywords: modelling skills, information systems modelling, process
modelling, relational reasoning, abstraction and executive control. We
included journal and peer-reviewed conference publications. From there,
we constructed a narrative review.
Results Modelling appears to depend heavily on frontal lobe func-
tioning: executive control and abstract, relational reasoning. Difficulties
with modelling manifest themselves mostly as poorly performed exec-
utive functions, such as a poor ability to inhibit distracting issues, to
switch between task foci or abstraction levels, to monitor progress, or to
scope problems.
Conclusions Poor executive control may lead to many discrepancies
in models remaining undiscovered. Thus, modelling training may need






Modelling is used in many different fields to visualise and understand complex
problems. However, Mendling et al. (2010) lament the low levels of modelling
competence found in practice. Modelling is a complex skill which poses many
cognitive challenges, such as grasping the essential meaning of a problem, trans-
lating it to concrete examples, scoping the problem and monitoring progress
towards an abstract modelling goal (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; King, 1999;
Sins et al., 2005; Uesaka & Manalo, 2012; Wilmont et al., 2012; Haisjackl et
al., 2016). These challenges are widely recognised, but few modelling support
protocols address the question of what modelling requires in terms of cognitive
resources.
Current modelling support efforts are largely directed at adapting the mod-
elling language to make it more visibly appealing (e.g., Moody, 2009), or
at providing direct instructions for what modelling actions to initiate (e.g.,
S. Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2009; Mendling et al., 2010). However, while these
approaches may help to solve simple tasks, they do not provide a long-term
benefit for complex tasks requiring extensive expertise. Quite the contrary:
less competent individuals tend to follow guidelines so rigidly that they do
not pause to reflect on what they are doing, and hence no learning occurs
(Bransford, 2000; Sins et al., 2005; Pittalis, Pitta-Pantazi, & Christou, 2018;
Polotskaia & Savard, 2018). Therefore, complex tasks require support based
on flexibility, active reasoning and metacognitive reflection (van Merriënboer,
Kester, & Paas, 2006; McKeown & Beck, 2009; Markovits, Thompson, & Bris-
son, 2015). These facilitate transfer of learning through comprehension of the
principles governing the task, which is necessary for modelling because the
same principles need to be continuously applied to different subsets of domain
knowledge. In order to design effective modelling support, it is critical to first
have a thorough understanding of modelling cognition.
Modelling cognition has received increasing attention in the last three decades
(e.g., Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Shanks, 1997; Vennix, 1999; King, 1999; Sins
et al., 2005; Gurung, Bousquet, & Trébuil, 2006; Moody, 2009; Wilmont et al.,
2010; Zugal et al., 2011; Pinggera, Zugal, et al., 2012; Mendling et al., 2012;
Claes et al., 2012; Ssebuggwawo, 2012; Hadar et al., 2014; van der Linden &
Hadar, 2015; Haisjackl et al., 2016; van der Linden et al., 2019). But while
modelling skills have been analysed many times (e.g., R. B. Miller, 1978; Nel-
son, 1991; Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; D. Lee et al., 1995; Shanks, 1997; King,
1999; Persson, 2001; Frederiks & Van der Weide, 2006; Wilmont et al., 2010),
an integrated, cognition-based overview of these valuable insights is lacking.
This chapter aims to fill this gap by providing a structured review of cogni-
tive processes which are hypothetically needed to support the complex skill of
modelling, which will help us to design training protocols. In this context, we
discuss the roles of relational reasoning, abstraction and executive functions.
33
2
CHAPTER 2. EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN MODELLING
Databases searched Google Scholar, Web of Science, Elsevier, Wiley On-
line, SAGE Publications, Taylor & Francis Online
Keywords Modelling skills, information systems modelling, pro-
cess modelling, relational reasoning, abstraction and
executive control
Publication level Peer-reviewed journal and conference publications,
book chapters
Strategy Identical queries in each database using the prede-
fined keywords, with snowball sampling if interesting
leads were found
Table 2.1: An overview of the search strategy.
Research Question
In this review we answer subquestion 1:
What are critical cognitive processes to facilitate a modelling
process?
2.2 Review Strategy
Due to the inductive, exploratory and interpretative nature of our research we
use a narrative review approach with systematic aspects, inspired by (Kitchenham,
2004; Liberati et al., 2009). An overview of the search process is given in Ta-
ble 2.1.
The contribution of snowball sampling was particularly strong in this re-
view. The initial set of keywords led us to many interesting leads which we
followed. The initial focus of the chapter was on modelling skills, but it quickly
became clear that they all related back to executive functions. Hence, we chose
to discard the concept of skill as main unit of analysis for this review. We saved
relevant articles in a reference manager and wrote summaries. For the final syn-
thesis of results, we used the structure of the executive function concept as a
backbone.
2.3 A Cognitive Perspective on Modelling
How might modelling be described from a cognitive perspective? Firstly, while
dealing with typical wicked modelling problems, modellers have to define and
relate relevant domain concepts, while continuously remaining aware of the
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many interactions and interrelations between existing and new concepts. This
requires significant skill in relational reasoning (e.g., Wand & Weber, 2002;
Gemino & Wand, 2003).
Secondly, they must mentally simulate functionality, structure it efficiently
and consider possible consequences for existing systems and other processes
being modelled. Input for a cognitive process may originate internally, from
other individuals in the room or from the environment itself (Hutchins, 1995).
It can then enter the mind either through conscious awareness (Carlson &
Dulany, 1985), or through mechanisms outside of conscious awareness such as
semantic, procedural and goal priming (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2009).
Eventually, all this knowledge must be structured in a diagram. This requires
the modeller to have strong skills in the formation of abstract representations
(e.g., Ross et al., 1975; Rasmussen, 1986; Kramer, 2007), which facilitates the
translation of domain knowledge into modelling notation (Salles & Bredeweg,
2002). When potential relations between concepts are viewed on different levels
of abstraction, essential information can be deduced from the meaning each
abstraction level implies (Theodorakis, Analyti, Constantopoulos, & Spyratos,
1999; Polyvyanyy, Smirnov, & Weske, 2008). Abstraction provides a focus
or perspective, allowing for well-scoped and comprehensible models. Also, it
allows modellers to enhance their reasoning (Manktelow & Fairley, 2000).
On top of this, modellers usually do not start with a clean slate. Rather,
they have a legacy of existing, operational systems to deal with, which the new
piece of software should seamlessly connect to. This also often includes many
different stakeholder interests and perspectives. To accommodate all this, espe-
cially in a collaborative session, the modeller must be able to monitor content
and progress, set and maintain clear task goals, ensure scope of the discussion,
initiate interventions and relate it all to his own mental model. The cogni-
tive processes facilitating such complex behaviour are called executive control
functions. These are a set of mechanisms controlling and coordinating an in-
dividual’s performance on complex cognitive tasks, as well as social behaviour,
so that the right responses are given in the right contexts (Logan, 1985; Kim-
berg, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1997; Ylvisaker, Szekeres, & Feeney, 1998; Miyake
et al., 2000). Many authors have written about the involvement of executive
control in abstract reasoning tasks (e.g., Pretz et al., 2003; G. Gioia, Isquith,
& Kenealy, 2008; Crone et al., 2009; Chuderska, 2010; De Baene, Kühn, &
Brass, 2012). Executive control allows for maintenance of focus by inhibiting
distractions and irrelevant routine behaviours. Furthermore, it monitors task
progress through controlled attention, regardless of the specifics of the task
(Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Gilbert & Burgess, 2008; McVay & Kane,
2011). Finally, it facilitates critical reflection, which is essential to consoli-
dating knowledge and learning (Vygotsky, 1978; King, 1999). When central
executive functioning is disrupted, performance on conditional reasoning tasks
suffers considerably (Toms, Morris, & Ward, 1993). In this thesis, we will argue
that strength of executive functions has a significant influence on the flow of a
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modelling process.
Construct Validity of Executive Control
A crucially important thing is that executive control is not a unitary con-
struct (Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss, Murphy, Binns, & Alexander, 2003). A wide
variety of behaviours are associated with executive functions, which include
reasoning, abstract thought, problem solving, verbal fluency, maintaining and
shifting sets, planning, organisation, working memory updating and selective
attention (G. A. Gioia & Isquith, 2004; Alvarez & Emory, 2006). Therefore,
executive control as an all-encompassing concept has a poor construct validity
(P. W. Burgess, 1997).
Many models have been developed to describe the different executive func-
tions (P. W. Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). Early the-
ories focussed mostly on higher-level planning and regulatory aspects (Luria,
1966; Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012), but later work introduced the
importance of more fundamental cognitive processes (e.g., Carpenter, Just, &
Reichle, 2000). Recent assessment models have split executive functions up into
self-regulatory and metacognitive functions. Examples are the Behaviour Rat-
ing Inventory of Executive Functions (BRIEF) (G. Gioia et al., 2008), or the
McCloskey Model of Executive Functions (McCloskey, Perkins, & Van Divner,
2009). However, the degree of precision with which executive functions are
described differs greatly. Whereas the BRIEF, a validated clinical instrument,
scores 9 functions, the McCloskey model, an instrument used in educational
settings, describes 23 functions.
Factor analysis reveals that inhibition, shifting, monitoring and updating
of information are fundamentally important dissociable processes in executive
control (Miyake et al., 2000). It should be noted that ‘updating of information’
is interchangeably used with the term ‘working memory’ for naming this ex-
ecutive function. Ylvisaker et al. (1998) add to this list goal setting, planning
for goal achievement, initiating behaviour towards achievement, and the ability
to organise daily routine and tasks. Based on existing models and studies, we
review the metacognitive functions of Relational reasoning, Forming abstract
representations, Initiation, Monitoring, and Planning and Goal setting, as well
as the self-regulatory functions of Inhibition, Switching and Working memory
updating (G. Gioia et al., 2008; McCloskey et al., 2009). An overview can be
found in Figure 2.1 on the next page.
While studying executive functions in isolation yields invaluable insights,
in the context of modelling one has to be careful to place too much importance
on the separate functions. One may, for example, score sufficiently on highly
specific tests for low-level executive functions, but when required to complete a
real-world task one may fail desperately due to a failure in the integration of the
processes. Therefore, for modelling the true strength of the executive control
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Figure 2.1: An overview of executive functions for modelling.
concept lies observing whether real-world task demands can be adequately met
through the interaction of all executive functions.
For the moment, it suffices to say that from an anatomical perspective,
reasoning, abstraction and the facilitatory executive functions are part of a
tightly connected, shared frontoparietal neural network (e.g., Monsell, 2003;
Fassbender et al., 2004; Garavan, Hester, Murphy, Fassbender, & Kelly, 2006;
Wendelken, Bunge, & Carter, 2008; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2009; Crone et al.,
2009; Christoff, Keramatian, Gordon, Smith, & Mädler, 2009; Wang, Conder,
Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010; M. C. Anderson, Reinholz, Kuhl, & Mayr, 2011;
Cools, 2011; D’Ardenne et al., 2012; Nee & Brown, 2012). In Chapter 3 we
will examine what we can learn from a physiological examination of modelling
cognition about individual differences and how best to train modelling.
We will now continue to describe how each executive function contributes
to modelling. We begin with the complex functions of relational reasoning and
abstraction. After that, we move on to facilitatory executive functions, starting
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2.4 Relational Reasoning
Relational reasoning, defined as “the ability to consider relationships between
multiple mental representations” (Crone et al., 2009), combines separate past
experiences and novel input so as to achieve a goal or to meet the demands
of a situation. It forms conclusions, judgements, or inferences from facts
or premises. Relational reasoning can be split up into many different rea-
soning processes with unique types of outcomes. For example, inferencing
(Stratford, Krajcik, & Soloway, 1998; Chin & Brown, 2000), means-ends anal-
ysis (Rasmussen, 1986), hypothesising and hypothesis testing (Stratford et al.,
1998; Chin & Brown, 2000; Hofstein, Navon, Kipnis, & Mamlok-Naaman, 2005;
Sins et al., 2005), drawing analogies (Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, & Dunbar,
2008), association (King, 1997; Sins et al., 2005), interpretation (Davis & Holt-
graves, 1984; Niss, 2003), exploring (Klein & Jarosz, 2011), contradicting (Klein
& Jarosz, 2011), integrating information (Badre & Wagner, 2004) and explain-
ing (King, 1999; Chin & Brown, 2000) all contribute to construing meaning in
a particular way, yielding comprehension of a certain system or mechanism. A
line of reasoning, based on a sufficiently broad and valid set of relevant facts
through the aforementioned processes, is essential for any further cognitive
actions in a modelling process (Niss, 2003; Alexander, Jablansky, Singer, &
Dumas, 2016).
In general, relational reasoning has been strongly associated with success
in problem solving and modelling (Maier, 1937; Chi & Glaser, 1985; Sutcliffe
& Maiden, 1992; King, 1999; Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; Gemino & Wand, 2003;
Sins et al., 2005; Alexander et al., 2016; Polotskaia & Savard, 2018). It allows
the modeller to recognise influencing variables and thereby construct relations
between them (Maass, 2006). Additionally, reasoning facilitates awareness of
consequences, because predictions can be made on the basis of using one model
as an analogy for another and seeing the relations between situations (White
& Frederiksen, 1998; C. Schwarz et al., 2009). Further potential benefits of
applying reasoning to modelling are improved monitoring of model structure,
increased awareness of domain knowledge and encouragement of mutual un-
derstanding.
Interestingly, the presence of a peer audience while performing complex
tasks had an effect on reasoning performance in adolescents, but not in adults,
when the peers were physically present (Wolf, Bazargani, Kilford, Dumontheil,
& Blakemore, 2015). However, when the peer was present via camera and
participants were explicitly instructed to pay attention to the camera to see
whether the peer was watching or not, reasoning performance suffered for both
adolescents and adults (Dumontheil, Wolf, & Blakemore, 2016). These are
interesting findings to keep in mind when designing collaborative modelling
sessions, when examining the validity of modelling research on students versus
on practitioners, and when considering potential implications for the increasing





Relational reasoning allows strong modellers to monitor the structure of both
the model and the modelling process. Strong reasoners can reason beyond
the information provided and pay attention to abstract goals and procedures
(Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Persson, 2001). In order to do so, one must use
a systematic approach, in which elaborate reasoning, critical discussions, and
consideration of the semantics of variables, relations and model behaviour are
crucial. The use of domain knowledge and experience as justification for model
revision is important, as well as a focus on how different relations affect model
output. Finally, the strong reasoner can keep the model structure as a whole in
mind (Sins et al., 2005; Markovits et al., 2015). Moreover, Claes et al. (2012)
note that lots of structure in the entire process of modelling was related to high
quality models, as was induction with reference to prior knowledge (Sins et al.,
2005). It appeared that if this reference was not made explicitly, modellers
showed no proof of making relations between the computer model and their
own knowledge, which is invaluable for modelling (Persson, 2001).
Awareness of Domain Knowledge
Relational reasoning forces the modeller to become aware of his domain knowl-
edge (Mayer, 1989), and potential gaps therein. Mental models of domain
knowledge are formed based on experiences and expectations. As individuals
assign their own meaning to concepts (Ogden & Richards, 1923), it may well be
that the initial conceptualisation is a naive or faulty one. Faulty conceptions
tend to inhibit conceptual restructuring of mental models (Vosniadou, 1994).
Reasoning helps to create metacognitive awareness of the faulty logic behind
the mental model, thereby initiating attempts to correct it. This is because
comprehension based on active reasoning leads to a deeper understanding of
the domain. To a large extent, active reasoning involves explaining things to
others, rendering something understandable and intelligible in a clear and un-
ambiguous fashion. Explaining complicated mechanisms forces the modeller
to run through his mental model in a high state of awareness, and works very
well for discovering discrepancies (Maier, 1937; C. Schwarz et al., 2009; King,
1999). Additionally, this awareness can be used to reach a higher abstract
understanding, which enables reasoners to make inferences beyond the direct
consequences (Manktelow & Fairley, 2000).
In modelling, domain knowledge may or may not be present. Domain knowl-
edge allows a modeller to focus more specifically on a topic, apply deeper rea-
soning and share a common language with the customer. However, potential
pitfalls are a narrow focus on familiar perspectives, contradictory views and
assuming mutual understanding without verifying it, because it may seem ob-
vious (Hadar et al., 2014). Additionally, when reasoning with familiar premises,
even though the relations between them were meaningless, resulted in reasoners
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having more confidence in their logical inferences than when the premises were
meaningless but the relations meaningful(Markovits et al., 2019). This fur-
ther emphasises the importance of conscious awareness of relational reasoning
techniques while modelling.
Mutual Understanding
As a consequence of increased awareness of domain knowledge, encouraging
reasoning and relational integration eases the difficulty of achieving a uniform
understanding during modelling (Gemino & Wand, 2003; Hadar et al., 2014).
There is always a gap between a modeller’s actual, internal interpretation of a
domain and a model, and how he conveys his interpretation to others (Norman,
1986; Gemino & Wand, 2004). Comprehension based on reasoning helps to re-
duce this gap. For example, reasoning has been found to play a role in response
relevance, and as a consequence influences the extent to which the response will
be processed and retained by other individuals (Davis & Holtgraves, 1984). Ad-
ditionally, it makes that the extent of understanding differs significantly across
modelling techniques and is influenced by the focus of the modelling technique.
These effects have not been found for passive comprehension based on recall
(Gemino & Wand, 2003). A potential explanation is that active reasoning de-
mands model viewers to use all information at their disposal to construct an
answer to a problem which cannot immediately be deduced from the model.
This is true regardless of the modelling technique used.
2.5 Forming Abstract Representations
Modelling and abstraction have an intricate relationship and a long history.
A model is an abstract representation of reality, and the process of creating
it involves the formation and modification of many abstract representations.
Abstraction provides a focus, or perspective, on the behaviour of the system the
model represents. This focus is based on a selection of attributes representing
essential, relevant aspects of the system (Arnheim, 1969). It allows us to view
systemic interrelations within different scopes, or subsystems, and on different
levels of detail. In this way, the modeller can capture essential information
needed to create a model (Theodorakis et al., 1999; Polyvyanyy et al., 2008).
While abstraction has been formulated as a model quality goal (Ross et al.,
1975) and even as an executive function (Alvarez & Emory, 2006), the use
of abstract thought for both the comprehension and the actual formulation of
model content is a significant skill in itself (Arnheim, 1969; Ross et al., 1975;
Rasmussen, 1986; Sins et al., 2005; Frederiks & Van der Weide, 2006; Haisjackl
et al., 2016).
In its most basic form, abstract thought is the execution of mental opera-
tions on objects and possible actions without the concrete object in question be-
ing present, and without seeing any physical relations between objects (Piaget,
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1969). In software engineering, abstraction is frequently described as a process
of leaving out details (Goldin & Berry, 1997; Colburn & Shute, 2007). How-
ever, while this is an inevitable consequence of forming abstractions, we argue
that this definition lacks the most essential aspect of abstraction: representing
the innermost essence of a concept (Arnheim, 1969). This is a prerequisite
for deep understanding. In an early theory of abstraction, George Berkeley
(1685 - 1753) proposed that abstraction occurred through a “shift in atten-
tion”: one can focus on a particular feature of a single object, and let that
feature represent a whole group of objects (Berkeley & Krauth, 1878). While
selectivity of attention is a predictor for abstraction (Gardner & Schoen, 1962),
a single distinctive attribute or a random collection of properties or features do
not constitute a coherent abstract concept (Arnheim, 1969; Kelley & Krueger,
1984; Lakoff, 1999). For example, ‘wing’ is not an abstraction of the concept
‘bird’. The important thing is that as a concept is generalised, the most defin-
ing structural property has to be retained, otherwise the abstraction loses its
meaning. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) have identi-
fied a highly inclusive level of abstraction which most people perceive as ‘basic’.
Instances at this level possess a great number of common attributes and have
similar motor programs. A consequence of this elaborate overlap is that po-
tential category members may be identified by averaging the shapes of other
members, or in some cases a single instance may even suffice to represent the
category as a whole. Note, however, the subtle nuance with Berkeley’s propo-
sition. Even at the most inclusive level, features have to be coherently related
in order to make the abstraction meaningful. Hence, the ability to deduce the
innermost essence of an object allows an individual to grasp the essential mean-
ing of an object (Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; Henning & Keune, 2007; Pittalis et
al., 2018), which in turn facilitates that the individual can select the relevant
focus, make assumptions about the problem and thereby simplify it to keep
the model comprehensible and maintainable (Maass, 2006).
We continue to discuss characteristics of different abstraction levels, and two
properties of abstraction, relativity and generativity. Together, they facilitate
the construction of principles and knowledge structures out of prior experiences
and learnings.
Levels of Abstraction
A concept can be viewed on multiple levels of abstraction. Depending on the
modelling goal, the most suitable level of abstraction, scope and focus for the
model are determined (S. J. B. A. Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2012). Modellers
must therefore be able to choose the right focus and level of abstraction (Ross
et al., 1975; Rasmussen, 1986), to reduce ambiguity and complexity within an
ill-structured, goal-oriented problem solving process (Ormel, 2010; Davidson
& Sternberg, 2003; Xun & Land, 2004). We continue to discuss views on
abstraction levels from neuropsychology, software engineering and philosophy.
41
2
CHAPTER 2. EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN MODELLING
In early neuropsychology, Goldstein and Scheerer (1941) describes the most
concrete level of the abstraction gradient as responding only to a specific aspect
of a real-world feature, such as its color, shape or practical usage. Slightly less
concrete is the ability to include in one’s scope of perception the total, obvious
meaning of an object or situation, and not being guided by just one aspect of
it. This level of concreteness is non-reflective, but the individual is not rigidly
fixated on a single aspect of an object or situation. The lowest level of the
abstract attitude is characterised by planning, initiating insightful behaviour
such as understanding of symbols and metaphoric thinking. The directional
aspect is abstract, whereas performance is concrete. Conscious and volitional
behaviour is shown, but there is no explicit awareness of all phases of perfor-
mance. The highest level of abstraction involves formation of generalised and
hierarchic concepts, thinking in terms of principles and their subordinate cases
and verbalising these acts. Every phase in performance is directed, controlled
and the individual is aware of why each act is being performed and ultimately,
the goal towards which the actions are leading.
From a software engineering perspective, Ross et al. (1975) do not specify
a fixed number of levels, they just state that each level of abstraction should
be slightly more abstract than the level below. This approach is still currently
being endorsed, for example by (Polyvyanyy et al., 2008; Smirnov, Reijers, &
Weske, 2012), where a slider metaphor is being used to gradually increase a
model’s level of abstraction. The slider covers an abstraction range from con-
crete instance model to metamodel, following the Meta-Object Facility stan-
dards as provided by the Object Management Group.
Rasmussen (1986), in pioneering Human-Computer Interaction literature,
defines an abstraction hierarchy specifically tailored for technological abstrac-
tion. In general, he follows the same path from concrete to abstract, but he
instantiates it using different levels at which one can perceive a computerised
system, from hardware to system purpose. His most fundamental notion, how-
ever, is that perception of abstraction level is influenced first and foremost by
the perceiver’s goals and intentions. Hence, each level in the abstraction hier-
archy describes certain means to achieve an end. First of all there is the level
of physical form, which represents the “physical appearance and configuration
of the system and its parts.” Next is the level of physical function, which essen-
tially covers the direct relations between the system’s parts and the processes
using the parts. The next level, generalised function, cuts the tie with the
physical parts and describes the functional, characteristic, generic properties
of a system process, such as pressing the brakes in a car without referring to the
mechanics of braking. The level of abstract function is represented by a gener-
alised causal network, for example representing the flow of information through
the entire system. Models at this level are meaningful only if considered in the
context of a working system of which the purpose and reasons for structuring
it as it is are known. The final, most abstract level, system purpose, describes
the “intended functional effect of the system upon its environment.” This can
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take the shape of simple quantitative input-output specifications or by stating
the functional relationships between the system and its environment. Hence,
for each interaction an individual might have with a system, the right level of
abstraction should be chosen that best suits the purpose of the task.
A philosophical account of abstraction and behaviour views the most con-
crete level as containing the directly perceived objects, acts and experiences
we encounter in our daily lives (Ribes-Iñesta, 2004). A first level of abstrac-
tion then forms representations of those experiences, with relations between
them, and a final second level of abstraction allows for behavioural operations
on those experiences. In this view, all behaviour is an abstraction as we can
never observe a person experiencing a chair, for example. When speaking of
the first level, we use “mental concepts or physical descriptions of movements,
postures, and reactions” with the purpose of describing or accounting for an
act or alteration. Linguistically, these descriptions of concrete situations are
formulated using verbs, adjectives and adverbs. When referring to the second
level, we use abstract nouns, and “examine, follow through, and analyse” the
way in which these formulations are linked to the concrete descriptions of the
first level.
Evidence from neuroscience shows brain activation corresponding to tasks
on different levels of abstraction (Baker et al., 1996; Wallis, Anderson, & Miller,
2001; Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003; Christoff & Keramatian,
2007; Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, & Wagner, 2005). Christoff and Keramatian
(2007) find activation in three different areas of the prefrontal cortex corre-
sponding to three different levels of abstraction. They define them as concrete,
consisting of a single observable feature; middle abstract, in which two concrete
instances are linked via a single relation; and highly abstract, in which two mid-
dle abstract configurations are again linked via a single relation. The whole
highly abstract configuration thus contains a hierarchy of two relations which
have to be processed in order to understand the configuration. Interestingly,
the hierarchy holds true as well for word-level semantic abstractions, such as
the concrete ‘chair’ versus the abstract ‘freedom’ (Christoff et al., 2009). This
potentially stands in stark contrast with the relativity property of abstraction,
discussed below, which states that what is abstract or concrete to one person
may vary as a result of experience, context or perception.
Table 2.2 on the following page provides an overview and comparison of
the different definitions of abstraction levels. In general, all definitions agree
on a range from tangible, concrete entities, whether as embodied perceptions
or as mental representations of perceptions, to gradually more abstract levels
representing generic concepts, relations and operations on concrete entities. In
IS and HCI research, abstraction definitions are more precisely tailored to suit
applied purposes by instantiating ‘concrete’ with instance models and physical
system parts, and ‘abstract’ with system functionality and metamodels.
Figure 2.2 on page 45 gives an overview of the interaction between abstrac-
tion levels as discussed so far.
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Table 2.2: Overview of abstraction levels as defined in different subject areas.
Relativity
Abstractions are guided by available knowledge structures, intentions, goals,
experiences, and the beholder’s specific context (Hampton, 2003). Therefore,
what is considered abstract or concrete is relative and may differ between
people based on experience and context. For example, Ferrari (2003) states
that, for any given moment in time, similarity to familiar prototypes greatly
influences what is remembered. Also, previous experiences and habits prime
future judgements, even in the presence of accessible abstract rules. It appears
that the automaticity of the prime overrides the effort invested to use and apply
the abstract rule. Additionally, relativity also concerns seeing how the current
abstraction relates to the context, such as the modelling goal, the intended
audience and existing models.
Many authors write about how abstractions are a result of an interaction
between the thing being abstracted and the state of mind of the beholder
(Berkeley & Krauth, 1878; Gombrich, 1960; Frorer, Manes, & Hazzan, 1997;
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Figure 2.2: An abstract representation can be either of a concrete, medium
abstract or abstract nature, and concern word-level semantic abstractions, or
relational abstractions. Switches between levels can happen via generalisation
or instantiation.
R. Zimmer, 2003; Hampton, 2003; Barsalou, 2003). Abstractions are dynamic,
tailored to a purpose, temporary, flexible, become more easy to use when viewed
often, and involve attention shifting (Barsalou, 2003). The aspect of increasing
easiness is interesting to consider when compared to Christoff et al. (2009)’s
findings that each abstraction level corresponds to a fixed area in the prefrontal
cortex. If an abstraction is made more often, people tend to perceive it as
becoming ‘more concrete’. But that would mean that prefrontal activation
changes as people become habituated to abstractions, which seems unlikely.
Another option is that the abstractions don’t actually become more concrete,
but rather that the activation pathway gets so deeply ingrained that it no
longer costs the modeller as much mental effort to process the abstraction.
The perception of abstraction level relativity, though, can change profoundly
as modellers adapt to abstractions. In practice, people reason on a certain
‘preferred level of abstraction’ (Gardner & Schoen, 1962), which appears to
be mostly context-dependent, fluctuates widely over time and is independent
of the capacity to abstract and of general intelligence. Hence, relativity and
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Generativity
Abstractions can also be generative, that is, form the basis for the creation
of more complete descriptions (Arnheim, 1969). Bransford and Franks (1971)
illustrates this with a study of how linguistic ideas are abstracted. When pre-
sented with non-consecutively experienced but semantically related sentences,
students extract features from these sentences and integrate them into ideas.
Ideas are based on the semantic relations between those sentences. Students
infer additional information from those relations, based on their knowledge
and experience, and add those to the ideas. Ideas abstracted ended up being
more complete than the original sentences ever were. When asked to recall
the information originally heard, the confidence with which students recall it
is a function of how closely the information matches the semantic relations
on the basis of which the idea was formed. Hence, we see that the link be-
tween an idea and an individual’s experience is made through active memory
(re)construction. Memory often ends up distorting, which is inherent to hu-
man memory (P. W. Burgess, 1997), but nevertheless abstractions can only
become truly meaningful by using this vast knowledge base. Generativity is
also vital when considering social abstractions. Being able to react appropri-
ately to others’ behaviour requires the ability to generate an idea of the others’
possible needs and intentions, based on knowledge of what one wants and what
one thinks the other would want (Call, 2003). These abstraction skills are the
foundation for deciding what to ask and how to conduct a modelling session.
A model, being a collection of multiple abstractions, will automatically
inherit the generative property, meaning that interpretations of the model can
vary greatly depending on the viewers’ experience. The modeller should thus be
aware of this potential source of ambiguity. In theory, a model is a formalism,
formulated in such a way that ambiguity is no longer possible (Frederiks &
Van der Weide, 2006). However, this is much more likely to be the case for
mathematical models than conceptual models. Nevertheless, a modeller should
test whether the formalised model truly expresses only that which is intended.
Once a formalism has been formed and internalised, the modeller should be
able to communicate and think in terms of this formalism, and to produce
future formalisms based on prior ones (Niss, 2003; Nelson, 1991).
2.6 Inhibition
Inhibition is the critical ability to suppress impulses, or to discontinue an ac-
tivity if the context so dictates (G. Gioia et al., 2008). It is the first executive
function to develop (Dawson & Guare, 2010). All other executive functions
build on inhibitory impulse control and it is therefore frequently seen as the
most fundamental function (Barkley, 1997; Ylvisaker et al., 1998; Miyake et
al., 2000). It allows one to consider the situation before acting, and there-




ing at all (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2009). In academic performance, inhibitory
control and working memory capacity correlate with math and reading abil-
ity, independently of general intelligence(Bull & Scerif, 2001; Blair & Razza,
2007). Also, inhibitory capacity contributes to analogical reasoning ability
(Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006; Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2011).
Inhibition declines with age, and executive functioning suffers as a consequence
(Schlaghecken, Birak, & Maylor, 2012). For example, older adults with declin-
ing inhibitory and attentional capacities perform significantly more poorly at
abstract analogical reasoning tasks than younger adults of a similar experience,
especially when irrelevant information was also provided (Viskontas, Morrison,
Holyoak, Hummel, & Knowlton, 2004).
Observable instances of inhibitory control are for example being able to
speak in full, finished sentences (G. Gioia et al., 2008). This is because sup-
pressing impulses in speech allows the modeller to finish a sentence rather than
trying to say many things at the same time. For another, the ability to intro-
duce new topics at appropriate times is important. The modeller can hereby
assess and evaluate the situation, making use of monitoring, to ensure that his
new idea is contextually relevant. Other direct contributions of inhibition to
modelling are difficult to assess, given that it mostly manifests itself through
more complex, observable executive functions. Therefore, we will discuss the
role of inhibition in the relevant contexts.
2.7 Switching
Switching, also known as shifting, concerns the ability to switch flexibly be-
tween different tasks, strategies, operations or mental sets (Monsell, 1996).
Inhibiting one response strategy allows the activation of another. Lack of inhi-
bition and working memory capacity result in trouble with switching, failure to
attend to feedback and poor evaluation of strategies during task performance
(Bull & Scerif, 2001).
The ability to shift focus at the right time during a modelling process, to the
right topic, task, goal or problem feature, prevents the modeller from getting
stuck or from missing relevant alternative opportunities (Lehrer & Schauble,
2000). In other words, while maintaining focus is essential, undue focus on one
salient feature poses problems. However, Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan (1993)
shows that the more abstract the nature of the problem, the less likely people
are to consider multiple alternative hypotheses. This is because more abstract
hypotheses take up more working memory space than concrete courses of ac-
tion, and hence will bias people towards choosing the hypothesis they think is
correct without further evaluation. Additionally, once a goal is perceived as
satisfied, its pursuit gets actively inhibited (Aarts, Custers, & Holland, 2007).
However, if this happens prematurely, it may negatively affect the quality of
the modelling process (Basadur et al., 2000). A practical example is given by
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Haisjackl et al. (2016). When comparing an imperative and a declarative pro-
cess model, model aspects that appear visually similar in the two models but
which have different semantics are often incorrectly interpreted. Thus, the need
to switch between different modes of abstract thought in model comprehension
is insufficiently engaged, and the goal satisfaction response is prematurely en-
gaged by unconsciously using the visual similarity to satisfy the semantics
question. Prompting for relational integration may take care of the natural
tendency people have to look for the simplest solution (Maier, 1937).
Another instance of switching is that the modeller may need to operate
in a different mindset or mode of thought depending on the modelling goal.
Examples are viewing technology as a means and not as an end (D. Lee et
al., 1995), or switching flexibly between a concrete and an abstract mode of
thought. Shifting focus can also occur between cognitive strategies (Benner,
1984; Bransford, 2000; Maass, 2006). This is typically associated with expert
behaviour. Novices tend to use only a single cognitive strategy, whereas experts
are able to switch between several cognitive strategies depending on which one
best suits the context.
2.8 Working Memory Updating
This function is called Working Memory in the BRIEF (G. Gioia et al., 2008)
and information updating by Miyake et al. (2000). They describe it as “moni-
toring and coding incoming information for relevance to the task at hand and
then appropriately revising the items held in working memory by replacing
old, no longer relevant information with newer, more relevant information.”
Working memory (WM) allows modellers to work systematically towards their
goals and not to, consciously or unconsciously, skip important phases or steps
in the process (Basadur et al., 2000; Epstein & Hundert, 2002). This process
can very well take place in cycles, as long as the focus is always returned to the
original goals, and progress continuously monitored against the baseline goals.
WM facilitates structuring of the problem space, which correlates with good
modelling performance. Additionally, it implies a solid understanding of the
functionality of the system being modelled (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992). Lack
of WM capacity significantly impairs reasoning (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000).
Strong WM manifests itself by modellers showing active focus as long as a
topic is relevant, actively referring back to related issues, and including new rel-
evant points of view. Remarks or advice from others are incorporated into the
discussion and potentially, references to stored knowledge or earlier discussion
outcomes are made. In other words, modellers are able to discuss two or more
related topics in a structured line of reasoning to achieve full comprehension. If
modellers deviate from topics, it should be only as a purposeful switch. Addi-
tionally, a modeller may repeat what others have said so that this information




1941; Dreyfus, 1991; Cowan, 1999; McCloskey et al., 2009; A. Baddeley, 2012).
2.9 Initiation
Initiation is the ability to engage functions like perception, thought and action
to independently generate ideas, answers or problem solving strategies in order
to start a task or activity (G. Gioia et al., 2008; McCloskey et al., 2009). In
modelling, initiation can be observed for instance in the ability to act upon
the results of reflection and analysis (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; D. Lee et al.,
1995; Weinert, 2001; Epstein & Hundert, 2002; Niss, 2003; C. Schwarz et al.,
2009), the ability to activate and use knowledge in the right situation (White &
Frederiksen, 1998; Maass, 2006) and, most importantly, to ask the right ques-
tions in time to enhance or correct comprehension (White & Frederiksen, 1998;
King, 1999, 2007). Gemino and Wand (2003) show that active reasoning yields
better models, for which initiation is an important prerequisite. In concrete
terms, we may observe instances of initiation in activities such as drawing or
reviewing a diagram, or note-taking, when it is contextually appropriate with-
out being externally cued. The modeller is engaged when new topics, ideas
or review suggestions are proposed, and he also easily proposes his own novel
ideas, alternative problem solutions or corrective goal-related actions. He ac-
tively leads discussions and involves team members in it (G. Gioia et al., 2008;
Dawson & Guare, 2010; Wilmont et al., 2012).
2.10 Planning and Goal Setting
Planning and goal setting complement each other. Planning involves the ability
to arrange an efficient method or scheme to achieve a certain goal before any
set of tasks is to be performed. It is a metacognitive function requiring a
proactive attitude, essential not only to coordinate the workflow, but also to
form the model. The modeller has to plan how to meet his modelling goals,
what domain knowledge is necessary, and to anticipate potential issues he might
encounter during the process (D. Lee et al., 1995; Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992;
Flower & Hayes, 1981; King, 1999, 2007). He needs to know which people to
work with, and whether they will be available or not. Planning relies heavily
on abstraction for a clear overview of the entire task, and how to split it up
into subtasks, to initiate them timely and to execute them in the most effective
or efficient order.
Goal setting provides a direction in which to operate. In a dynamic envi-
ronment, achieving goals depends very strongly on goal maintenance (Powers,
1973). An activated goal modulates how we respond to stimuli. Inhibition
is a key mechanism for this because it ensures that no irrelevant stimuli are
being processed, as well as monitoring of performance, context and compet-
ing goals. This allows us to adapt to or produce consistent output in novel
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situations (Berkman, Falk, & Lieberman, 2012). Goals may be activated ei-
ther consciously, unconsciously or both. An unachieved goal will unconsciously
continue to send out activation signals, priming the modeller to work towards
this goal (Aarts et al., 2007; Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008). In addition,
Chuderska (2010) shows that goal-directed selection of information is essential
in order to deal with the structure imposed by the reasoning task. It facilitates
searching through memory and selecting relevant information to substitute into
the task structure.
Instances of planning and goal setting can be observed when modellers for-
mulate suitable goals and subgoals for previously defined or mentioned overar-
ching abstract session goals (Badre & Wagner, 2004). These may need to be
fulfilled within or outside of the session to fill knowledge gaps identified during
or prior to the session. Finally, Rittgen (2011) shows that focus on modelling
goals significantly reduces modelling time.
2.11 Monitoring
Monitoring oversees a process during the time that it runs and serves as a feed-
back mechanism to guide future behaviour (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2009). The
monitoring process mediates simultaneously triggered, conflicting responses
(Fassbender et al., 2004; Badre & Wagner, 2004). This happens first through
error detection, followed by an act of reflection and evaluation of the situation,
and finally an act of initiation to perform error correction (Garavan, Ross, Mur-
phy, Roche, & Stein, 2002). Increased monitoring has been associated with bet-
ter overall performance (Somsen, 2007; Markovits et al., 2015). Modellers need
to monitor progress continuously. Zmud (1983) describe how IS professionals
need an overview of all the different objectives, purposes, scopes, constraints,
internal and external functioning in the problem domain. Continuous monitor-
ing has also been related to better gathering of information (Sutcliffe & Maiden,
1992), improved organisation of knowledge and text (Flower & Hayes, 1981),
deeper understanding (Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; C. Schwarz et al., 2009) and
improved model integrity and validity (Wilmont et al., 2012). Problem solving
scaffolds frequently have explicit monitoring opportunities built into them (e.g.,
King, 1999; Pretz et al., 2003; Xun & Land, 2004; King, 2007; van Dooren et
al., 2014; Polotskaia & Savard, 2018).
Significant forms of monitoring include reflection, evaluation and scoping.
To begin with, reflection has a global focus. It involves looking back on the task
in hindsight, considering the big picture and predicting and planning what to do
differently during the next run in order to improve the process. This is widely
implicated in modelling (Flower & Hayes, 1981; White & Frederiksen, 1998;
Maass, 2006; Henning & Keune, 2007; King, 2007). Reflection involves meta-
knowledge about the task and the process, facilitated by abstraction, such as




et al., 2009), or to know when to use what kind of reasoning strategies, such
as cause-based or data-based reasoning (Lehrer & Schauble, 2000). It requires
the modeller to have a sense of self-awareness and critical curiosity (Epstein &
Hundert, 2002), lack of which may lead to conscious avoidance of confronting
one’s own faults.
Secondly, evaluation, or validation, is focussed more locally on the model
content. It is a critical monitoring skill to substantiate or confirm the findings
expressed in the model. The modeller should be able to relate the modelling
goals to the resulting outcomes, and to perceive when the model is faulty (Hayes
& Flower, 1986). This forms the input for initiation of further modelling actions
to improve the draft. In modelling, validation usually appears as hypothesis
testing. Insufficient hypothesis testing has been correlated with poor modelling
performance (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Sins et al., 2005), and is frequently
cited as essential to modelling (White & Frederiksen, 1998; Bransford, 2000;
Frederiks & Van der Weide, 2006; Henning & Keune, 2007; C. Schwarz et al.,
2009). Also, it plays a critical role in the closing phase of most modelling and
problem solving cycles (Flower & Hayes, 1981; Basadur et al., 2000; Pretz et
al., 2003; Pinggera, Zugal, et al., 2012).
Finally, scoping provides a focus for the entire modelling process and al-
lows the modellers to define goals and purposes (Flower & Hayes, 1981; Van
Der Valk, Van Driel, & De Vos, 2007). It guides the modeller in what to
include and what not to include, facilitating efficiency in the modelling pro-
cess and reducing the chances of including erroneous or irrelevant conceptions
(Maass, 2006). This ensures that the represented elements and the chosen level
of abstraction are in agreement with the scope of the model and that the model
contains no irrelevant details (Mohagheghi et al., 2009). Initial problem scop-
ing phases are typically followed by more detailed reasoning, and a failure to
scope correlates with poor modelling performance(Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992).
Determining the scope of the problem interacts strongly with abstraction, as
the modeller must first have an overview of the problem and have grasped the
essential meaning of it. However, once the scope has been determined this
also helps abstraction, as the modeller may find, for example, that certain
properties considered relevant fall out of scope.
2.12 Visual Summary
As we have elaborately seen in the discussions above, many interrelationships
are described in the literature between the subprocesses of the main executive
functions, as well as dependencies of the main functions on each other. Fig-
ure 2.3 on the following page presents a visual summary of the subprocesses
described and the potential relations between them. The aim of this diagram is
not to be complete, but to give an overview of the complexity of the cognitive
processes involved, and their tight interrelatedness.
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Figure 2.3: An overview of the many interrelations between the subprocesses
of the main executive functions, as described in this literature review.
2.13 Conclusion
To conclude, we propose that modelling relies heavily on a set of metacognitive
control functions, known as executive functions. The most important, overtly
observable executive functions for modelling are abstract thought and rela-
tional reasoning. Other more fundamental executive functions have a covert,
facilitatory role in modelling. Abstraction and relational reasoning are used in
order to see through problem structures and focus on relevant features. Each
executive function contributes to the process of gathering information, inter-
preting and forming a deep understanding of the problem domain, translating
this mental model into a format that can be used to convey the interpretation
to a companion modeller, and all the while maintaining an overview of the





The cognitive processes discussed in this chapter and their implications for
modelling raise many questions. In particular, they inspire questions related
to potential individual differences in cognitive capacity, methods for the assess-
ment of modellers’ current levels of competence and requirements for training
practices. For example, should we train executive functions directly? Are
these skills sufficiently generalisable to modelling? Or should we focus on more
fundamental facilitatory cognitive processes? Perhaps both the higher and
the lower-level processes should be addressed. Or should we look beyond the
borders of cognition and take a broader physiological perspective? Evidence
suggests, for example, a correlation between aerobic fitness levels and executive
function performance (e.g., Winter et al., 2007; McMorris et al., 2009; Best,
2010; Diamond & Lee, 2011). These questions will be elaborately discussed in
Chapter 4.
Another issue to discuss is the validity of existing modelling support prac-
tices which are claimed to be usable without any additional cognitive inter-
ventions. It seems likely that such methods implicitly assume that executive
control is fully functional already when confronted with the support method,
because no matter how much support one is offered, the relations leading to
comprehension and mastery still have to be grasped. However, we need to
know more about how executive functions work in order to reason about the
validity of modelling support. Therefore, we will change our focus in the next
chapter from the high-level executive functions to how fundamental cognitive






Working Memory, Attention and Goal
Pursuit in Modelling
“There is no unique picture of reality.”
Stephen Hawking (1942 - 2018)
This chapter is an elaboration of (Wilmont et al., 2013).
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Abstract
Problem Difficulties in conceptual modelling can manifest themselves
as difficulties with executive control. In order to support modelling, we
need to know which fundamental cognitive processes play a facilitatory
role and how best to engage them.
Research Question What fundamental cognitive processes facilitate
executive control and may provide leads for modelling interventions?
Method We searched for studies relating to one or more of the fol-
lowing keywords: executive functions, working memory, attention, goal
pursuit, relational reasoning, abstraction, affect, conscious and uncon-
scious processing. We included journal and peer-reviewed conference
publications and constructed a narrative review.
Results Working memory provides a workspace to construct, manip-
ulate, maintain and integrate relations, which is a critical feature for
the facilitation of all executive functions. Attention filters the irrelevant
information, and interacts closely with goal processing to enhance the pri-
ority of the information to be processed in WM. Goals are strengthened
by affective signals. Capacity limits are inherent to all these processes,
however a great deal of this processing happens unconsciously, which
provides a lot of flexibility for the system.
Conclusions This framework provides a comprehensible starting point
to examine individual differences in the process of modelling and relate






Information systems modelling relies strongly on a set of regulatory cogni-
tive processes called executive functions, as discussed in Chapter 2. Executive
functions are often described in terms of observable behavioural acts, which
may serve metacognitive or self-regulatory purposes (Barkley, 1997; G. Gioia
et al., 2008; Markovits et al., 2015). Metacognitive functions are higher-level
functions like reasoning, abstracting, planning, organising, monitoring and ini-
tiation, whereas self-regulatory functions are basic processes like inhibition,
attention shifting and updating working memory content. Yet we need a more
fundamental understanding of how executive functions work in order to reason
about potential ways to intervene in modelling. Key facilitatory processes are
hypothesised to be working memory (WM) (e.g., Kimberg et al., 1997; Miyake
et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2000; Bull & Scerif, 2001; Gruber & Goschke,
2004; Courtney, 2004; Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Hester & Garavan,
2005; Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Bailey, Dunlosky,
& Kane, 2008; E. K. Miller, Lundqvist, & Bastos, 2018), attention (e.g. L. Bar-
rett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Lépine, Parrouillet, & Camos, 2005; Alvarez &
Emory, 2006; Clare-Kelly, Hester, Foxe, Shpaner, & Garavan, 2006; McCabe,
2010; A. Baddeley, 2012; Jha, 2013) and goal processing (e.g. J. A. Bargh,
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; J. Y. Shah, Friedman, &
Kruglanski, 2002; Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Custers & Aarts, 2007;
Aarts et al., 2007; Eitam, Hassin, & Schul, 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2010; Di-
jksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Kiefer, 2012; Aarts, 2019), which can operate either
consciously or unconsciously.
In this chapter, we review the cognitive mechanisms by which these pro-
cesses help to facilitate executive control. We study both the cognitive psycho-
logical and the neurophysiological level, the latter which will help to enhance
our understanding of findings related to how to train executive control. We
begin by discussing the cognitive processes and their interactions, and then
continue to investigate their role in executive control. It should be noted,
though, that most of the studies discussing the involvement of WM, attention
and goal pursuit in executive control have been done either in the context of
executive functions in general, relational reasoning or abstract reasoning, and
not so much in the context of the more fundamental executive functions.
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Databases searched Google Scholar, Web of Science, Elsevier, Wiley On-
line, SAGE Publications, Taylor & Francis Online
Keywords Executive functions, working memory, attention,
goal pursuit, relational reasoning, abstraction,
(un)conscious processing and working memory ca-
pacity
Publication level Peer-reviewed journal and conference publications
Table 3.1: An overview of the search strategy.
Research Question
In this review we answer subquestion 2:
What fundamental cognitive processes facilitate executive
control and may provide leads for modelling interventions?
3.2 Review Strategy
As in Chapter 2, we use a narrative review approach with systematic aspects,
inspired by (Kitchenham, 2004; Liberati et al., 2009). The research question
structures the search process and review structure. An overview of the search
process is given in Table 3.1.
We made liberal use of snowball sampling in this review. The initial set of
keywords, and combinations thereof, led us to follow many interesting leads.
We included studies from both cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, given
that neuropsychological evidence provides strong support for what the more
indirect cognitive psychological studies show. Articles were considered relevant
if they discussed one of the fundamental cognitive processes in relation to
either executive control, reasoning or abstraction. Both correlation evidence
and mechanistic explanations were included. We saved relevant articles in a
reference manager and wrote summaries. These were grouped by fundamental
process and integrated into a critical narrative review.
3.3 Facilitating Executive Control: A Hypothesis
What fundamental requirements are essential if we want to achieve strong
executive functioning in the context of modelling? In this section, we provide a
hypothesis about how cognitive processes interact in the facilitation of executive
control and about the necessary processing requirements.
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Involvement of Cognitive Processes
First of all, we need a cognitive mechanism which can maintain and manip-
ulate relevant information. It must have access to existing knowledge in order
to integrate relations. Once we have the relevant information in place, we can
begin to switch between abstraction levels, monitor consistency and progress,
plan and organise models and initiate related tasks. A primary process to
facilitate this is working memory (WM). Working memory is fundamentally
involved in both elementary and complex cognitive processing, and is found to
be most predictive of complex cognitive performance after being stripped of
confounding factors such as cognitive processing and processing time (Lépine
et al., 2005; McCabe, 2010). WM is specifically implied in the facilitation of
relational reasoning (e.g., Rips, 1983; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Toms et al.,
1993; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Ashby & Ell, 2001; Evans, 2003; Oberauer, Süss,
Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007; Lewandowsky, 2011; Alexander et al., 2016; Gray
& Holyoak, 2020), abstraction (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1985; Park & Holzman,
1992; Owen, Evans, & Petrides, 1996; D. Glahn, Cannon, Gur, Ragland, &
Gur, 2000; Markovits, Doyon, & Simoneau, 2002; J. Lee & Park, 2005; Green,
Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh, & Dunbar, 2006; Cowan, Saults, & Morey,
2006) and executive control in general(e.g., Kimberg et al., 1997; Miyake et
al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2000; Bull & Scerif, 2001; Gruber & Goschke, 2004;
Ackerman et al., 2005; Hester & Garavan, 2005; McCollough & Vogel, 2008;
E. K. Miller et al., 2018).
Secondly, however, the ability to store and manipulate information alone is
not enough to explain modelling behaviour. For one thing, we need a mecha-
nism which filters what information enters the limited space of WM. Literature
suggests that attention provides just such a filter (Awh & Jonides, 2001; Hes-
ter & Garavan, 2005; Fougnie, 2008; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012; Jha, 2013).
Attention selectively processes information, largely unconsciously (A. M. Treis-
man & Gelade, 1980; Kiefer, 2012), while WM retains it. Jha (2013) formulated
this as follows: “Working memory, akin to a mental white board, works hand
in hand with attention, which puts the information onto the board and keeps
distractions off of it”.
For another, information can only pass through the attention filter if there
is a way to mark it as relevant. A way to achieve this is prioritisation through
emotional control. The role of emotional control, though, is likely to work hand
in hand with goal processing. Both consciously and unconsciously, activated
goals guide WM resources towards relevant information (Aarts et al., 2007;
Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). The activated goal then elicits an emotional
response. This positive or negative affect can be used to bias information
towards being marked as relevant or irrelevant, and determine whether it goes
through the gate of attention or gets lost (Aarts et al., 2008).
Thus, information entering working memory is filtered by an attentional
control process and is subjected to a goal processing system. Activated goals
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which make it into working memory elicit an emotional response, which primes
easier access to the information. The strength of the goal signal, the capacity
for attention and for working memory all influence how well the executive
control processes can make use of the information available to them.
Processing Requirements
A second aspect to examine is the processing effort involved in executive con-
trol. WM, attention and goal pursuit are all limited-capacity resources, so how
can a system characterised by cognitive flexibility be facilitated by resources
which can only maintain around 3-5 items at one single time (G. Miller, 1956;
Z. Chen & Cowan, 2009; Ricker, AuBuchon, & Cowan, 2010; Cowan, 2010)? To
shed some light on this question, we examine the involvement of both conscious
and unconscious processing in executive control.
Traditionally speaking, executive control has always been taken to belong
exclusively to the domain of conscious processing. The role of consciousness
in executive control can be demonstrated by studying the development of ex-
ecutive control in children. This increases proportionally in relation to the
development of consciousness (Zelazo, 2004). Additionally, the level of con-
sciousness at which an executive function operates predicts how well it is per-
formed. The capacity for conscious processing, however, is limited. Kiefer
(2012) argues that a cognitive control system involving only conscious control
would be highly inflexible, due to the enormous amount of processing that
would have to take place within the limited number of resources humans have
at their disposal. The brain’s capacity for unconscious processing, on the con-
trary, is nigh unlimited (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). So to what extent can
unconscious processing take over the load from the conscious domain?
Unconscious processing may play a crucial role in facilitating conscious
processing. Both conscious and unconscious information processing functions
have benefits for goal attainment (J. A. Bargh & Williams, 2007). Addition-
ally, unconscious processes have advanced properties, like flexibility, context-
specificity, goal-directedness and monitoring, that have previously only been
associated with conscious processes (Wokke, van Gaal, Scholte, Ridderinkhof,
& Lamme, 2011). In fact, recent evidence suggests that the strict independence
of conscious and unconscious processing is in conflict with results such as that
unconsciously triggered error monitoring, or conflict, can induce adjustments
in conscious control mechanisms (Horga & Maia, 2012; De Pisapia, 2013). It
is therefore plausible to hypothesise that both share similar neural substrates
and processing mechanisms, and that the crucial difference is in the strength
or quality of the neuronal representation (Horga & Maia, 2012). For example,
consider the case of unconscious error monitoring. The initial monitoring sig-
nal has a certain neuronal firing strength, which determines the quality of the
neural representation. If the quality of the error monitoring process is suffi-




be able to point out an error. If not, the representation decays and is lost.
Thus, it may be that unconscious processing takes care of a great deal of fil-
tering, leaving limited conscious resources to deal only with the most relevant
information.
We will now continue to examine evidence for the involvement of WM,
attention, goal pursuit, and conscious and unconscious information processing
in executive control.
3.4 Working Memory
Working memory (WM) is a limited capacity memory system that deals with
the temporary storage, selection and manipulation of a certain amount of in-
formation that can be kept in mind at one point in time (Ricker et al., 2010;
A. Baddeley, 2012). Information in WM is ephemeral by nature, but can be
maintained by repetition. After passing through WM, information may ei-
ther be lost, or be transformed into a more lasting representation in long-term
memory (Cowan, 1999).
Functional Models of Working Memory
To begin with, how might WM perform maintenance while also allowing space
for active operations on available knowledge? The two most prominent models
of WM have been proposed by A. Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Della Sala, and
Spinnler (1986) and Cowan (1999), which, despite differences in focus, both
propose a central regulatory mechanism aided by different forms of information
storage and processing.
A. Baddeley et al. (1986) describes a model consisting of multiple compo-
nents which includes processing modules for different types of information and
a separate module for control and operations on information. Phonological and
auditory information are stored and processed in the so-called phonological loop,
and visuospatial information in the visuospatial sketchpad. In a later adapta-
tion, (A. Baddeley, 2000) added a component for domain-general information
storage and processing, the episodic buffer. Processing and manipulation of
information is regulated by the central executive component. The model is
shown in Figure 3.1 on the following page.
An alternative model is put forward by Cowan (1999). This model does not
distinguish between the types of information processing; its main focus is on
how WM deals with large amounts of ephemeral information. The hypothesis
is that WM cannot process this without long-term memory (LTM) support
(Young & Lewis, 1999). Cowan’s Embedded Process Theory is a hierarchically
organised theory in which WM is based on activated information in LTM which
is “unusually accessible” and resides within the short-term store. Within this
short-term store there is yet another subset, the focus of attention. The focus
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Long term knowledge systems
Figure 3.1: Multi-modal working memory model, as proposed by Baddeley
(2000).
of attention determines what information is available to WM, thereby exer-
cising control over WM. Simultaneously, attention span determines how much
information can be activated at any given time. Information within the focus of
attention is typically used for tasks requiring strong executive control, whereas
information within the short-term store can be used for automated, familiar
tasks. The model is shown in Figure 3.2 on the next page.
The two models do not propose competing hypotheses, especially not after
A. Baddeley (2000)’s model revision to include the domain-general episodic
buffer. Rather, they emphasise different properties of the same system. In
essence WM is a control mechanism operating on different types of information
which reside in more stable, easily accessible LTM stores. For an elaborate
review providing an overview and integration of WM findings, see A. Baddeley
(2012). More recent research appears to corroborate this conceptualisation,
by stating that there is not a single site in the brain involved in WM, but
rather many different sites which operate on a gradient of abstraction levels,
transforming information (Christophel, Klink, Spitzer, Roelfsema, & Haynes,
2017).
Generic or Specialised Processing?
If WM plays a role in facilitating reasoning, executive functions and abstrac-
tion, it should be capable of dealing with all types of information. The question
whether WM processes domain-general or domain-specific information has long















Figure 3.2: Embedded Process Theory of working memory as proposed by
Cowan (1999).
that for the most part, WM has a fundamental, domain-general processing ca-
pacity involved in both elementary and complex cognitive processing (Kyllonen
& Christal, 1990; Lépine et al., 2005; Ackerman et al., 2005). However, despite
a broad shared basis, there appears to be a certain degree of WM specialisa-
tion, both in terms of WM functions and the type of information processed.
Evidence shows that there is less interference when processing different types
of information as opposed to when processing information of the same type
(A. D. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Friedman & Miyake, 2000; Cocchini, Logie,
Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley, 2002). Furthermore, Oberauer, Süss,
Schulze, Wilhelm, and Wittmann (2000) found a clear dissociation between
spatial WM and verbal and numerical WM. For the latter two, though, a clear
distinction was not warranted. They show this to be in agreement with other
literature, which also points out differentiation between spatial and non-spatial
WM (Daneman & Tardif, 1987; P. Shah & Miyake, 1996; E. E. Smith, Jonides,
& Koeppe, 1996; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997; Law, Trawley, Brown, Stephens,
& Logie, 2012). In addition to verbal and numerical WM, a final type of non-
spatial WM is visual WM (Johnson-Laird, 1985). In an fMRI study, Just et
al. (2001) provide evidence that shows brain activation in different areas when
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processing verbal information as opposed to visual information, but that the
resource making the information available to the individual, hypothesised to be
attention, is shared between the two processing locations. Hence, this evidence
suggests specialised locations for processing information but a domain-general
resource that actually performs the processing which is shared amongst all
recruited processing locations. Schmeichel (2007) corroborates the idea of a
shared resource for executive control as a whole. His study shows that ini-
tial efforts at executive control tasks impede consecutive efforts at executive
control tasks. This holds true for attentional, emotional and working memory
resources.
Limits to the System
In spite of all the functions WM is capable of performing, it has been firmly es-
tablished that WM is a limited capacity system. So how might WM be able to
execute all the aforementioned operations simultaneously, or at least in short
succession? One key factor is LTM involvement. Young and Lewis (1999)
suggest that WM is used to strategically search LTM, in which information
may take the form of recognition-based knowledge. Additionally, processed
information may make its way into a more stable form of WM. Cowan (1999)
claims that repetition transforms WM content into new memory representa-
tions in long term memory (LTM), where it remains highly accessible for some
time. Furthermore, recently retrieved information from LTM can be ‘loaded’
and actively maintained in WM when it is necessary for subsequent mental
operations (D’Esposito, 2007).
Another factor is so-called ‘chunking’, in which chunks can either be single
items or multiple pieces of related information. WM can handle approximately
3-5 chunks at one point in time, provided that rehearsal is actively prevented
(G. Miller, 1956; Z. Chen & Cowan, 2009; Ricker et al., 2010; Cowan, 2010).
Kalyuga (2006) further elaborates on this, using the theory of long-term work-
ing memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) to explain that chunking in WM is
possible by using information schemas, or knowledge structures, in LTM to
form the chunks. The schemas contain related information, and when learners
encounter familiar information they may either, through WM, activate and/or
update existing schemas or start building new schemas. The better and more
elaborate the structure of the schemas, the more efficiently WM will operate
on the chunking aspect.
Since WM can deal with different types of information, another optimi-
sation option is parallel processing. This appears to be possible in WM, as
shown by performance differences on dual-processing tasks, although compet-
ing information quickly starts interfering despite being of a different nature
or already residing in LTM (e.g., Oberauer et al., 2000; A. Baddeley, 2012).
In the light of a shared, domain-general and limited attentional resource, this




For example, McCollough and Vogel (2008) have found that efficient process-
ing happens through early, possibly unconscious, filtering of information before
WM can process it. None of the options discussed above are mutually exclusive,
and it is highly likely that they interact closely in order to facilitate filtering,
maintenance and active operations on information.
The why and how of WM capacity limits are discussed in detail in (Cowan,
2010). An intriguing hypothesis mentioned is that the capacity limit is ideal
for humans. Mathematical simulations performed under controlled conditions
suggest that information searches are most efficient when the searched set of
items include 3.5 items on average. More than 5 items may obstruct the process
of associating the concurrently active items in WM, thereby leading to no result
at all. In language learning, for example, this might allow focus on the general
rules of language while forgetting about the exceptions for the time being. For a
learning process, this is adaptive. For a modelling process, this reasoning might
hold true as well, given that it allows focus on the main flow and structure at
the start, and once that is done, exceptions can be included.
WM in Executive Control
So what do we know about the relation between WM and executive control?
A significant body of evidence supports general WM involvement in executive
control (e.g., Kimberg et al., 1997; Miyake et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 2000;
Bull & Scerif, 2001; Gruber & Goschke, 2004; Courtney, 2004; Ackerman et
al., 2005; Hester & Garavan, 2005; Clare-Kelly et al., 2006; Alvarez & Emory,
2006; Braver et al., 2007; Tanji, Shima, & Mushiake, 2007; McCollough & Vo-
gel, 2008; Bailey et al., 2008). Additionally, Owen, Downes, Sahakian, Polkey,
and Robbins (1990); Owen et al. (1996); Law et al. (2012) specifically describe
the involvement of spatial WM. Executive functions may even be most directly
facilitated by working memory. For example, Miyake et al. (2000) hypothesise
that the most generic mechanism executive tasks tap is “the maintenance of
goal and context information in working memory”. As soon as relevant in-
formation is in focus and being actively maintained, more complex executive
functions such as monitoring and planning become possible as they now have
information to work with. The updating and monitoring functions require that
relevant incoming information be coded and monitored, so that items held in
WM can be appropriately replaced. This dynamic manipulation requirement,
rather than only a passive storage requirement, makes it entirely dependent on
a WM that can actively manipulate information.
WM in Relational Reasoning and Abstraction
When closely examining the involvement of WM in reasoning as differentiated
from abstraction, we run into a problem. For our purposes we differentiated
between reasoning as the process of considering and manipulating relationships
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between multiple mental abstract representations, driven by a goal to come to
some conclusion or answering some question. On the other hand, we view
abstraction as the formation of the abstract representation in and by itself, as
discussed in Chapter 2. However, in the cognitive literature, no such distinction
is made. Given that reasoning tasks require an abstract mapping to be made
between two knowledge representations, abstraction is frequently tested using
reasoning tasks. Additionally, fMRI studies show that relational reasoning
according to rules activates the same brain areas as abstraction processing
(Crone et al., 2009; Christoff et al., 2009). Hence, we first discuss reasoning as
combined with the process of abstracting.
There is strong evidence for WM involvement in reasoning (Kyllonen &
Christal, 1990; Oberauer et al., 2007; D’Esposito, 2007; Cho, Holyoak, & Can-
non, 2007; Crone et al., 2009) and additional complex cognitions relevant to
modelling, such as writing (McCutchen, 1996; Hoskyn & Swanson, 2003), com-
prehension (Lépine et al., 2005; Montgomery, Magimairaj, & O’Malley, 2008),
and problem solving (Lépine et al., 2005; Cowan, 2010). Complex reasoning
involves working memory processes in order to manipulate information and
integrate relations (Milner, 1963; Miyake et al., 2000; Oberauer et al., 2000;
Oberauer, 2003; Alexander et al., 2016; Agarwal, Finley, Rose, & Roediger III,
2017). More specifically, Halford et al. (2010) suggest that WM provides the
workspace for constructing and altering relations.
Lesion studies show us how WM deficits impair abstract reasoning abilities
(Park & Holzman, 1992; D. Glahn et al., 2000; J. Lee & Park, 2005). For ex-
ample, in schizophrenics, when the maintenance aspect of WM was impaired,
performance on abstraction tasks suffered (D. C. Glahn et al., 2005), suggesting
that maintenance is at least a precondition for being able to form abstractions.
Moreover, it was found that the severity of the impact of distraction in re-
lational reasoning depends on whether the disturbed relations have or have
not exceeded WM capacity (Chuderska, 2010). In other words, if maintenance
capacity is exceeded, information is more likely to be subject to interference.
This is in accordance with early observations by Gelb and Goldstein (1925),
who demonstrated that without the capacity for inhibition or maintenance,
interference happens continuously. In highly concrete settings, a patient can
be persuaded to classify and sort objects according to material (e.g. iron vs.
wood) as long as the two types of material are observably present. When
new objects are added, they are not sorted according to the abstract ‘type of
material’ rule. This suggests that no single aspect of the new object can be in-
hibited and that potentially impairment of inhibition precedes the impairment
in maintaining focus. Additionally, no representation in WM appears to have
been stored, because previous reactions are forgotten as soon as the visible
configuration changes.
Another interesting observation is that there appears to be a dissociation
between the types of WM involved in reasoning on a concrete level, as opposed




either the number of objects, or to visual object features such as colour, appears
to suggest that WM stores object representations at different levels of abstrac-
tion, and that activating a certain representation will activate a brain area
dependent on the level of abstraction desired (H. D. Zimmer, 2008; Christoff
et al., 2009). Reasoning with concrete-level representations draws mainly upon
visual WM resources (Johnson-Laird, 1985), and there exists a strong correla-
tion between strength of mental imagery and visual WM tasks. Mental imagery
is the ability to form an image in the mind of a certain situation without the
actual stimuli being present. However, for those individuals with low mental
imagery capacity, performance on visual WM tasks was still well above chance,
suggesting that they might use a different strategy for solving the same task
(Keogh & Pearson, 2011) and that concrete reasoning might hence not be so
strongly subject to individual differences. Markovits et al. (2002) also find a
correlation between verbal WM capacity and concrete reasoning in a condi-
tional reasoning task. Abstract reasoning, on the contrary, shows a different
pattern of WM engagement. Performance on abstract reasoning tasks has been
linked to spatial WM resources (Owen et al., 1990, 1996; Law et al., 2012) and
also to verbal WM resources (Markovits et al., 2002). It thus appears that
verbal WM is involved in both concrete and abstract reasoning. In support
of the latter, Wang et al. (2010) find that processing of abstractions appears
to make use of the verbal neural processing pathways, activating brain areas
involved in phonological and verbal WM.
Evidence suggests that concrete and abstract WM processing areas have
to interact intensively to make reasoning possible. Executive control is en-
gaged while solving problems and maintaining rules on all levels of abstraction
(Markovits & Vachon, 1990; Wallis et al., 2001; Christoff & Keramatian, 2007;
Crone, 2009). The more abstract the cognitive control tasks, the more the ab-
stract processing areas of the neural network are engaged (Badre & D’Esposito,
2009; Christoff et al., 2009). Activation during concrete processing and ab-
stract processing were found to be dissociable (Badre, Hoffman, Cooney, &
D’Esposito, 2009). An example of this can be found in the context of analog-
ical reasoning, considered a very pure form of abstraction because a mapping
has to be made between two abstract knowledge representations. This relies
on WM manipulation and relation integration processes (Holyoak & Morrison,
2005). Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, et al. (2006) confirm this as they found
that both analogical reasoning and a categorisation task engaged a frontopari-
etal network that had previously been associated with WM manipulation for
categorisation. In this network, areas associated with more concrete process-
ing appeared to mediate WM processes, providing a substrate for integration
of abstract relations. Additionally, a frontopolar region was selectively ac-
tive during the abstract relational integration component of the analogy task.
These findings are supported in a review by D’Esposito (2007), who further em-
phasises that active maintenance of information may well be achieved through
coupling of stimuli-specific sensory information with abstracted, higher-order
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representations.
The more complex the abstraction, the more WM capacity it consumes.
However, this only appears to be the case during the initial formation of ab-
stract representations. Once formed, processing abstract representations ac-
tually requires less activation due to the smaller amount of details that have
to be activated. Cant, Jeffery, and Henderson-Sellers (1995) argue that WM
capacity can be increased by storing an abstraction of a chunk of information,
which is supported by more recent WM research (Z. Chen & Cowan, 2009;
Ricker et al., 2010). So in a sense, an abstraction is an efficient optimisation
for complex reasoning tasks (Schack, Weiss, & Rappelsberger, 2003; Wang et
al., 2010; Wendelken, Chung, & Bunge, 2012). However, this does not mean
that abstract reasoning is easier (Christoff & Keramatian, 2007).
3.5 Attention
The second facilitatory cognitive process we discuss is attention. What does
attention contribute to conceptual modelling, and how do models of attention
explain the workings? For our purposes, attention satisfies the system’s filtering
requirement. It filters out irrelevant stimuli, so that an individual can focus on
a set of objects or tasks in favour of others. The mediation of attention may
play a dominant role in bringing information into the focus of WM (Awh &
Jonides, 2001; Hester & Garavan, 2005; Fougnie, 2008; Sewell & Lewandowsky,
2012; Jha, 2013).
Defining the scope of attention is a difficult task, and has been subject to
debate for many decades. McIlvane, Dube, and Callahan (1996) describes the
difficulties of defining attention from a behaviour analytic perspective. Atten-
tion cannot be directly observed and many models of attention have significant
overlap with constructs such as WM and executive control. In fact, Purves
et al. (2011, pp. 697) mentions that some even see WM as a special kind of
attention that operates only on internal knowledge, rather than sensory in-
put. Shallice and Cooper (2011) explore and compare attempts to define the
brain’s supervisory control system, related to prefrontal functioning, as solely
attention (Posner, 1990) versus using more high-level complex concepts such
as Spearman’s g (Spearman, 1904; Duncan et al., 2000; Duncan, 2001). They
conclude that neither perspective suffices to fulfil all requirements for a super-
visory control system. Therefore, they propose using a different theoretical
framework which employs the concept of attention as a fundamental process
in the service of routine and non-routine behavioural processing.
From Unconscious Stimulus to Conscious Awareness
In order to understand the filtering function of attention, we need a global un-




researchers agree that the process of attention begins with a state change in
an organism: arousal. This occurs when a stimulus which signifies interesting
consequences presents itself. The state change was observable as heart rate
deceleration and negative EEG shifts. This increases the level of receptivity of
the organism (Sokolov, 1963, pp. 309). Neural evidence shows that attended
information is then dynamically encoded (Duncan, 2013). Driver and Spence
(1998) provide strong evidence that the scene is divided up pre-semantically
into different objects before the selection process begins to operate on per-
ceptual input. Then, the organism may adapt its orientation. The stimulus
activates certain pathways biasing the organism towards certain events, and it
may trigger a change in orientation of sensory and central systems. If the stim-
ulus is strong enough it may occupy focal attention, and the organism becomes
consciously aware of the stimulus.
Posner (1990) conceptualise this basic mechanism in a model consisting of
three systems: the orienting system, which allows spatial orienting to critical
stimuli; the executive attention system, modulating behaviour when there is
difficulty in response selection; and finally the alertness system, which pro-
vides vigilance in low-stimulation environments to ensure tasks are still being
carried out efficiently. These properties operate on several dimensions. The
first is endogenous versus exogenous attention, in which endogenous attention
is voluntarily controlled, in a top-down fashion, and exogenous attention is
involuntarily driven by dominant environmental stimuli. The second is that
attention can be focussed on either actions, thoughts or perceptions. The last
one is selective attention versus divided attention, where selective attention
allows one to be focussed on a single object or task, as opposed to divided
attention where attentional scope is more broadly oriented. Attention may be
sustained for a long time. If, through this mechanism, a stimulus gains access
to the central attention mechanism, it is highly likely that we become aware
of it. Hence, such changes in pathways and alerting may precede conscious
attention and separates automatic effects from strategic ones.
Contrary to popular perception, that typically associates attention with
conscious awareness, we describe a large part of attentional processing as hap-
pening outside of conscious awareness. The question thus arises whether at-
tention and consciousness are truly dissociable. Despite many shared cognitive
features and neural circuits, attention and consciousness can occur in isola-
tion of each other and are manipulable using distinct paradigms. Additionally,
top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects, such as that
participants can see target images better when attention is being taxed with
task-irrelevant information (Posner, 1994; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2006). Hence, it
is plausible to dissociate attention and consciousness.
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Early and Late Selection
A very prominent attentional property that deserves further elaboration is
whether the attentional selection filter operates early or late in the process.
The first model of attention, the filter model (Broadbent, 1958), proposed that
information is filtered immediately after perception, so that only the informa-
tion in the primary channel attended to made its way into conscious awareness.
However, later studies pointed out that this was too restrictive, that some unat-
tended information actually did make its way into awareness, especially if it
was salient information like one’s own name. A. Treisman (1964) therefore pro-
posed an attenuating filter which gave priority to primary information but did
not entirely ignore unattended information. Around the same time, Deutsch
and Deutsch (1963) put forward a competing model: the late selection theory.
This model assumed that information was first fully analysed, unconsciously,
and after analysis the most relevant input was put through to consciousness.
Shallice and Cooper (2011) describe that we now know that both early
and late selection models can be valid, depending on the context. They state
that if the early selection models propose an attenuating filter, then some form
of late selection must be involved as well if particularly salient input occurs.
Hence, the theoretical gap between the two models is not as great as was
initially assumed. Moreover, early selection models are typically valid given
two conditions. First of all, all input is provided in the same sense modality,
such as dual input in the visual channel, or two streams of audio being played
at the same time. The second condition is that the task involves demanding
operations at stages following the purely perceptual stage. So the time of
selection can be said to depend on the cognitive load involved. If cognitive load
is high, early selection is the rule. If the load is low, late selection happens
(Lavie, 1995).
Recent evidence elegantly demonstrates how two target detection strategies
are used in attentional cueing tasks. First of all, the threshold to cross if a stim-
ulus is a target or not is decreased. Secondly, a stimulus’ neural representation
is selectively increased (Buschman, 2015). Luo and Maunsell (2015) show that
both strategies are used in monkeys interchangeably. For the second strategy,
changes in neural behaviour were measured. The attentional filter works by
increasing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of single, sensory neurons. Attention
improves the response of single neurons by increasing their firing rate, thereby
making them more sensitive, and by boosting the gain of their response. On a
neural population level, this leads to a reduction of noisy, uninformative cor-
relations between neurons, and yields an increase in information content of
neural populations. This synchronised activity of selected neural populations
increases their impact on downstream regions. For the first strategy, while it
could be measured behaviourally, no changes in neural activity were found.
However, the mechanism of increasing the SNR seems to correspond well with




in the process. Decreasing the selection threshold may correspond with late-
selection effects.
Attention and WM Interaction
As we have seen, attention filters out irrelevant stimuli, so that an individual
can focus on a set of objects or tasks in favour of others. The mediation of
attention may play a dominant role in bringing information into the focus of
WM (Awh & Jonides, 2001; Fougnie, 2008; Hester & Garavan, 2005; Sewell
& Lewandowsky, 2012; Jha, 2013). However, the relation between WM and
attention is a complex one. For one, WM and attention appear to have a
considerable functional overlap. However, subtle differences have been demon-
strated. Ricker et al. (2010) suggest that attention appears to be involved
in central executive regulation, but not necessarily in storage of information
or the rehearsal process, dissociating it from WM’s involvement in executive
control. WM thus appears to relate only to attentional control over executive
functions. Hester, Foxe, Molholm, Shpaner, and Garavan (2005) show that
loading WM decreases control of attention over inhibitory and switching func-
tions. Awh and Jonides (2001) argue that WM appears to recruit attention
in the service of memory rehearsal. In a review on the relation between WM
and attention, Fougnie (2008) finds a strong distinction between attention and
storage in WM. During encoding and manipulation of information, attention
and WM were found to interact closely. However, afterwards, attention plays
but a limited role in the maintenance of information. More specifically, central
processing attention, but not visuospatial attention, was found to be necessary
for manipulation in WM.
Attention in Executive Control
At the very least, attention is a critical, and limited, resource in executive
control facilitation. In a review, Alvarez and Emory (2006) find that selective
and sustained attention both underlie executive functions. Furthermore, at-
tentional mediation and time are both crucial resources to allow invocation of
executive processes (Engle et al., 1999; L. Barrett et al., 2004; Lépine et al.,
2005; Clare-Kelly et al., 2006; McCabe, 2010; A. Baddeley, 2012; Jha, 2013).
Additionally, when taxing attentional resources, subsequent performance on
tests of executive control is impaired (Schmeichel, 2007). A good deal of at-
tentional processing happens unconsciously. Explaining how this works also
provides insight in how unconscious processing is involved in executive con-
trol. For this, Kiefer and Martens (2010) propose the attentional sensitisation
model. This is based on the idea that unconscious processing is modulated
by “attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways” (Kiefer,
2012). A task set, engaging a set of executive control functions related to a
subliminal prime, was found to enhance subliminal priming effects, whereas an
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unrelated task set attenuated the priming effect. In fact, (Kiefer, 2012) argues
that unconscious processing is only effectively engaged when the cognitive sys-
tem is configured accordingly. He shows that “subliminal priming depends on
attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced
by action intentions and task sets” in the domains of visuomotor and semantic
processing. This is because attention makes neurons more sensitive to specific
kinds of conscious and unconscious processing, including executive control.
Attention in Relational Reasoning
Attentional control in reasoning, as demonstrated by Pribram and McGuin-
ness (1975), is proactive: activation occurs before arousal. Activation concerns
preparation of the physiological response mechanisms and arousal is the phasic
physiological response which occurs while input is being received. Thus, from
this we may again derive that preparatory processing for reasoning happens
unconsciously. M. Buehner, Krumm, and Pick (2005) find no direct relation
between attention and reasoning, and explain reasoning variance in terms of
WM storage and coordination. However, in a subsequent study, M. Buehner,
Krumm, Ziegler, and Pluecken (2006) do find a strong correlation between rea-
soning and sustained attention. When looking more generically, awareness of
attending to features increased analytic processing, which can be explained by
the notion that features in the focus of attention are more available to the indi-
vidual (Cowan, 1999). Recent neuroscientific evidence supports this notion by
demonstrating that the focusing of attention increases neuronal activity in the
neurons associated with the features the individual is focusing on (Roelfsema,
2011). It thus appears that for reasoning, too, attention is a precondition, but
that the relation may work indirectly via WM.
Attention in Forming Abstract Representations
The probability of finding an indirect relation between attention and abstrac-
tion is high. To a certain extent, making explicit certain strategies that in-
crease attention to relevant features improves performance in abstract tasks
(Platt & Griggs, 1993). But this need not be specific to abstraction, because
performance in general can be enhanced by training people to direct atten-
tion effectively (Jha, 2013). This may work because attention increases neural
firing (Roelfsema, 2011) and receptivity in individuals (Sokolov, 1963). An
interesting finding, though, is that attention appears to relate concrete rep-
resentations in the early visual areas to the representations of goal-relevant
information, guided by more abstract representations in the lateral prefrontal
cortex (A. J.-W. Chen et al., 2012). Attention may thus play a mediating role





We will now continue to explore the role of goal pursuit, which helps to bring
modelling to a successful end while engaging WM and attention. Goal pur-
suit brings an intention, which has unconscious beginnings, to a consciously
achieved, tangible result. Goal achievement, like many other neural systems,
depends critically on an interplay between two processes: on the one hand,
stability is required to keep goal-relevant information active, and on the other
hand, flexibility is critical to respond to changes in the environment (Dijksterhuis
& Aarts, 2010). WM resources are recruited for maintenance and switching,
while attention mediates which goals make their way into WM (Jha, 2013).
Attention also provides a focus for WM, serving to inhibit distractions, or to
inhibit a current goal in favour of a more pressing one (Markman, Brendl, &
Kim, 2009; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). The initial phases of goal pursuit,
such as filtering and selection of information in the early, pre-attentive infor-
mation processing stages, happen mostly unconsciously, with only the most
aggressively activated goals make their way into conscious awareness (J. Bargh
& Ferguson, 2000; Custers & Aarts, 2010). The scope and strength of attention
are influenced by affective signals, which associate with a stimulus so that the
latter gains a certain strength to potentially pass the maintenance threshold.
In general, people may acquire a motivation to achieve a goal if it is mentally
accessible, discrepant with one’s current state, and associated with positive
affect (Custers & Aarts, 2005).
Goal Structures
First of all, what are goals? Goals are dynamic mental representations of in-
tentions to accomplish tasks or take actions which are desirable to achieve
or otherwise rewarding to engage in (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Dijksterhuis
& Aarts, 2010). A goal is not simply a performance criterion, but a knowl-
edge structure specifically referring to some material or otherwise desirable
value (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). Shea,
Krug, and Tobler (2008) even argue that the goal-directed decision making
system makes use of conceptual representations, in which goals may be as-
sociated with semantically related words, alternative goals or other memory
constructs (J. A. Bargh et al., 2001; Van Osselaer et al., 2005). Existing goal
structures can serve to accommodate new ones. When existing structures are
sufficiently generic they appear to be transferable to other goals. Additionally,
concrete structures formed in early development may serve as an analogical
basis for development of later, more abstract concepts and goals. This appears
to be the case for both cognitive representations and associated neural circuitry
(J. A. Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009).
Goal structures are hierarchically organised according to level of abstrac-
tion, with significant interaction occurring between concrete and abstract goals.
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When activating highly concrete goal features such as physical temperature,
physical distance or physical cleanliness, this influences the way highly abstract
decisions are made or abstract concepts are interpreted, such as how well peo-
ple are liked or how well people comply with goals relating to moral purity.
For example, participants who had briefly held a warm cup of coffee were more
positive about unknown people than participants who had held an iced cup
of coffee (Williams & Bargh, 2008). In another example, people primed with
a spatial orientation of moving away from something tended to interpret an
ambiguously formulated time event as occurring in the future, whereas people
primed with the notion of moving towards something interpreted the event as
occurring in the past (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). This suggests that ab-
stract concepts, such as psychological (ie. emotional or interpersonal) distance
or temporal orientation is scaffolded upon the concretely perceived concept of
physical, spatial distance (Trope & Liberman, 2003; Williams et al., 2009).
This makes the relation between goals and the formation of abstract repre-
sentations very clear. With its associated level of abstraction and concrete
scaffolds, the goal structure may become a part of a certain abstract represen-
tation, providing it with the benefits of activation and sensitivity to priming
effects. This works through the influences of affect and attentional mediation,
which we will now continue to explore in detail.
The Influence of Affect
Affect is a critical factor in driving behaviour (Damasio, 1994). While it is mon-
itored by control processes (Eyal & Fishbach, 2010), affect may bias cognition
(e.g., L. F. Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Blanchette & Richards, 2010), influ-
ence the selection and activation of desirable goals, encourage goal attainment
(Aarts et al., 2007, 2008; Strauman et al., 2013) and help to resolve conflicts be-
tween control dilemmas (Reis & Gray, 2008). Affective markers associated with
goals determine the amount of effort invested in achieving the goal in question,
and the likelihood of engaging executive control (Dixon & Christoff, 2012). For
example, Laran (2010) shows how affect works its influence throughout the en-
tire process of decision making. First of all, the amount of information in the
environment conducive to goal processing should be congruent with a goal’s
action level. An action goal pursued in an elaborate information environment
leads to higher satisfaction with the decision making process, whereas it would
lead to dissatisfaction in a low information environment. In the same manner,
inaction goals should be pursued in low information environments. Satisfac-
tion with the decision process increases satisfaction with the decision itself, and
hence the likelihood that one will perform a decision-congruent action. If time
passes without the goal being achieved, the goal gets activated even more ag-
gressively and more affect becomes associated with the decision process. Once




How Affect Assigns Value
Let us consider in more detail how emotional control works in goal pursuit.
Pessoa (2009) proposes a dual competition framework in which affective value,
originating from both emotion and motivation, influences information process-
ing at both the perceptual and executive level. On the perceptual level, emo-
tional content enhances sensory representations of associated items. Affect
most easily becomes associated with highly accessible representations (Clore
& Huntsinger, 2009). Subsequently, affect imposes a positive or negative value
on the accessible representations, with positive affect encouraging and nega-
tive affect inhibiting them. This happens through output connections from
the amygdala to the visual cortex, including the primary visual cortex. Then,
executive control is enhanced as a consequence, because strengthened sensory
representations will be assigned more attentional resources, as long as they are
available. There is also evidence that affective information is directly projected
to the prefrontal cortex, which facilitates executive control, resulting in mod-
ulation of executive control in a top-down manner. The framework assumes
shared resources for all executive functions, meaning that energy devoted to
one executive function will inevitably reduce energy available to other execu-
tive functions. Furthermore, affective values are hypothesised either to affect
information processing because a stimulus elicits a certain emotional response,
or because an individual is currently in a certain emotional state, such as a
motivated or a sad one.
How resources are distributed in the case of a stimulus-driven influence
can be illustrated using the example of threat (Pessoa, 2009). In low-threat
situations, affective values enhance processing of the associated item without
significantly impacting other executive functions. The pool of resources can
in this case be directed to the single item without any problems. In high-
threat conditions, on the contrary, an emotion-associated stimulus will recruit
all necessary resources to prioritise its processing, while also activating specific
executive functions needed to handle the situation, such as inhibiting all irrel-
evant actions, and continuously updating WM content. This will thus make
a much larger demand on shared resources, and may therefore hypothetically
be much more sensitive to individual differences. In the case of state-driven
influences, two effects are most likely to take place. First of all, motivation will
create heightened awareness of the executive functions relevant to the task at
hand, thereby improving performance, and secondly, motivation may influence
the allocation of shared resources (Pessoa, 2009).
In the case of multiple goal pursuit, the same influences are at work: goal
proximity and emotional states. Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg (2007) propose
a comprehensive model predicting that goal actions, such as increasing effort,
postponing effort, abandoning the current goal or switch to pursue another goal
are influenced by both the emotions flowing from prior goal achievements and
the proximity to future goal attainment. When goal achievement is distant,
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positive emotions transferring from prior successful achievement lead to an
increase in effort by diverting resources away from competing goals. Negative
emotions stemming from prior failure, in contrast, decrease effort towards the
current goal and reallocate resources towards other valued goals. When close
to achieving the goal, however, the relationships reverse. In this case, positive
emotions yield a decreased effort towards the current goal and instead promote
a shift towards other goals, whereas negative emotions increase effort towards
the currently pursued goal and decrease efforts towards other goals. In support
of this model, goal proximity and emotional states generalise to achievement of
abstract health, financial, academic and altruistic goals, both on the short and
the long term. Moreover, the effects occur independently of goal difficulty and
individual differences such as self-esteem and self-control (Trope & Liberman,
2003; Louro et al., 2007).
Mediation of Activated Goals
If we take another step into the fundamentals of goal pursuit, we arrive at
goal activation, which is triggered unconsciously by the priming of goal rep-
resentations and the affective signals that become associated with the goal at
the moment of priming (Aarts et al., 2007). Goals of various types can be
activated through priming effects on various levels of abstraction in varying
domains (J. A. Bargh & Williams, 2007). These range from individual low-
level physical goals (Williams & Bargh, 2008), to abstract goals (Wheatley &
Haidt, 2005), to group goals on an organisational level such as achieving coop-
eration (Locke & Latham, 2006). The more activation, the more accessible the
goal becomes, and the stronger the impact on behaviour will be (Van Osselaer
et al., 2005). For goal-activation, the level of interference by the most active
goal that is not the focal goal should be below a certain threshold (Altmann
& Trafton, 2002). In case of a new goal, its activation should be strengthened
to overcome the interference level, and in case of reactivation of a suspended
goal it should be primed by an associated trigger before being strengthened.
Positive affect enhances goal activation strength. Aarts et al. (2007) pro-
pose that when positive affect becomes associated or co-activated with a goal
concept, motivation and readiness to achieve that particular goal are facili-
tated, while negative affect is assumed to put pre-existing goals on hold. They
find that primed goals in the presence of negative affect cease to become acces-
sible and to operate. Also, the behavioural effort invested in working towards
goal achievement is lower with negative priming, when compared to a baseline
condition of no priming, or neutral priming. After the experience is forced into
consciousness by explicit priming, the reported motivation to achieve the goal
is also lower in negative affect conditions. Through the use of affective signals,
qualitatively different alternatives can thus be unconsciously evaluated.
The next step is attentional mediation (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010), which




goals cross the threshold into conscious awareness. Attention orients and alerts
an individual to goal-relevant information, and supervises the process of trans-
lating goals into overt behaviour (Posner & Fan, 2007). The selection process
happens mostly endogenously, that is, driven by internal incentives. As dis-
cussed, attention can be directed by strong basic stimuli, such as hunger or
thirst, which have the capacity to override most other thoughts. Goals may
be primed in such a bottom-up fashion through concrete means (J. Y. Shah
et al., 2002). However, most directed attention which is not so fundamen-
tal tends to be short-lived if not accompanied by some strong emotional force
(Benson, 1994). Hence the particular necessity of affect in top-down goal ac-
tivation, in which case activation of an abstract goal representation translates
into a concrete action by unfolding into its constituent parts and eventually
into motor actions executing the abstract meaning. Critical for this is the
proposed mechanism that neural populations can link symbolic concepts to
underlying emotional and sensorimotor representations, which translate into
action (Schröder & Thagard, 2013).
Activation can be influenced by automaticity. Once similar or identical
goals have been attained multiple times, goal responses tend to become habitual
and automaticity of goal pursuit develops. This is the moment that conscious
monitoring of goal-related thought disappears, for both concrete and abstract
tasks (Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002). The response is then initiated upon
activation of the goal (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). As goal responses are
executed more and more frequently, the associations between goals and actions
become more practised, stronger and easier to elicit automatically. Moreover,
a positive mood enhances automaticity of goal pursuit (Ferguson & Bargh,
2004).
Concerning resources, J. A. Bargh and Williams (2007) proposes that un-
conscious self-regulation and emotional influences may well be similarly man-
aged, and that their high efficiency and reliability provide benefits for goal
achievement when conscious processes are focussed elsewhere. However, un-
conscious and conscious goals may at least partly share the same facilitating
attentional resources, given that the effect of unconscious goal pursuit was
found to disappear if the mental process facilitating the unconscious goal was
taxed by a conscious goal (Aarts et al., 2008). There thus seems to be a delicate
balance between the extent of unconscious emotional processing and conscious
cognitive load.
Goal Shielding
Critical to attentional goal mediation is the process of goal shielding, an in-
hibitory mechanism which protects focal goals from competing goals. J. Y. Shah
et al. (2002) found that inhibition of alternative goals was found to increase
with 1) an individual’s level of commitment to the focal goal, 2) the extent to
which focal and alternative goals were perceived as redundant, 3) the extent to
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which the focal goal was perceived as a duty or obligation fulfilling a need for
prevention, and 4) an individual’s level of anxiety and need for closure. The
latter effect was enhanced if the focal goal represented a prevention focus. On
the contrary, inhibition decreased if 1) attainment of alternative goals would
contribute to achievement of the focal goal, 2) the extent to which the focal
goal was perceived as an ideal that fulfils a need for promotion, and 3) an in-
dividual’s level of depression. The latter effect was attenuated if the focal goal
represented a promotion focus. All these effects are likely to influence each
other. An example of goal shielding at work is the finding that once people are
engaged in the pursuit of a goal, goal-related object are automatically evaluated
as more positive than goal-irrelevant objects (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004).
Goal Contagion
In group contexts, people may automatically adopt and pursue another per-
son’s goal through a phenomenon called goal contagion (Aarts et al., 2004; Dik
& Aarts, 2007). Goal contagion is affected by goal strength, appropriateness
and persistence. However, people do not automatically adopt goals when the
observed goal pursuit is somehow perceived as unacceptable and unattractive.
Goal contagion also depends on the strength and nature of an individual’s rela-
tionship to the other person whose goal he might consider adopting (J. Y. Shah,
2003). In general, the stronger and closer an individual’s relationship with the
other person, the more likely it will be that the individual will also pursue the
other’s goal. This research was done in which relationships were “of great per-
sonal importance”, hence we cannot say whether this will also work for people
who are in artificially constructed relations such as manager-employee, but it
might imply that at least a comfortable atmosphere and emphasis on relevant
goals during a modelling session might improve the chances that all participants
willingly pursue the same goal. Potential evidence for this is that even highly
abstract goals involving multiple people, such as shared goals within an organ-
isation, can be strengthened by reducing negative emotions and perceptions of
distance between groups (Locke & Latham, 2006).
Goal Pursuit and Executive Control
Ultimately, without goals there would be no point in performing any higher cog-
nitive process. For example, cognitive control in both abstract and concrete
trial conditions is rarely engaged without a goal-driven, motivational incentive
of which the expected outcome was of a greater value than the automatic re-
sponse (Dixon & Christoff, 2012). Furthermore, a goal-directed search in WM
directly improved the efficiency of relational mapping, an abstract executive
control task (Chuderska, 2010). Both examples are indicative of immediate
benefits of goals for executive control. However, the more intertwined the cog-




pursuit and executive control have a relation of which we can ask ourselves
whether goal pursuit is in the service of executive control or vice versa. Goals
have self-regulatory functions (J. Y. Shah, 2005), and unconscious goal pursuit
is not merely automatic and habitual but relies on executive processing capac-
ity and working memory capacity (Eitam et al., 2008; Custers & Aarts, 2010;
Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Kiefer, 2012). Firstly, primed goals may remain
mentally accessible for up to several minutes, suggesting an updating or re-
hearsal mechanism at work (J. A. Bargh et al., 2001; Aarts et al., 2004, 2007).
Secondly, unconscious activation of one goal can inhibit competing goals, which
points towards the inhibitory goal shielding mechanism protecting goals from
distractions (J. Y. Shah et al., 2002; Aarts et al., 2007). Finally, when sub-
liminally primed goals are operated in a discrepant situation, people tend to
explore alternative opportunities in novel settings, which suggests monitoring
and feedback processing (Aarts et al., 2004; Custers & Aarts, 2007). It thus
appears that goals drive engagement of executive control, and that features of
executive control in turn help goals being achieved.
When considering the involvement of conscious and unconscious process-
ing efforts in this process, we have so far seen that mostly complex cognitive
processes have unconscious beginnings and depending on activation strength,
either make their way into conscious awareness or decay. The contribution of
unconscious processing is significant, in many cases of complex decision making
even yielding qualitatively better outcomes than when conscious processing is
involved (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). Even processing of abstract concepts
(Lin & Murray, 2014) and social influences (Prabhakaran & Gray, 2012) may
be able to operate partly outside of conscious awareness, influencing execu-
tive control. However, it may be that in some cases the two do not interact
well. For example, when required to integrate unconsciously perceived reward
values with consciously expected reward attainability, poor and unsubstanti-
ated choices are made (Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2012). Potentially, conscious
reward processing is necessary for the promotion of integration of value and at-
tainability information. This might be because conscious processing activates
more regions of the brain involved in evaluating reward likelihood and cognitive
control than unconscious processing (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, &
Glover, 2005; O’Neill & Schultz, 2010).
A limitation to take note of is that despite the current state of the art
in unconscious information processing research, we still cannot unquestion-
ably prove that an unconscious process is solely unconscious (Desender & Van
Den Bussche, 2012). This originates from such factors as the non-uniformity
of definitions used for consciousness and unconsciousness, the external validity
of masking paradigms and our limited knowledge of the neural networks facil-
itating such processing. But overall, it does seem that we may take advantage
of unconscious processing in goal-driven executive control tasks.
79
3
CHAPTER 3. WM, ATTENTION AND GOAL PURSUIT
Goal Priming via Abstraction Level
Interestingly, emotions (Eyal & Fishbach, 2010), goals (J. A. Bargh & Morsella,
2008; Williams et al., 2009) and actions leading to goal achievement (Vallacher
& Wegner, 2012) can all become associated with a level of abstraction. On top
of this, all three are sensitive to priming via this abstraction level, although
there does appear to be a certain order in the process. Emotions may prime be-
havioural actions, which in turn may make the associated goal more accessible.
How might this work?
First of all, abstract emotions prime abstract behaviour, whereas concrete
emotions inform about pursuit of concrete goals. For example, feeling an emo-
tion such as pride requires executing an abstract course of actions involving
self-consciousness. An individual has to evaluate his actions over a certain pe-
riod and attach a value to them, and hence pride is a more abstract emotion
than pain or joy, which result from an immediate, concrete perception. In this
way, emotions provide meaning to the situation which helps people self-regulate
behaviour in the given situation. Along the same line of reasoning, Eyal and
Fishbach (2010) infer that abstract emotions monitor long-term goal pursuit
and concrete emotions monitor short-term goal pursuit.
Secondly, according to Vallacher and Wegner (2012)’s action identification
theory, behavioural actions can be identified at various levels of abstraction.
When a high-abstract action is identified, the goal it is meant to achieve be-
comes very accessible. When, on the contrary, a low-abstract action is identi-
fied, more concrete action-related features become accessible rather than the
abstract goal construct. When both the low and the high-level identifications
are possible, high-level identifications tend to override low-level identifications,
implying that humans do have a natural tendency towards goal-driven be-
haviour over impulsive behaviour.
The effects of priming via abstraction level may be observed in the context
of reasoning. When priming the goal of relational reasoning, activation of ab-
stract concepts trigger abstract relations. In studies on the effects of concept
activation during analogical reasoning, activation of category concepts played
a fundamental role in analogical thinking (Green, Fugelsang, & Dunbar, 2006;
Green et al., 2008). Given that the abstract function of the stimuli, namely
category vs. analogy, appeared to be responsible for the priming effect rather
than the content of the stimuli, it seems that people activate an abstract ana-
logical relation based on category relations instead of content when they grasp
the analogy between two items. Thus, the sensitivity of goals to priming and
their self-regulatory functions may provide mechanisms through which cogni-
tively demanding processes such as executive control and abstract reasoning




Affective States and Reasoning Strategy
The effects of affective states on reasoning performance can also be observed
rather directly. In general a positive mood improves performance on abstract
reasoning tasks, whereas a negative mood improves performance on concrete
reasoning tasks (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Marguc, Förster, & Van Kleef,
2011; Burgoon, Henderson, & Markman, 2013). A possible explanation for
this is that positive moods are associated with safe environments and hence
trigger a broad view, a tendency to explore and global, relational processing,
whereas a negative mood is associated with unsafe conditions and produces
the opposite tendency and induce item-specific processing (Reis & Gray, 2008;
Förster, Marguc, & Gillebaart, 2010; Huntsinger, 2013). However, the choice
of focus depends on one’s affective state and the accessibility of either a narrow
or broad focus, and is thereby subject to great flexibility. Huntsinger (2013)
states that “when a broad focus is accessible, as is customarily the case, happy
people focus broadly and sad people focus narrowly. But when a narrow focus
is accessible, happy people now focus narrowly and sad people broadly.” If
none is accessible, affective state does not influence the choice of attentional
scope. This fact that there exists a condition in which affect has no influence
is consistent with the notion that affect does not directly guide the scope of
attention. From this, it thus appears that happiness triggers whatever cognitive
strategy is most directly accessible. Another nuance is that while generally
negative emotions impair logic during reasoning, if the emotion is relevant to
the task, it can sharpen focus and thereby facilitate reasoning, whereas task-
irrelevant emotions only serve to distract the performer from the task. This is
because emotions engage more attention for memory encoding.
Moreover, happiness is associated with reliance on a more heuristic reason-
ing style and increased mood-congruent judgement, if events consistent with
one’s current mood are available (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Sadness,
on the other hand, promotes a more indirect strategy, and careful, system-
atic processing. It did not, though, produce an interpretative bias. However,
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) show that a sad state does bias the individual
towards high-risk/high-reward options, as opposed to a state of anxiety which
biases an individual towards low-risk/low-reward options. They reason that
anxiety primes the goal of uncertainty reduction, which is compatible with
low-risk options. On the contrary, sadness primes the goal of reward replace-
ment, which is more compatible with a desire for a high reward. Blanchette
and Richards (2010) reasons that anxiety biases attention towards threatening
interpretations of stimuli, but only after the threatening interpretation had
been generated. So anxiety in and by itself does not generate more threat-
ening interpretations than neutral conditions or other emotions, but it biases
attention in a certain way once the possible interpretations have become clear.
Additionally, it increases estimates of the likelihood of future negative events.
Hence, anxiety appears to bias information processing towards identifying po-
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tential threats and reducing negative outcomes. This pattern for anxiety has
also been found in reasoning tasks.
In summary, affective states can be said to have an effect on information
processing style. The mood-as-information hypothesis (N. Schwarz & Clore,
1983, 2003) generalises across the aforementioned affective state to propose that
negative moods signal that something is wrong in the environment, requiring
an individual to activate careful and elaborate information processing. On the
contrary, a positive mood may signal that a situation is as it should be, and
that hence habitual patterns and more heuristic information processing can
safely be relied on.
3.7 Conclusion
Figure 3.3 on the facing page presents an overview of how the fundamental pro-
cesses may hypothetically interact to provide input to a modelling skill. Affect
and goals strengthen each other, while competing with distractions from the
environment. Both the goals and affective signals may be either endogenous or
exogenous. They are initially processed unconsciously in the focus of attention.
Attention provides an information filter on multiple input modalities, priori-
tising information on high-demand tasks so that we may maintain focus, and
allowing for more broadly scoped divided attention if the task is less demand-
ing. If activation reaches a sufficient level, they may be processed consciously
in the central executive of WM, which provides output to more stable forms
of memory storage. Together, affect, attention and goal activation fulfil the
filtering and prioritisation requirements of our modelling hypothesis (Monsell
& Driver, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). Based on this litera-
ture review, it seems valid to assume that all information is initially processed
unconsciously before reaching conscious awareness. An exception may be ex-
tremely disruptive distractions. A question that remains is whether conscious
and unconscious processing share the same attentional resources. Finally, WM
provides definitive input, in all its possible forms, to facilitate a modelling
skill, fulfilling the maintenance, manipulation, switching and monitoring re-
quirements of our hypothesis.
3.8 Discussion
The evidence for dynamic WM and attention involvement in modelling is
strong, and may therefore be significant factors to focus on when developing
training protocols. WM and attention span are strongly subject to individual
differences, but the extent to which this may observably influence modelling,
and the extent to which they are trainable, will be discussed in the next chap-
ter. What we can learn from the properties discussed in this chapter is that



















Figure 3.3: An overview of how the fundamental processes may interact.
minimal distraction. For methods, this means minimal modelling operator sets
and incremental methods, in which additional operators only become available
once the basics have been mastered and if the situation should so demand.
Modelling environments and work schedules should be designed in such a way
that humans can function optimally in them and that all necessary cognitive
processing can happen undisturbed. This means sufficient breaks with exercise
and purposeful distracting activities to allow unconscious processing to do its
work and thereby optimise attention and WM functioning. It should not be
forgotten that these resources are highly limited, and that they need sufficient
recovery time in between periods of cognitively demanding work.
Finally, considering how goals and affective signals are a driving force in
executive control, we may deduce that it is very important to have clear mod-
elling goals defined and ingrained in the modellers’ collective awareness so that
they can help to direct the focus to the relevant output. However, not only
modelling goals should be taken into account. Motivational and social goals
must also be considered, if we are to take full advantage of the beneficial ef-
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fects of goal pursuit. People should not have negative associations with their
work goals, colleagues or environment, as this may inhibit their cognitive per-
formance. Happy mood states may be primed before a modelling session if
a broad, exploratory and global view is desired, whereas a more serious, sad
mood state may be primed if careful, item-specific processing is the relevant
information processing strategy. Also, priming of abstraction levels congruent
with the modelling goals may be used before modelling sessions to enhance
focus.
In the next chapter, we will take a closer look at individual differences
in executive control, WM and attention capacities, how these may relate to
modelling difficulties and how we can optimise executive control performance.







Individual Differences in Modelling
Performance
“The supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic
elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surren-
der the adequate representation of a simple datum of experience.”
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955)
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Abstract
Problem Individual differences in modelling ability have a significant
influence on the modelling process and the resulting model. These dif-
ferences are hypothesised to be related to executive control and working
memory capacity (WMC), which may be improved by certain interven-
tions.
Research Question What are sources of individual differences in ex-
ecutive control that may impact modelling performance, and which in-
terventions may improve executive control?
Method We searched for studies relating to one or more of the fol-
lowing keywords: working memory capacity, working memory training,
attention span training, modelling performance, individual differences,
executive function training. We included journal and peer-reviewed con-
ference publications and constructed a narrative review.
Results Individual differences in modelling performance can best be
described in terms of the different executive functions involved. For most
executive functions, WMC is the best predictor of performance. Targeted
WM training can improve performance temporarily, but generic strate-
gies to optimise brain functioning as a whole may have a more lasting
positive impact on executive control. Examples are physical exercise,
mindfulness, emotional development, creativity training and reduction
of stress.
Conclusions WM training increases performance, but transfer to un-
related tasks is narrow. However, a combination of continuous, challeng-
ing WM training and the aforementioned brain optimisation strategies
yield significant results. The greatest benefits were achieved by those
who started off with the greatest deficits in executive control. There-






Individual differences in modelling have been elaborately described (e.g., Sut-
cliffe & Maiden, 1992; Sins et al., 2005; Kramer, 2007; Mendling et al., 2012;
Wilmont et al., 2012; Pinggera, Zugal, et al., 2012). Modellers contribute their
own unique capacities and experiences, which shape the interactive modelling
process and create the final product: the model (Newcomb, 1953; McGrath,
1984; Shanks, 1997; Niss, 2003; Haisjackl et al., 2016; van der Linden et al.,
2019; Gray & Holyoak, 2020).
As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, modelling behaviours are a result
of a complex chain of both unconsciously and consciously mediated cognitive
processes, potentially related to executive control. Executive functions are
strongly subject to individual differences. Additionally, it is not a unitary
construct but consists of several independent but interacting behavioural mon-
itoring functions (Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss et al., 2003). It may therefore
well be that an individual is competent in certain functions, whilst remaining
woefully deficient in others (McCloskey et al., 2009). However, we may also
find overall executive functioning to be of higher or lower performance quality.
Studying individual differences on a neuropsychological level can lead to
greater understanding of where difficulties are likely to arise, and how we may
best design interventions for a specific individual. For this reason, this chap-
ter centres around the concept of working memory capacity (WMC). WMC is
highly predictive of cognitive performance and found to be a source of indi-
vidual differences in abstraction, reasoning, goal pursuit and executive control
(e.g., Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Markovits et al., 2002; M. J. Buehner & May,
2002; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; McCollough & Vogel, 2008;
Chuderska, 2010; Meinz et al., 2012; E. K. Miller et al., 2018). Noticeably, dif-
ferences in WMC are significant even though the capacity limit is fixed within
the 3-5 items range.
In this chapter, we relate observable differences in modelling performance to
individual differences in cognitive abilities. Moreover, we discuss how executive
control and WMC can be trained and engaged more optimally so that an
individual can benefit during practical modelling tasks.
Research Question
In this review we answer subquestion 3:
What are sources of individual differences in executive con-
trol that may impact modelling performance, and which inter-
ventions may improve executive control?
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Databases searched Google Scholar, Web of Science, Elsevier, Wiley On-
line, SAGE Publications, Taylor & Francis Online
Keywords Working memory capacity, working memory train-
ing, attention span training, modelling performance,
individual differences executive function
Publication level Peer-reviewed journal and conference publications
Table 4.1: An overview of the search strategy.
4.2 Review Strategy
As in Chapters 2 and 3, we use a narrative review approach with systematic
aspects, inspired by Kitchenham (2004); Liberati et al. (2009). The research
question structures the search process and review structure. An overview of
the search process is given in Table 4.1.
We initiated the search with the set of keywords listen in Table 4.1. From
each database, we included the first 20 results. Duplicates were removed. We
included studies from cognitive, educational and neuropsychology. Articles
were included if they covered individual differences in modelling, executive
functions or WMC, or potential causes or process influences. Both correla-
tion evidence and mechanistic explanations were included. We saved relevant
articles in a reference manager and wrote summaries.
After that, we continued with a process of snowball sampling. We used
backward referencing to find leads that explained the neuropsychology of ex-
ecutive functioning and WM in more detail. For each resulting article, we did
a forward reference query. From every first 10 results, we included the articles
which contributed to explaining the mechanisms of executive control. We con-
tinued this process until we considered our narrative review a coherent whole
explaining how observable individual differences in levels of modelling perfor-
mance could be influenced by differences in neurophysiological functioning.
In this review, we start with a classification of observable individual dif-
ferences in modelling performance, from educational psychology. We relate
the described set of behaviours to the elements of executive control they over-
lap with. From there, we study the main variable associated with individual
differences in executive control: WMC. Finally, we examine in detail how phys-
iological facilitation of WM and executive control works, in order to be able to
reason about the best ways to intervene for optimisation of executive control
performance in practice.
4.3 Classifying Levels of Modelling Performance
First of all, how can we describe levels of modelling performance as we observe
them in practice? Sins et al. (2005) characterise modelling performance as
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‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘good’, and observe that modelling problems tended to be
related to one of three foci: perception of the modelling task, content of the
problem, or the modelling tool. Overviews of each level characterisation are
shown in Tables 4.2 on the following page, 4.3 on page 93 and 4.4 on page 94.
At the lowest level (Table 4.2), modellers do not even show awareness of
modelling skills, and hence they are not yet contributing to the development of
competence (Epstein & Hundert, 2002). There is no understanding of the pur-
pose of the modelling task, and modellers engage in ‘model-fitting’ behaviour:
randomly tuning model parameters until the final output looks like the ex-
pected solution.
At the medium level (Table 4.3), modellers know about the existence of
modelling skills but are not yet able to fully apply them (Epstein & Hundert,
2002). Most defining is a lack of critical reflection. This is because superficial
problem solving skills and task perception rely on directly observable prob-
lem features while lacking a thorough understanding of the problem structure
(Bransford, 2000; Sins et al., 2005). People learn a pattern of behaviour and
try to apply this same pattern in every similar situation without evaluating the
properties of the problem situation to decide on the most applicable solution
(Chi & Glaser, 1985). In modelling settings we have observed examples of such
behaviour for instance when people suggest valid modelling structures which
do not make sense in the context, or finalise their models without testing the
relations with exceptions to the rule (Wilmont et al., 2012). Claes et al. (2012)
provide further evidence that lack of structure, lots of movement between model
aspects and an overall slower modelling speed lead to lower quality models.
Finally, expert level problem solving (Table 4.4) is characterised by ac-
tive reasoning, structure and scope monitoring, switching between the abstract
modelling problem and the tangible solution by means of hypothesis testing
and reflection on progress using domain knowledge (Bransford, 2000; Sins et
al., 2005). When modellers can apply their skills in a controlled, educational
setting, they are just one step away from achieving competence in practice
(Epstein & Hundert, 2002).
In our search we did not encounter any literature directly assessing execu-
tive functioning in the context of modelling. However, if we look at the good
performance characteristics described in Table 4.4, we can see that they all
involve critical elements of executive functioning and reasoning. The lower the
performance level, the fewer executive functions are involved. Generic studies
of executive functioning show, for example, that a lack of inhibitory control
impairs academic performance (Bull & Scerif, 2001; Blair & Razza, 2007) and
that low WM abilities correlate very strongly with poor cognitive performance
(e.g., Jausovec, 2000; Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005; McCollough &
Vogel, 2008; Mall & Morey, 2013). The same holds for reasoning. In the ab-
sence of reasoning, people fail to scope a problem, do not form good mental
models of the problem domain and do not sufficiently test their hypotheses
(Maier, 1937; Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Bransford, 2000). Weak novice mod-
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Task Perception Content Tool
Systematic
Approach
Lots of requests for
guidance were made








ing of the purpose of
modelling, no link was












Focus mostly on what
the final modelling re-
sult should look like
rather than what the
result means, also fo-
cus on a single quan-
tity at a time rather
than considering rela-
tions
View the model only
as an artefact to gen-
erate data rather than












eters to match the
provided experimen-
tal data graph, en-
gage in ‘model fit-
ting behaviour’: tun-
ing parameters un-
til the model output
matches the expected





from the lack of model
fit that the model is
incorrect but do not
know where to adjust
it. If revisions were
done, no argumenta-
tion or evidence for
them was provided
-
Table 4.2: Characteristics of low modelling performance.
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Table 4.3: Characteristics of medium modelling performance.
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Table 4.4: Characteristics of good modelling performance.
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ellers generally use reasoning strategies less effectively, for instance by testing
only general hypotheses, performing poor tests and as a consequence drawing
vague conclusions. Also, hypotheses are discarded immediately after generation
which suggests that reasoners are unable to develop tests for their hypotheses
based on the task requirements (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992). Hence, we may
deduce that executive function deficits will directly affect modelling.
4.4 Working Memory Capacity
Let us continue to examine in more detail where individual differences in ex-
ecutive control may originate. As mentioned above, working memory capacity
(WMC) is considered a significant source of individual differences (Kyllonen
& Christal, 1990; McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Owen, 1997; Miyake
et al., 2000; Markovits et al., 2002; Kane et al., 2007; Aarts et al., 2008; Mc-
Collough & Vogel, 2008; Chuderska, 2010; Gray & Holyoak, 2020). WMC is
highly predictive of cognitive performance because of the way it processes in-
formation, which will be further explained below (M. J. Buehner & May, 2002;
McCollough & Vogel, 2008; Meinz et al., 2012; Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, &
Lewandowsky, 2016).
WMC is mediated by attention span (Gardner & Schoen, 1962; Lépine et
al., 2005), which is the available amount of attention for focusing on and manip-
ulating information in WM. However, we do not explicitly differentiate between
attention span and WMC, because it is likely that attention and WM interact
so closely during information processing that the distinction is not measur-
able and serves a purely theoretical purpose (Fougnie, 2008). For example,
Ackerman et al. (2005) state that attentional control is at least involved in
scheduling activities of the WM slave systems and in strategy selection. More
specifically, McCabe (2010) shows that in both young and older adults, atten-
tional resources in WMC can only be effectively allocated if time is sufficient
to allow executive control processes to operate effectively. If time is too short
for control processes to be activated, no strategy use can be invoked. In fact,
Lépine et al. (2005) argue that WMC is essentially the amount of attention
available to activate knowledge or to prevent decay of activated traces.
Explanations for the influence of WMC are sought in variations in storage
and processing capacity. There is a debate as to whether the efficiency of pro-
cessing capacity is solely responsible for all WM functionality (McCollough &
Vogel, 2008), or whether storage and processing capacities are independent and
both contribute to overall individual differences (Cowan et al., 2006). In favour
of the first perspective, Vogel et al. (2005) show that individuals with a high
WMC are much better at attending to relevant information and thus inhibit-
ing irrelevant information. Low capacity individuals, in contrast, process both
target and distracter information. Distracters are only detrimental to perfor-
mance if they are being actively processed (Chuderska, 2010; McCollough &
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Vogel, 2008). This means that low capacity individuals process relatively more
information than high capacity individuals, but end up with far less meaning-
ful information overall. This effect has been demonstrated for the auditory
modality (Maier, 1937; A. R. Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001), the visual
modality (Vogel et al., 2005) and for problem solving in general (Jausovec,
2000). On the other hand, in favour of physical storage capacity, Todd and
Marois (2005) show that in the absence of processing requirements, the amount
of brain activity in the posterior parietal areas correlates significantly with vi-
sual WM performance. Additionally, high WMC is associated with resistance
to interference in situations requiring attentional control without any mem-
ory involvement whatsoever (Kane & Engle, 2002; Sewell & Lewandowsky,
2012; Oberauer et al., 2016). Thus, through this combination of allowing more
activity and access to information, ensuring better filtering and providing re-
sistance to interference, WMC can exert a significant influence on cognitive
performance.
4.5 WMC Involvement in Executive Control
What evidence do we have for WMC involvement in the different executive
control functions? We summarise the evidence below.
Relational Reasoning If WM is the workspace where relations are con-
structed, maintained, manipulated and integrated (Halford et al., 2010), then
it makes sense to say that the bigger the workspace, the better reasoning
performance will be. And indeed, evidence links reasoning abilities to WMC
(e.g., Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Engle et al., 1999; A. R. A. Conway, Cowan,
Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Hambrick, Kane, & Engle, 2005; Coolidge
& Wynn, 2005; Orzechowski, 2010). For example, Handley, Capon, Beveridge,
Dennis, and Evans (2004) find that in logical reasoning, performance on belief-
based problems was predicted by WMC and inhibitory control, whereas per-
formance on belief-neutral problems was predicted by WMC alone. In fact,
WMC turns out to be the single best predictor of reasoning ability (Oberauer
et al., 2007). They find that it explains at least half of the systematic variance
found in reasoning tests, and the effect also holds true across all types of WM
and reasoning tasks, as a limiting factor on a high level of generality.
Forming Abstract Representations In the context of abstraction, sev-
eral studies have been done exploring neuropsychological differences between
high- and low-performing individuals, but these differences have not been ex-
plicitly related to WMC. Nevertheless, we can deduce similarities in the ways
information is processed between WMC processing and, for example, abstract
information processing in creative and gifted individuals (Jausovec, 2000). As
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discussed above, individuals with a high WM span process information more ef-
ficiently by not processing everything. Jausovec (2000) shows that creative and
gifted individuals also display less brain activity during abstract classification
tasks than average individuals. The hypothesis is that they do not use brain
areas irrelevant for the problem at hand. Interestingly, creative individuals
have more cooperation between brain areas when solving ill-defined problems,
whereas gifted individuals show greater decoupling between brain areas, possi-
bly pointing to greater specialisation in gifted individuals. However, given that
performance did not significantly differ between creative and gifted individu-
als, there may be multiple routes to good performance in abstract, creative
reasoning.
Initiation To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies explicitly test-
ing the initiation function. However, Zhang et al. (2014) writes that initiation
of working memory retrieval activates a neural network which is also involved
in executive control facilitation. Initiating WM retrieval showed more activa-
tion than initiating WM maintenance, which they hypothesise might be due
to retrieval’s larger cognitive demands. Therefore it does not seem implausible
that a larger WMC will facilitate easier or perhaps faster initiation, both by
inhibiting interference during initiation, and for the act of initiation itself.
Planning and Goal Setting Concerning formulating and executing plans,
and goal setting within those plans, the ability of WM to maintain informa-
tion despite interference is critical. Plans are also more easily retrieved from
long-term memory when there is no interference. Both WMC and emotional
signalling play a role in conscious and unconscious goal processing (Aarts et
al., 2008; Pessoa, 2009). Goal priming motivates people to achieve a goal, and
it subsequently consumes WMC without people’s conscious awareness of it.
Hence, the larger WMC, the easier the plans are formed and executed, and
thereby goals achieved (Engle et al., 1999; Kane & Engle, 2002; Coolidge &
Wynn, 2005). This is also illustrated in earlier writing research. WMC con-
strained the complexity of writing plans, and a greater WMC also led to more
successful, unambiguous ending sentences (Tetroe, 1984). Furthermore, when
dedicating WMC to the planning of text structure alone, better plans were
created. However, an additional benefit was that this also led to better texts
because the high-quality plan resulted in the eventual writing process taking
up less WMC (Glynn, Britton, Muth, & Dogan, 1982; McCutchen, 1996).
Monitoring To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies available
explicitly testing the relation between monitoring and WMC. However, moni-
toring can be viewed as a complex behavioural function consisting of a response
inhibition upon detection of an error, and a subsequent alteration of behaviour
to correct the error (Hester et al., 2005). This activity was associated with
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brain areas also involved in WM, and activation was observed independently
of whether subjects were aware of detecting the error or not (Garavan et al.,
2002; Hester et al., 2005; Garavan et al., 2006). Particularly the active main-
tenance part of monitoring is associated with WM areas (Miyake et al., 2000),
and it would therefore be plausible to hypothesise that monitoring too should
be sensitive to WMC.
Inhibition The loss of inhibitory control, when it comes to inhibiting impul-
sive responses, can be related to a decline in WMC (R. J. Roberts, Hager, &
Heron, 1994; Dunbar & Sussman, 1995; Waltz et al., 1999). Mall and Morey
(2013) demonstrate a more specific relation between inhibition and WMC.
During memory retrieval, engagement of inhibition is hypothesised to lead to
retrieval induced forgetting because competing memory traces are temporarily
less accessible. Low WMC participants exhibited forgetting within and be-
tween overlapping categories, suggesting that they were resolving competition
during retrieval. High WMC individuals exhibited forgetting between cate-
gories, which suggests they experienced reduced competition. However, low
WMC individuals experienced the strongest forgetting and “no retrieval ben-
efits when interference resolution demands were high”, suggesting that it is
not forgetting itself that yields performance benefits, but the efficiency with
which inhibition is being used to reduce availability of temporarily irrelevant
information.
Switching Higher WMC leads to better learning of stimulus-response associ-
ations and improved response strategy shifting (Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012).
However, whether WMC influenced either cognitive process was determined
by the need for coordination of multiple knowledge representations. When no
coordination is required, WMC only determines how well stimulus-response
associations are learned. If, however, coordination is required, WMC addition-
ally determines how well people can switch between response strategies. Dis-
tantly related but worthy to report in the context of switching, Torrens (1999)
demonstrates that abstract reasoning ability predicts the ability to generate
alternatives. So-called ‘canned thinking’ may result from the strong associa-
tion between concrete features, ideas, thoughts and feelings, and their everyday
context, making it difficult to realise other potential uses or contexts for them,
or even just to classify them in a more general sense (Goldstein & Scheerer,
1941; Lubart & Mouchiroud, 2003). A higher WMC could be hypothesised to
help to facilitate this process.
Working Memory Updating Updating is a critical component of execu-
tive control (Morris & Jones, 1990), and correlates with both verbal and visuo-
spatial WMC tasks (St Clair-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006). Süss, Oberauer,




WMC and WM tasks involving storage and processing components, which they
claim to be analogical to updating tasks as defined by Miyake et al. (2000).
A. R. Conway, Kane, and Engle (2003) corroborate this in a review. From an-
other perspective, (Zhao, Zhou, & Fu, 2013) show that updating performance
increased after WM training. They also demonstrate that the amplitude of cer-
tain event-related potentials related to WM performance changed significantly,
implying that this might signify a change in WMC and that a greater WMC
may thus well improve updating performance.
In summary, we may thus infer that for most executive functions, corre-
lations with WMC are stable. Major contributions of WMC are a greater
resistance to interference and more efficient, targeted information processing,
leaving more capacity for performing the actual task at hand. Thus, individu-
als with a greater WMC benefit from processing less information, but ending
up with more meaningful information overall.
4.6 Training WMC
Executive control processing is costly in terms of cognitive effort, and deficien-
cies in it have widespread consequences for everyday reasoning and decision-
making. We may ask ourselves if there are ways to optimise the process. An
obvious first thought would be through increasing WMC. But can WM train-
ing improve WMC and, more critically so, do the benefits transfer to unrelated
tasks? To begin with, short-term improvement on specific executive control
tasks can be achieved. For example, Zhao et al. (2013) report improved reac-
tion time on WM tasks and improved control on both inhibition and memory
updating after WM training. Additionally, mindfulness training may also ben-
efit WMC by enhancing inhibitory control, improving information quality and
reducing response conservativeness (Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand,
2010; van Vugt & Jha, 2011). Potentially, though, these results may be a con-
sequence of improved attentional focus, which may also be increased through
mindfulness training (Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Baijal, Jha, Kiyonaga,
Singh, & Srinivasan, 2011; Chiesa, Calati, & Serretti, 2011; Leonard et al.,
2013). Additionally, training attentional allocation through computer games
may improve performance on executive control tasks (Rosario Rueda, Rothbart,
McCandliss, Saccomanno, & Posner, 2005), but only if the games continue to
remain sufficiently challenging (Diamond & Lee, 2011).
However, while WM training appears to improve performance on related
tasks, Shipstead, Redick, and Engle (2012) point out that it has not yet been
shown that this effect is directly due to a structural increase in WMC. Since the
mechanisms of WM transfer to other skill domains are unclear, the observed im-
provement might well be due to a temporal learning effect. The same holds for
improvement of attentional focus, particularly because attentional mediation is
deemed to be a relatively stable personality trait depending on central nervous
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system characteristics and functioning (Luszczynska, Diehl, Gutiérrez-Doña,
Kuusinen, & Schwarzer, 2004). Also, these studies should also be interpreted
with caution due to some methodological shortcomings (Chiesa et al., 2011).
Contradictions arise when discussing whether the benefits of WM train-
ing can transfer or not. Some research shows transfer to fluid intelligence
(Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008; Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dal-
gleish, 2011), whereas other studies fail to corroborate these results (Owen et
al., 2010; Chooi & Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2013). This may be due
to the level of challenge imposed upon the participants (Schweizer et al., 2011).
The more challenging the task, the more noticeable the transfer gains, which is
also demonstrated in executive control training programs in school (Diamond
& Lee, 2011). Another confounding influence might be variety in the charac-
teristics of the sample used. For example, Owen et al. (2010) used a sample of
11 430 participants aged 18-60, all viewers of a BBC brain training program,
whereas Schweizer et al. (2011) used a sample of 45 highly intelligent students
aged 21-30. It could well be that for a highly intelligent population, transfer
benefits are greater than for a more average population. However, there is no
definitive explanation yet. Interestingly, when extending WM training to the
affective domain, Schweizer et al. (2011) find improved performance on abstract
problem solving tasks as a result of emotional WM training. They hypothesise
that this is because participants learn to dissociate task-irrelevant emotionally
laden material from goal-relevant affective material, which may transfer to cog-
nitive control processes in daily emotive decision-making as well. In support
of these findings, addressing emotional development in school curricula yields
significant improvements in executive control (Diamond & Lee, 2011).
4.7 Neural Networks for Executive Control
An alternative to WM training would be to take a more generic approach to
problem solving training, or even focusing on achieving better physical and
emotional health. However, in order to understand why this might improve
executive control performance, we first need to study the neurophysiological
mechanisms of the WM and executive control networks in more detail. For ex-
ample, neurotransmitter functioning and neuronal firing strength, which them-
selves are highly generic mechanisms, are critical for the neurophysiological fa-
cilitation of WM. Optimal neurotransmitter functioning, in turn, contributes to
firing strength. Additionally, WM and executive control depend on an at least
a partly overlapping neural architecture, the so-called frontoparietal network
(e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Fassbender et al., 2004; Garavan et al., 2006;
Ptak, 2012; Mantini, Corbetta, Romani, Orban, & Vanduffel, 2013; Cole, Re-
povš, & Anticevic, 2014; Scolari, Seidl-Rathkopf, & Kastner, 2015; Crittenden,
Mitchell, & Duncan, 2016). The same holds for reasoning and abstraction. If
we are dealing with generic mechanisms and a shared neural architecture, we
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may ask whether executive control improvement had not better be approached
generically through understanding how it works, rather than through training
a single, albeit critical, component.
We begin by discussing neurotransmitter functioning and neuronal firing
strength in the context of WM. Then, we study the neural architecture asso-
ciated with reasoning, abstraction, WM and other executive functions, after
which we relate the significance of what we have learned to the potential for
executive control improvement.
Neurotransmitter Functioning
In the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which WM is associated with, interneurons and
pyramidal cells interact closely during WM activity (Goldman-Rakic, 1996).
Interneurons transmit messages between neurons and work mostly via the in-
hibitory neurotransmitter gamma - amino butyric acid (GABA). Pyramidal
cells have many dendrites which allows them to integrate vast amounts of in-
formation from other neurons. They use excitatory neurotransmitters, in par-
ticular glutamate. These two types of cells innervate each other in such a way
that as interneurons increase their activity, adjacent pyramidal cells decrease
in activation, and vice versa. As GABA levels in a certain brain region fall,
glutamate excitation allows learning to take place. In the long term, this also
allows the information to pass into long-term memory. The GABA system op-
erates in a fragile balance though. Too much glutamate release results in cell
death, whereas too much GABA results in reduced learning capacity (Krause
& Cohen Kadosh, 2014).
Furthermore, pyramidal cell excitability is tightly modulated by dopamine
(Gulledge & Jaffe, 2001; Tseng & O’Donnell, 2004). Both too little and too
much dopamine stimulation hamper activity of the pyramidal cells, and hence
Goldman-Rakic (1996) speculate that “fluctuations of dopamine release and
dopamine receptor occupancy, and consequent effects on excitatory transmis-
sion in information processing pathways, may account for fluctuations in cog-
nitive performance under different conditions of performance.”
Thus, neurotransmitter activity triggers the encoding of information in WM
through so-called memory fields (Goldman-Rakic, 1996). A memory field in a
certain neuron is created when a neuron starts firing in response to a stimulus.
At some point in time it reaches a maximal firing strength. This activity rises
in particular after the stimulus has been presented, so during the delay period,
until a response is initiated. Some cells respond only to specific stimuli, but
most PFC cells respond to multiple stimuli.
Neuronal Firing Strength
Neurotransmitters send either an inhibitory or an excitatory signal of a certain
strength to the postsynaptic neuron, thereby influencing its firing strength. In
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the context of WMC, the extent to which maximal firing may be maintained,
also called persistent neuronal firing, is critical (J. Lisman, 2010). More specif-
ically, the maintenance aspect depends on the ability of a set of neurons to
inhibit the activity of their neighbours, while encoding depends on whether the
stimulated neurons can sustain a sufficiently high level of excitation for a suffi-
ciently long time. For maintenance and volitional WM control, E. K. Miller et
al. (2018) propose that interactions between different brain rhythms in distinct
cortical layers are crucial, with deep layer alpha and beta rhythms regulating
the flow of sensory information from the superficial gamma rhythms. Further-
more, it appears that activation for maximal WMC can only be reached under
optimal conditions, and that people usually function using an ‘effective’ WMC
which can be reached relatively easily but is not optimal (Dempere-Marco,
Melcher, & Deco, 2012).
Persistent firing is characterised by oscillations in the gamma and theta
ranges of an EEG, which are linked through a process named cross-frequency
coupling (Canolty et al., 2006; Jensen & Colgin, 2007; J. E. Lisman & Jensen,
2013). This means that within every low-frequency theta wave, several higher-
frequency gamma waves occur consecutively. The significance of the gamma
waves is that for each gamma wave within the theta cycle, a memory is fired.
Nevertheless, the order and individuality of each memory is preserved by the
spatial pattern of cell firing within the gamma wave. According to this theory,
WMC is limited by the number of gamma cycles that can fire within each theta
cycle (J. E. Lisman & Idiart, 1995). In experimental studies, the coupling of
theta and gamma waves has also been shown to be predictive of working mem-
ory success (Axmacher et al., 2010) and ability to incorporate information in
long-term memory (Tort, Komorowski, Manns, Kopell, & Eichenbaum, 2009).
It appears that both pyramidal cells and interneurons contribute to gamma
and theta waves, although some differences may be observed as to the spe-
cific gamma bands within which the specific neurons fire (Belluscio, Mizuseki,
Schmidt, Kempter, & Buzsáki, 2012). What this means for behaviour is still
unclear, but it would make sense to hypothesise that individual differences in
dopamine metabolism as described above may have an influence on this process.
The Frontoparietal Network
Now that we understand how neurotransmitters and firing strength contribute
to the quality of brain activity, let us examine the neural architecture associ-
ated with reasoning, abstraction, WM and more fundamental executive control
tasks.
Reasoning activates in particular the dorsolateral (DLPFC) and rostrolat-
eral (RLPFC) parts of the prefrontal cortex (Crone et al., 2009). Within the
parietal cortex, the superior parietal lobule (SPL), supporting visuospatial rep-
resentations, and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), sensitive to the number of
relations being considered, show increased activation for maintenance of infor-
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mation when organisation was required. The same activation pattern holds for
the DLPFC (Wendelken, Bunge, & Carter, 2008), suggesting that the DLPFC
and the superior parietal cortex (BA 7) interact to support organisation and
maintenance of information. This function could contribute to relational inte-
gration ability on complex reasoning tasks (Crone et al., 2009).
For abstraction, activity in the ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) correlates with
concrete reasoning, DLPFC activity with medium abstract reasoning and RLPFC
activity with highly abstract reasoning (Christoff et al., 2009; Krawczyk, Mc-
Clelland, & Donovan, 2011). Furthermore, Wang et al. (2010) find that abstract
concepts more actively engage the verbal pathway, which runs via the inferior
frontal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus, whereas concrete concepts elicit
more activation in the perceptual pathway, involving the posterior cingulate,
precuneus, fusiform gyrus, and the parahippocampal gyrus. They hypothesise
that it is therefore likely that the processing of concrete concepts thus happens
via mental imagery, the strength of which is at least an important contributor
to individual differences in visual WM performance (Keogh & Pearson, 2011).
To unify these findings, Cole et al. (2014) propose in their flexible hub the-
ory that the frontoparietal control system consists of highly interconnected,
distinct brain regions. Within this system, several subsystems exist which
serve related but specialised functions and have their own internal communica-
tion. The frontoparietal subsystem is particularly involved in adaptive control
processing and thought to communicate with a variety of systems such as the
auditory, visual, motor, memory, olfactory, tactile or limbic system, depending
on current task demands, which might explain why one system is capable of
providing domain-general control of tasks. Dysfunctions in the system, such
as for example reduced activity in the DLPFC, result in a marked decline in
cognitive performance on inhibition and updating tasks (Curtis & D’Esposito,
2009; M. C. Anderson et al., 2011; D’Ardenne et al., 2012).
Efficiency of Neuronal Communication
Finally, we are left with the task of relating neurotransmitter functioning, fir-
ing strength and the frontoparietal network in such a way that allows us to
understand the significance of this discussion in the modelling context. The
critical concept for that is efficiency of neuronal communication. The actual
functioning of the frontoparietal network may depend on the efficiency of com-
munication between interconnected brain areas (Giedd, 2008; Deary, Penke, &
Johnson, 2010), which plays a crucial role in neuronal firing strength (J. Lis-
man, 2010). For this, the abundance of connections is more critical than the
volume of the brain areas themselves, as demonstrated by the fact that during
development, the greatest increases in executive function performance correlate
with the maturing of myelin-coated white matter tracts (Giedd, 2008), which
facilitate greater efficiency of neuronal communication by conducting electri-
cal signals (Klingberg, Vaidya, Gabrieli, Moseley, & Hedehus, 1999; Posthuma
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et al., 2003; Strenziok, Greenwood, Santa Cruz, Thompson, & Parasuraman,
2013). Also, myelination “modulates the timing and synchrony of neuronal
firing patterns that convey meaning in the brain” (Giedd, 2008). Additionally,
activity of neurotransmitters is critical for neuronal communication, allowing
rapid and flexible alterations in the efficacy of synaptic connections while leav-
ing the synaptic architecture unchanged (Arnsten, Wang, & Paspalas, 2012).
A particular emphasis is placed on dopamine functioning in executive control
(Arnsten & Li, 2005; Cools, 2008, 2011; Badre, Doll, Long, & Frank, 2012).
Dopamine has been implicated in, among others, inhibition (M. C. Anderson
et al., 2011), updating (D’Ardenne et al., 2012) and attentional modulation
(Dang, O’Neil, & Jagust, 2012). We have seen the necessity of having just
the right amount of dopamine to regulate pyramidal cell excitability. If this is
the case, efficient signal transmission allows neuronal firing to proceed undis-
turbed, with stimulation of the alpha-2A-adrenoceptors on a neuron’s spines
to strengthen synaptic efficacy and increase network firing, and optimal stimu-
lation of dopamine D1 receptors to shape network inputs so as to refine mental
representation (Arnsten et al., 2012). Fatigue, stress and ageing are factors
that reduce dopamine and impair stimulation of the receptors, thereby reduc-
ing firing and impairing cognition.
Another interesting fact to take into account is that for neurotransmit-
ter binding to occur, the vesicle in which the neurotransmitter is contained
must blend entirely with the receiving membrane. Both membrane and vesicle
are made up of unsaturated fatty acids, given that they need a high fluidity.
However, if membrane and vesicle are not of identical fatty acid composition,
neurotransmitter binding will fail because the vesicle and the membrane cannot
blend. An example of an intervention on this level is a study in which sup-
plementing with the omega-3 fatty acid DHA improved scores on the Verbal
Fluency test in older adults with mild cognitive impairment (Sinn et al., 2012).
4.8 Improving Executive Control
From the discussion above, the most critical take-home message that it is likely
that significant performance gains may be acquired by targeting generic mech-
anisms of neural functioning, and that as brain functioning in its entirety im-
proves, so will executive control. We have examined the complexity of the ex-
ecutive control system, and its sensitivity to minor fluctuations in brain chem-
istry. We therefore wish to emphasise the significance of taking an individual’s
entire physical and emotional functioning into account when aiming for opti-
mal cognitive functioning. This has far-reaching consequences for the design of
optimal modelling methods and environments, and will also require a change in
our attitude towards facilitating work productivity. However, human-centred
movements are gaining momentum, and this is another interesting challenge
for improving the way we do cognitively demanding work.
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There exist many strategies to train and improve executive control perfor-
mance. There are targeted problem solving strategy training programs, both
computerised and non-computerised, both yielding benefits (Diamond & Lee,
2011). Simply getting enough practice is another way to improve, but broader
interventions such as physical exercise, mindfulness, emotional development,
creativity training and reduction of stress also lead to significant executive
control gains. Also, the benefits of subliminal and motivational priming can
be used to help engage executive functions. We will continue to discuss the
evidence for how each intervention strategy may improve WM and executive
control.
Problem solving strategy training: On the long term, positive results
have been obtained with a more generically oriented strategy training, aiming
to create awareness of one’s actions on problem solving tasks (van Dooren et
al., 2014). Increasing attention to relevant features improves performance on
abstract tasks (Platt & Griggs, 1993). Awareness of attending to features in-
creases analytic processing. Explanation of this effect in terms of mental model
theory would state that mental models are being further elaborated by pay-
ing attention to those features that were still missing (Johnson-Laird, 1985).
Similarly, collecting complementary goal information induces more complete
processing, leading subjects to avoid drawing incorrect conclusions based on
overly narrow hypotheses (Wharton, Cheng, & Wickens, 1993). Finally, cog-
nitive training significantly improves executive functioning in breast cancer
survivors, who suffer executive function deficits after chemotherapy (Kesler et
al., 2013). Karbach and Kray (2009) find near and far transfer to executive
tasks and fluid intelligence in both children and adults after executive function
training.
Practice: Clare-Kelly et al. (2006) find that “both practice and individual
differences in task performance were associated with the ability to modulate
and maintain activity in frontostriatal areas mediating attentional control, sug-
gesting that the areas that differ between individuals can be modulated by
practice within an individual. These results raise the possibility that a fun-
damental human ability, reflexive cognitive control, is amenable to practice.”
Practice, however, needs to be performed continuously with an increasing level
of challenge for the benefits to continue to develop (Diamond & Lee, 2011;
Agarwal et al., 2017).
Mindfulness training: Mindfulness has been hyped in many pseudoscien-
tific contexts, but scientific literature defines it simply as bringing one’s com-
plete attention to the present moment (Jha et al., 2007). Mindfulness training
can therefore be interpreted as teaching an individual how to make optimal
use of their attentional capacities. Beneficial effects of mindfulness training
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have been reported in school curricula (Flook et al., 2010). Interestingly, those
who started with executive function difficulties showed the greatest improve-
ments after training. Mindfulness training has also been shown to positively
impact attention networks (Jha et al., 2007; Baijal et al., 2011; Chiesa et
al., 2011; Leonard et al., 2013). For example, participants who engaged in
mindfulness training became 5% faster at directing their attention than those
who were untrained, accompanied by an increased readiness of neurons to fire.
WM span was also found to increase with mindfulness training (Jha, 2013).
These improvements in performance have been linked to tractable changes in
brain structure and function: long-term meditation practitioners have more
intricately folded and tightly connected brain structures, which implies implies
more efficient communication among neurons in the affected areas (Luders et
al., 2012). However, these practitioners had an average experience of 20 years
and practised almost every day. It is unlikely that modellers will be able to
change their brain structure after a short period of training, but significant im-
provements in orienting attention and conflict monitoring have been measured
after 8 weeks of training (Jha et al., 2007). The latter would be valuable for
many modellers.
Physical exercise: Many studies show a positive effect of physical exercise
on executive functioning. Acute, high-intensity exercise appears to have a more
significant immediate effect on performance than chronic exercise (Winter et al.,
2007; McMorris et al., 2009; Verburgh, Königs, Scherder, & Oosterlaan, 2014).
Furthermore, cognitively engaging exercise has significant transferable impacts
on children’s performance (Best, 2010). Contributing factors are the cognitive
demands inherent to exercise, such as monitoring performance in relation to a
sports goal, keeping track of peers and monitoring a team effort and the cogni-
tive demands resulting from executing complex movements. Barenberg, Berse,
and Dutke (2011) find that exercise benefits inhibition tasks more than dual
task coordination or shifting tasks. All aforementioned studies, however, point
to the following physiological explanations for the beneficial effects of exercise:
the increase in blood flow to the PFC, increasing oxygenation, the stimula-
tion of repair and plasticity of the brain architecture, and the upregulation of
neurotransmitter metabolism. In particular, norepinephrine and dopamine are
implied (Sutoo & Akiyama, 2003). Finally, exercise with an additional focus
on discipline and character-building, such as martial arts, yielded even greater
improvements than regular exercise (Diamond & Lee, 2011). Again, the great-
est improvements were seen in those with the lowest initial levels of executive
functioning. A related aspect is that improvement of executive functioning cor-
relates with higher nutritional intake quality (J. F. W. Cohen, Gorski, Gruber,
Kurdziel, & Rimm, 2016).
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Emotional training: Addressing emotions and emotional control can have
significant influences on executive control development. As we have seen in
Chapter 3, a happy or sad mood has a significant influence on whether a broad
or a narrow view of a problem is taken, and whether attention is more or
less efficiently engaged. When it comes to developing emotional control, chil-
dren trained to verbalise their emotions and to practice self-control strategies,
such as self-talk and waiting to act when they get upset, demonstrated bet-
ter inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility after a year of training (Riggs,
Greenberg, Kusché, & Pentz, 2006). Brain-training with emotional material
appears to generalise to other emotionally-laden tasks (Schweizer et al., 2011).
Also, better emotional management leads to reduced stress levels, a directly
related factor which will be discussed below.
A different way to engage emotions to enhance executive control is through
using motivational incentives. Executive control is more efficiently engaged
when the outcome of the behaviour is associated with a motivational incentive
(Beck, Locke, Savine, Jimura, & Braver, 2010; Dixon & Christoff, 2012). In-
terestingly, the affective state itself is, in turn, influenced by personality traits
related to motivation. F. K. Lee, Sheldon, and Turban (2003) perform an il-
lustrative study of how the traits of low confidence, extrinsic motivation and
intrinsic motivation affect goal pursuit. Based on self-determination theory
(Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000), they demonstrate that the rel-
atively concrete trait of low confidence leads to goal avoidance, lower invested
efforts and hence lower performance. A condition of extrinsic motivation can
lead to both goal avoidance and goal approach, in which only goal approach
was associated with higher performance. Finally, when participants were in-
trinsically motivated, considered the highest level of abstraction for these mo-
tivation conditions since it involves relating to a distant goal rather than only
one’s own feelings, goals were approached with enhanced mental focus, which
correlated strongly with enhanced performance. Additionally, intrinsic motiva-
tion also correlates with enhanced creative task engagement (Tan, Lau, Kung,
& Kailsan, 2019). Hence, motivation priming at different levels of abstraction
mediates the effort with which goals are pursued.
Stress: While acute physical stress can enhance WMC by enhancing gluta-
matergic transmission in the PFC (Yuen et al., 2009), both acute psychological
stress (Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernández, 2009) and chronic stress
(Mizoguchi et al., 2000; Beilock & Decaro, 2007) have been linked to impair-
ment in WMC. It is thought that this happens because stress produces overly
high dopamine levels in conjunction with high cortisol levels (Mizoguchi et al.,
2000; Qin et al., 2009). This response may enhance the functioning of brain
areas associated with automated behaviour, which could be adaptive in a situa-
tion requiring a fight-or-flight response (Arnsten, 2000). However, mindfulness
training may be protective of WMC in high-stress environments (Jha et al.,
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2010).
Creativity training: Music, dance, singing and play help us to optimise
executive functions (Diamond, 2014). These activities increase self-confidence,
make people happy and provide cognitive, physical and emotional challenges.
For example, music training improves performance on conflict resolvement,
enhances control in a nonverbal spatial task and a specialised auditory task
(Bialystok & DePape, 2009) and appears to improve verbal intelligence (Moreno
et al., 2011). Music training improves executive and emotional control in chil-
dren (Schlaug, Norton, Overy, & Winner, 2005), older adults (Bugos, Perlstein,
McCrae, Brophy, & Bedenbaugh, 2007) and traumatic brain injury rehabilita-
tion patients (Thaut et al., 2009). In fact, working in projects which transcend
one’s own discipline in general is very effective for stimulating creativity (Daly,
Mosyjowski, Oprea, Huang-Saad, & Seifert, 2016).
Priming: Subliminal goal priming has beneficial effects on the actual achieve-
ment of primed goals. Priming keeps goals accessible for some time, it inhibits
competing goals and makes people explore opportunities (Aarts et al., 2007;
Custers & Aarts, 2007). A solution along these lines to avoid misunderstand-
ings and to decrease gaps in individuals’ shared knowledge is presented by
Ogden and Richards (1923). They propose to use metaphors, definitions, feed-
forward learning and basic vocabulary. This solution draws largely on the
beneficial impact of the concreteness effect, which refers to the effect that
concrete words are processed much faster and more accurately than abstract
words. This results from the combined effects of a greater availability of ver-
bal context resources and supportive spatial-imagery processing (Jessen et al.,
2000). Feed-forward learning primes future goals and increases self-monitoring
towards those goals. Applying these concepts to the design of a modelling
method may be beneficial. Another interesting priming effect is that priming
people with the notion of being in power increases performance on abstract
reasoning tasks (P. K. Smith & Trope, 2006). This increases their perception
of distance towards others, which leads the individual to focus on the big pic-
ture rather than individual details. Abstraction via perceived distance also
correlates with self-control capacity (C. Anderson & Berdahl, 2002), which is
closely related to optimal executive control (Baumeister, 2002). It may thus
be worth emphasising each individual’s contribution to a modelling session as
being powerfully influential to the final result.
4.9 Conclusion
Individual differences in modelling performance and executive control are widely
observable in practice. Good modelling performance involves a thorough com-




to construct validated arguments for solutions and the capacity to monitor
progress towards a modelling goal. Low modelling performance, on the con-
trary, is associated with a lack of reasoning, characterised by application of
learned patterns of behaviour which are not linked to comprehension of the
mechanism and absence of scoping and hypothesis testing. The better mod-
elling performance, the more elements of executive control are involved.
A significant source of individual differences is considered to be WMC. A
high WMC allows greater resistance to interference and more efficient informa-
tion processing, meaning that less information is processed but more meaning
is obtained overall. WMC explicitly predicts reasoning ability, and correlates
with performance on inhibition, shifting and updating tasks.
Finally, several strategies can be used to optimise executive control. WM
training on its own yields some performance benefits, especially if the tasks
are sufficiently challenging, but they do not generalise well to other cognitive
tasks. Also, they have to be continuously maintained with practice. How-
ever, approaches aimed at optimising an individual’s entire brain functioning,
such as physical fitness, mindfulness/emotional training and creativity train-
ing, have significant impacts on improving executive functioning in groups of
all ages. It thus seems that a combination of continuous, challenging executive
control/WM training, physical training and emotional development provide the
greatest benefits for achieving optimal executive control.
4.10 Discussion
Now that we have elaborately discussed the ins and outs of individual differ-
ences in executive control and what we may do to improve them, we can discuss
the implications for modelling in general.
First of all, consider the assessment of modelling competence and training
methods. It is interesting that for all strategies, the greatest benefits of exec-
utive control training were achieved by those who started off with the lowest
levels of executive control (Diamond, 2014; Agarwal et al., 2017). Of course,
weak modelling ability can have many causes, but these findings argue in favour
of first training weaker modellers in executive functioning to bring them on par
with their stronger peers. If after this differences still exist, other measures may
be taken, but at least the fundamental basis will be in place. For assessment
purposes, next to conventional modelling tasks, it would give valuable insights
if modellers were tested on fundamental dimensions of executive functioning
such as inhibition, updating and shifting, to see where they need most support.
In this context, it will be interesting to find out if there is a minimal thresh-
old for WMC before abstract reasoning can be performed, and to study more
specifically the role the different types of WM play in the reasoning process.
For the modelling method itself, it means stepwise introduction of method
elements to allow for easy focusing and not introducing new elements until
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the old ones have been internalised and automated and left to unconscious
processing (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000) and building primes and motivational
incentives into the method. This could be hypothesised to aid low-WMC indi-
viduals by subliminally directing their attention to relevant features, so as to
ease the load on their weak inhibitory capacities. Also, low WMC can to some
degree be compensated for if individuals use strategies they are strong in for
tasks of a different nature, such as using a verbal strategy for a visual WM task
if one is not strong in mental imagery (Keogh & Pearson, 2011). This suggests
that different forms of representation, based on language or imagery, can help
different types of modellers.
Concerning support for the modelling method, simply providing prestruc-
tured modelling constructs does not improve weak modellers’ performance
(Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992). This finding is very plausible, given that if funda-
mental comprehension is not achieved, no amount of prestructured guidance
is going to help. This implies that modelling methods with built-in support,
such as Moody (2009)’s Physics of Notation, may only work once a modeller
has achieved a basic level of competence. Built-in scaffolds can also be very
distracting to the actual modelling task at hand, and vice versa. However,
problem-solving scaffolds from educational research, such as (King, 1997, 1999),
can teach modellers a way of thinking which, once internalised and automated,
is invaluable for modelling performance. Future research could therefore ex-
amine how best to apply such methods for modelling training. Should they be
built into the modelling method, or should problem-solving training sessions
be given, for example, after a session, so that the modellers can reflect on their
actions using the scaffolds without being distracted by their modelling task.
Also, modellers should take the initiative to keep practising on abstraction
tasks and analogous tasks to strengthen synaptic connections.
However, a great deal of the generic interventions, such as creating healthy
and supportive work conditions for everyone, are the responsibility of the in-
dividual modeller, the employer and the team he is working with. Modellers
should have the opportunity to exercise, to recover mentally, to develop their
creativity, to openly discuss emotional issues, and to eat healthfully at all times
so that they can function optimally.
For our research, this in-depth exploration means that if we take all the
theoretical evidence we have accumulated in this chapter and the previous two
chapters, we can hypothesise that modelling will be affected by a modeller’s use
of executive control functions, based on the abundant theoretical implications
that executive functioning correlates with modelling skill. We will therefore
continue in the next chapter to design an observation method to identify exec-
utive control behaviours during modelling, so that we may analyse the impact
it has on other modellers and the progression of the modelling session. This
method will provide a framework through which we can study modelling, and
in particular when difficulties are being pointed out, we can analyse which










An Observation Method for Behavioural
Analysis of Collaborative Modelling
“Create your own method. Don’t depend slavishly on mine.
Make up something that will work for you! But keep breaking tra-
ditions, I beg you.”
Constantin Stanislavski (1863 - 1938)
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Abstract
Problem Process modelling skills are strongly subject to individual
differences in cognitive abilities. However, we lack systematic methods
to analyse how psychological mechanisms facilitating cognition influence
modelling skills. In this study, we develop a method for a more ecologi-
cally valid analysis of modelling behaviour.
Research Question Which variables are essential to observe in a method
to analyse individual variability in cognitive processes in modelling ses-
sions?
Method Our method is based on data from interviews, observations
of modelling sessions and literature review. Analysis was performed in
a bottom-up fashion and compared to existing models to construct a
coding scheme, which was tested on four independent modelling sessions
until theoretical saturation was achieved.
Results The resulting categories were Abstraction, Reasoning, Moni-
toring, Switching, Working memory, Initiation and Planning. Across the
different data sources, they were remarkably consistent. The categories
of Abstraction, Reasoning and Monitoring featured most prominently
during modelling sessions. The method may be applied to observations
of collaborative modelling sessions to visualise interactions between these
categories.
Conclusions The categories were consistently applicable to real mod-
elling sessions. Future research may analyse behavioural patterns within
and across these categories to provide valuable insights in the psycho-






Process modelling is a cognitively challenging activity which is nevertheless
critical to industrial activities such as IT system design (Gemino & Wand,
2003; Davies et al., 2006).
It is subject to individual differences in cognitive factors such as executive
control, abstract reasoning ability and working memory capacity, elaborately
described in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
Behavioural patterns relating to modelling performance have been studied
many times (e,g,. Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Shanks, 1997; Gemino & Wand,
2003; Wilmont et al., 2012; Sins et al., 2005; Kramer, 2007; Mendling et al.,
2012; Pinggera, Zugal, et al., 2012; Haisjackl et al., 2016).
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge we currently have no systematic,
objective way of analysing the cognitive aspects of modelling skills as they occur
in the practice of IT, which also leaves us without structured footholds to signal
difficulties and in particular, which cognitive processes need to be addressed
for improvement.
In this study, we examine essential variables for observational analysis of
individual variability in cognitive skills in modelling sessions. Our literature
review has revealed a critical role for abstraction, relational reasoning and ex-
ecutive control in modelling (Wilmont et al., 2013). Compatible with (Martini
et al., 2016), evidence suggests that WMC expresses itself through executive
control (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; McEvoy et al., 1993; Owen, 1997; Engle
et al., 1999; Miyake et al., 2000; Markovits et al., 2002; A. R. A. Conway et
al., 2002; Hambrick et al., 2005; Coolidge & Wynn, 2005; Kane et al., 2007;
Aarts et al., 2008; McCollough & Vogel, 2008; Chuderska, 2010; Orzechowski,
2010) and is a critical facilitator of both abstraction (Christoff et al., 2009)
and reasoning (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). Recent lab evidence shows positive
correlations between working memory capacity (WMC) and process modelling
quality (Martini et al., 2016), which can be taken as an incentive to further
explore facilitating mechanisms.
In this study, we explore whether we can observe these variables in real
modelling sessions. We compare the theoretical findings to the opinions of ex-
perienced modelling practitioners and develop an observation method for sys-
tematic analysis of modelling skills. Outside the structured, restricted settings
of a laboratory, behavioural observations are the method of choice when assess-
ing complex performance (Singleton, 1978). They are also the foundation of
psychological assessments (Lezak et al., 2012, p.125). Our method should pro-
vide more insight in how reasoning, abstraction and executive control manifest
themselves in relation to each other and in relation to the modelling process.
This may give us insights in why modelling performance is so individually vari-
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Research Question
In this study we answer subquestion 4:
Which variables are essential to observe in a method to
analyse individual variability in cognitive processes in modelling
sessions?
We begin by briefly reviewing our key variables. Secondly, we describe our
data collection process and how we integrated the results with existing models
to create an observation scheme for behavioural analysis. Finally, we discuss
implications for future research.
5.2 Abstraction
Abstraction is one of the most difficult and most important modelling skills
(Ross et al., 1975; Sins et al., 2005; Frederiks & Van der Weide, 2006; Kramer,
2007). The overarching term ‘abstraction’ refers to the process of perform-
ing mental operations and simulations on a set of related objects without the
objects in question being present (Piaget, 1969). ‘Abstraction’ as a noun en-
compasses the static component of abstraction: mental representations. ‘Ab-
stracting’ as a verb relates to mental operations, such as instantiation and
generalisation, that can be applied to any mental representation on any level
of abstraction. It should be noted that the act of abstracting is strongly inter-
woven with processes like analogies and inferences. However, given that these
are not isolated abstractions, they are operationalised as reasoning processes.
When manipulating abstract representations, one might do this by switching
between abstraction levels by generalisation or instantiation. On the other
hand, a representation might be transformed into another representation with-
out necessarily changing abstraction level, such as a mathematical formula or
a process flow diagram which might be represented in different forms. In both
cases, it is necessary that the modeller has the insight to understand that the
essential meaning of the representation is still correctly represented after the
transformation.
In modelling, domain comprehension on an abstract level improves mod-
elling performance (Manktelow & Fairley, 2000), encourages engagement in
problem solving behaviours, which in turn improves overall model quality
(Gemino & Wand, 2003). Ideally, the abstract representations modellers form
during the session are articulated, tested and translated into model syntax.




Most of the literature focusing on quantifying abstraction has classified
abstraction into different levels, as shown in Table 2.2 on page 44. Levels are
based either on mental imagery triggered by the concept (Goldstein & Scheerer,
1941; Ribes-Iñesta, 2004) or on observation of neural activation in response to
semantic prompts and relational reasoning tests (Christoff et al., 2009). All
level classifications begin with a highly concrete level, which is defined as a
highly detailed mental copy of the real object. Then, there are two or three
gradually more abstract levels: a medium level of abstraction, also known as the
preferred level of abstraction (Rosch et al., 1976), which encompasses generic
names of objects which allow us to know what one means well enough to hold a
comprehensible conversation, and a high level of abstraction which is devoid of
most detail. When talking on this level, if one does not know domain processes
and underlying infrastructure, comprehension is impossible. Rasmussen (1986)
specifically mentions that goal and focus of abstraction levels shift as they
change; each level of increased abstraction shows different details which serve
to specify certain systemic functions. The Object Management Group increases
its levels of abstraction according to increasingly abstract generalisations, that
is, collections of objects.
5.3 Relational Reasoning
Relational reasoning is strongly associated with success in both modelling
(Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Vosniadou, 1994; Manktelow & Fairley, 2000; Gemino
& Wand, 2003) and problem solving in general (Chi & Glaser, 1985; King, 1999;
Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; Chin & Brown, 2000; Sins et al., 2005; Alexander et
al., 2016). Relational reasoning creates awareness of domain knowledge (Mayer,
1989), sound mental model structuring (Maass, 2006), enforces consideration
of consequences (C. Schwarz et al., 2009), identifies knowledge gaps (Chin &
Brown, 2000) and promotes error detection (Maier, 1937). Crone et al. (2009)
defines relational reasoning as “the ability to consider relationships between
multiple mental representations”. In essence, it encompasses the operational
component of abstraction: mental operations one can perform to relate or mod-
ify abstract representations. One combines experience, input from peers and
existing model concepts and relations to form new representations, through a
process of understanding, integration and structuring. The final result should
meaningfully convey the model’s purpose. To assess relational reasoning, we
use the following reasoning processes that have been identified in educational
literature, in particular literature on metacognition and problem solving: As-
sume, Analogy, Explain, Elaborate, Inference, Integrate, Rephrase, Summarise
and Verify.
Assume An inductive reasoning process to engage in a course of reasoning
often based on inconclusive evidence. For example, when modellers are describ-
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ing a certain path through a process requiring input from a client, they take for
granted that the client has provided the input and that nothing is wrong with
it. Assumptions are essential to complex reasoning because beyond a certain
level of complexity, human capacity can no longer cope, and furthermore, we
can never be certain of another agent’s perfect rationality so we are forced to
make certain guesses about its behaviour or the truth of the context in which
it operates (Arthur, 1994). In ill-defined contexts, reasoning can thus not take
place without making assumptions.
Draw an Analogy The essence of reasoning by analogy is to find a similarity
between features of two different concepts, which may be used as a basis for
a comparison. In this way, the workings or construction of a certain system
may function as a model for another system (Dietz, 2006). For example, the
workings of the heart may be described by comparing it to the workings of a
pump. Analogical reasoning is considered to be the ultimate form of abstract
reasoning (e.g., Gentner, 1983; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000; Viskontas et al., 2004;
Green et al., 2008; Holyoak, 2012; Wendelken, Nakhabenko, Donohue, Carter,
& Bunge, 2008). Schunn and Dunbar (1996) show that analogical reasoning
is attempted when the source and the target share similar surface features,
goals or underlying systems of relations. Additionally, analogical reasoning
ability depends on relational knowledge, the capacity to integrate multiple
relations, and inhibitory control over featural distraction (Holyoak, Junn, &
Billman, 1984; Richland et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2011). In problem solving,
analogical reasoning is an essential tool for coming to a solution (Chin & Brown,
2000; Klein & Jarosz, 2011).
Explain The process of explaining aims to make clear the meaning of some-
thing, to render something understandable or intelligible, especially to others
participating in the modelling session. In educational problem solving settings,
the act of explaining is a critical predictor of a student’s success (King, 1999;
Chin & Brown, 2000; Sins et al., 2005). First of all, explaining is observable
proof that an individual understands what is going on, and moreover can make
this clear to others. Any gaps in one’s knowledge will otherwise also be discov-
ered through explaining. Secondly, such sharing and defending one’s mental
models facilitates co-construction of knowledge (King, 1998).
Elaborate An elaboration serves to further develop a topic with related in-
formation, to expand it or to work it out in detail. It differs from an explana-
tion in the sense that an elaboration serves to add additional detail to a topic
under discussion rather than its primary aim being to clarify something. Nev-
ertheless, elaborations are critical contributions to explanations (Bransford &




to trigger collaborative knowledge construction are centered around elaborating
on topics (King, 1999; Chin & Brown, 2000).
Infer Technically speaking, inferencing is the act or process of deriving logical
conclusions from premises known or assumed to be true. However, an inference
is also any type of reasoning process in the form of ‘if X, then Y’. An inference
differs from an assumption in that it links a consequence to the assumption.
It is a critical conditional reasoning process (Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Stratford
et al., 1998; Chin & Brown, 2000; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; Goodwin &
Johnson-Laird, 2005), but, in practice, the form of inference is used for many
goals other than a logical deduction. For example, a prediction or hypothesis
is often formulated using the same if-then construction, without an explicit
mention of an expectation, which may nevertheless clearly be derived from the
context. However, it seems that constructing crude inferences from multiple
mental models is the most prevalent and robust way of inferential reasoning
(M. J. Roberts, 2000).
Integrate The process of integration essentially combines segregated units
into a whole, a unified system. One structured, coherent line of reasoning neces-
sary for full comprehension of a process or question results (McKeown & Beck,
2009). It is the essence of abstract, relational reasoning (Waltz et al., 2004;
Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2006; Megalakaki, Tijus, Baiche, & Poitrenaud,
2012). Many types of connections made are forms of relational integration,
such as causal relations, associations, means-ends analysis (Rasmussen, 1986)
and reconceptualisation (Klein & Jarosz, 2011). Nevertheless, if the observed
task is not specifically focused on a specific type of reasoning, it has proved
nigh impossible for us to observe the different types of relational integration on
such a detailed level, because participants simply do not use them so explicitly
in the flow of a discussion (Wilmont et al., 2012).
Rephrase Rephrasing, or paraphrasing, knowledge is to express something
either into simpler terms, different words or to change it from one form, func-
tion, or state to another. It may also serve to convert, transform or translate
ideas into a model of reality. However, an essential aspect is that the meaning
should never change. Paraphrasing is an essential indicator of whether an indi-
vidual has mastered knowledge and is able to put it to use on his own initiative
(Sins et al., 2005).
Summarise When drawing up a summary, one transforms previously stated
facts or statements into a comprehensive and usually brief recapitulation, which
should cover the essential meaning of what was said. It is another critical indi-
cator of whether generalisation over many concepts has succeeded, and hence
comprehension has been achieved (Feldman, 2003). Metacognitive frameworks
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also make use of summarisation to trigger comprehension monitoring (King,
1999; McKeown & Beck, 2009).
Verify A verification, or justification, or testing of a hypothesis, aims to
confirm, support or prove by a statement by providing attestation or evidence
in accord with the line of reasoning suggested by the statement. They provide
strength to arguments and help identify erroneous thinking or knowledge gaps
if they are properly grounded in concrete knowledge. This way, they are critical
problem solving skills (Pretz et al., 2003; Xun & Land, 2004) and are stimulated
in educational settings (Stratford et al., 1998; Chin & Brown, 2000; Hofstein
et al., 2005).
5.4 Executive Control
As discussed in Chapter 2, executive functions are a set of monitoring functions
over one’s own behaviour, primarily focusing on control and coordination of re-
sponses to input which might originate from the environment or from one’s own
thoughts (Logan, 1985; Brown, 1987; Lyon & Krasnegor, 1996; P. W. Burgess,
1997; Ylvisaker et al., 1998). This is achieved through processes such as in-
hibitory control, switching, working memory updating and monitoring (Miyake
et al., 2000). Executive functions lie at the heart of modelling. A modeller con-
tinuously engages in inhibition and switching as he performs such diverse tasks
as deducing and testing hypotheses on how model elements interact and select-
ing the relevant elements (Ross et al., 1975; Sins et al., 2005; Dawson & Guare,
2010). He must interpret and comprehend this information, and match his
own mental representation with what other modellers are saying and writing
(Gemino & Wand, 2003). He must be able to switch between different levels
of abstraction for viewing system structures and focus his attention on differ-
ent aspects of the problem in scope (Rasmussen, 1986; Wilmont et al., 2012).
And finally, he must regulate and monitor his selection in case of multiple
simultaneous inputs.
Moreover, modellers should not only monitor themselves, but also others
as the discussion progresses (Wilmont et al., 2012). This allows them to react
appropriately to other participants, providing them with information to inter-
pret. Either they should act, following the triggering of a monitoring response
upon detecting a discrepancy between information presented and their own
representation, or choose not to act if things are proceeding as desired. At
the end of the session, the modeller needs to relate the modelling goals and
the users’ needs to the model created to ensure final model quality (Sedera,
Rosemann, & Gable, 2002). Modellers are involved in a multitasking process
during which they need to maintain task focus, both of which are related to
strong executive control (P. Burgess, 2000; Stuss et al., 2003). Jeffery, Maes,




cesses in order to facilitate effective team functioning. For instance, teams
should learn to plan effectively, to communicate effectively, to define each oth-
ers’ roles, to learn about each others’ background, to develop techniques for
monitoring and feedback, and to develop communication rules.
When assessing executive control, we want to make sure we measure in-
tegral executive functioning rather than isolated abilities. This is because in
executive function deficits, certain abilities may be left intact but their inte-
gral functioning to produce useful performance may be compromised (Lezak
et al., 2012). Furthermore, each executive function is only as strong as the ex-
tent to which it has developed, implying they can grow stronger as a result of
training (McCloskey et al., 2009). For ecologically valid, behavioral assessment
of executive functions, several models exist. The main concept they share is
that the different dimensions of executive functioning are all facilitated by a
common underlying cognitive process, such as working memory, which allows
maintenance of a goal state, and active evaluation of the current state against
that goal state, to take place continuously (Miyake et al., 2000). Examples are
the Behavior Rating Inventory for Executive Functions (BRIEF) (G. A. Gioia,
Isquith, Retzlaff, & Espy, 2002) and educational assessment methods (Meltzer,
Pollica, & Barzillai, 2007; Dawson & Guare, 2010). All methods find their
origin in clinical tests of attention, executive functioning and frontal lobe func-
tioning. A comparison of the models is shown in Table 5.1 on the following
page. It is worth noting that in (Dawson & Guare, 2010), Sustained attention
is explicitly differentiated from Working memory to draw a distinction between
maintaining focus and remembering and manipulating information on the short
term. Both Time management and Goal-directed persistence are scales which
are not formally measured by any method in existence, because they are hard to
assess within the context of a single test. Nevertheless, in real settings such as
education and modelling, these are essential skills that will directly contribute
to task achievement.
5.5 Method
We first conducted exploratory interviews with modelling experts to verify
whether their notion of essential modelling skills matched with what theory
suggested to be essential modelling skills. The interviews were analysed in a
bottom-up fashion, using aspects of grounded theory. Then, we observed mod-
elling sessions in IT industry. A small sample of these sessions was analysed
for modelling skills in the same bottom-up way as the interviews. The results
from both the observations and the interviews were compared to the execu-
tive control models discussed above, from which a pilot observation scheme
resulted. This scheme was tested on four independent modelling sessions until
theoretical saturation was achieved, and revised to create a final observation
scheme. In this study, we focus on the level of the individual, who makes small
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(Meltzer et al., 2007)
Inhibit Response inhibition -
Self-monitoring - Self-monitoring
- Sustained attention -
Emotional control Emotional control -
Shifting Flexibility Shifting
Initiate Task initiation -










- Time management Prioritising
Table 5.1: A comparison of executive function models.
contributions to a group. We explicitly define our scope of modelling skills
as restricted to cognitive skills, as opposed to people or communication skills.
Interview data was collected from individuals working in the private sector.
Observation data was collected in a work setting in the collective sector. The
purpose of the outcome is to enable us to describe modelling performance in
terms of desirable and undesirable patterns of cognition.
Semi-structured Interviews
Five semi-structured interviews were conducted with experienced modelling
facilitators. Within this limited sample, we took care to include as much di-
versity as possible (Patton, 1999, 2002). The sample included one female and
four males: an enterprise architect, a business architect and two application
architects working for a Dutch bank, and a business engineer working for an
international IT company. An interview guide was prepared centred around
how the interviewees experience the facilitation of modelling sessions, what
they consider to be critical modelling skills, different types of stakeholder re-
sponses and how they deal with them. The researcher provided scenarios, such
as ‘what would you do if you notice a participant in your session who does
not manage to follow along’, to stimulate the interviewees to think about what
they would do or consider most important in such cases. All interviews were




with the researcher only probing if further information was desired, or to keep
the interviewees within scope.
The interviews were analysed directly from the audio files with Atlas.ti,
following a grounded theory approach. Transcription was bypassed because
the essential meaning was conveyed by the broader discussion of topics, not via
formulations on word level. Firstly, open coding was applied to the interviews
(Saldaña, 2009). No specific unit of analysis was defined, codes were assigned
to fragments of speech which the researcher considered representative for the
code in question. A few examples of codes assigned to utterances (translated
from Dutch) can be found in Table 5.2 on the next page. After open coding,
the codes were grouped during a phase of axial coding according to the emerg-
ing categories. An external review was applied to the results (Lincoln & Guba,
1985; Creswell, 1998): the process and results were discussed with an IT pro-
fessional who was competent in both the business engineering and architecture
domains.
Observations of Modelling Sessions
The next step was to observe modelling sessions in the real practice of IT, given
that real-life modelling is subject to many influences currently still unknown
to us. We purposely performed this inductive step without reference to the lit-
erature on modelling skills nor to the interviews, to find out whether we could
afterwards link the resulting modelling skill descriptions together as objectively
as possible. For both codebook construction and testing for theoretical satu-
ration, a total of seven modelling sessions were analysed. One session took
place at a Dutch bank and included an IT architect, a program director and a
program manager. No video recordings were allowed but the researcher wrote
up one elaborate report immediately after the session, describing actions by
session participants. Codes were assigned to those actions, and to described
responses by other participants. For example, the reported sentence of “MV
immediately began pointing out errors in the Archimate model, mostly pertain-
ing to teams that no longer existed or had been merged” was coded as error
monitoring.
The other sessions took place over the course of three months as part of
a larger IT project in a Dutch organization, active in the collective sector.
The sessions included a business analyst, a project leader, an architect and
a change manager. Camera and audio recordings were made with all partici-
pants’ consent. A camcorder was put up in a corner so that it would capture
as much of the scene as possible, without it being too obtrusive for the par-
ticipants. The researcher had been present at all sessions in a non-obtrusive
manner. Before the observations, the researcher had met and talked with all
participants to get to know them and get them accustomed to her presence. No
interventions were done during the sessions. The observations took place at the
organizations’ offices, and were typically rooms with whiteboards and brown
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Utterance Code Rationale
“We say okay, assume you
are leading a discussion about
how you as a company will
put your products in the mar-
ket, will you talk about the
distribution channels, you
talk about how you produce
it”
instantiate The interviewee describes the
concept of how to put prod-
ucts on the market and gives
more concrete examples, or
instances, of how to do this:
via distribution channels or
the way you produce the
product.
“That you went through it
properly yourself, that you
took out the essence and
that in advance, you shortly
present ‘this is it . . . this is
what I want to discuss with
you and eh . . . to then go





The interviewee talks about
how to prepare for a session:
being immersed in the details
of the situation and having
abstracted the essence of it so
that he is well prepared for
which key points to discuss.
“You have to follow a very
strict line when you begin to
denote things . . . on the other
hand you have to learn to let
go because the danger of mod-





The interviewee talks about
the difficulty of guarding
scope on the one hand, both
with regard to what to de-
note and how to denote it in a
model, and on the other hand
giving participants some free-
dom so that new interesting
issues might emerge.
Table 5.2: Examples of codes assigned to utterances during the interviews.
paper sheets attached to the walls. Participants were free to make sketches and
notes in this way. The final products were photographed, and resulting digital
documentation was also collected.
The recorded sessions were fully transcribed. We directly coded the ut-
terances of all participants using a grounded theory approach with Atlas.ti.
A phase of open coding was followed by two cycles of axial coding (Saldaña,
2009). During open coding, the unit of analysis was a participant’s full turn,
terminated only by an interruption or a natural reaction from another par-
ticipant. Pauses between utterances were taken to belong to a single turn
unless they exceeded 10 seconds. In addition to the emerging codes, each turn
was specifically assigned a level of abstraction, to monitor the flow of abstrac-
tion levels throughout the discussion. A certain amount of bias in formulating




ally, many new codes were formulated which did not appear as such in existing
literature. An example of a coded fragment (translated from Dutch) can be
found in Table 5.3 on the following page.
Who Utterance Codes Rationale
M2 “We do not achieve
the goal of the pro-
cess, then we can
very easily say that












In this fragment, M2
makes an if-then inference,
proposes the alternative
of changing the goal of
the process, but is at the
same time monitoring the
process goal by bringing
the discussion to goal
awareness. Finally, this
statement is made in very
abstract terms such as
‘goal’ and ‘process’. We
do not know exactly what
details are encompassed in
this.
M1 “No but maybe we
should also men-
tion the outcome of
the process . . . so







. . . complete and
timely registered
income information
. . . goal can also
be that we do not
















first of all an alternative to
the goal problem pointed
out by M2 in the previous
utterance. Also, M1 tries
to test his proposition by
making his notion of out-
put more specific. This is
immediately an instantia-
tion, an act of abstracting
to gain better understand-
ing. He starts on an ab-
stract level and lowers it to
a medium level, on which
we know more about the
output but still not on a
level of detail that talks
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M2 “Yes but then
we have a com-
pletely different
goal . . . and this
one . . . has nothing














Here M2 makes the incon-
sistency with M1’s notion
of output and the mod-
elling goal explicit, hence
both the inconsistency de-
tection and the goal mon-
itoring codes. He also
makes an inference by im-
plying that if M1’s notion
is true, then they have a
goal problem. He still talks
on an abstract level about
goals and income informa-
tion.
Table 5.3: Examples of codes assigned to a discussion fragment during the
observations.
Method Validity
To control for the researcher’s influence on the participants, we applied pro-
longed observation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Data was collected from the same
project for three months. The researcher had also been present at the of-
fice in between observations to socialise with the participants. Within these
three months, there were no significant changes to be noticed which might be
attributed to the researcher’s presence. In both the interviews and the ob-
servations, we included as many participant roles as possible. The researcher
observed the sessions from a cognitive perspective. The research objectives
had been made known to the organisations in abstract terms, but nothing had
been said about the specific variables in question to minimise influencing the
participants’ behaviour. Nevertheless, the cognitive perspective caused vari-
ables such as interpersonal communication and relations to be considered out
of scope for this study. All participants were experienced in the field of mod-
elling, although the domain was relatively new for them, given that the projects
had just started.
5.6 Results
After categorising the emerging codes from both the interviews and the obser-
vations, we examine how widely they occur within the context of the interviews
and observations. Then, we compare the categories to those found in the liter-
ature to construct a pilot observation scheme, which is revised and reapplied






































Table 5.4: An overview of the number of codes per category and the cumu-
lative groundedness of each category as resulting from the interviews and the
observations.
Categories
We classified the emerging codes into categories, or code groups, for both the
interviews and the observations. Table 5.4 shows an overview of the resulting
categories, comparing the number of codes per category (empirical variables)
and the so-called groundedness of the empirical variables. Groundedness refers
to the number of times each code appears in the real-world data. In Table 5.4
we show the cumulative groundedness: the number of times all codes in the
category have appeared in our data.
Interviews We can easily see that Monitoring is by far the most prominent
category, both in terms of codes and groundedness. This is followed by Ab-
straction and Reasoning processes.
Interestingly, Communication / People skills includes a similar number
of codes as Abstraction and Reasoning processes, but it has a much lower
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groundedness score. When we look at the interviews in which these codes are
grounded, they feature very prominently in only one interview. The others
make mention of the most generic Communication / People skills code, but
it seems that the architects differ in the degree of importance they assign to
this category. In this research, however, we will focus on the cognitive aspects
of modelling, and therefore this category will be considered out of scope for
future analyses conducted within the context of this study.
Another interesting category is Mental flexibility. Although it contains only
a single code, it has a relatively high groundedness score. The categories of
Goal orientation, Initiation / Exploration and Maintaining attention, on the
contrary, are all rather sparsely mentioned throughout the interviews. Poten-
tially this is because these are skills which are more unconsciously performed
during modelling. If modellers are not highly aware of them, it is unlikely that
they would discuss them elaborately during an interview.
Finally, the category of Modeller characteristics emerged. It consisted of
‘age’ and ‘experience with modelling’. While these are important influences,
they are to be taken as factors we need to control for while selecting samples
of modellers to observe, and will therefore not be continued as codes in the
developing codebook.
Observations Only Monitoring and Reasoning are broad categories contain-
ing many codes. The other categories appear quite specialised, containing only
two or three codes. If we then consider the cumulative groundedness scores, we
can see that Monitoring is by far the most strongly grounded category, followed
by Reasoning and then Abstraction.
Switching also has a relatively high groundedness score given that it con-
tains only two codes. It thus seems that switching is a specialised behaviour
that nevertheless occurs quite frequently during a discussion.
Goal orientation has the lowest groundedness score, but when we consider
the context in which the codes are assigned, it appears that once goals are
formulated, they are left to be and any action referring back to the goals is
moved to the Monitoring domain with codes such as ‘monitor goal’ or ‘reflect
process’. The same essentially holds for Initiation. Once a task has been
initiated, any further actions related to the task become part of the other
categories.
The categories of Inhibition and Working memory are difficult categories.
They are quite fundamental cognitive processes, and, as mentioned by Miyake
et al. (2000), are two of the most fundamental processes facilitating the more
complex executive functions. Given their facilitatory role in all complex cog-
nition, they are difficult to observe in their pure forms.
Interviews vs. Observations When we compare the number of codes re-




nificant different emerge from the Abstraction and Monitoring categories.
The main difference for Abstraction is that the interviewees talked mostly
about actions associated with abstraction, such as trouble switching between
abstraction levels, abstraction level monitoring, mapping concrete to abstract
knowledge. Such activities are essentially Monitoring and Switching activities,
applied to Abstraction in the case of the interviews.
The Monitoring category in the interviews is also highly elaborate compared
to the Monitoring category for observations. This is because interviewees de-
scribed many types of high-level monitoring behaviours and actions, such as
coherence, consistency, consequence, error, goal, quality, responsibility and un-
derstandability monitoring, many of which have significant semantic overlap
and are therefore not all observable as such in the observations.
For the other dimensions, however, the codes matched relatively well.
Pilot Observation Scheme
An overview of the resulting categories and codes obtained from the interviews
and the observations compared to the assessment items provided by existing
schemes described in the literature is provided in Table 5.5 on the following
page.
The categories in the pilot scheme can be defined as follows:
• Goal orientation: Any act relating to any goals of the modelling session.
These can for example be modelling goals, planning goals or organiza-
tional goals.
• Initiation: Any act relating to the start of a new task or discuss a new
topic.
• Working memory: Any act in which the modeller returns to a previ-
ously mentioned topic or repeats and manipulates previously mentioned
information.
• Switching: Any act relating to a switch in related topics or perspectives
without deviating from the main focus.
• Monitoring: Any act relating to monitoring the progress of the session,
the structure or content of the model, the way utterances are related to
set goals, comprehension of other modellers, guarding discussion scope
and error monitoring.
• Reasoning: Any process of considering multiple mental representations
in relation to each other.
• Abstraction: Any act of observing processes in more detail to gain
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Interviews Observations Literature Pilot Scheme





















Monitoring Monitoring Metacognition /
Monitoring
Monitoring













- - Time manage-
ment
-
- - Organisation -
- - Planning -
- - Emotional con-
trol
-
Table 5.5: A comparison of the categories from the interviews, observations
and literature study.
The categories of Goal orientation, Initiation, Working memory, Switching and
Monitoring, appear in the interviews, observations and the literature. It thus
seems justified to keep them as categories for the final coding scheme.
Response inhibition as measured by the items in the BRIEF or the edu-
cational models is extremely difficult to implement, as the educational models
are tailored to children whose inhibitory control is still developing, and most of
the BRIEF items, such as distractibility or impulsivity, are also not observable
in modelling sessions. Additionally, items such as inability to stop fidgeting,
classified as indicative of poor inhibition by the BRIEF, has also been implied
to stimulate creativity (Karlesky & Isbister, 2014) and may therefore carry a




broke off sentences halfway. This behavior appeared meaningless in the con-
text of modelling, therefore we follow (Meltzer et al., 2007) and do not include
inhibition as a separate category.
Reasoning and abstraction are both complex cognitive processes facilitated
to a significant extent by executive functions, but are not considered executive
functions themselves by existing measurement methods. In some studies, rea-
soning and abstraction are used as ways to observe executive function strength.
They are both critical processes in modelling, and therefore we will include
them in the coding scheme as the two main variables which will be examined
in relation to the different executive functions.
Communication/People skills and Modeller characteristics were factors peo-
ple only talked about in the interviews, when discussing their experiences from
a generalised point of view. When observing sessions, such factors cannot be
directly observed when the unit of analysis is defined as a single turn. There
thus seems to be no reason to include them.
The factors Time management, Planning, Organisation and Emotional con-
trol typically span an individual’s functioning across a great many tasks. Within
the context of a single modelling session, these factors were also not observable,
and hence we have decided to exclude them from the final coding scheme.
Final Observation Scheme
We applied the revised pilot observation scheme to four further modelling ses-
sions, taken from the same project, to achieve theoretical saturation.
Firstly, we found that coding Abstraction only in terms of concrete, medium
and abstract levels did not capture the essence of the variable. For example, a
modeler could be talking on a highly abstract level yet not be able to formulate
the type of elegant solution that would solve a modelling problem. Therefore,
we further refined Abstraction into semantic and relational abstraction, as in
(Christoff et al., 2009). Semantic abstraction refers to the inherent abstrac-
tion level of the words in an utterance, operationalised in terms of the extent
to which it can arouse a nonverbal mental image, and the extent to which it
refers to something that can be directly experienced with the senses (Paivio,
Yuille, & Madigan, 1968). Relational abstraction refers to the number of rela-
tions between the concepts discussed in an utterance (Christoff & Keramatian,
2007). In operational terms, this means that a concrete relation is a directly
perceivable relation on instance level. A first level encompasses one abstrac-
tion step in which two or more concrete instances are related to each other by
some way of comparison or transformation. A second level abstraction relates
two or more first level abstractions through comparison or transformation. To
the best of our knowledge, no higher abstraction levels than second level are
mentioned in the literature. In this way, it became clear that, for example,
semantically abstract concepts can be used in concrete relations, and that this,
if not instantiated, can easily hide poor comprehension.
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Secondly, we refined Reasoning into comparative and transformative reason-
ing processes. Transformative processes change the presentation of information,
but preserve the essence of its meaning. It includes rephrasing and summaris-
ing, but also instantiation and generalization, keeping the Abstraction category
purely for classifying the abstraction level of an utterance. Comparative pro-
cesses use two or more sources of input to derive some consequence for the next
step in the reasoning process. Examples are inferencing, verifying, assuming
and analogy. Furthermore, we merged codes which had significant semantic
overlap and were indistinct in practice, such as elaborate and explore.
Thirdly, we found that aspects of communication, such as different forms
of backchannelling, were after all critical to determine a modeller’s initial reac-
tion to a peer’s utterances. We hence added Communication as a supportive
category.
Finally, we found that goal-related utterances occur either within the con-
text of a monitoring act, such as monitoring previously set process goals, or a
planning act, such as articulating future session goals. Additionally, in these
sessions another participant made heavy use of other planning aspects such
as organising modelling progress and articulating future actions. Therefore,
we chose to eliminate Goal orientation as an independent category, to add a
Planning category into the coding scheme and to place the goal-related acts
under both Monitoring and Planning.
The final coding scheme thus consists of the following categories 1:
• Abstraction (Semantic, Relational),








For the development of our codebook we used data triangulation (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985) between interviews, observations and literature review. It was
particularly illuminating to see the difference in skills emerging from the inter-
views and the observations. During the interviews, people talk about a much




more abstract set of monitoring skills, because what people talk about spans
many individual experiences, and this has generalised to a rather abstract view
of what they are doing. On the contrary, during the modelling sessions the re-
searcher observes their actions directly. This yields two sets of complementary
codes of which the observation codes are a lot more concrete, and give insight
in the abstract processes described by the interview codes. It also illustrates
the need to monitor consistency between levels of abstraction on which codes
are formulated. Furthermore, external reviews (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) were
conducted with the final codebook results during two presentations for a pro-
fessional interest group of IT architects, and with an individual expert in the
field.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have described how we have developed a method to analyse
critical modelling skills, in particular abstraction, reasoning and certain execu-
tive control factors in real modelling sessions. We have compared results from
expert interviews, observations and the extensive literature on abstraction, rea-
soning and executive control to construct an observation scheme. The resulting
categories from the different data sources were remarkably consistent, of which
Abstraction, Reasoning and Monitoring were most prominently present. Ex-
amination of the relations between codes and consecutively occurring groups
of codes promises to provide insights in how psychological processes facilitate
collaborative modelling. In the next chapter, we will apply our method to a
larger sample of modelling sessions and perform a behavioural pattern analysis
on the results.
5.8 Discussion
Our results strongly suggest that some dimensions of executive control, in par-
ticular Monitoring and, to some extent, Switching, are more clearly observable
in this context than the more fundamental dimensions such as Inhibition, Work-
ing memory and Emotional control. This does not mean that the fundamental
processes do not play an important role, it simply shows that defects in the
fundamental processes are no longer so obvious in a working context as they
might have been when they were still developing in an educational setting, from
which most existing executive control frameworks originate. This includes ex-
periences which might very well be suppressed in a work context. Nevertheless,
this is indicative of appropriate inhibition given the context. In future studies,
we will therefore have to examine the relation between individual measures
of both fundamental and metacognitive executive functions, abstraction and
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The scope of this study was limited to making observable abstraction, rea-
soning and executive control processes in a real modelling setting. In future
work, we will analyse this dataset to come to actual patterns of modelling be-
haviour. A potential technique for this is process mining. When assigning the
quotations in Atlas.ti directly to the video fragment, one also has the dura-
tion of a cognitive process, and a process mining tool could then show how
long people engage in certain cognitive processes, and how they consecutively
follow up on each other. Analysis should also focus on the relations between
the different categories and individual codes to understand the collaborative
process of modelling. Which codes co-occur most frequently? What is the
effect of this cluster of behaviours on other modellers in the session? Do they
follow and continue the line of reasoning, or do they apply corrections? Can
consecutive, consistent behavioural patterns be deduced from this? It seems
logical that consecutive groups of utterances may form a meaningful unit of
analysis to find such patterns.
Finally, at the current stage of research, we have not been able to perform
inter-rater reliability tests, because our coding scheme is still in an early stage
of development and contains a lot of details, which both make it very difficult
to train other coders to use it. For this study, we used external reviews with
experts about the observation schemes and study results to strengthen validity.
In the following three chapters, we will apply our coding scheme to the full
observation dataset, which will give us better insights into which codebook
details are essential and which ones less so. But first, we continue in the next
chapter to study the full set of executive functions in the context of modelling






An analysis of Executive Functions in
Modelling Practice
“Truth is ever to be found in simplicity, and not in the multi-
plicity and confusion of things.”
Isaac Newton (1642 - 1727)




CHAPTER 6. AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS IN
MODELLING
Abstract
Problem Cognitive aspects like executive control, reasoning and ab-
straction have a crucial influence on modelling performance. Yet how are
executive functions used in practice?
Research Question How can the use of executive functions process
modelling sessions be characterised and what behavioural differences can
be observed?
Method In this case study we analyse observations of 3 modelling
sessions according to a coding scheme for behavioural observation of ex-
ecutive control, reasoning and abstraction. We complement the findings
with a qualitative analysis of the sessions using thick description.
Results We find that the modellers have unique styles in how they
use executive control, that there appears to be an implicit order in when
specific executive control processes are used, and that the use of executive
control alone does not guarantee modelling progress.
Conclusions Greater awareness of the effects of executive control use






What happens in terms of complex cognitive processes during the progres-
sion of a modelling session? High-quality modelling performance is associ-
ated with behaviours like reflection, elaborate relational reasoning, monitoring
model structure, monitoring goals, testing hypotheses and scoping of variables
(Shanks, 1997; Sins et al., 2005; Kramer, 2007; Mendling et al., 2012; Pinggera,
Zugal, et al., 2012; Wilmont et al., 2012). Low-quality modelling behaviour,
on the contrary, is characterised by a lack of the aforementioned behaviours
and a strong focus only on visible output (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Sins et
al., 2005).
As reviewed in Chapter 2, high-quality modelling behaviours show signifi-
cant overlap with executive control functions. Executive control is an umbrella
term for both fundamental cognitive operations that allow organised behaviour
to emerge, as well as complex metacognitive behaviours such as monitoring,
planning, reasoning and abstracting. The role of executive control in modeling
is still elusive, but has the potential to provide valuable insights in how to
optimise modeling training. In this chapter, we analyse the use of executive
functions in relation to the process quality variables shared understanding and
shared consent. We perform a comparative qualitative analysis of a small set of
modelling sessions in which we triangulate the results from applying the obser-
vation method developed in Chapter 5 with thick description analysis (Lincoln
& Guba, 1985).
Research Question
In this study we aim to answer subquestion 5:
How can the use of executive functions in process modelling
sessions be characterised and what behavioural differences can
be observed?
6.2 The Question of a ‘Good’ Model
What constitutes a high-quality model is subject to intense discussion. Differ-
ent types of human behaviour lead to a certain model quality, which can be
theoretically described. However, the ultimate goal of a model is to convey
a message to the stakeholders for whom it was made. If this is not mini-
mally achieved, one can question the relevance of all other aspects of model
quality. Additionally, how do we objectively determine what good modelling
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performance is, without assigning to ourselves the role of all-knowing mod-
eller? While in educational settings these differences might be more strikingly
observable (e.g., Sins et al., 2005), in professional settings with trained mod-
ellers the answer is not so clear-cut. We will use both insights from literature
about strong modelling performance with the qualitative analysis of the mod-
elling session context and the quality variables shared understanding and shared
consent to describe our results.
Shared Understanding and Consent
There is an extensive body of research on model quality, that is, the quality
of the final product (e.g. Lindland, Sindre, & Solvberg, 1994; Unhelkar, 2005;
Berenbach & Borotto, 2006; Krogstie, Sindre, & Jorgensen, 2006; Mohagheghi
et al., 2009). These studies emphasise generic properties such as understand-
ability (Ross et al., 1975; Mohagheghi et al., 2009; Moody, 2009; Mendling et
al., 2010; Cruz-Lemus et al., 2010), modifiability (Ross et al., 1975; Cant et
al., 1995; Mohagheghi et al., 2009), effectiveness (Duivenvoorde, Briggs, Kolf-
schoten, & de Vreede, 2009; Ssebuggwawo, Hoppenbrouwers, & Proper, 2010),
correctness (Mohagheghi et al., 2009; Mendling et al., 2010), reliability (Ross
et al., 1975), consistency (Ross et al., 1975; Mohagheghi et al., 2009), com-
pleteness (Ross et al., 1975; Mohagheghi et al., 2009), modularity (Ross et al.,
1975; Moody, 2009; Mendling et al., 2010) and abstraction (Ross et al., 1975).
Most of these important quality goals are related to the static content and
representation quality of the model, saying nothing about whether the model
has actually achieved its intended purpose. A model may be well-structured,
easily modifiable due to proper use of separable modules, entirely correct and
complete, but if the content itself does not make sense to the readers, the model
has failed. Thus, this type of model quality is by no means absolute. A model
of a lower quality which nevertheless receives consent of all stakeholders is a
better model than a high-quality one which no one understands. This is valid
because the context, the people involved and that which is socially accepted
among them ultimately determines what is correct (Wooffitt, 2005).
Therefore, one answer is that quality can never be objectively determined
without taking the context into consideration, in this case the modelling process
and the people performing it. The quality of any creative process can be
defined by studying the process, its content and the skills required (Basadur,
1995). The process is observable from the modellers’ interactions, during which
they reflect on content using their skills. For example, are they in agreement,
detecting inconsistencies, or are they indecisive? Whatever the process, to
create a model that conveys effective communication, modelers firstly need to
achieve the quality goal of shared understanding (Ross et al., 1975). Do they
comprehend that which is being expressed in their diagram? Secondly, shared
consent becomes relevant. Are modellers in agreement that the model meets
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its intended goals? In this study we limit modelling process quality to these
two goals.
Reasoning and Monitoring
High quality modelling performance, associated with reasoning and monitoring
(Sins et al., 2005; Somsen, 2007; Wilmont et al., 2012), may be said to either
lead directly to increased shared understanding and possibly consent, or lead to
a better model which facilitates shared understanding and consent. Reasoning
and Monitoring are the executive control processes most directly concerned
with manipulation of the content of the modelling discussion, and they likely
have intricate, bi-directional relations.
Reasoning facilitates the translation of domain knowledge into modelling
notation (Salles & Bredeweg, 2002) and makes the modeller consciously aware
of his domain knowledge (Mayer, 1989). Explanations, discussions about model
structure, hypothesis testing, interaction with peers, inconsistency detection
and prompts for model revisions are all correlated with strong modelling skills
(Sins et al., 2005). Using these processes to explain complicated mechanisms
helps to create metacognitive awareness of potential faulty logic behind a men-
tal model, facilitating attempts to correct it (Maier, 1937; King, 1999; Sins et
al., 2005; C. Schwarz et al., 2009).
Monitoring allows the modeller to pay attention to abstract goals and pro-
cedures (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Persson, 2001) and to keep the model struc-
ture in mind (Sins et al., 2005; Chuderska, 2010). Directly related to structure
is the ability to determine the relevant scope, which provides a focus for the
entire modelling process and allows the modellers to define their goals and pur-
poses (Flower & Hayes, 1981; Van Der Valk et al., 2007). This may contribute
greatly to shared understanding and consent.
Abstraction
In general, strong abstraction skills allow modellers to enhance their reason-
ing (Salles & Bredeweg, 2002). But how might we observe strong abstraction
skills? Christoff et al. (2009) show that the brain has dedicated areas for
responding to challenges on different levels of abstraction. They also demon-
strate that the higher the abstraction level on which reasoning is required, the
more brainpower it costs and the harder it is to perform the task. Modellers
use abstraction skills to actively connect generic concepts to concrete activi-
ties and objects through generalisation and instantiation (Theodorakis et al.,
1999). This allows a model to become meaningful, which is vital to comprehen-
sion (Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; Barreteau, 2003). Whether comprehension is
achieved typically requires acts of monitoring that relate concrete knowledge to
model structure, such as testing hypotheses and asking questions. Additionally,
concrete knowledge must be available in order to instantiate. The better the
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integrity of the memory representating this knowledge, the easier it is to form
an abstraction (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002). However, concrete knowl-
edge gaps can result in faulty conceptions of a domain, a failure to monitor
understanding and progress, and thereby hamper success at problem solving
(Brown, 1987; Feltovich, Spiro, Coulson, & Feltovich, 1996). Additionally, if
concepts turn out to be too abstract to understand, unconscious reduction of
abstraction level may take place by retreating to familiar mental structures,
relying on fixed procedures while working, and discussing specific examples
rather than a whole set (Hazzan, 2008).
Initiation and Switching
Initiation and Switching are not primarily concerned with manipulating the
content of the modelling discussion. Rather, they influence the structure of a
discussion, based on an abstraction of what the content is about, and whether
the discussion is moving towards its goal or not. So in essence, they can be
said to build on Reasoning and Monitoring.
Initiating a task can mean engaging in new topics, proposing new or alter-
native ideas and problem solutions or initiating a corrective action. It requires
a modeller to have a solid understanding of the situation at hand, and based
on that must judge whether the task he is about to propose is relevant or not.
The same argument can be made for switching focus during a modelling task.
Often, switching focus and initiating tasks go hand in hand. These strategies
can prevent a modeller from getting stuck on problem features or missing out
relevant opportunities (King, 1999; Lehrer & Schauble, 2000; Dawson & Guare,
2010). The challenge about observing Initiation and Switching is to determine
where the action happens, and whether the action is deemed relevant by the
other session participants.
Planning
This is a metacognitive skill building on all other executive functions to guide
the modelling process and consecutive actions. It requires a proactive attitude,
which means that the modeller should anticipate to prepare for, intervene in or
control an expected occurrence or situation, especially a complex one (D. Lee
et al., 1995). It stands to reason that planning skills, given that they require an
overview of the situation, would be related to having stronger executive control
skills in the other domains as well.
From this literature overview, we deduce the following questions to guide
data analysis:
• How are instances of the Reasoning, Monitoring, Abstraction, Initiation




• How can individual use of Reasoning, Monitoring, Abstraction, Initiation
and Switching be characterised?
• How is Planning used in relation to Reasoning and Monitoring in a mod-
elling session?
• How can the process of achieving shared understanding be characterised
in terms of executive control processes in a modelling session?
• How can the process of achieving shared consent be characterised in terms
of executive control processes in a modelling session?
6.3 Method
This is an inductive, qualitative study, centred around the individual, who
makes small contributions to a group. We analyse our data from two different
perspectives. We begin with an in-depth analysis of modelling session frag-
ments according to the guiding questions formulated above. These manually
selected fragment represent interesting episodes with regard to our variables.
Secondly, we analyse the occurrences of the cognitive processes using occur-
rence counts. This will provide complementary insights to the results from the
in-depth analysis.
Observation Context
Data was collected within the context of a series of unstructured observations
of modelling sessions, performed for six months in 2011 within a Dutch or-
ganisation in the collective sector. The organisation’s task was to monitor
retirement funds. The researcher spent time at the company both during and
outside of the modelling sessions, to get to know the participants and observe
them in different settings. Observations were entirely passive, no interventions
were done. Project goals were to chart the organisation’s business processes,
currently executed mostly by hand, and to design new ones for the purpose of
automation.
Participants and Sessions
For the scope of this study, we include three modelling sessions performed
by three experts in different configurations: the project leader, the business
analyst and the lead architect. They were externally hired from different com-
panies and had between 2 - 5 years of relevant experience in business analysis.
Modelling sessions lasted for 1-2 hours each, with a minimum group size of two.
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Data Collection
Sessions were recorded in video format with the participants’ consent. Further-
more, written documentation resulting from sessions was collected and photos
of the final models were taken to complement the session recordings. The
sessions took place in rooms equipped with a beamer and a flip chart board.
The models under discussion had been printed and put up on the walls. These
external working memory offloading opportunities were used extensively. Inter-
action during the session was not explicitly structured. Models were adapted
and contradictory issues discussed.
Data Analysis
For the scope of this study, we performed an in-depth qualitative analysis of
three sessions, held on a single day on the same topic. This particular day was
chosen because it included the greatest diversity in roles and capacities. The
sessions were performed by the project leader, the business analyst and the
lead architect, in different configurations. We first coded the dataset and then
applied thick description to relevant episodes. We present the results of this
analysis as relations between the codes, as they are supported or contradicted
by the detailed episode descriptions.
Coding All recordings were fully transcribed, loaded into Atlas.ti and coded
using the coding scheme described in Chapter 5. The unit of analysis rep-
resented by a single quotation was a participant’s full turn, terminated only
by an interruption or a natural reaction from another participant. Pauses be-
tween utterances were taken to belong to a single turn unless they exceeded 10
seconds. Each quotation was assigned a selection of the following codes:
• a unique identifier for the modeller
• a level of relational abstraction
• a level of semantic abstraction
• instances of the reasoning, monitoring, planning, initiation or switching
groups
Semantic and relational abstraction were compulsory for every quotation
including more than backchannelling or responses consisting of simply ‘yes’ or
‘no’. Instances of the other groups were assigned as was deemed relevant. After
coding, the total number of occurrences of codes were counted and compared




Thick Description In order to complement the coded dataset with con-
textual data, interesting episodes were manually selected from the sessions.
Initially, we observed the sessions sequentially and marked where the discus-
sion changed focus. Each change in focus marked the end of an episode and the
beginning of a new one. It appeared that in terms of main focus, the modellers
were either searching for shared understanding, or engaged in a constructive
modelling flow. Each fragment was then subjected to thick description (Lincoln
& Guba, 1985), from which subtypes of the main focus categories emerged. We





• What is remarkable about this episode?
• What precedes the episode?
• Relation to episode events?
• What follows the episode
• Relation to episode events?
• Do they achieve shared understanding? How does this become apparent?
• Do they achieve shared consent (explicit agreement)? How does this
become apparent?
• Fragment lead
The characterisation tag is a one-line summary of the episode based on the
episode description, which emerged during analysis and was reused whenever
possible for similar episodes. The aspects of interest in relation to executive
control, reasoning or abstraction were explicitly recorded. For the purpose of
context, events preceding and following aspects of interest were noted. ‘Frag-
ment lead’ refers to the person who mostly leads the discussion. In total,
22 relevant episodes were selected from the sessions; 15 from the first session
with all 3 modellers, 4 from the second session with the lead architect and the
project leader, and 3 from the third session involving the business analyst and
the project leader. The shortest episode lasted 1:52:43 minutes, whereas the
longest episode has a duration of 24:22:24 minutes.
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Method Validity
We apply unstructured observation because studying a complex skill like mod-
elling in isolation in a laboratory does not generalise well to a real situation in
which the same skill is applied (Singleton, 1978, pp. 36). Validity threats in-
clude oversimplification for ease of measurement, removing true incentives for
performing a skill optimally and isolating skill performance from its context.
This is significant because the context dictates what is socially accepted and
what is not (Wooffitt, 2005). Furthermore, coding and thick description are
triangulated to get a richer, context-based picture of what happens in mod-
elling sessions, how participants interact and how executive functions are truly
used.
6.4 Results
Summaries of the descriptions of all session episodes can be found in the
chapter appendix (Section 6.7 on page 161). They are structured according
to the guiding questions formulated in Section 6.2 on page 141.
In the qualitative analysis, the main discussion types we observed were Search
for shared understanding (12 episodes) and Constructive modelling flow (10
episodes). Within either of these categories there are different subtypes, as
shown in Table 6.1 on page 151. Once shared understanding is sufficiently
achieved, a constructive knowledge-building discussion follows. In this section,
we continue to answer the questions formulated in Section 6.2 on page 141,
based on the results from the coded analysis and the thick description analysis.
An example of a thick description fragment can be found in Table 6.2 on
page 150, the summaries in Section 6.7 on page 161. The coding results are
shown in Figures 6.1 on page 152, 6.2 on page 153 and 6.3 on page 154. These
graphs are grouped per session, and show the number of code occurrences for
each executive control group. It should be noted that the vertical axes, which
show the number of occurrences, have a different scale in each graph, because













AR explains on a concrete mixed with medium
level how he sees the new situation (“I did not re-
ceive images of Pamela Anderson, I did not receive
music files, I got a good, up-to-date file, even in the
case of a paper version, the structure suffices [. . . ]
this is the first step, in the second step I will do re-
lation checks within the files I received”), asks BA
and PL explicitly to comment on it afterwards(“I’m
going to speak very fast, you must comment on it
afterwards”). PL confirms with an example. AR
continues to explain (concrete + medium). They
get to an issue with timing and GBA. BA provides
information about how it may work, time-wise (“we
have understood that in another process, there is a
direct web-based link between your portal and GBA,
so that you can literally get information real-time,
within one second, from GBA, do I know this per-
son. Otherwise, in case of an upload [. . . ] it will be
something like 5 minutes, 15 minutes, night batch
processing, I don’t know”). AR and BA exchange
information in concrete terms and build on each
other (“If that is so, we must think about what you
will do about the availability of your systems, your
portal, it will depend on the availability of backof-
fice databases . . . are you going to bring them to
the front?”). They appear to have shared under-
standing because there are no correction acts, no
questions and they continue on the topic they have
started. The conversation flows logically. BA re-
fines and provides additional information relevant




BA and AR really build on each other’s input.
What precedes
the episode?
The correction of PL’s abstraction failure
Relation to
episode events?
Does not appear to influence AR’s explanations
What follows
the episode?




The question relates to the GBA issue they had
been discussing in this episode
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Yes, BA and AR confirm each other and visibly
work with each other’s input. This is not possible if







Implicitly, because there are no contradictions
Fragment lead AR, who gives lead to BA when BA appears to
have superior knowledge




Search for shared under-
standing
Constructive modelling flow
Goal setting 1 Dynamic discussion 4
Abstraction issue 6 Evaluation of monitoring act 1
Monitor comprehension 3 Verification of assumptions 3
Sharing perspectives 2 Knowledge structuring 2
Table 6.1: Occurrences of each of the discussion subtypes.
1. How are instances of the Reasoning, Monitoring, Abstraction, Ini-
tiation and Switching groups used in a modelling session? We found
the use of these executive control processes to differ with the phase of the
discussion and the modellers’ goals. However, we observe several prominently
recurring patterns. Firstly, the use of instantiation with highly concrete ex-
amples works successfully to clarify complex issues. However, this requires the
modeller to have a structured mental model of the context, and sound working
memory capacity to make assumptions to fill up potential mental model gaps.
This strategy fails if the modeller does not have a solid mental model. He will
be able to perform the strategy but the content will not be relevant. Secondly,
the Reasoning processes of Inference, Instantiate and Case discrimination are
favourites, as well as the Monitoring processes Refine peer, Reflect and Test
proposition (compare Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). These processes combined are
used explicitly to ensure that all are still on the same track. Thirdly, Monitoring
processes like Scoping, Inconsistency detection and Refine peer are mostly used
once comprehension of both content and context has been achieved. Fourthly,
rephrasing information and using it in a new line of reasoning is a good way
to ensure that comprehension is truly achieved. Still, rephrasing alone is not
enough to bring out potential inconsistencies in comprehension. Fifth, the
modeller initiating the most model writing is often the same person who is in
the lead and has the best mental model at that time. Finally, extensive use of
Switching processes may point to a deviation in focus. Therefore, evaluation of
context with Monitoring processes and Reasoning processes such as Instantiate
and Rephrase is crucial when discussing switches.
2. How can we characterise individual use of Reasoning, Monitor-
ing, Abstraction, Initiation and Switching? A total of three participants
across three sessions were observed. The architect showed a clear leading role,
expressing a lot of structure and working in a highly goal-oriented fashion. He
was the only one to speak of goals at the start of a session. He frequently
used Inference, Explain, Case discrimination and Instantiate, used Abstrac-
tion flexibly and functionally, to test hypotheses and to create comprehension
of the generic context. Interestingly, he uses the least concrete relations and
concepts, although for the concepts, this difference is negligible. It could be
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because he uses his concrete concepts only in very specific cases, when trying
to clarify something. He was the only one to continuously monitor his peers’
comprehension, paid attention to Scoping, and would not continue with the
discussion until he was satisfied, even if it cost a lot of extra time. He made
effective use of model writing, and whenever his mental model was incomplete,
he would make and test assumptions to fill the gaps (compare Figures 6.1, 6.2
and 6.3).
The business analyst began sessions by silently processing information, but
once he detected an inconsistency or had achieved comprehension of some-
thing, he would immediately tread prominently to the foreground and take the
lead. He effectively uses Monitoring processes, and is particularly strong on
Test proposition and Scoping, along with Inference, Instantiate and Explain,
to explain himself and to safeguard the relevance of all that was being dis-
cussed. He too monitored his own and his peers’ comprehension well, albeit
not as often or as explicitly as the architect. He did use model writing effec-
tively, particularly in the session without the architect. Both higher-level and
concrete abstractions were used easily and effectively.
The project leader showed the least functional Reasoning and Monitoring
of all participants, but appeared to be in continuous search of comprehension
by asking questions, proposing alternatives and offering input, waiting for his
peers to provide confirmation, refinement or rejection. Many times, his in-
put was unstructured and came as a surprise to his peers. He uses Elaborate,
Rephrase and Test proposition significantly more often than his peers. Unfor-
tunately, Elaborate invited him to deviate from the topic. Rephrase and Test
proposition were used in to try and comprehend explanations by peers, but not
actively on his own initiative to provide a contribution. His use of Abstraction
was curious, making instantiations with semantically abstract concepts, which
bypassed the point of hypothesis testing. Although his actual use of executive
control processes does not differ significantly from the others, it is remark-
able that his contributions appear to have the least impact on the discussion,
even slowing it down, receiving continuous corrections and refinements from
his peers, which he accepts. However, in quite a lot of instances, he still fails
to use the new knowledge in future utterances.
3. How is Planning used in relation to Reasoning and Monitoring
in a modelling session? In all three sessions, Planning had only a minimal
role in the session, only becoming relevant towards the end when decisions
about the follow-ups of the session had to be made. Occasionally, a future act
would be formulated during the session, and during one session goal planning
was done at the start of the session, by the modeller with the strongest mental
model. It appears that Planning requires a form of structure and an activated
mental goal. If doing this at the start of a session, it implies that the modeller
is strong in structuring and aware of his goals. However, it appears that the
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end of the session is the most natural moment to engage in acts of planning.
For one, the primary goal of shared understanding has been achieved, and a
complete structure has been formed. Also, at the end of the session the need to
formulate next steps is most pressing, so there is an external stimulus as well.
The architect was strongest on Planning aspects (compare Figures 6.1, 6.2 and
6.3), which is consistent with his continuous leading role in the sessions.
It is interesting to observe that acts of planning are not accompanied by
Reasoning or Abstraction processes, but that they seem to use the abstracted
results of prior Reasoning processes for the formulation of future action or
evaluating and structuring their current modelling progress. Thus, Planning
appears to have little influence on the content of the modelling discussion,
and is truly a metacognitive process that uses the input from more fundamen-
tal executive functions in a more abstract overarching structure. This makes
Planning stand slightly apart from the other processes, as even Initiation and
Switching are used in the flow at a discussion to influence the eventual outcome.
4. How can the process of achieving shared understanding be charac-
terised in terms of executive control processes in a modelling session?
Shared understanding appears to be the main, if often unspoken, goal of every
session. As long as any single modeller in the group senses a discrepancy in
comprehension, the entire discussion will be geared towards achieving a uni-
form idea, even if it thoroughly disrupts the flow of the session and takes up a
lot of time. Most surprisingly, the modellers even went to great lengths to ex-
plain issues if they had already been marked as irrelevant. However, as long as
the modellers are still searching for shared understanding, the discussion is less
structured, many options are being explored, modellers are making alternative
proposals, or simply be silently processing information. It appears as though
Reasoning is less prominently used when the modellers are indecisive and hes-
itant. If the mental model is not clear, Instantiation and Monitoring processes
are used in order to fix the mental model, after which Reasoning and the use of
higher abstraction levels can take place. Planning, Initiation and Switching do
not yet have any role during this phase. However, if some have achieved shared
understanding and others not, highly concrete instantiations of the aspects un-
der discussion are made to clarify issues. Occasionally, generalisation is also
used to draw a more complete picture of the situation. During these moments,
abstraction switches become most clearly visible. Once shared understanding
has been achieved, those with a strong mental model become very structured,
make notes, draw diagrams on flip charts and engage in constructive discus-
sions using a wide variety of Reasoning and Monitoring processes in particular.
Abstraction switches to higher levels to create context are more prominently





5. How can the process of achieving shared consent be characterised
in terms of executive control processes in a modelling session? In
all three sessions, achieving shared consent remained implicit for most of the
session. The only clues we can observe are the fact that the discussion always
continues until all participants either explicitly agree or do not explicitly dis-
agree. As consent becomes related to Planning issues such as next steps or
representation of models to stakeholders, it does become more explicitly visi-
ble, as modellers make proposals and ask for explicit confirmation. Thus, in a
sense we could say that consent follows from understanding, and that any act
of asking for confirmation or proposing something in a questioning tone is in
fact a prompt for testing shared consent.
Result Validity
Due to time and budget constraints, no inter-rater reliability could be com-
puted. This analysis thus relies on triangulating thick description and coding
as its main validity measure (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), so that both analyses
may show complementary insights. Additionally, we discussed the results with
an external expert in the field.
6.5 Conclusion
In this study we have examined how executive functions are used in process
modelling sessions and what behavioural differences were observable. This
study is the first of a set of three studies aiming to generate working hypothe-
ses about how reasoning and executive control are being used in modelling
sessions, and how they may influence session progress and the final outcome.
We make no claims about generic truths. That said, it was highly insightful to
compare a bottom-up, qualitative description of the sessions, rich with context,
with a more analytical analysis of the sessions using the codebook. Obviously,
the observation of executive control process use alone does not differ between
qualitative description or coding, but the context in which the process is used
and the effect it has on the session is only visible in a qualitative description.
This adds a valuable dimension to the evaluation of modelling strategies. From
our analysis, four main patterns of behaviour involving executive function use
emerged, around which all findings could be grouped. We describe them below.
Pattern 1: Semantic and Relational Abstraction do not necessarily
correlate. We observe that simply speaking on a high semantic abstraction
level is not necessarily accompanied by purposeful use of abstraction. The
project leader in particular uses medium and abstract semantic concepts elab-
orately, but mostly in the context of either concrete or first-level relational
abstraction. This discrepancy in itself is not problematic, but in the project
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leader’s case these occurrences are continuously accompanied by peer correc-
tions. Also, given that he rarely instantiates to a concrete level but also rarely
uses second-level relations, it suggests that his comprehension is not yet opti-
mal. According to the relativity property of abstraction, what is abstract may
be perceived as concrete once it is understood and frequently used (Arnheim,
1969). Using abstract concepts may make it easier to make a process sound
coherent, but a prerequisite for this is a solid understanding of the concept and
its implications. Thus, in cases of suboptimal comprehension, this discrepancy
could be a coping strategy, implying that the modeller is speaking abstract
words without truly being aware of their meaning. When examining abstrac-
tion skills, it may therefore be more meaningful to consider relational level
abstraction as indicator for abstraction skills, including switches in semantic
abstraction levels accompanied by generalisation or instantiation. Addition-
ally, given that the use of all abstraction levels varies a lot between the sessions
and the participants, we will perform a further analysis of our abstraction data
in the next chapter.
Pattern 2: The use of Executive Control alone does not necessarily
correlate with modelling progress. In educational frameworks, such as
(King, 1997; Sins et al., 2005), and many other executive control observation
frameworks like (McCloskey et al., 2009; Dawson & Guare, 2010), it appears to
be enough to pinpoint the occurrence of the behaviour to conclude something
about the quality of an individual’s entire strategy. In our study, this did
not always appear to be the case. For the business analyst and the architect,
their goal-oriented, structured behaviour was clearly reflected in their use of
executive control. However, for the project leader, this was less so. He did
talk a lot, and in doing so, used just as many executive control processes as his
peers. However, when examining the context of his utterances, in many cases
they were refined, corrected or sometimes declared out of scope. They were not
being used to further the knowledge building process. The interesting thing is
that there are no clear key processes to be pinpointed that he uses differently
than the others that might explain his less effective behaviour. The only clues
might be that he is much less focused on Scoping than his peers, and uses a
lot of Elaborate which allows him to go off topic. So it is crucial to monitor
the content of the utterances and their effects on the discussion in addition
to which processes are used. Whether this can efficiently be integrated in an
observation method is an open question.
One difference with existing executive control frameworks might be that
they all originate from educational research involving children who are still
developing executive functions. It might be that adults have learned how to
use them regardless of cognitive capacity, but that cognitive capacity is reflected




Pattern 3: There appears to be an implicit order in the use of Ex-
ecutive Control. In all sessions, there appeared to be a generic tendency to
use Reasoning and Monitoring processes as the primary executive functions.
Most of the sessions were geared towards achieving shared understanding, and
Reasoning and Monitoring contribute most directly to that goal. Switching
and Initiation were sporadically used during the discussions when necessary,
but mostly only after shared understanding had been achieved about a topic.
This might make sense, given that you can only consider something in relation
to other things once you have comprehended it. This also allows higher ab-
stractions to be made. Planning only appeared before or after the discussions,
as the most metacognitive process of all, to set goals for the session in question
or future sessions.
Pattern 4: Shared understanding seems of primary importance to
strong modellers. It was interesting to see how frequently shared under-
standing was prioritised over efficiency, even though efficiency is considered a
significant process quality goal (Ross et al., 1975). In many cases, it was ap-
parent that no knowledge building for the overall discussion would be achieved
by giving detailed explanations of irrelevant utterances, but to those who were
leading the discussion, creating a solid understanding of why the utterance was
irrelevant in relation to the entire discussion was more important than wav-
ing it away and achieving quick progress. Especially in the light of achieving
shared consent, which follows from understanding, this is desirable strategy.
6.6 Discussion
In this study we have used a combination of coding and contextual thick
description to investigate the use of executive control and abstraction in 3
modelling sessions. We found initiation to co-occur frequently with leading
behaviour, and the use of executive control, in particular combinations of rea-
soning and monitoring, to differ mostly between phases in which shared under-
standing was being searched for, or achieved already. Also for abstraction is
was clear that switches in abstraction level, with intensive use of Instantiation
to test examples and sometimes also Generalise to guard the overview, co-
occurred mostly with working towards shared understanding phases. Planning
was most often used after sessions. Shared consent remained implicit. Individ-
ual differences were noticeable in the extent to which lead-taking, structuring
and goal-orientation were displayed, as well as peer monitoring, information
processing time and purposefulness of reasoning and monitoring use. Also with
regard to corrections and deviations, it was clear who was doing the correct-
ing and who was being corrected. These results are meant to describe initial
observation trends, which have to be subjected to further analysis with more
sessions to see if there is any further support for them.
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With regard to our data gathering methods, threats to validity of unstruc-
tured observation in natural settings include uncontrolled or unanticipated in-
fluences. Social relations, opinions of others’ functioning, project demands and
intrinsic motivation, for example, could influence the modelling behaviour ob-
served. Although we explicitly exclude them from the scope of our research, we
did take care to denote social talk, both during sessions and during break times,
which might reveal something about unanticipated influences so we could con-
trol for them during data analysis. The only undesired influence we observed
was a slightly negative perception of one of the participants’ functioning among
the other participants. However, this was never discussed with the participant
in question, and he did not behave as though he felt in any way intimidated
or undesired by his colleagues. To counter such influences, we triangulate be-
havioural counts with qualitative analysis, and we followed the participant for
the entire project duration of 3 months, in different settings and group con-
figurations. This allowed us to get a better grasp on consistency of behaviour
and how participants influence each other.
For analysis, we used a predefined executive functions scheme, based on
both prior observations and the enormous existing body of literature on the
topic. However, using a predefined scheme carries a risk of missing relevant
aspects, and it does not provide a level of detail that allows one to see how con-
secutive interactions between participants lead to certain outcomes. Therefore
we triangulated the code counts with thick description, so that the context in
which codes were assigned would not be lost. Non-random selection of episodes
carries a risk of bias, but in this case we were particularly interested in the mo-
ments of disagreement or active peer refinement as opposed to a well-structured
discussion flow to see how abstraction and executive functions were used. For
the purpose of hypothesis generation, we considered this to be acceptable.
Thus, the main limitations of this study are the small sample and the
risk of researcher interpretation bias. To further mitigate these effects, we
will continue to study our four patterns in consecutive chapters, increasing
the sample of observations and the body of results to further discuss with
experienced practitioners. In the next chapter, we will examine P1 and P4 in







Participants: Project leader, Lead architect, Business ana-
lyst
Purpose: To describe a process flow
Nr. of episodes: 15
Discussion subtypes: Goal setting (1), Abstraction issue (6), Dy-
namic discussion (3), Evaluation of monitor-
ing act (1), Monitor comprehension (2), Veri-
fication of assumptions (2)
Session 10:
Participants: Project leader, Lead architect
Purpose: To explain a domain concept to the project
leader
Nr. of episodes: 4
Discussion subtypes: Monitor comprehension (1), Sharing perspec-
tives (1), Verification of assumptions (1), Dy-
namic discussion (1)
Session 3:
Participants: Project leader, Business analyst
Purpose: To agree on what and how to present several
models to stakeholders
Nr. of episodes: 3
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Summaries of the Episode Descriptions
Visualisations of executive control process use can be found in Figure 6.1 on page 152 for Session
2, Figure 6.3 on page 154 for Session 3 and Figure 6.2 on page 153 for Session 10.
How are instances of the Reasoning, Monitoring, Abstraction,
Initiation and Switching groups used in a modelling session?
Session 2 The session begins with a search for shared understanding. The architect imme-
diately takes the lead and initiates a process of goal setting. In this session, he appears to be
the only one referring to goals in the processes of Articulate session goals and Monitor process
(sub)goal. He starts with a task inventory and division, and also immediately starts with Initiate
model writing. Mostly, existing processes and earlier choices are discussed and charts studied.
Also, Monitoring processes are heavily used by the business analyst and the architect, such as
Scoping, Refine peer, Reflect process flow, Inconsistency detection and Test proposition. Rea-
soning processes are mostly Elaborate, Explain and Inference, which matches with an exploratory
discussion aimed at finding a common understanding. Not much is happening with abstraction
yet. Some Instantiations are made, and mostly they speak on semantically abstract and medium
levels. They do not yet appear to have a sufficiently detailed mental model that allows for concrete
scenarios to be used for testing.
The search for shared understanding continues. However, two episodes of Abstraction is-
sues follow. Both give very accurate demonstrations of the crucial importance of Instantiate and
continuous explicit monitoring for achieving shared understanding of complex abstractions. Mon-
itoring processes used are pretty straightforward: Reflect process content and Test proposition.
Reasoning starts to play a more important role. The architect explains using Analogy, Case dis-
crimination and Inference, and continuously uses Instantiate. He also makes explicit connections
between the process under scrutiny and related context processes. The project leader continuously
reformulates what he has heard to verify his understanding, but curiously he tends not to finish his
sentences and not make the connections between concepts. This cycle of explaining in increasing
levels of detail and reformulation happens three times during each of these two Abstraction issue
episodes before the participants are satisfied. Interestingly, while the architect instantiates, start-
ing with semantic abstract to medium concepts, and then continuing from medium to concrete
concepts, the project leader does not appear to be able to reformulate using the concrete concepts.
He continues to speak in abstract and medium terms, therefore it is difficult to verify whether
he has truly made the connection between the abstract relation and the concrete test scenario.
However, in both cases the architect keeps prompting for reformulations and refining until he can
confirm with confidence.
Then, a lengthy dynamic discussion follows, mostly between the architect and the business
analyst. The architect very clearly explains the process in medium terms, uses more abstract terms
to explain related aspects and then instantiates and tests his propositions with concrete examples.
The business analyst follows in the medium-level explanations, and actively scopes, rephrases and
confirms. No corrections are made, and each utterance builds logically on the previous one.
Another Abstraction issue follows in which the project leader is corrected with concrete argu-
ments by the architect. This issue passes quickly though, and hardly distracts the architect at all
from the process flow explanation he was doing. The dynamic discussion continues with a similar
flow as before. The business analyst occasionally leads the discussion as his knowledge becomes
superior to that of the architect, with lots of concrete examples and refinement of the architect’s
responses.
Then another Abstraction issue follows in which the project leader is tested more explicitly
than before. He tries to verify his understanding by mentioning what he thinks is an inconsistency.
The business analyst asks him to explain himself. He uses a medium-level example for this. The
architect corrects him with a highly concrete example and the project leader agrees and even fur-
thers on it. The business analyst continues to monitor this example in an evaluation of monitoring
act, whether it will truly happen like that in practice, providing a counter-scenario. All agree,
and the architect relates it to the process design, to future actions that it should be checked and
monitors everyone’s comprehension.
Then a topic change is initiated out of the blue by the project leader, in which he implies that
he does not understand something. The discussion returns to a search for shared understanding,
in which the business analyst explains on a medium and concrete level what monitoring process
they are talking about. This time, refining is done through generalisation to other processes. The
business analysts scopes, concluding that these details are not relevant at that moment. All agree
and they return to the former discussion.
By now the architect and the business analyst seem to share a vision, but the project leader’s




business analyst becomes very sharp in his scoping actions, and also starts to monitor time. Again
highly concrete explanations work to resolve the project leader’s issues. Another abstraction issue
follows. The project leader introduces another related but irrelevant aspect, and it corrected in
scope with concrete explanations. It is curious how continuous scoping and relational errors in his
mental model lead to the myriad of distracting abstraction issues, which nevertheless have to be
resolved before the discussion can continue.
Then, they come to a part of the process design about which they have no certainty in terms of
domain knowledge. The architect starts making assumptions through inferences, and the business
analyst refines and continues them. He discovers a discrepancy and resolves it immediately. They
explicitly confirm their assumptions given the current state of events. The architect continues with
a new task step, in which the set of assumptions just made is being used. The project leader asks
how a certain concept is related to the task step, and the architect and the business analyst explain
that that is exactly what they had just been discussing. Again, concrete explanations result in no
further questions.
The architect and the business analyst then finish off the session by verifying the process
design. The business analyst provides many additional details and they compare identical flows by
abstracting and generalising. The context is created around what they had been discussing during
the session. They relate this to what to discuss the following day, and they end with explicit
agreement.
Session 10 In the first episode, the architect starts with an explanation in which the Reason-
ing processes of Case discrimination and Inference are used. When wrapping up his explanation,
he uses Integrate to put everything into perspective. During this explanation, he uses Initiate
task and Initiate model writing. He uses the Monitoring functions of Monitor peers’ compre-
hension,Reflect process flow, Confirm and Refine peer, and finally towards the end maps the
process they have been discussing to the existing model. He also makes use of the Switching pro-
cess Discuss related aspect. He starts with a concrete explanation, then he generalises to higher
abstraction levels, and finally instantiates back to concrete again. His relational and semantic
abstraction levels follow each other nicely. The project leader responds with the Reasoning pro-
cesses of Elaborate and Inference, after which he monitors himself using Test proposition. He
describes the relations on a concrete, directly describable level, but nevertheless uses semantically
abstract words. He is confirmed and refined by the architect. The project leader then rephrases
the architect’s explanation, and this time does not make a relation but only uses medium abstract
level words. He switches to another aspect as well, but is refined by the architect.
The second episode is still very much a search for shared understanding, but this time sharing
different perspectives is more central to the discussion. The project leader being by asking a
question and uses Inference. The architect refines him and presents his own viewpoint, explaining
in very concrete terms, and testing his propositions and verifying them along the way. As he speaks,
he uses drawings on a flip-chart to support his explanations. He generalises his explanation. As
the architect writes, the project leader tries to verify and reflect on the process with an example
from the prior discussion, which had already been labelled as irrelevant. The architect contradicts
him explicitly this time, explaining again with reference to the process goal and content. Then the
project leader starts a line of reasoning based on what he and the business analyst had discussed
earlier that day. Now his use of executive control becomes more varied, including Inference, Case
discrimination, Explain, Reflect process flow and Map process to model. However, he continues to
use concrete relational abstraction with semantically abstract terms. The architect then confirms
and refines with elaborate reference again to the process flow and organises the modelling flow in
a more comprehensible way. He continues to monitor the project leader’s comprehension.
The dynamics of the discussion change somewhat in the third episode. The project leader
starts making richer, lengthier contributions and engages in abstraction switches as well. The
use of relational and semantic level are more often in synchrony. The architect maintains his
style of confirming, refining and monitoring. It becomes a much more constructive modelling
flow, in which both the architect and the project leader voice their assumptions and verify them
together. However, the architect remains implicitly in the lead. The project leader feeds him bits
of information, and the architect puts it all into logical perspective.
In the fourth and final episode, the focus of the discussion moves towards testing risk scenarios.
The architect begins with an evaluation of what might happen when they remodel their processes.
Elaborate, Explain and Instantiate are used. The project leader confirms and elaborates the line
of thinking, but with Monitoring processes such as Formulate unanswered issues, Map model to
stakeholder input and Reflect process content. The only Reasoning process he uses at this moment
is Instantiate. Then they move from the actual process content to making plans about how to
present their work to the stakeholders. Acts of planning begin to replace reasoning processes.
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Session 3 This session starts in the context of hesitation from both the project leader and the
business analyst. Both are unsure where to begin. The business analyst uses mostly a Monitoring
strategy: he instantiates parts of existing models, tries to map scenario’s to the models and actively
matches his partner’s input to the flow of the discussion. The project leader asks questions, suggests
several alternatives and makes thought switches, thereby using a Switching strategy. Reasoning is
not the main priority at this point in the discussion.
This indecisive process continues for about 45 minutes, during which the business analyst is
mostly silent and pensive, whilst the project leader continues to provide remarks and ask questions.
After this, the dynamics change entirely. The business analyst actively starts structuring the
discussion. He describes a concrete instantiation of the modelling flow to illustrate the diagram he
is drawing on a flip chart. He listens to the project leader’s input, asks questions and does another
concrete walkthrough of the process they are discussing. He tests propositions, asks the project
leader for input at every step but very strictly scopes this input. Making mental models explicit
through writing and concrete instantiation is the main strategy at this moment. The business
analyst is clearly in the lead, initiating the structuring process and heavily monitoring what is
currently there. Reasoning is currently less prominently used. The project leader confirms and
also instantiates a concrete scenario. Apart from that, he mostly answers the business analyst’s
monitoring questions.
In the final episode, a significant change in behaviour takes place on the part of the project
leader. After a change of topic, he suddenly becomes activated and much more coherent in his
suggestions. He engages in scoping, and builds a line of reasoning based on a scenario and considers
different process outcomes and their consequences. The business analyst continues to monitor him
and verifies his utterances using instantiation. He also continues to monitor the discussion structure
and modelling goals. More contributions are on a medium abstract level now.
How can we characterise individual use of Reasoning, Monitoring,
Abstraction, Initiation and Switching?
Session 2 In this session, the architect is clearly in the lead and uses a wide variety of
Reasoning and Monitoring processes. He focuses strongly on using the Reasoning processes to
make clear the meaning of the discussion to his peers, and is intent on acquiring explicit approval
from them before he continues. Even though he is exploring, he structures everything explicitly
on paper and builds knowledge from there. The business analyst, while a strong reasoner himself,
gives the lead to the architect. In the beginning, he appears to be doing a lot of internal processing,
during which little is said. After he has found his mental model, he actively participates in the
architect’s discussions using refinement and scoping. The project leader appears lost in this session.
He tries to propose a lot of related aspects and topic switches, but they are mostly irrelevant to
the discussion at hand, as can be deduced by the corrections both his peers initiate. The project
leader accepts these corrections, but shows no clear style of Monitoring or Reasoning of his own.
The Reasoning processes Case discrimination, Explain, Inference and Instantiate are partic-
ularly emphasised by both the architect and the business analyst in this session. The architect has
an extraordinarily high use of Inference and Instantiate, which matches with the many instan-
tiated explanations he was giving. The project leader uses Inference, Instantiate and Rephrase,
but other than that shows minimal Reasoning activity.
In terms of Monitoring, the architect is strong on Contradict peer, Ask for confirmation,
Formulate unanswered issue and Inconsistency detection and Inconsistency clarification, which
implies he is very actively engaged in the collaborative process of knowledge building for the model.
Also, he uses the most Reflection, Scoping and Test proposition of all, which illustrates his focus on
the quality of what is being produced. The business analyst is most active in Refine peer, Reflect,
Repeat information and Scoping, suggesting that he is mostly evaluating the discussion, ensuring
comprehension and refining where necessary. It is interesting that the Monitoring processes used
to some degree appear to reflect the role both modellers have assigned to themselves in this session.
The project leader uses Reflect, Ask for confirmation, Map model to stakeholder input, Monitor
model structure and Refine peer, suggesting that he still has a focus on ensuring that the models
are in line with the stakeholder input, and that the structure matches the content. While his
intentions are good, his actual input is continuously refuted or refined by his peers.
Planning and Initiation both illustrate the architect’s lead role. He almost solely performs
Initiate model writing, and the other Initiation processes are also dominated by him. The same
holds for the Planning processes. In Switching, only the architect offers Different perspective and
Propose alternative. The aspect Discuss related aspect, though, is used a lot by all modellers but
mostly by the project leader. But from the reactions in the session, it thus appears that a related




Finally, the architect shows the highest use of all abstraction categories, almost twice as
much as the other participants, except for Relation concrete. Partly this might be attributed
to the fact that he did most of the talking, but it also suggests that he is most aware of the
relations between model entities, their concrete counterparts and their abstract context. The
business analyst follows the architect’s pattern, only with fewer occurrences. The project leader
uses mostly medium and abstract concepts, with concrete and first-level relations. He uses almost
no second-level abstraction. This difference in balance as opposed to his peers is interesting.
Session 10 In the first fragment, the most striking individual difference we see is the depth
and richness of the architect’s explanations, using a great variety of executive control processes to
make his explanations sound, comprehensible and relevant. He places everything into perspective
and has no trouble switching between abstraction levels, both in semantic and relational terms, to
clarify his point. He uses semantically concrete terms for concrete relations (“I want to know what
Jack and Jill have earned this year so that I can compute their premium”), and semantically
abstract terms in more abstract relations (“That is why we should consider straight-through
processing and only have a monitoring process and a trend analysis running in parallel”). In
this way, concrete examples are clearly differentiated from generalised, abstract relations. As long
as he seems to sense a lack of shared understanding, he patiently explains in great detail and
creates the context very explicitly for his peers. The project leader, on the other hand, shows a
much more superficial use of executive control processes, and uses mostly what he has heard from
others as the basis for his input. He tries to include context issues, but these are continuously
corrected and refined by the architect. The project leader accepts every correction. Additionally,
he shows a discrepancy in his use of abstraction, making concrete relations but using semantically
abstract words (“We have to design this monitoring process so that we can keep an eye on the
signal list”).
The number of occurrences of executive control process appear to support these observations.
For all Reasoning processes used, the architect has a similar or higher use except for Rephrase.
The latter matches with the project leader’s efforts to comprehend what is being explained. The
architect is wholly in the lead when it comes to Initiation, implying that he has control over the
session structure and what he wishes to touch on. The architect uses a lot of Initiate model
writing to support his explanations, which correlates with more complete and integrated mental
models (Sins et al., 2005). As far as Monitoring processes are concerned, the picture is a little
more varied. The project leader makes more use of asking questions, mapping the model to
external input and repeating information, as might be expected from the role of project leader.
The architect focuses on refining and contradicting his peer where necessary, monitoring goals and
comprehension, reflection and scoping. This is essential for safeguarding the quality of the content
of a session. When we look at Switching, the project leader focuses on discussing related aspects,
which matches with his Monitoring focus on mapping the model to external input. The architect
makes less use of Switching, keeping a more steady focus. Finally, the Abstraction processes show
that the project leader indeed makes minimal use of concrete concepts, but does speak mostly
in terms of concrete relations, followed by a comparable but slightly lower number of first-level
relations, and no second-level relations. The architect’s use of semantic abstraction levels is slightly
more balanced. Medium and abstract concepts are used in similar amounts, with slightly lower
use of concrete concepts. He uses mostly first-level relations, with some second-level and concrete
relations. If, in relation to this, we consider the Reasoning processes of Generalise and Instantiate,
we see that the project leader rarely generalises but instantiates a lot, whereas the architect uses
both processes liberally. For the project leader, especially given his lack of second-level relation
use, this focus on instantiation matches with his high use of concrete relations.
Session 3 It is remarkable to see that the project leader’s continuous Switching strategy
occurs without much Monitoring. He provides a lot of input, probably hoping that one alternative
will at some point provide clarity, but without monitoring how the inputs fit into the context
of existing models, scenario’s and the current flow of discussion, this alone does not further the
discussion. He appears to be mostly driven by the impulse of the moment. One moment, he is
suggesting alternatives, and the next moment he stands corrected and accepts this. However, once
they arrive at a topic of which he appears to have a solid mental model, his contributions become
a lot more coherent.
The business analyst has a style of staying on the background as long as he is processing
information. However, once he appears to have a vision, he brings himself prominently to the
foreground. Transitions from passive processing phases to active structuring phases are clearly
observable for him. He complements the project leader perfectly in this case by remaining very
strong on the Monitoring functions, especially when he realises his comprehension is not complete.
He makes it a top priority to achieve a minimal level of sound comprehension between all discussion
165
6
CHAPTER 6. AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS IN
MODELLING
partners using Monitoring functions before they engage in Reasoning processes. He also makes
significant use of Initiate model writing to support his reasoning processes.
In this session, for the purpose of finding comprehension, both the project leader and the
business analyst focus on Reflect process flow, Refine peer, Test proposition and to a slightly
lesser extent on Map model to stakeholder input, Scoping and Repeat information. The project
leader in this case scores very high on Refine peer and Test proposition. When it comes to
Reasoning processes, they both use a lot of inferences. The project leader is strong on Elaborate
and Verify. The business analyst is strong on Case discrimination and Instantiate. Switching
is not significantly used, but most switches come from the project leader proposing alternatives.
The Initiation processes show an interesting picture. Hardly any Initiation processes are used,
except for a significant engagement in Initiate model writing from the business analyst. Active
visualisation supports knowledge structuring, but it appears to require a degree of preprocessing
and a specific focus. The project leader’s focus is on many different alternatives and does not
converge much, and the business analysts also did not start writing until he had processed the
initial chaotic input into something that was coherent for him. In terms of abstraction, the project
leader uses far more semantically abstract concepts than his peer, and the business analyst uses
far more first-level relations than his peer. A lot of concrete relations are used, and hardly any
second-level relations. These results match with the observations that the project leader is mostly
exploring alternatives and the business analyst is trying to make sense of it by making it concrete.
These foci strongly dominate the session and make that other than Reasoning and Monitoring,
very few executive control processes are used.
How is Planning used in relation to Reasoning and Monitoring in a
modelling session?
Session 2 The architect does most of the planning in this session. It happens towards the
end of the session, after the discussions on the processes have taken place. Only one act of
planning, Articulate session goals, was done during the discussion, when the architect remarked
that something should be checked as it was an open question in need of an answer. The business
analyst also played a role in moving the discussion towards acts of planning by monitoring time,
also towards the end of the session, and that certain agreements have to be made for follow-up
sessions.
Session 10 Planning is not frequently used within this session. The architect uses more acts
of planning than the project leader, but the difference is small. During the course of the discussion,
moments of organising the modelling progress come up, and the architect and the project leader
both reflect on how their models and questions may impact the stakeholder review sessions that
are to follow. Only towards the end of the session do they articulate some future actions based on
what they have done today. Reasoning processes are used much less, because the organisation of
progress and future actions are all abstractions and consequences of the elaborate reasoning that
has already been performed earlier in the session. The architect uses explicit scoping and project
goal monitoring in relation to acts of planning, which ensures only relevant aspects are being taken
into consideration. The project leader confirms him.
Session 3 Planning only plays a very minor role in this session. Most of the session was
dedicated to achieving comprehension. Only during the last few minutes does Planning become
relevant, as the business analyst and the project leader discuss how to present their findings to
the stakeholders. The business analyst offers a few suggestions, and the project leader agrees. No
visible reasoning or monitoring takes place at this time, which is also reflected in that only future
actions are articulated, but no reference to goals or organisation of modelling progress are made.
How can the process of achieving shared understanding be
characterised in terms of executive control processes in a modelling
session?
Session 2 Remarkably, while all three participants appear in search of shared understanding,
they have significantly different attitudes while approaching their goal. The architect is very goal-
oriented, confident and lays out the tasks ahead without any hesitation. He involves his peers in
his thought process very explicitly, continuing to prompt them until he has no further questions




also displays confidence about the process content, but he clearly gives the lead to the architect.
His explanations are quickly understood and accepted, and whenever he detects inconsistencies,
he volunteers corrections. The project leader, on the contrary, appears insecure about the content,
asking a lot of questions about process structure, which he sees as a problem but which was
simply a matter of choosing one representation over another. The difficult thing about observing
the project leader is that it does not become clear whether he achieves comprehension, because
after receiving answers to his questions he simply accepts and does not continue to work with the
answers in further questions or lines of reasoning. An interesting episode illustrates this point.
The project leader asks clarification about a set of assumptions on which they had all agreed just
seconds before. The business analyst and the architect explain with a noticeable hint of frustration.
This shows that shared understanding was not achieved previously, despite explicit agreement. It
thus appears that to truly verify shared understanding, an utterance in which the knowledge is
rephrased or used in a continuing line of reasoning is essential.
In the constructive, dynamic discussions between the architect and the business analyst, shared
understanding appears to be achieved between them on a turn-by-turn basis. There are no correc-
tions, only logical explanations and tests of previous utterances that build on each other. Questions
asked are immediately answered and confirmed. Sometimes the project leader’s questions interrupt
modelling progress, yet tackling them is essential to achieve shared understanding. But mostly,
shared understanding follows from explanations, many of them concrete, refinement, rephrasing
and applying the knowledge in new lines of reasoning.
Session 10 The two initial phases of this session are entirely focused on achieving shared
understanding. In the first fragment, the lead architect is entirely in the lead, explaining to the
project leader in a style that involves a lot of concrete instantiations and asking explicit monitoring
questions. Explanations are done in a step-by-step way, involving a lot of examples. In a way, the
architect is behaving like a schoolteacher. The architect does not stop asking monitoring questions
until he has heard an explicit ‘yes’, meaning understanding has been achieved. The project leader
verifies his own understanding by asking questions and reformulating what he has heard. He too
does not stop asking until he has received explicit confirmation that his understanding is correct.
In the second fragment, the project leader starts to provide more input. However, he does not make
concrete instantiations or use examples during his reformulations, but rather continues to talk on
a medium abstract level. Another remarkable aspect is that the project leader either reformulates
the architect, or mentions input that has been provided by others earlier on. He provides no input
that is uniquely his own. The architect responds with more explanations, corrections and scoping
acts such as demonstrating how something is irrelevant. He starts with abstract explanations, and
when these are not grasped he switches to more concrete forms. After these two fragments in
which the search for shared understanding appears to be the main goal, the session continues with
more constructive modelling flow. Shared understanding remains important to the participants,
and monitoring questions continue to come from the architect, as well as confirmations and re-
formulations from the project leader. But the focus of the discussion now lies elsewhere. In this
session, achieving shared understanding is thus accomplished via two different ways. Firstly, by the
one who understands most, by explaining a process in increasingly concrete terms, step-by-step,
using lots of examples, correcting the other, focusing on the discussion scope and always verifying
via explicit monitoring questions whether the other has truly understood the point. Secondly,
by the one who understands least, by continuously asking questions and rephrasing explanations.
However, this does require one to be aware of his knowledge gap. The relation between shared un-
derstanding and Planning remains highly implicit in this session. Acts of planning always appear
to follow discussions using Reasoning and Monitoring processes, which implies that these modellers
only use Planning once a basic level of shared understanding has been achieved.
Session 3 This session has a particularly slow start. Both the project leader and the business
analyst are uncertain where to begin. They engage in a lengthy search for shared understanding.
The business analyst tries to instantiate parts of existing models to find a suitable starting sce-
nario. The project leader asks questions and proposes some options. The business analyst tries to
comprehend and create an overview, but does not receive confirmation, rather only more input and
a thought switch. He asks why the switch took place, and the project leader explains. The business
analyst agrees with part of it, but in that part they seem to have found shared understanding from
which to proceed.
After a long period of hesitation and relative silence particularly from the business analyst, who
appears very pensive during that time, the dynamics of the discussion change. The business analyst
starts to actively structure his knowledge, including what has been voiced during the session, and
writes it on a flip-chart. He prompts the project leader whenever he encounters knowledge gaps
and the project leader fills the gaps. Shared understanding is achieved through the creation of an
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explicit mental model. In the final episode, this pattern continues, with the addition of the project
leader suddenly becoming much more active and coherent, as though they had suddenly touched
on a topic of which he had a complete mental model. He provides more critical input, and together
they explicate and test their knowledge. This happens through very concrete instantiations from
the business analyst, related to acts of monitoring such as model writing, scoping and explicitly
working the discussion input into the evolving model. The project leader contributes by proposing
alternative scenario’s, monitoring them with instantiations, scoping and reflecting on the process
flow.
How can the process of achieving shared consent be characterised
in terms of executive control processes in a modelling session?
Session 2 Shared consent is only implicitly visible in this session. The modellers continue
discussing until they all explicitly agree on something and continue with the next topic. Only
towards the end, when discussing how to frame their findings in the next day’s planned discussions,
does consent become important. They explicitly talk about what to show, how to represent it and
whether the content is agreed upon. It thus appears that finding consent results from a combination
of Monitoring acts.
Session 10 Achieving shared consent is a lot less visible in this session. In the initial phases
of the session there appears to be no real need yet for consent. The architect explains what he
thinks is needed and the project leader accepts. Once the constructive modelling flow starts, both
provide inputs to the discussion and respond to each other, either with confirmations, explanations,
alternatives or counter-questions. Only in the final fragment of this session does consent become
explicit. They talk in detail about possible scenario’s that may result when they remodel their
processes. This leads to the question of agreement on what they are modelling, and how they
will remodel it to account for fraud opportunities and risks. Thus, this final step towards shared
consent is characterised by detailed, concrete explanations, an open attitude towards exploring
alternative propositions and explicit utterances of agreement between the modellers.
Session 3 Again, shared consent is not explicitly visible. In the first fragment, they both
implicitly consent to continue with that part of the model on which they had achieved shared
understanding, and that it was qualitatively good enough for the moment. As the discussion
progresses, shared consent remains implicit. The business analyst leads the discussion, makes his
mental model explicit on a flip chart, and the project leader agrees with the results and continues
to work with them. In the final episode, shared consent becomes more explicitly visible. Both sides







An Analysis of Abstraction in Modelling
Practice
“What is true, is true only for one time and only for one place.”
T. S. Eliot (1888 - 1965)
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Abstract
Problem Acquiring competence in abstraction is a challenge for mod-
elling. Increased mental efforts are required for the formation of abstrac-
tions, and on top of that it is also perceived to be difficult. In this study,
we therefore want to gain more insight in how the process of abstraction
building proceeds for different modellers.
Research Question How can the flow of constructing and using ab-
stractions be characterised in a collaborative modelling practice?
Method We analyse video observations of 13 modelling sessions, per-
formed by 7 modellers in different configurations. They were recorded in
industrial settings according to a coding scheme for behavioural obser-
vation of executive control, reasoning and abstraction. We triangulate
these findings with a qualitative analysis of a selected set of modelling
fragments from each participating modeller, using thick description.
Results We find that there are hierarchical trends to be observed
both in the use of abstraction levels, reasoning and monitoring processes
according to the strengths and weaknesses of the modeller. Weaker mod-
ellers find workarounds, even though these may only succeed in specific
settings.
Conclusions Awareness of abstraction level use, how reasoning and
monitoring tie into this, a modelling group’s dynamics depending on the
participants and an overview of one’s individual modelling flow grant
valuable insights for optimising both one’s own modelling skills and one’s





Abstraction allows us to reason with principles and structures, constructed
from prior experiences and knowledge. As discussed in the previous chap-
ters, acquiring competence in abstraction is a major challenge for modelling.
For one, the required mental effort increases as abstraction increases, indepen-
dently of task difficulty (Markovits & Vachon, 1990; Tall, 1991; Markovits et
al., 2002; Christoff & Keramatian, 2007; Krawczyk et al., 2011). For another,
abstraction is perceived to be difficult (Salles & Bredeweg, 2002). How ab-
stractions are constructed and used in practice, in the context of chaotic and
unstructured discussions which demand significant attentional resources in and
by themselves, remains an open question.
In this chapter, we explore how modellers create and use abstractions in
practice, so as to study the impact of different abstraction strategies and as-
sociated executive function use on modelling progress. Using this perspective
may reveal where difficulties lie and what potential foci for training protocols
may be. Within this context, we further investigate Pattern 1 (P1) “Semantic
and Relational Abstraction do not necessarily correlate” and Pattern 4 (P4)
“Shared understanding seems of primary importance to strong modellers”, as
formulated in Chapter 6. P1 suggests that semantic abstraction levels may
not be appropriate as indicators of abstraction ability because modellers may
be able to use abstract words without being truly aware of their meaning or
implications. In fact, it might even be easier to speak in abstract terms when
comprehension is unclear, because it allows contradictory details to be lost in
increased generality. We will thus re-examine the essential aspects of abstrac-
tion and analyse it from a relational perspective in this study. P4 suggests that
the greater the modeller’s insight in the domain and the business processes to
be modelled, the more importance he will assign to ensuring peer comprehen-
sion, even if this happens at the expense of modelling efficiency. Therefore,
we will also examine the co-occurrences between abstraction and the executive
control processes of reasoning and monitoring.
An in-depth investigation of the context of modelling sessions befits both P1
and P4, because the use of abstraction levels and the role of shared understand-
ing only becomes meaningful when considering the session as a whole. This is
therefore a descriptive study aimed at further exploration and elaboration of
P1 and P4.
Research Question
In this study we aim to answer subquestion 6:
173
7
CHAPTER 7. AN ANALYSIS OF ABSTRACTION IN
MODELLING
How can the flow of constructing and using abstractions be
characterised in a collaborative modelling practice?
We structure this chapter according to the following subquestions:
1. How does the use of abstraction levels compare between modellers?
2. How are reasoning and monitoring processes used while building abstrac-
tions during the modelling flow?
3. How can the abstraction flow be characterised in a practical context for
individual modellers?
7.2 Abstraction in a Practical Context
How might we characterise abstractions as we observe them in practice? From
the observations in Chapter 6, we concluded that simply looking at abstraction
levels does not give us enough information. We need further knowledge on the
development of abstraction, how abstractions are thought to be constructed,
and how abstraction is used in practice, which we continue to discuss.
Development of Abstraction
When we examine the development of abstraction in early childhood, we find
that this ability develops gradually, potentially continuing until the maturation
of the frontal lobe completes around 25-30 years of age. The first signs become
apparent at the early age of 9 months in human infants (Diamond, 2006). In-
troducing a physical connection between two objects allows infants to deduce
an abstract rule underlying a task. However, when the physical connection is
taken away, the task becomes nigh impossible until the age of 2. Then, children
will observe visibly disconnected instances and search for similar features, on
the basis of which they will classify things as belonging to one category or not
(Colunga & Smith, 2003). In later stages, thoughts about these operations
can occur with neither the physical objects nor the connection being present.
Rule-like generalisations are applied to instances never seen before. Instances
are replaced in the mind by simple propositions defined by structural features
(Diamond, 2006). This basic generalisation process is very important for con-
cept learning (Colunga & Smith, 2003; Feldman, 2003) and relational thinking
(Christoff et al., 2009; Crone et al., 2009).
It should be noted that abstraction does not equal generality. Rather,
generalisation is a form of abstraction: generality is required for abstraction,
but abstraction is also required for generalisation (Arnheim, 1969). This cyclic
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statement poses a problem: it implies that a certain abstract concept has to
be present before any abstraction is made in the first place. We can solve
this issue by viewing concrete concepts as Diamond (2006)’s basic abstract
representations without breaking any rules of abstraction. After all, mental
representations, no matter how concrete, are not the real objects.
Constructing Usable Abstract Structures
Critically, and in accord with Rosch (1999), Salles and Bredeweg (2002) show
that concrete domain knowledge forms the basis for identification of abstract
processes, goals and flows. However, the crux of abstraction is the transfor-
mation from concrete processes to an abstract model, and vice versa. In a
study conducted in educational settings, Hershkowitz, Schwarz, and Dreyfus
(2001) describe this transformation in terms of epistemic actions: mental ac-
tions through which knowledge is constructed. These actions allow connections
to be made between entities which were previously only available in isolation.
The act of connecting them means that a new structure has been made acces-
sible to the learner. This new structure constitutes the essence of abstracting.
They describe the process of abstracting as happening in three phases: con-
struction, recognition and building-with. Construction is the phase in which
existing knowledge is reorganised into novel structures, often more abstract
than the original knowledge elements. If the construction phase happens thor-
oughly, the learner will also develop a ‘language’ in which to verbally express
the novel ideas. This is a precondition for explanation, one of our key reasoning
processes. Recognition happens when a learner encounters structures during
reasoning which are recognised and immediately related to existing abstract
structures or principles. No new knowledge construction is necessary for this.
Recognition is strongly subject to relativity, as it depends on a learner’s exist-
ing structures whether something is perceived as abstract or concrete, and how
much construction is required. This is the relativity property of abstraction,
discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, Building-with is the most advanced phase in
which the learner is able to use existing knowledge structures in different, rele-
vant combinations to solve new problems. Without successful construction and
recognition, it is impossible to build on existing structures.
Thus, building usable abstract structures appears to be a challenging pre-
requisite for complex cognitive processes like relational reasoning and monitor-
ing. This is illustrated, for example, in Salles and Bredeweg (2002)’s study.
Students perceived the most difficult aspects of abstraction to be (1) abstract-
ing to acquire an overview of a domain, (2) to determine what perspective to
take and (3) to judge the relevance of different aspects. Model fragments could
only be created by those students who had achieved an elaborate understand-
ing of the abstract modelling representation itself. Similarly, having trouble
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Abstraction in Modelling Practice
In collaborative modelling situations, constructing new abstract structures and
actively applying them to a modelling problem may happen within a modeller,
but also between modellers as they actively discuss and provide input for each
others’ mental construction and application processes. From the discussion
so far, it logically follows that abstraction cannot happen without a practical
context from which input is derived. For successful application of abstraction,
modellers need to derive contextual concept representations on different levels
of abstraction. Different abstraction levels allow different properties of a con-
cept to be studied. On a concrete level, physical properties and functions are
described. When moving higher up in the abstraction hierarchy, a concept’s
generic functions and system purposes feature more prominently (Rasmussen,
1986). For example, a ‘computer’ can be described in terms of transistors and
wires, but also in terms of data it produces, which has to be interpreted by
another computer in the network.
Modellers must also meaningfully relate these concepts to existing abstract
representations. For this, reasoning and monitoring processes are essential.
The better the integrity of the memories representating this knowledge, the
easier it is to form an abstraction (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). Instantiation can
be used to classify objects. Generalisation allows deduction of common pat-
terns of behaviour by inferring similar properties from observing concrete in-
stances and combining this knowledge with experience (White & Frederiksen,
1998). Shifting up and down between abstraction levels through generalisation
and instantiation allows a model to become meaningful by actively connecting
generic concepts to what the evolving model means in terms of the concrete
activities and objects a modeller or user encounters in his daily environment
(Tall, 1991; Theodorakis et al., 1999). This is vital to comprehension (Lehrer
& Schauble, 2000; Barreteau, 2003). When creating a model, there will be a
certain threshold above which addition of more concepts and relations through
instantiation will make the model too complex to comprehend and use. Both
the modelling goal and the audience play a role in allowable complexity. For
example, using a model for computer simulation of a complex process will re-
quire much more detail than when the purpose is to communicate an overview
of the structure of business processes to a group of stakeholders.
Sometimes the connection between concrete and abstract goes awry. Usu-
ally, people only know partly how the complex systems they work with func-
tion, rendering it very hard to verbally express procedural or tacit knowledge
(McDermott, 1999). Such knowledge gaps can result in faulty conceptions of a
domain, a failure to monitor understanding and progress, and thereby hamper
success at problem solving (Brown, 1987; Feltovich et al., 1996). However, if
concepts turn out to be too abstract to understand, unconscious reduction of
abstraction level may take place by retreating to familiar mental structures,




rather than a whole set (Hazzan, 2008).
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, the relativity and generativity proper-
ties of abstraction play a significant functional role in practical use. Relativity
refers to the fact that what may be considered abstract at one moment may be-
come concrete once it has been mentally processed. With generativity, higher
abstraction levels may form the basis for the creation of more complete and
detailed descriptions (Arnheim, 1969). Features are extracted from the ab-
stractions, and consecutive instantiations end up being more detailed than the
original descriptions (Bransford & Franks, 1971).
From this theoretical discussion, we conclude that the most essential as-
pects of abstraction are connecting and relating concepts, and flexible switch-
ing between abstraction levels, in order to build knowledge which benefits the
evolving model.
7.3 Method
This is an inductive, qualitative study, centred around the individual, who
makes small contributions to a group. We coded our data in Atlas.ti, using
the coding scheme described in Chapter 5. We analysed our data from two dif-
ferent perspectives. First we randomly sampled abstraction episodes from the
recorded modelling sessions which we subjected to thick description. Then, we
counted the number of occurrences of abstraction conditions for each modeller
in our sample, and the co-occurrences with Reasoning and Monitoring. The
code counts and thick description results provided complementary insights.
Defining Abstraction
First of all we will define our view on abstraction for the scope of this study.
As discussed in Section 7.2, abstracting requires the ability to draw relations
within and between levels. We thus require relational abstraction levels. Ad-
ditionally, we want to know how switching between abstraction levels takes
place. Switching can take the form of generalisation, instantiation or simply
without explicitly generalising or instantiating. All these situations are in-
cluded. Semantic abstraction levels pose no further constraints, other than
that the utterance must have at least one semantic level. Thus, we selected
our abstractions in Atlas.ti based on the following criteria:
1. utterance contains exactly two relational abstraction levels (any combi-
nation of concrete, 1st, 2nd)
2. utterance contains one or more semantic abstraction levels (any combi-
nation of concrete, medium, abstract)
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The combination ‘Concrete - 2nd’ had only one occurrence: Instantiate 2nd -
concrete. We did not consider this significant and chose not to include it in our
analysis. Theoretically, there is no objection to also including quotations coded
with all three relational abstraction levels. However, we chose not to include
this category because we wanted to keep the focus on core abstractions with
only one level switch. The relational categories and semantic level combinations
into which quotations were sorted are shown in Table 7.1. For every relational
category specified in Subtable 7.1a, the entire set of semantic combinations
mentioned in Subtable 7.1b was taken into account. This yields a total of
number of categories * number of semantic level combinations = 6 x 7 = 42
abstraction conditions.
Table 7.1: Overview of the relational categories and semantic combinations.
(a)
Relational categories
Generalise concrete - 1st
Generalise 1st - 2nd
Instantiate 1st - concrete











Concrete - medium - abstract
Observation Context
Data for this study was collected within the context of a series of unstructured
observations of modelling sessions, performed for six months in 2011 within
a Dutch organisation in the collective sector. The organisation’s task was to
monitor retirement funds. The researcher spent time at the company both
during and outside of the modelling sessions, to get to know the participants
and observe them in different settings. Observations were entirely passive, no
interventions were done. Project goals were to chart the organisation’s business
processes, currently executed mostly by hand, and to design new ones for the
purpose of automation.
Participants and Sessions
Two consecutive, three-month projects were observed, led by two different
project leaders. In first project, modellers analysed business processes and drew
process models, in the second project they wrote functional design documents.
All included modelling sessions were performed by modelling experts, lasting




We observed seven modellers: a project leader (PL), three business analysts
(BA1, BA2 and BA3), a technical architect (AR1), a lead architect (AR2) and
a change manager (CM). All participants were externally hired from different
companies and had between 2 - 5 years of relevant experience in business anal-
ysis. Each individual was followed for three months working with the same
group of people throughout a series of sessions, allowing us to determine the
consistency of behaviour. Only BA1 participated in both projects and was thus
followed for six months.
Data Collection
The researcher spent time at the company both during and outside of the ses-
sions of interest, to get to know the participants and observe their interaction
dynamics in multiple work settings. Modelling sessions were recorded in audio
and video format, with the participants’ consent. Furthermore, written docu-
mentation resulting from sessions was collected and photos of the final models
were taken to complement the session recordings. All sessions took place in
rooms equipped with a beamer and a flip chart board. The models under dis-
cussion had been printed and put up on the walls. These external working
memory offloading opportunities were used extensively. Interaction during the
session was not explicitly structured. Models were adapted and contradictory
issues discussed.
Data Analysis
We included a total of 872 video and audio minutes (14.5 hours) in our analysis,
spread over a total of 13 sessions. The shortest session took 17 minutes, the
longest session 2.5 hours. We subjected the video and audio sessions to coding
and thick description.
Comparing the Use of Abstraction Levels, Reasoning and Monitoring
Firstly, we performed a between-modeller analysis on the entire coded dataset
to compare the use of abstraction levels, the co-occurrences between abstraction
levels and abstraction categories, and the co-occurrences between abstraction
categories and Reasoning/Monitoring processes. All recordings were fully tran-
scribed, loaded into Atlas.ti and coded using the coding scheme described in
Chapter 5. The unit of analysis represented by a single quotation was a par-
ticipant’s full turn, terminated only by an interruption or a natural reaction
from another participant. Pauses between utterances were taken to belong to
a single turn unless they exceeded 10 seconds. Each quotation was assigned
the following codes:
• a unique identifier for the modeller
• at least one level of relational abstraction
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• at least one level of semantic abstraction
• where applicable, instances of the reasoning, monitoring, planning, initi-
ation or switching groups
After coding, we first counted how frequently the abstraction levels were
used throughout all sessions. We computed relative occurrence frequencies for
abstraction level occurrences as well as for semantic and relational abstraction
level use per modeller. Next, we counted how frequently modellers engage in
the different abstraction categories, the co-occurrences between the abstrac-
tion categories and Reasoning processes, and the co-occurrences between the
abstraction categories and Monitoring processes. These numbers are meant
to represent trends, which will be compared to thick description outcomes,
described next.
Individual Abstraction Flows Secondly, we sampled 39 episodes from
the coded sessions: a single representative abstraction episode for each mod-
eller from each abstraction category. Three categories contained no episodes
(AR2: Generalise concrete - medium, CM: Generalise medium - abstract, CM:
Concrete - medium), yielding numberofcategories ∗ numberofmodellers −
numberofmissingepisodes = 6x7 − 3 = 39 episodes. Sampling happened
semi-randomly. All episodes were assigned a unique number, after which a
random number generator was used. If the resulting episode was deemed un-
suitable, for example if it was hard to interpret due to a lack of meaningful
wording, another episode was randomly chosen.
We analysed these 39 episodes using thick description. The purpose of
this is to give highly detailed accounts of how the individual modellers use
abstraction in practice, given preceding and consecutive utterances, and peer
interactions. We focused on the relations drawn, how semantic abstraction
levels were used and what reasoning and monitoring functions were used to
shape the abstraction. This contextual information is essential in order to
assign meaning to the final results.
Finally, we compared the numbers on abstraction level use, reasoning and
monitoring to the trends emerging from the detailed descriptions, to see whether
they would support or contradict each other.
Method Validity
We used naturalistic observation to minimise validity threats associated with
studying complex skills in isolation, such as oversimplification for ease of mea-
surement, not considering the larger context and removing the true incentive
for performing a skill optimally (Singleton, 1978). The downside of naturalistic
observation is that it is very difficult to disentangle the richness of observed




Another issue is that we used a predefined executive functions scheme for anal-
ysis, based on both prior observations and the enormous existing body of liter-
ature on the topic. Using a predefined scheme carries a risk of missing relevant
aspects, and it does not provide a level of detail that allows one to see how
consecutive interactions between participants lead to certain outcomes. To
control for both issues, we triangulate occurrence counts of pre-specified be-
haviours with detailed descriptions of a randomly selected set of abstraction
episodes. Thick description provides context and meaning to behavioural anal-
ysis (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Wooffitt, 2005).
Other validity threats include uncontrolled or unanticipated influences. So-
cial relations, opinions of others’ functioning, project demands and intrinsic
motivation, for example, could play a role influencing the modelling behaviour
observed. Although we explicitly exclude them from the scope of our research,
we did take care to denote social talk, both during sessions and during break
times, which might reveal something about unanticipated influences so we could
control for them during data analysis. The only observation of an undesired
influence we could derive was that there was a slightly negative attitude about
the ability of one of the participants’ cognitive functioning among the partici-
pants. However, this was never discussed with the participant in question, and
from his behaviour on the workfloor it did not appear as though he felt in any
way intimidated or undesired by his colleagues. Following and interacting with
the participants for a sufficient length of time, in both formal and informal set-
tings, allowed us to determine consistency of behaviours and how participants
influence each other when working in different group configurations.
7.4 Results
The highly detailed descriptions of the 39 abstraction episodes sampled
for each participating modeller, as well as all full-page figures referenced
in this chapter, are presented in the chapter appendix (Section 7.7 on
page 199).
In this study, we compare modelling behaviour both between and within mod-
ellers. We begin with a between-subject analysis of abstraction level use, fol-
lowed by between-subject descriptions of how reasoning and monitoring pro-
cesses are used in abstraction building. This answers subquestions 7.1 and
7.2. We address subquestion 7.3 by deducing individual characterisations on
abstraction behaviours based on the detailed descriptions and the results from
the first two subquestions. In our interpretation, we address the patterns of
abstraction behaviour and how this relates to both the theories of strong mod-
elling and the neurocognitive theories discussed in Chapter 4 on page 87.
181
7
CHAPTER 7. AN ANALYSIS OF ABSTRACTION IN
MODELLING
Modeller BA1 BA2 PL BA3 AR1 AR2 CM
Participation 67% 50% 32% 17% 12% 11% 5%
Minutes 586 434 282 146 100 66 45
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Total occurrences for each abstraction 
condition
Figure 7.2: The total number of oc-
currences for each of the abstrac-
tion categories defined.
It should be noted that the proportion of time spent under observation is
not equal for each participant. As mentioned, we included a total of 872 video
and audio minutes in our analysis. The percentage of participation for each
modeller is shown in Table 7.2, ordered from highest to lowest.
Comparing the Use of Abstraction Levels
We first examine the use of abstraction levels based on the Atlas.ti code counts,
focusing on differences and similarities between modellers.
Total Semantic and Relational Level Use
First of all, the distribution for the relative frequencies of semantic and rela-
tional abstraction events is shown in Figure 7.1. On the concrete level, seman-
tic abstraction level use is 12% under relational abstraction level use. On the
medium level, this difference increases to 20%, with relational use still being
higher than semantic use. Finally, on the abstract level, this relation inverses,
with relational use being 32% lower than semantic use. Please note that these
percentages only represent an indication of the proportion of abstraction level
use. It thus appears that our modellers are most comfortable using either
medium or abstract semantic concepts, and 1st - level relational abstraction.




congruent with the finding that it is most neurologically costly of all abstrac-
tion levels. However, we also see in our fragments that many concrete relations
have to be drawn and comprehended before any higher abstract relations can
be built on them, which might be another contributing factor. But then it is in-
teresting that no such difference exists between concrete and medium relations.
Apparently, concrete and medium relations present no significant differences in
difficulty to these modellers, and many of both are needed to build abstract
relations.
Semantic and Relational Levels Per Modeller
If we disaggregate the dataset per modeller, certain patterns are revealed, as
shown in Figure 7.3 on the following page. On the concrete level, we see that
CM and AR2 make the least use of concrete concepts and relations, with AR1
not far behind. AR2 is the only individual to use more concrete concepts than
relations, but the difference is minimal. AR2 uses a lot of concrete examples
to explain himself, which might be reflected in this minimal difference. For
BA3, BA2, BA1 and PL, the use of concrete relations far outweighs the use
of concrete concepts. On the medium level, the pattern remains very much
the same as on the concrete level, except that the use of medium concepts
and relations has increased. Additionally, AR2 now also uses slightly more
medium relations than concepts. Finally, on the abstract level, all modellers
use more abstract concepts than abstract relations. For some, like PL, CM,
BA2 and BA3, this difference is strikingly large, whereas for BA1, AR2 and
AR1, the difference is slightly more balanced. PL, CM and BA3 make minimal
use of abstract relations, which is congruent with PL and BA3’s slighly weaker
performance. For CM it is difficult to say given his short participation in our
observations. For all modellers except AR2, the generic pattern still holds that
they use more concrete and medium relations than abstract relations, with
medium use being higher than concrete use. Only AR2 uses more abstract
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Semantic and Relational Levels Per Abstraction Category
The next step is to examine the relational and semantic level use per mod-
eller in the context of our 6 predefined abstraction categories. Figure 7.2 on
page 182 shows how frequently the different abstraction categories were used
by all modellers. Both Generalise categories are used less than the other cat-
egories. Interestingly, Generalise concrete-1st is used significantly less than all
other categories. For the other categories, the differences are much smaller.
Semantic and Relational Levels Per Category Per Modeller
When we again disaggregate this dataset per category per modeller, we can
describe more precise patterns. The category Generalise concrete - 1st
(Figure 7.4 on page 215) is used sparingly by all modellers. AR2 does not use
it at all. BA1 uses it most frequently. This is interesting because Figure 7.3 on
the preceding page shows that PL, BA1, BA2 and BA3 all make quite elaborate
use of concrete relations. Apparently, taking the next step of generalising from
these concrete relations is not the most obvious one. When looking at the
semantic level combinations used, we see that the corresponding Concrete -
medium semantic levels are used for all instances by CM and BA3, and for the
majority of instances by BA1 and BA2. The other semantic categories appear
to be used in seemingly random fashion.
Generalise 1st - 2nd (Figure 7.5 on page 216) is used much more fre-
quently, especially by BA1, BA2 and AR1. CM does not use this category at
all, and PL, BA3 and AR2 use it sparingly. Again, the majority of semantic
categories used is the corresponding Medium - abstract category. The second
most frequently occurring semantic category is Abstract. Only AR2 deviates
from this pattern, using both Concrete and Concrete - abstract as his other
major semantic categories.
Instantiate 1st - concrete (Figure 7.6 on page 217) is used a lot by
BA1, PL, BA2 and AR1. BA3, CM and AR2 use it more sparingly, but this
category is used by all modellers. In this case the corresponding semantic
category Medium - concrete is dominantly used by CM, AR2, BA1 and BA3.
AR1 and PL use it, but not dominantly, and BA2 does not use this semantic
category at all. Interestingly, BA2 dominantly uses Medium and Concrete, so
not making a lot of semantic switches in his relational switches. BA3 and AR1
also use the Concrete category a lot, whereas PL and AR2 use the Abstract -
medium category as their second dominant category.
Instantiate 2nd - 1st (Figure 7.7 on page 218) is used sparingly by all
except BA1, who uses it very frequently. Again all modellers use this category.
The dominantly used semantic category by all except CM is the corresponding
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Concrete - 1st without generalisation/instantiation (Figure 7.8 on
page 219) is used mostly by BA1, followed by PL, BA2 and BA3. CM does not
use this category, the others use it sparingly. When examining the semantic
categories, things get a little more chaotic. The corresponding Concrete -
medium is used to some extent by AR1 and BA3, but sparingly or not by
the others. More dominant is the Medium category, followed by the Concrete
category. It thus appears that semantic switches are less obvious when there is
no generalisation or instantiation involved. BA2 is the most consistent in this
case with his use of only Concrete, Medium and Medium - concrete.
1st - 2nd without generalisation or instantiation (Figure 7.9 on
page 220) appears the most popular category. All modellers use it. BA1,
BA2 and AR1 use it most frequently. Again the corresponding semantic cat-
egory Medium - abstract is not the most dominant, but is still significantly
used by AR2, AR1 and BA3. The categories Abstract and Medium are more
dominantly used. Interestingly, only BA1, AR1 and PL use deviating semantic
categories, making this the most congruent semantic - relational abstraction
category.
We see across all categories that the more instances of a relational abstrac-
tion category a modeller uses, the greater the variety of semantic categories
used. In the categories involving generalisation or instantiation, the corre-
sponding semantic categories were dominantly used. Only Instantiate 1st -
concrete showed more variation, involving more semantic Abstract use. In the
categories without generalisation or instantiation, single semantic level cate-
gories were more favoured, with slightly higher levels of congruence between
relational and semantic levels exhibited in particular by BA2, BA3, AR2 and
CM. The most interesting finding is that all modellers use all categories, but
the stronger modellers are more equally represented in both concrete and ab-
stract categories, whereas the weaker modellers are more heavily represented
in the concrete categories as compared to the abstract categories.
Use of Reasoning in Abstraction Building
The first part of subquestion 7.2 refers to how reasoning processes, as defined
in the Reasoning category in our coding scheme (Chapter 5), are used during
the modelling flow in relation to abstraction building. Figure 7.10 on page 221
shows the co-occurrences between the Reasoning processes and the predefined
abstraction categories.
Use of Individual Reasoning Processes
To begin with, Explain is used most liberally in the Instantiate categories,
with 16 respectively 15 occurrences. This makes sense given that instantiations
are frequently used to clarify and explain complicated concepts. In the other




categories, being used least in Generalise concrete - 1st with only 3 occurrences,
and 8 and 9 occurrences in the remaining categories.
The next process, Analogy, is hardly used in the concrete - 1st categories,
only twice by AR1 and once by AR2. It is more liberally used in the 1st - 2nd
categories, with CM being the only one who does not use it at all. AR1, BA1
and BA2 use the most analogies, with BA3 following just behind.
Then, Inference is the most frequently used reasoning process across all
categories. It appears as if ‘if - then’ reasoning comes naturally to modellers
at all levels of abstraction. In the two Generalise categories, Inference is used
least, with 12 and 14 occurrences. In the other categories, the occurrence range
is between 27 and 41. All modellers use Inference at some point. CM uses it
least, only in 3 categories. AR2 uses it in 4 categories, PL in 5 and the other
modellers in all categories.
Verify is used least in Generalise concrete - 1st, with only 4 occurrences. In
the other categories, the occurrence range is between 12 - 19 occurrences. In
the 1st - 2nd categories, PL does not use Verify at all. He uses it minimally in
only 2 categories. The most consistent Verify users are BA1, BA2 and AR1,
who use it in all categories.
Case discrimination shows a similar pattern to Explain, being used most
liberally in the two Instantiate categories with 26 and 27 occurrences. Case
discriminations are also frequently used with instantiations to explain matters.
Interestingly, it is also used 24 times in Concrete - 1st. It makes sense that
case discriminations mostly appear in concrete relations, but apparently not so
much in co-occurrence with Generalise, with only 7 occurrences. In the other
two 1st - 2nd categories, Case discrimination is used 12 and 16 times.
Integrate is a process which is not frequently used across all categories.
Generalise 1st - 2nd and Instantiate 2nd - 1st have the most co-occurrences,
9 and 8 respectively. For all other categories, the count is below 5. CM and
BA3 do not use Integrate at all. BA1 is the only one to use Integrate in all
categories.
Assume is also not very frequently used. Only Instantiate 1st - concrete has
14 co-occurrences, the other categories all have fewer than 10. Again, BA1 is
the only one to use Assume across all categories, with BA2 just behind, using
it in 5 categories. AR2 does not use Assume at all.
Elaborate is used 9 times in Instantiate 1st - concrete, but less than 5 times
in all other categories. CM, BA2 and AR1 do not use Elaborate at all. At most
3 modellers use Elaborate in Instantiate 1st - concrete and Concrete - 1st. In
the other categories, only 2 modellers use Elaborate, and in Generalise 1st -
2nd AR2 is the only one to use it.
Categorisation is another minimally used process across all categories. In
Concrete - 1st, Categorisation is not used at all. The two Generalise categories
and Instantiate 1st - concrete have only 1 co-occurrence, and the other two
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Rephrase is used most often in Instantiate 1st - concrete, with 14 co-
occurrences. In the other categories, it is used between 4 - 7 times. BA3
does not use Rephrase, and CM uses it only in Instantiate 1st - concrete. BA1
is the only one to use it across all categories.
Finally, Summarise is used most frequently in 1st - 2nd with 12 co-occurrences.
The other categories all have less than 6 co-occurrences. It is remarkable that
BA1 is clearly the heaviest Summarise user. In Generalise 1st - 2nd, he is
the only one to use it 6 times. BA1 always ended complex explanations with
summaries, for the purpose of monitoring both his own and his peers’ compre-
hension. CM and AR2 do not use Summarise at all.
We also examined how frequently Instantiate co-occurs with the Generalise
categories, and vice versa. It turns out that Instantiate co-occurs with the Gen-
eralise categories 9 (Concrete - 1st) and 14 (1st - 2nd) times , and Generalise
co-occurs with the Instantiate categories 9 (1st - concrete) and 18 (2nd - 1st)
times. All modellers do this at some point. Quite often, we observe that In-
stantiate and Generalise are part of a single line of reasoning, for example when
something is being explained using instantiation, and is afterwards generalised
again to re-evaluate it against the larger context. Or when a generalisation is
immediately tested using an instantiation.
Reasoning Trends
Finally, when we look at the trends across all situations, we can see some
subtle differences. In Generalise concrete - 1st, Instantiate 1st - concrete and
1st - 2nd, all modellers have several co-occurrences. In Generalise concrete
- 1st the spread between ‘per modeller’ reasoning process use is also rather
evenly distributed. In the other cases, this is much less so. In Generalise 1st -
2nd and Instantiate 2nd - 1st BA1, BA2, AR2 and AR1 dominate the scene,
and in Concrete - 1st PL and BA3 make a few more contributions. CM is
noticeably absent from all three latter cases. Analogy, remarkably, is barely
used in the concrete categories but extensively in the categories involving a
relational 2nd level. There is also a slight generic trend that the processes of
Explain, Inference, Verify, Case discrimination, and to some extent Integrate,
are more liberally used overall.
To summarise, the examination of Reasoning processes shows us that mod-
eller participation in the concrete categories is rather balanced, but that in
the abstract categories, the stronger modellers dominate the scene. Addition-
ally, the processes Explain, Inference, Verify and Case discrimination are most
heavily used, suggesting they form a good basis on which to build abstractions
on all levels. In the abstract categories, Analogy is also used extensively, mostly
by the stronger modellers. An analogy is considered the ultimate form of high
abstraction, which is supported by these observations. Apart from Analogy,





Use of Monitoring in Abstraction Building
The second part of subquestion 7.2 refers to the use of monitoring processes,
as defined in the Monitoring category in our coding scheme (Chapter 5), dur-
ing the modelling flow in relation to abstraction building. The co-occurrences
between the abstraction categories and monitoring processes are shown in Fig-
ures 7.11 on page 222, 7.12 on page 223 and 7.13 on page 224.
Use of Monitoring Process Clusters
We examine the different monitoring processes in clusters of related processes.
First of all, the Peer monitoring cluster: Refine peer, Contradict peer, Confirm
peer, Monitor peers’ comprehension and Ask questions others’ ideas. For Re-
fine peer, BA1, BA2 and AR1 are the only modellers to have co-occurrences
across all categories. The other modellers all have co-occurrences distributed
across the categories, with the greatest variety in the Generalise categories, in
which only CM does not participate. CM only participates in the Instantiate
categories. Contradict peer has even fewer co-occurrences in all categories, and
none at all by PL and AR1. For PL we have seen that he is often the one being
corrected or contradicted, mostly passively processing what others are saying,
therefore it might not be surprising that he does not contradict others in con-
junction with making abstractions. AR1 uses abstractions mostly for lengthy
explanations, so he may also not contradict in conjunction with abstraction.
For Confirm peer, the distributions are similar except that BA1 has slightly
more co-occurrences now. BA1 has always been very explicit with confirma-
tions, and also often starts an abstraction from a confirmation, a contradiction
or refinement. Monitor peers’ comprehension is a process that stands out. It
is only used in co-occurrence with three categories: in the two Generalise cat-
egories by BA1 alone, and in Instantiate 1st - concrete by BA1 and BA3. This
is interesting because in the detailed descriptions we will see that AR2 is very
specific about peer monitoring. However, his style is more implicit. He keeps
looking at his peers for reactions, and keeps explaining until he seems satisfied
by their looks that they are on par with him. AR1 also has a similar style of
peer monitoring. In our coding, we have only assigned annotations to explicit
utterances. The process Ask questions others’ ideas is used by all modellers
except AR2, but the distribution is rather random. BA1 and BA2 appear to
use it most consistently, but for example in Instantiate 2nd - 1st only CM uses
it. AR1, PL and BA3 only use it once, all in different categories.
When looking at the Inconsistency detection and Inconsistency clarification
cluster, we see that the modellers participating in Inconsistency clarification
are always either the same or a subset of the modellers participating in Incon-
sistency detection. CM is the only one not to participate in this cluster. BA1
participates most often in this cluster.
In the Reflect cluster, consisting of Reflect process content and Reflect pro-
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cess flow, it stands out that Reflect process flow is high in every single abstrac-
tion category. All modellers use it. Interestingly, CM uses it only in the two
Instantiation categories, and BA3 is the only one to use it in every category.
The other modellers use it in most categories. The other reflection process,
Reflect process content, is used considerably less, in most categories about half
as often. Only in the category 1st - 2nd, Reflect process content use is minimal
compared to Reflect process flow. The distribution of modellers to use Reflect
process content is similar to Reflect process flow. Thus, it appears that reflec-
tion, one of the most fundamental monitoring processes, is an act that comes
naturally to the modellers and is widely used in modelling practice on all levels
of relational abstraction. Additionally, talking through a flow appears to be
more intuitive than explicitly referring to content. It could be that content
only becomes relevant if the flow appears to be inconsistent.
The Structuring cluster consists of Scoping, Monitor process (sub)goal, Ask
questions about existing model and Monitor model structure. For Scoping, the
category 1st - 2nd stands out. Scoping is used 30 times in that category, by all
modellers except AR2. Interestingly, though, AR2 uses Scoping most in the two
Generalise categories, where other modellers use it less. BA1 is very consistent
in his elaborate use of Scoping, using it in all categories except Instantiate 2nd
- 1st. Other than that, all modellers participate in Scoping at some point, and
there does not seem to be any specific preference for concrete, 1st or 2nd level.
Monitor process (sub)goal is only used by BA1, BA2 and AR1, and not very
frequently. Ask questions about existing model is mostly used by BA1, BA2
and BA3, again not very frequently. Also CM and AR1 both use it once in
the Instantiate 2nd - 1st category. It might be that the three business analysts
have the most concern of all participants to make new and old models match,
since it is up to them to actually deliver the models. For AR2, for example, it
was very clear that his purpose was to explain mechanisms and to ensure that
the overarching structures made sense, but he was less concerned with what
had already been modelled on paper. Monitor model structure is used a little
more frequently, and also by all participants at some point. BA1 uses it most
by far.
A related cluster to Structuring is the Mapping cluster, comprised of Map
model to stakeholder input and Map process to model structure. First of all, Map
model to stakeholder input is used mostly by BA1, in the two Generalise and
Instantiate 1st - concrete categories. PL, BA2, BA3 and CM also each make a
single use if of it at some point. It is again interesting to see that the business
analysts and the project leader are most concerned with the stakeholder input.
For CM, who is partly a stakeholder himself, it makes sense to match things
to his own perspective. Map process to model structure is used much more
frequently, by all modellers across all categories. It appears that at every
abstraction level, it is intuitive for all modellers to ensure that the process
under discussion is still coherent with what is being written on paper.




Refine self, Return to topic, Monitor own comprehension and Ask questions
own ideas. Test proposition is used a lot, especially in Instantiate 1st - con-
crete with 44 co-occurrences, by all modellers. In the other categories it is
used somewhat less, but still quite frequently. It makes sense that the most
concrete instantiation category, which lends itself best to concrete examples, is
used so extensively for testing propositions. Ask for confirmation is not used
very frequently, most consistently by BA1 and also, especially in the Generalise
categories, by AR2. For AR2, asking for confirmation is his way of performing
peer monitoring, for if he does not get explicit confirmation he will explain
things again, as we have seen in the description of the Peer monitoring cluster.
Refine self is used by all modellers except AR2, with BA1 having the most
co-occurrences in particular in the two Generalise categories and 1st - 2nd. It
is interesting to see this process co-occur most often with the more abstract
categories, which might not be the most likely categories in which to discover
one’s own errors. However, it might be that errors were actually discovered
in more concrete categories, and that repair is then consecutively done during
more abstract lines of reasoning. Overall, though, the process is not frequently
used. For Return to topic, AR1 is the only one not to use this process. The
other modellers use it rather sporadically throughout different categories. This
is not a very fundamental monitoring process, although it might give an indi-
cation of WMC, but only if a topic actually needs returning to. Monitor own
comprehension is only engaged in by PL, BA1, BA2 and BA3. BA1 does it
most often, but he is also the most outspoken participant frequently engaging
in thinking aloud. For CM, AR1 and AR2, we cannot say how much compre-
hension monitoring they have done implicitly. However, their roles were mainly
to explain to the business analysts what they already knew, therefore it makes
sense for them not to engage in explicit comprehension monitoring. Ask ques-
tions own ideas happens only very sporadically, and not at all in Generalise
1st - 2nd and Instantiate 2nd - 1st. In the other categories, PL, BA1, BA2
and BA3 are the only ones to do it, with more co-occurrences in the concrete
categories than in the abstract categories. This might again be explained by
the fact that the business analysts and to some extent the project leader are
the ones who have to translate input from stakeholders and architects into
model structures, which they can ask questions about. It is interesting that it
happens mostly during concrete reasoning, which implies that ideas which are
forming are immediately tested with peers.
Formulate unanswered issue is a process that stands by itself, relating more
to Planning and thinking ahead than optimising the current model. It is not
used much. Interestingly, in Instantiate 2nd - 1st PL is the only one to use the
process. In Generalise 1st - 2nd it is not used at all. It appears unintuitive to
use Formulate unanswered issue in conjunction with abstraction building.
191
7
CHAPTER 7. AN ANALYSIS OF ABSTRACTION IN
MODELLING
Monitoring Trends
The thing that stands out most is the distribution of modeller participation in
the different categories. In Instantiate 2nd - 1st, BA1 and BA3 do not partic-
ipate at all, whereas PL participates rather actively. For BA1 this is peculiar,
given that he participates elaborately in all other categories and performs a
lot of Reasoning in this category, in particular Analogy, Inference and Case
discrimination. BA3 has fewer co-occurrences in every other category, so this
might be less remarkable. For PL, who participates most actively in the con-
crete categories, this is an interesting observation. Still, Instantiate 2nd - 1st
has the least monitoring co-occurrences of all, despite it being the category in
which BA1 and AR2 in particular perform the most Reasoning. Perhaps these
lines of reasoning could be seen as scaffolds for potential consecutive monitor-
ing actions in a different abstraction category. For all other categories, the
modeller participation is much more balanced.
The analysis of Monitoring processes suggests that monitoring happens
quite extensively during modelling, but least in the Instantiate 2nd - 1st cate-
gory. Some commonalities are that Reflect process content, Reflect process flow
and Test proposition were high across all categories. Reflecting and testing are
closely related acts. However, it also seems that each modeller has a different
monitoring profile. Some have more implicit styles of monitoring, while others
explicitly ask for confirmation. Some place a strong emphasis on scoping and
goal monitoring, or structure mapping.
Individual Abstraction Flows
As the final part of this analysis, we will describe the abstraction flows for each
individual participant.
PL elaborates a lot but is prone to getting lost in detail when he talks. He
appears to lose track of his context, focusing mostly on one single flow. He
frequently does not come to a clear point, ending with an implicit implication.
He describes the details of his abstractions, but a peer is always needed to
translate these into a clear point that can be worked with afterwards. PL
is rarely in the lead, mostly he reacts to his peers. His reasoning consist
largely of direct inferences and elaborations. His monitoring appears to be
targeted mostly at asking others for confirmation, and reflecting on process
flow and content. He does not show much active monitoring of his peers’
comprehension. When abstractions are narrowly scoped, he does well, but
when they require a strong overview of multiple processes, he tends to show
weaker lines of reasoning.
When considering the tendencies described above in the neurocognitive con-
text, they show similarities with the signs of a lower working memory capacity




abstract concepts more actively engage the verbal pathway, whereas concrete
concepts elicit more activation in the perceptual pathway (Wang et al., 2010) is
interesting to consider given PL’s relative comfort in the concrete abstraction
categories and his suboptimal verbal fluency. This might suggest that he is
more visually oriented, and less strong in activation of the abstract pathways.
In the context of the levels of modelling performance as described by Sins et al.
(2005) (printed in Chapter 4 in Tables 4.2 on page 92, 4.3 on page 93 and 4.4
on page 94), he shows mostly medium performance characteristics. He does
some reasoning, reflecting and hypothesis testing and makes valid points, but
his focus is narrow and he does not appear to grasp the overarching interac-
tions well. Also he frequently stands corrected while trying to translate his
ideas into formal model entities.
BA1 is strong in initiation, and during this process shows self-monitoring in
the form of talking through process steps and domain knowledge. He keeps a
good mental overview of the relations he draws and which goals they serve. He
easily switches between them and knows which information is most relevant for
the abstraction at hand. Often this is reflected in his semantic level use. He uses
concrete terms when there is clear misunderstanding, and medium terms when
he assumes comprehension to be sufficient. These two forms of using semantic
levels are then tested against the more abstract relations, making targeted use
of instantiation and generalisation. He is particularly strong in scoping, detect-
ing inconsistencies and formulating the key point. He uses targeted language to
state his point, followed by extensive descriptions of more concrete examples
to explain his point, which cover all possible marginal cases.This makes his
abstractions functional and illustrative. BA1 is often in the lead of discussions
and uses his abstractions very purposefully, to illustrate a point, to verify a
process goal or to structure a process flow. He also uses abstractions to test
and confirm his peers’ input and to clarify situations, signifying a focus on peer
monitoring as well.
BA1 displays the characteristics of high WMC, and his excellent verbal flu-
ency and functional abstractions suggest that he may very well have strong
abstract pathway activation. In his interactions, all the characteristics of good
modelling performance can be discerned. He thinks through his structures, rea-
sons elaborately about model entity interaction and overarching goals, scopes
and translates knowledge into model formalism easily.
AR2 makes functional and clear abstractions which greatly aid his explana-
tions. He explains process steps in highly concrete, visual examples. He is
rather consistent with his use of semantic abstraction levels, they match well
with the relational abstractions he makes. Within one explanation, semantic
levels tend to change very little. He makes clear points, using many examples
and in a story-like fashion that make them easy to comprehend. His style is
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almost like that of a teacher. He is less explicit in relating to process goals than
BA1, but he always appears to discuss relevant issues and process paths. AR2
also shows strong structure monitoring, relating system set-up and potential
implementation issues easily, and he displays efficient switching between per-
spectives and abstraction levels. AR2 also continuously monitors himself and
his peers closely. Peers can build well on his reasoning.
Like BA1, AR2 shows high WMC characteristics, excellent verbal fluency
and functional, flexible abstraction abilities. He also exhibits the qualities of
a strong modeller. He has a highly structural approach to the task at hand,
his explanations are well thought through and he elaborates on details if they
are helpful in making a complex phenomenon comprehensible. He is strong
in scoping, hypothesis testing, maintaining focus, using domain knowledge,
reflecting on progress and peer monitoring.
CM has fewer instances of abstractions than the other modellers, but his
abstractions are clear, crisp, illustrative, to the point and very consistent in
terms of relational and semantic levels. He takes his time to understand the
modelling situation and then shows a pattern of goal-directed utterances, which
his peers can build upon. He draws logical relations and scopes well. He also
takes time to reflect on his peers’ input and uses it to further the discussion.
CM’s short participation in our sessions makes it very difficult to get a reli-
able idea of his modelling ability, but he does appear to show characteristics of
strong modelling. He reasons clearly about why certain phenomena appear as
they do, he scopes well and he can reflect on things to the benefit of the discus-
sion at hand. Additionally, he makes extensive use of his domain knowledge.
CM also has excellent verbal fluency, which may suggest a good WMC.
BA2 is not at the forefront, does not give lengthy explanations and uses
reasoning processes rather sparingly compared to BA1 and AR2. His answers
are nevertheless well-reasoned and his abstractions are mostly considerations
of consequences to actions. He monitors by reflecting on process flow and
content, from which he derives inferences, which he uses to justify his answers.
He appears to be aware of arising discrepancies, but does not appear to pinpoint
them as precisely as BA1 and AR2. He often generalises before giving examples.
His answers are clear and comprehensible to most of his peers. Only one peer
had trouble translating his answers into functional design document text. This
is the only case in which we see BA2 taking the lead. He does his best to
ensure that comprehension is shared again, making clear and illustrative use of
instantiations and medium-level descriptions. BA2 uses semantic abstractions
as he sees fit, but his relational abstractions always make sense.
Given that BA2 is a lot less verbally expressive than BA1, AR2 and CM,
it is more difficult to assess his modelling ability. He uses his abstractions




few cases in which he speaks falteringly. Mostly, this happens when he works
with more fluent and dominant modellers like BA1, or the technical architect
AR1. It is clear from BA2’s behaviour that he accepts these peers as his
superiors in terms of knowledge, although he does give critical feedback every
now and again. When working with BA3, BA2 appears more comfortable
taking the lead, albeit in a very gentle manner. His inferences are logical and
valid, which implies at least a good WMC, and we also see him making use
of strong modelling skills like hypothesis testing, structured reflection using
domain knowledge, discrepancy detection and making good efforts to monitor
shared comprehension. He is simply very modest in his behaviour.
AR1 appears proficient in reasoning on and switching between all abstrac-
tion levels. He has no trouble switching between levels, and generalises and
instantiates with ease. He appears confident about his goal, and his reasoning
is practical and to the point. However, AR1 uses a lot of concrete database
jargon in lengthy monologues, making his reasoning appear less rich, as though
he focuses mainly on the database implementation and less on the greater con-
text. Sometimes he speaks in abstract terms about rather concrete database
implementations, which makes it difficult for his peers to catch on because they
are less comfortable in the database domain. AR1 often uses silence to monitor
his peers’ comprehension. If they do not contradict, he assumes agreement and
continues. When he notices comprehension difficulty, however, his strategy
is to explain with ‘more of the same’ which does not always appear to lead
to true clarification. Where BA1 is an expert in switching flexibly between
contexts to find the most suitable explanation perspective, AR1 continues to
utilise database actions to verify his conclusions. Unfortunately he rarely mon-
itors his peers explicitly so that it does not become apparent in which cases his
explanations are helpful and in which ones not. AR1 uses his abstractions to
illustrate the relations between system functionality and database implemen-
tation. Sometimes his abstractions also serve to structure the documents they
are working on, which requires a higher relational abstraction level because it
places a piece of functionality in its larger context and in relation to its goal.
AR1’s main weakness appears to be his narrow focus on the database con-
text. In terms of switching, he seems less flexible than the other modellers.
However, his excellent verbal fluency, logical reasoning and easy abstraction
level switching suggest good WMC and abstraction abilities. Additionally,
within processes relying on database functioning, AR1 shows all the character-
istics of strong modelling skills.
BA3 clearly appears to be more comfortable reasoning on the concrete and
1st relational abstraction levels. She has more instances of these than the other
modellers, and her peer confirms more frequently in these situations than in
higher level situations. Her points are clear when focused on a direct path
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that can be clearly envisioned. She appears less comfortable when relating
scenarios to metacognitive entities like goals, principles or other processes,
relying on her peer to keep her on track. Her abstractions appear to be less
‘deep’ in the sense that they relate less to issues that are not immediately
obvious. But her structural process thinking is good, and she reasons through
inferences, verifying her conclusions with consequences, although she sometimes
needs a lot of help from her peer. She builds up her abstractions in a logical
way, initially talking in relatively concrete terms about what is going on in
the process and only resorting to more abstract terms when she comes to her
conclusion.
BA3’s tendency to use mostly concrete, directly observable relations and
her weaker grasp of the entire modelling context suggest lower WMC than
her peers. Yet, she is capable of achieving abstraction with help, and once
understood she makes valuable contributions to the discussion, for example by
pointing out inconsistencies in the model. She refers to domain knowledge,
in particular on the concrete level, engages in hypothesis testing and reflects
on what she is writing. She also monitors her own comprehension, because
she always asks for help if she does not fully comprehend what she has to
write down. However, she has trouble scoping and is sometimes hesitant about
which variables are critical at a certain moment. She thus shows mostly strong
modelling skills, with a few weaker points.
In summary, the individual analyses give us interesting insights in each
modeller’s abstraction building process. We observe very stable behaviour
from BA1, AR2, CM, BA2 and AR1. They show the same strong modelling
tendencies throughout all fragments, which may be characterised in the most
generic sense as making use of a rich variety of reasoning and monitoring pro-
cesses, with particular emphasis on using reasoning and monitoring processes
in the more abstract categories. Those processes aimed at testing and verifying
utterances were used most, and for monitoring, comprehension and especially
peer comprehension monitoring was a predominant feature.
BA3’s behaviour shows more fluctuations, sometimes being stronger than
at other times. PL’s behaviour appears to show the most fluctuations, but
when examining unrelated fragments, it does show that he too has his stronger
moments. However, PL shows the least self-awareness of all modellers, because
where BA3 mostly asks for help, PL is mostly corrected by his peers.
Result Validity
Due to time and budget constraints, no inter-rater reliability could be com-
puted. This analysis thus relies on triangulating thick description and coding
as its main validity measure (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), so that both analyses
may show complementary insights. Additionally, we discussed the results with





In this chapter, our aim was to find out how to characterise the flow of con-
structing and using abstractions in a collaborative modelling practice, in terms
of the use of abstraction levels, reasoning processes and monitoring processes.
We have studied these variables in modellers while they were building abstrac-
tions in a practical context. We draw our conclusions in relation to Pattern 1
and Pattern 4, as described in Section 8.1.
First of all, it proved to be very difficult to draw generic conclusions about
abstraction flows, because all modellers have their own unique styles. We saw
that for semantic and relational abstraction level use, stronger modellers are
more equally represented in both concrete and abstract categories, whereas
the weaker modellers are more heavily represented in the concrete categories
as compared to the abstract categories. Stronger modellers tend to use more
reasoning and monitoring processes, and also of a greater variety, than weaker
modellers. Strong modellers also tend to focus more on peer comprehension
monitoring. The latter provides further support for P4 “Shared understanding
seems of primary importance to strong modellers”.
Nevertheless, characterising individual abstraction flows in terms of the use
of abstraction levels, reasoning and monitoring yielded many insights which
merit further investigation. It shows how modellers create and polish their ab-
stractions as they discuss their mental models with their peers. In particular, it
shows modellers’ self-awareness in relation to their modelling progress, it gives
details about each modeller’s style of reasoning and monitoring, it shows where
they need the most help from their peers, what their strongest skills are, where
in the process the most stagnation of progress occurs and how this is resolved.
Overall, these associations may suggest that the use of specific reasoning and
monitoring processes in combination with abstraction level categories, espe-
cially when studied in the context of specific modelling fragments, might give
an indication of a modeller’s current performance quality, which is a potential
point of intervention for training.
With regard to P1 “Semantic and Relational Abstraction do not necessarily
correlate”, the abstraction level code counts call into question how we should
interpret the relation between semantic and relational abstraction. Based on
counting alone, there appears to be a certain degree of coherence between se-
mantic and relational levels, although this differs per abstraction category, and
there is also no clear set of modellers who are consistently more coherent than
others. Only in cases of instantiation or generalisation, the consistency between
semantic and relational was slightly higher. Still, the qualitative differences we
observed in the previous chapter about how inconsistent use of relational and
semantic categories leads to delays in the modelling progress and corrections by
peers cannot be deduced from the code counts, further emphasising the need
at this point in time to triangulate counts with qualitative descriptions and
that coherence between relational and semantic levels alone is not a reliable
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indicator for generalisation of performance quality.
7.6 Discussion
In the context of this analysis, we re-examined P1 and P4. The findings on
abstraction level use provide an indication that P1 may be supported, but that
congruence between semantic and relational levels appears to be too random to
consider it as an indicator of strong modelling. The finding that the abstract
semantic level is used much more frequently than either medium or concrete
level implies that people are a lot more comfortable using abstract concepts
than abstract relations. This appears to contradict the findings by Christoff
et al. (2009), which imply that the use of the highest abstraction level for
both relations and concepts require a higher mental effort and are thus equally
difficult. One explanation could be that once people learn how to use abstract
concepts, the additional effort goes away. However, Christoff et al. (2009) used
common abstract words such as love, freedom and peace in their research, which
still triggered RLPFC activation. But still it could be that the modellers had
assigned such a meaning to the abstract concepts that they had reached the
‘preferred level of abstraction’ people are comfortable talking on (Rosch et al.,
1976). Perhaps, in the context of modelling that specific domain, those abstract
concepts were the preferred level of abstraction. If this is so, it would provide
another clue that semantic and relational abstraction levels are unrelated in a
practical abstraction building process.
Concerning P4, the finding that the Reasoning processes Explain, Inference,
Verify and Case discrimination were most widely used, as well as the Monitor-
ing processes Reflect process flow, Reflect process content and Test proposition,
suggest that creating shared understanding is important to all modellers. In
terms of simply counting co-occurrences, we do not see strong evidence that
strong modellers engage more in creating shared understanding. However, dur-
ing the individual abstraction flow characterisations, we do see clearly that the
stronger modellers place a much more specific emphasis on creating shared
understanding, by taking the lead, giving lengthy explanations, asking explicit
confirmation, reading facial expressions and repeating things if necessary. Such
communication style differences are not reflected in the coding, because mod-
ellers can give very lengthy explanations or ask for explicit confirmation mul-
tiple times in one utterance, but an utterance will still only be assigned one
single code for the behaviour in question. It thus appears that P4 is supported
in the sense that creating shared understanding is certainly of primary impor-
tance to strong modellers. However, it also appears to be important to weaker
modellers, but their style of achieving it is less explicit. For example, BA3
found a way of achieving it by focusing on her own comprehension. Whenever
she did not understand something, she would ask. This strategy will work if




achieve a desirable shared understanding. PL relied on being corrected by his
peers. Again, this will only work if the peers show superior comprehension. It
seems that stronger modellers simply have more capacity to focus on others
because their own comprehension costs less effort.
The second topic to discuss is the added value of this way of analysing
modelling behaviour. The most important trends emerging from this analysis
are the balanced use of concrete and abstract relational levels by strong mod-
ellers, and the relatively heavy use of concrete levels by weaker modellers. This
is also reflected in the findings that both Reasoning and Monitoring process
use is much more varied in terms of participating modellers in the concrete
categories than in the abstract categories. It thus seems that all modellers
participate in reasoning and monitoring, but that the differences lie mostly
in when and how they are used. The individual characterisations show us
that stronger modellers make much more purposeful use of their abstractions,
which is not truly reflected in the coding. Another issue is that for example,
if you want to analyse where and how an act of abstraction building fails, you
need a temporal aspect, especially if it fails between several modellers. So far,
the codes can only provide an indication for failure, for example if there is a
concentration of Ask for confirmation or Monitor peers’ comprehension codes.
But once you find the start of the failure, you will have to analyse the entire
process from beginning to end with thick description in order to find out what
went wrong and why. Thus, we may deduce that coding the behaviours and
examining fragments of behaviour using thick description provide more value
than the sum of its parts.
The purpose of these findings, however, should not be to draw definitive
conclusions about modelling behaviour, but rather to make the modeller aware
of his own style, strengths and weaknesses. This can provide valuable con-
tributions for training purposes. An example is the relatively heavy use of
semantically abstract concepts in concrete relations by PL. One could examine
if PL uses these as compensation for lack of comprehension, or simply because
his concrete image is reflected in an abstract concept. Either way, it will pro-
vide him insights in his own behaviour, which is always the most important




Category Generalise concrete - 1st with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description PLs peer is asking highly focused questions about process steps to get clarity, on
an abstract level: When . . . is the next step in our monitoring process?. He focuses on
structure. PL does not answer the question with a step name, but an example which he
first describes on a medium level: “I can imagine discriminating between a single case
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. . . that you want to give him an opportunity to do it next month, that you don’t start
calling immediately.” Then he first instantiates this example to a concrete level: “a new
employer who has not submitted for a long time, or existing employers who have trouble
with returning erroneous submissions”. Then PL generalises this to a potential ‘if-then’
action: “you may formulate criteria for that, you want to make a sort of queue . . . call,
or call with visit, and then you can make a decision about giving extra time or not . . . ”.
He tests his proposition by asking for peer confirmation, however with a question that has a
different focus: “you don’t want to give extra time by default, right?”. His peer generalises
his remarks to the level of the model structure he was creating, translating this situation
into a process step name.
Reasoning codes Assume, Case discrimination, Elaborate, Inference, Rephrase
Monitoring codes Reflect process content, Test proposition
Interpretation The relations drawn between PL’s peer’s process step question and PL’s examples
remain implicit. However, it appears as though PL is using his example to illustrate the
process step asked for. He relates his concrete illustration to the more abstract option of
formulating special criteria. PL uses medium terms for his concrete example and abstract
words for his 1st-level generalisation. In this situation the abstraction works because his
peer picks up the essence of his message and keeps his focus on finishing the model structure.
If he had gone along with PLs exact final question, they might have deviated off topic for
a while. So PL makes a valid point, but does not focus his attention on the initial point
of the discussion. This results in his not performing the final step of relating his input to
the model structure, which his peer does for him. Thus, the abstraction appears to be only
partly functional and complete. This instance is the only instance of Generalise concrete -
1st for PL.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd with semantic Abstract
Description PL’s peer makes a medium/concrete assumption: “here you have a payroll, there
should always be a physical comparison of that print-out with what we have in our sys-
tem”. PL generalises this assumption to: “well, it is a means to prevent say . . . unjustified
differences, that they start to deviate from the norm”. He draws a relation between dif-
ferences and norm, and relates this to the concrete example his peer gave. He provides a
reason for why the assumption is valid: “otherwise we will come for a checkup, and we
find out that nothing is wrong”. His peer rephrases and accepts, but emphasises that they
should validate with a specific stakeholder.
Reasoning codes Rephrase
Monitoring codes Refine peer
Interpretation PL’s peer wants to make sure whether his assumption is correct. PL’s general-
isation appears functional, relating his peer’s assumption to a more generic purpose and
justifying it with a possible consequence, which is a form of peer refinement. PL only
uses abstract terms for this, although his justification is clearly aimed to be more concrete.
Thus, here we see PL speaking with a more concrete intention than his words suggest. His
peer wants more detail to be sure, because he rephrases it in the next utterance with a
more detailed, medium level description. Therefore it appears that PL’s abstraction was
functional, but not complete enough for his peer to have complete faith in it as far as form
and content are concerned. Another clue for this inference is the peer’s note of urgency in
his voice as he reacts. This instance is the only instance of Generalise 1st - 2nd for PL, and
on top of that it is minimally accompanied by reasoning and monitoring, implying that this
is not the type of abstraction he is most comfortable with.
Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Concrete - Medium
Description The session is in an impasse. PL tries to walk through an existing model to verify
his perspective. He draws a relation between a deadline which has passed and a consecutive
5-day reminder period: “once the period is over, you send a reminder with a request to
still submit required data within 5 days”. He instantiates by elaborating on a two-option
scenario: “if he submits within 5 days, I’ll have it . . . if I don’t get it . . . so in this
situation I have no complete timely registration of payroll data”. His peer corrects him
that he is mixing up timeliness and completeness of registration, in terms of how to monitor




Reasoning codes Elaborate, Inference
Monitoring codes Ask for confirmation, Confirm peer, Reflect process flow
Interpretation The form of this abstraction appears functional. PL uses mostly medium terms
to describe this situation, only the ‘5 days’ is highly concrete. We do observe again PLs
tendency during the modelling discussion to easily get lost in details of a single process
path, without adhering to a predefined scope. PL performed Instantiate 1st - concrete 12
times during observations.
Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Abstract - Medium
Description PL is trying to make sense of a previously constructed model in the preceding utter-
ance. He expresses his doubts about a certain model step:“we assume that we can receive
either on paper or digital . . . what bothers me is look, you can only check syntax with
the system’s help. If you receive a form, you can’t check syntax yet.” He then elaborates
on what he means: “you can only check syntax once it has been digitised.” Then he
inferences the consequence that bothers him: “so that step . . . if we have digitised it and
we import it into the system I would say that it will also perform a form authorisation
syntax check by default.” He looks to his peer for a reaction. His peer refines his scope with
a concrete example: “Form and authorisation check happens with ‘Receive submission’
(a different process not currently being discussed). So if it is a free-format fax, or it has
staples in it, we don’t even bother to digitise it, we send it straight back.”
Reasoning codes Elaborate, Explain, Inference, Integrate
Monitoring codes Ask question own ideas, Monitor model structure, Reflect process flow
Interpretation PL draws a 2nd level relation between an incoming file, which might be in digital
or physical form, and the system which will process it. Within the system, a syntax check
has to take place, and the incoming file is instantiated to ‘a form’. A 1st level relation is
drawn between the file format and the checks. The incoming file is used to test how the
checks should be performed. Semantic levels are congruent with relational levels. Medium
abstract is used for the components coming into the system, and abstract is used for the
system actions. PL’s inference then serves to monitor his own interpretation. The form
is functional, only his peer does not fully agree with his perspective on the scope of the
processes under discussion. Again, this is the only instance of Instantiate 2nd - 1st for PL.
Category Concrete - 1st with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description His peer is talking through a concrete model situation. PL reacts by asking what
might go wrong: “what goes wrong here, say you process this . . . we process it but there
is no WIA decision document, then the only thing we cannot do is calculate the right
premium . . . ”. He relates data processing to a missing document and the consequences
of this, and then relates that to the individual who should have delivered it: “but it is
the employer’s responsibility to submit that”. His peer refines him by stating that certain
actions need not take place and refers back to the process goals: “if we could possibly know
that something is wrong, that there should be a WIA document but there is none . . . then
we are not even going to try processing it, we send it back. Because the goal is correct
and complete registration”.
Reasoning codes Assume, Inference
Monitoring codes Reflect process content, Test proposition
Interpretation PL starts with a concrete relation and then inferences to a 1st level relation. He
tests this statement with an inference and looks to his peer for confirmation. It appears a
functional statement, with sensible relations which convey his message, but again PL is lost
in details which are incongruent with the process goals. His perspective is really focused
on one flow and he appears to forget the context. PL performs Concrete - 1st 13 times.
Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium
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Description PL’s peer has made a suggestion to publish the names of those who have not done
timely payments in their debtors administration. PL draws a relation between this situation
and a situation from his former assignment: “during a previous assignment I had a lot
of defaulters. They were day care centres for children . . . they had too little money”.
Then PL relates this situation to the paradox it provides in the situation under discussion:
“they were obliged to register themselves but then you have very few options to get your
money, you can’t just tell them to stop.”. His peer accepts the input and makes a further
suggestion.
Reasoning codes Analogy
Monitoring codes Reflect process flow
Interpretation This appears a functional abstraction which builds on knowledge of a former
assignment which is first related to the situation at hand (1st level), and then to the
particular consequences (2nd level). The analogy drawn illustrates the point. The semantic
level does not change throughout the utterance. This condition occurs 6 times for PL.
BA1’s Abstraction Episodes
Category Generalise concrete - 1st with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description BA1 is going through a functional design document with his peer. He describes how
the process may proceed, and describes consecutive process steps: “So the enterprise . . . no
the first thing we’ll do is indeed, from the temporary situation we have described above
we will send a letter announcing the phone . . . yes”. Then he generalises these steps to
the process structure displayed on a large screen, to which he points while speaking: “this
is generic, so we have to ask AR1 . . . this is what we have just been talking about”. His
peer accepts.
Reasoning codes Summarise
Monitoring codes Formulate unanswered issue, Monitor model structure, Monitor own compre-
hension
Interpretation This abstraction is meant to get started on a new topic during the session, there-
fore it is mainly a summary being related to the structure they will be working with. BA1’s
talking through the process steps is meant to monitor his own comprehension. The pro-
cess steps are described in medium terms, the structure and uncertainties encountered in
abstract terms. His language appears even more abstract given that BA1 is looking at a
screen from which the process steps he is referring to can literally be read. But the purpose
of his abstraction is clear, it appears functional and informative. BA1 has 10 instances of
Generalise concrete - 1st.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description BA1s generalisation comes from a line of reasoning started earlier in the session. In
the preceding utterance, he describes a way to automatically sort a blacklist: “you could
automatically arrange that list . . . if it is a defaulter you could put him higher, if someone
always pays perfectly on time you could put him lower, even if we detect something the
probability is high that he will pay anyway”. He relates this to the generic mechanism
of how the list works and what the consequences of a problem detection could be: “if we
assume he has submitted incorrectly we just remind him. That is a way to get it down”.
Reasoning codes Analogy, Inference
Monitoring codes Confirm peer
Interpretation This abstraction was meant as a detailed confirmation of BA1’s peer. It appears
functional, describing how a process step might be implemented. It is also used as a test.
The list sorting is described on a 1st level in medium terms, the connection to the generic





Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Medium - Concrete
Description BA1 states two possible implementation alternatives: “So if it . . . functionally
. . . under water first in the front portal and then in the basic administration, or directly
in the basic administration, I don’t know and it doesn’t really matter.” He instantiates
with a condition that has to be met: “But it is the case that if at the moment we hang
up the phone, and that everyone agrees that you belong with us, then from the moment
the phone call has been terminated it will definitively be registered in the basic adminis-
tration”. His peer accepts and reformulates.
Reasoning codes Inference
Monitoring codes Monitor peers’ comprehension, Reflect process flow, Scoping
Interpretation BA1’s abstraction is a functional explanation to clarify the situation. The re-
lation between the implementation alternatives (1st level) and the condition to be met
(concrete level) is one of scoping. He declares something as irrelevant, and redirects the
focus to a more relevant point. He describes the concrete actions in a mixture of concrete
and medium terms. BA1 uses Instantiate 1st - concrete 39 times.
Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Medium - Concrete
Description BA1 explains his point of view on a department-wide discussion. He starts with
an instantiation of the discussion topic. Then he draws a relation between concrete data
that should be entered in the system and how this should be processed internally: “if you
go from CAO to UTA, do we make a new registration, or is it simply a mutation we
have to process?”. Then he draws a relation between this internal processing and how it
should be presented to the user, decoupling these two issues: “where does this discussion
come from? the user wants to see which data he needs on the screen, and that is slightly
different for CAO and UTA. But your presentation layer is something entirely different
then what you process internally”.
Reasoning codes Assume, Case discrimination, Explain, Inference
Monitoring codes Formulate unanswered questions, Map model to stakeholder input, Scoping
Interpretation This instantiation is functional and displays good insight in how different ab-
straction layers are related. He starts his instantiation from a 2nd level relation concerning
several issues on which there is disagreement. From there, he focuses to 1st level relations.
While explaining his instantiation he uses medium and concrete terms interchangeably but
highly comprehensibly, which makes it very illustrative. BA1 uses Instantiate 2nd - 1st 33
times.
Category Concrete - 1st with semantic Medium
Description BA1 is writing down a basic process flow. He explains what he is writing. He
draws a relation between a call for information and the employers who have to provide it:
“what this first line does, from the call we will get a complete list of employers”. This
is a direct relation. Then he draws a relation between the employers and their attributes,
another direct one: “per employer you know how many employment registrations there
are. Plus the number of employees”. Then he relates the employers and attributes to the
input the overseeing organisation will receive and what the system will do with the list
of employers: “here we have a list of all employers . . . so we get a submission, we can
process it . . . are we going to do something with this list at that moment?”. He asks his
peer for confirmation. His peer confirms and relates it to existing models.
Reasoning codes Assume, Inference, Verify
Monitoring codes Ask question own ideas, Map process to model structure, Test proposition
Interpretation In this abstraction, two direct relations are merged into one 1st level relation.
BA1 uses medium terms, but the meaning appears clear. It is functional, comprehensible
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Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Abstract
Description BA1 is describing on ‘database’ level what has to happen to get certain data in
the right place, drawing a relation between data and the method of storage: “we select
all records here that satisfy this condition, we enrich them and put them back in the
database”. His peers are listening. Then he draws another relation between the data
storage combination and the conditions on the database that have to be met: “we do this
for all records until the whole database satisfies how we want to store it in our central
administration”.
Reasoning codes Summarise
Monitoring codes Reflect process flow, Return to topic
Interpretation Simple, to the point line of reasoning mostly serving to recap the process flow
related to potential implementation. All is described with the aid of a paper sketch, in
abstract terms. But terms like ‘database’ and ‘record’ could by now easily have acquired a
concrete meaning to the modellers. It appears functional and comprehensible. BA1 has 40
instances of 1st - 2nd.
AR2’s Abstraction Episodes
Category Generalise concrete - 1st
Description There are no instances of this condition for AR2.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description AR2 is explaining a process flow. His peer points to an existing model and asks if
that is the monitoring process. AR2 replies: “so that is a completeness check”. He relates
this check to what his peer is pointing to, thereby generalising his peers question. Then
he relates it to what he was explaining: “so it is not in the happy flow in the sense that
I have a trigger that will start this . . . but if things go smoothly you can still send it on
time”. His peer again points to another existing model, and his other peer refines this and
scopes the process actions.
Reasoning codes Rephrase
Monitoring codes Refine peer, Scoping
Interpretation Many things happen implicitly in this abstraction. First of all, it builds on
the generalisation of many aspects that have been discussed earlier, and also diagrams of
previously drawn models. AR2 is putting his peer’s question into the right context and
structuring the process flow. After speaking both his peers continue with the discussion.
There is no explicit acceptance, but both peers continue to build on AR2’s reasoning,
implying that they accept it. It thus appears a functional abstraction. AR2 uses Generalise
1st - 2nd 5 times.
Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Medium - Concrete
Description AR2 is explaining a process through which data is delivered to the organisation. His
peer asks a question, his other peer nods. AR2 states a generic, desirable process state: “I
think we should strive to bring this as far to the front as possible, but it might not always
be possible”. Then he instantiates with a highly concrete example and counterexample:
“The example we just had, person and his citizen service number. The first test we
have to do, does this person already exist in our administration? If yes, then it will be
. . . a mutation or not, but we know which person is indicated. Does he not exist, then
you can conclude, this is a new person and we have to register him. A new painter has
arisen, we perform our check with the municipality administration. The result is that
the combination of date of birth and this citizen service number does not exist, is invalid.
Only at that moment have I performed a check outside our data and I want to reply to
the employer. Hey, you’ve submitted some stuff, I’m very happy with it, but in the end
you took his twin brother”. Then AR2 states they need to relate such situations to which




Reasoning codes Case discrimination, Elaborate, Explain, Inference
Monitoring codes Formulate unanswered issue, Refine self, Reflect process content, Reflect pro-
cess flow, Test proposition
Interpretation AR2 starts with a very functional instantiation aimed to explain a situation,
using first medium and then concrete terms. There is a strong focus on one flow, but with
attention for exceptions to the rule. It is remarkable how many details AR2 includes in
his explanation which are not necessarily relevant, but which nevertheless exhibit a sense
of humour which make it easy to visualise, understand and remember his explanations.
Implicitly, AR2 relates control checks, their potential outcomes and system behaviour in this
episode, suggesting a strong grasp of how the system is set up. AR2 performs Instantiate
1st - concrete twice.
Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Abstract - Concrete
Description AR2 is explaining a process to his peer. His peer has just rephrased his explanation
to test his comprehension. AR2 confirms him and continues explaining. He states the
mechanism in abstract terms: “you will determine the delta here”, and then instantiates
it with 3 highly concrete examples: ‘‘I conclude the date of birth has changed, so I adapt
the date of birth. So actually I have a photo, and another photo, find the differences, and
I have to determine myself what is going on. So that is how I talk about a ‘situation’.
I have a paycheck for January, a paycheck for February, I will subtract the two, that is
the difference that I will process”. Then AR2 also describes two possible sub-mechanisms.
His peer asks a further question.
Reasoning codes Case discrimination, Elaborate, Explain, Rephrase
Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Refine peer, Reflect process content
Interpretation Another very functional and clear explanation. The multiple examples ensure
comprehension from different perspectives. Implicitly, AR2 monitors his peer very closely,
because he knows his peer has a hard time understanding this topic. AR2 draws a straigh-
forward relation here between the generic mechanism and the submechanisms, explaining
both with concrete illustrative examples. AR2 uses Instantiate 2nd - 1st 7 times.
Category Concrete - 1st with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description AR2’s peer is testing his interpretation of what AR2 is trying to achieve. AR2 replies
that he does not know yet where he is going, only that he has seen in 2 different models
that the same phenomenon is being discussed: “here we say something about feedback,
and here we say something about feedback . . . the confirmation letter”. His peer agrees
that they are the same.
Reasoning codes -
Monitoring codes Inconsistency detection, Monitor model structure
Interpretation AR2 draws a direct relation between the action and two models in which it
appears. The models are pinned up on the wall and therefore allow for a concrete relation
to be drawn. Then he draws a relation between this phenomenon and the fact that they
need to take action on it. He uses abstract terms to refer to what is in the models, and
then medium terms to specify the object which the ‘feedback’ refers to. It is a functional
abstraction, and suggests good structure monitoring. There are 2 instances of Concrete -
1st for AR2.
Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description AR2’s peer has just elaborated on AR2’s earlier explanation, and concludes two
options. AR2 agrees, but states that the choice has an influence on the timing of when
to perform the database commit “at the moment you still have to make that choice, you
do . . . in Oracle terms . . . here you will do your commit, otherwise you will have to roll
back, stop, I’ve discovered an error . . . all those preceding steps I would also not have
performed otherwise, right?” His other peer emphasises that this only holds if you choose
a certain option, AR2 confirms.
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Reasoning codes Inference
Monitoring codes Ask for confirmation, Map process to model structure
Interpretation AR2 draws a relation between the options mentioned by his peer, and the influ-
ence that will have on the database actions. Implicitly, another relation is drawn between
this and potential consequences of making a choice at the wrong moment. It appears a
functional, simple and straightforward inference, less concrete this time. But his peers
have built and continue to build on his abstractions, and AR2 appears to have confidence
in his peers’ comprehension. AR2 has 2 instances of 1st-2nd.
CM’s Abstraction Episodes
Category Generalise concrete - 1st with semantic Concrete - Medium
Description CM’s peer is explaining how the right premium should be deduced for the right
employees. CM emphasises that it is not important what the employer submits as long
as they can recognise within the organisation what the right premium should be for an
employee: “as long as we say internally . . . if you are CAO you deliver according to the
rules of CAO. Whatever tricks he wants to perform, that’s his business”. CM then relates
a concrete premium type to the characteristics of employee data from which they can make
an automatic deduction and thereby check the correctness of the information: “I think
we will still be able to recognise that he belongs in that category and the corresponding
premium. I believe that is all we can do”. His peer continues explaining and tries to refine
CM’s line of reasoning.
Reasoning codes Inference
Monitoring codes Contradict peer, Return to topic, Scoping, Test proposition
Interpretation CM and his peer are trying to achieve shared understanding of a mechanism,
namely how to figure out if an employer is trying to commit fraud by presenting one type
of worker as another. But they appear to have different starting points in mind, which
creates the incompatibility of their mental models. Neither CM nor his peer are expressing
the starting point explicitly. CM’s abstraction itself, though, is comprehensible, functional
and in line with the discussion if considered from his mental model. He draws logical
relations and scopes well. This is the only instance of Generalise concrete - 1st for CM.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd
Description There are no instances of this condition for CM.
Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Medium - Concrete
Description CM and his peer are discussing combinations of options, to see which ones are
possible. CM first makes a generic statement about how the options relate to a basic process
requirement, namely deducing payroll data per employee: “(the options) say something
about how the link with the total employer concern is constructed from the perspective
of different regulations”. His peer gives an example. CM confirms, then instantiates to
illustrate what they will and will not be able to deduce from incoming data: “it could
well be that the employer has 20 locations and each has one UTA regulation, but if they
decide to pay all at once, you won’t be able to see if half of them come from Enschede
and . . . ”. His peer accepts and continues the line of reasoning.
Reasoning codes Assume, Explain
Monitoring codes Refine peer, Reflect process content, Return to topic, Test proposition
Interpretation CM draws a relation between an employer and a set of rules, and how different
implementation scenarios can lead to different consequences. He is consistent in using
medium terms for the 1st level relation and concrete terms for the example. This abstraction
is functional and consistent. CM takes into account his peer’s input and reflects on it,




Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Medium - Concrete
Description CM and his peer are talking about partial submission of data, and how to commu-
nicate to the user if part of the submission is faulty. His peer mentions that it matters for
the actual texts the user will see. CM agrees and then relates this to the process content,
the user text and the process flow: “that is true, but also for the content of the process
. . . purely in terms of review you cannot say I got 10, 8 were correct, 2 were faulty . . . you
don’t see the split-up over there . . . it doesn’t matter one bit for the process but it does
matter for the accompanying text”. His peer accepts and agrees.
Reasoning codes -
Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Reflect process content, Scoping, Test proposition
Interpretation CM instantiates from the generic process flows to a 1st level example of how
employers may submit payroll data. It is a functional, important nuance in the discussion,
clearly articulated and to the point. The example is illustrative, discussed in medium and
concrete terms. This is the only instance of Instantiate 2nd - 1st for CM.
Category Concrete - 1st
Description There are no instances of this condition for CM.
Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Abstract
Description CM and his peer are wrapping up their session and discuss ownership of data, with
regard to how they will present their results to the stakeholders. CM suggests to take a
different approach, and draws a relation between in which process the dataset is being used,
and the stakeholder responsible for the process: “you shouldn’t make it dependent on the
name, but . . . if I’m correct in this process we only ask data that may end up in the basic
administration, so it belongs with that . . . so the owner of that dataset . . . you can let go
who it is”. His peer accepts and continues to sketch their next steps.
Reasoning codes Verify
Monitoring codes Refine self, Test proposition
Interpretation This appears a functional abstraction indicating a nuance in perspective. It is
clear who and what are being referred to even though it is all in abstract terms. There are
3 occurrences of 1st - 2nd for CM.
BA2’s Abstraction Episodes
Category Generalise concrete - 1st with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description BA2 answers his peer by describing that a certain step should be taken much earlier
on in the process. He draws a relation between an incoming document and a decision that
must be based on the document: “I think you receive an AAD document, and that you
have to make a choice at that moment, do we know this person or not?” He then draws
another relation between the decision and its consequences: “if you don’t know him, you
have to register him, and if you do know him then you only have to copy payroll data
or mutate it”. He then generalises this: “I think that is the trigger to determine which
flow you will enter... when dealing with an AAD”. His peer rephrases and asks if she
understands him correctly.
Reasoning codes Case discrimination, Inference, Verify
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Interpretation This is a set of direct relations generalised to a process flow trigger. BA2 uses
medium terms to describe his concrete example, and abstract terms for his generalisation.
Still it is a clear and comprehensible line of reasoning. It appears functional but his peer
does not seem to fully grasp the meaning of his answer in the context of what she wants to
write down. BA2 uses the consequences of the decision to verify things, which ensures that
things make sense within the context under discussion. BA2 uses Generalise concrete - 1st
5 times.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd with semantic Concrete - Abstract
Description BA2 and his peer are working on a functional design document. His peer asks if
two checks are the same thing. BA2 relates the two check scenarios and generalises them
to an identical situation. He justifies his answer by drawing another relation between the
check scenarios and preconditions that have to be met: “instead of looking per line in the
file if it is correct, you have read it in and you know immediately because you have to
satisfy certain constraints like field length and certain business rules”. His peer accepts,
but asks further clarification questions.
Reasoning codes Case discrimination
Monitoring codes Reflect process flow, Scoping
Interpretation BA2’s point appears clear. The check scenarios are described in abstract terms,
probably because they have been explicitly named earlier on in the discussion. The pre-
conditions are mentioned in concrete terms. But during this fragment of discussion BA2
and his peer continuously appear to be just missing each others’ point. Judging by his
peers answers, and she cannot match his answers to what she wants to hear. She appears
to be thinking on a more concrete level within a more narrow focus than BA2 is at that
moment. BA2 tries to adjust but apart from answering her yes/no type of questions, he
provides additional context with each answer which appears to confuse his peer. There are
11 instances of Generalise 1st - 2nd for BA2.
Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Concrete
Description BA2 and his peer are having a very concrete discussion in which they describe and
verify process elements. His peer talks through a screen flow. BA2 answers by drawing a
relation between a possible current state of a user, and instantiates with the actions the
user can perform: “he (the employee) is unknown so I click that button. But then after
the button you have to return to that screen 0101 to still give him . . . that this is the
administration office with which this enterprise has a relation”. His peer accepts.
Reasoning codes -
Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Reflect process flow
Interpretation This is a functional continuation of the ongoing discussion in very concrete terms.
BA2 appears to have a well-structured notion of the processes and how they may be trans-
lated into tangible software. He also personifies the user, speaking of the actions that ‘I’
can perform, implying that he can easily visualise what he is talking about. The point is
clear and illustrative. BA2 uses Instantiate 1st - concrete 12 times.
Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Abstract - Medium
Description BA2 and his peer are talking about whether they have arrived at the end of a process
or not. BA2 makes an assumption that at that point: “assuming that the enterprise is
not known to us yet, we will in any case not register individuals or labour agreements
belonging with an enterprise we don’t know so I think it is indeed the end of the process”.
He justifies it by describing the consequences through an instantiation: “we will . . . yes
well there is something strange going on then, in any case we have to do some research
because otherwise how can he submit his data?” His peer accepts and writes it down.
Reasoning codes Assume, Verify
Monitoring codes Ask questions about existing model, Confirm peer, Map model to stakeholder




Interpretation Functional but uncommon. BA2 draws a relation between the state at the end
of the process and the actions of an employer. He then draws another relation between
the consequences of the employers actions. His instantiation is used to describe said conse-
quences. Interestingly BA2 makes a rather abstract instantiation, namely ‘end of process’
to ‘strange situation we are in if this is indeed end of process’. He describes the ‘end of
process’ situation in abstract terms, and describes the consequences in medium terms. BA2
uses Instantiate 2nd - 1st 7 times.
Category Concrete - 1st with semantic Concrete
Description BA2 is writing a design document. His peer is describing a concrete scenario in
which files are being received and mentions that part of the design document should be
changed. BA2 accepts, draws a relation between his peers suggestion and what the system
in the scenario should do: “Exactly, High T (system name) is going to create a clear
entity VP KvK”. Then he relates it to where the scenario should take place in the process:
“so High T . . . in the front portal”. His peer confirms.
Reasoning codes Inference
Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Map process to model structure
Interpretation This is a direct, concrete translation of his peer’s utterance into usable functional
design text. Many details about the relations drawn remain implicit in BA2’s speech,
partly because he is typing them up in the document. But the intention is clear and well
understood by both modellers. There are 11 instances of Concrete - 1st for BA2.
Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium
Description His peer is describing how to import an input file, and gives several options with
regard to when to perform certain quality checks. BA2 draws a generic conclusion from
the suggestion, and then relates that to the failure of the entire process: “to see if this is
at all desirable . . . If you always . . . get a file containing an error and you immediately
discard it, then I think the entire mechanism of automating KvK files has failed”. His
other peer supports him. The first peer accepts and emphasises that that is why they have
to make a choice.
Reasoning codes Inference, Verify
Monitoring codes Monitor process (sub)goal, Reflect process flow, Scoping
Interpretation This is a logical conclusion from his peer’s former point. Again BA2 works with
relating an utterance to its consequences on direct level and on process level. BA2 makes his
whole statement on a medium level, but the relations he describes increase in complexity.
BA2 performs 1st - 2nd 22 times.
AR1’s Abstraction Episodes
Category Generalise concrete - 1st with semantic Concrete - Abstract
Description AR1 is drawing a relation between how input has been processed and how it will
be stored in the database. He generalises from concrete database fields to how they will
be stored as temporary entities: “A next step is to . . . from the 1-on-1 things to database
things which are formatted . . . irrelevant fields out and the relevant fields, date fields,
number fields, exact varchar instead of the whole . . . so you can process this, here you
have processing things, in any case have I processed it? Because from here you send it
. . . I would say this would be the temporary entity, or the temporary KvK 1 to what have
you”. He then rephrases it in more metaphoric terms: “just throw them all in one big bin,
and KvK type 1 to . . . what have we . . . 3 would just be a field”. His peer asks questions
about alternative possibilities.
Reasoning codes Rephrase
Monitoring codes Reflect process content
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Interpretation AR1 appears to be making a functional abstraction and a clear point, but there
appears to be a bit of an interpretation barrier between the database-minded technical
architect and his two more high-level thinking peers. His generalisation is in abstract terms,
his database talk in very concrete terms. However it is difficult to interpret how functional
this abstraction is in terms of furthering the discussion, because AR1 is doing most of the
talking. Additionally, his peers consider him to be the expert on SAP systems, the chosen
implementation, and they say very little. It is impossible to say whether this is because
they are processing AR1’s input as new information, whether they do not comprehend it
or whether they simply do not want to contradict the expert. The latter seems unlikely
given that they do sometimes ask critical questions. Also in this case one peer asks for
alternatives. But even the peer who has mostly been in the lead in earlier sessions is
remarkably quiet in AR1’s presence. AR1 has 4 instances of Generalise concrete - 1st.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description AR1 is describing batch processing in concrete terms. His peer has just asked a
question about where the results of the batch processing will end up. AR1 confirms and
expands upon the question: “Yes! That is just, say, all those statuses you can set”.
He generalises to other attributes: “Because I have just said, what should I do with
this? Well maybe at some point we will also get Collectivity here, which collectivities
should I associate it with? Somewhere I encountered it based on inclusion conditions,
so based on those I will perform operations on it”. Then he relates data, attributes and
preconditions to possible data operations: “That is also an automated thing, you can
. . . all records, regardless what you do with it, if you should add or delete or what have
you, you must look at, for which collectivities . . . is in in a new situation”. His peer
accepts and rephrases.
Reasoning codes Categorisation, Verify
Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Reflect process flow
Interpretation In this generalisation, AR1 draws relations between data, their attributes and
preconditions on a 1st level and then connects it to operations on a 2nd level. It is functional
in terms of making clear where in the process he is trying to perform which steps. His
explanation feels very concrete, yet he uses medium for the first part of the explanation
and abstract terms after having generalised. Still it is illustrative and embedded in the
process flow. There are 11 instances of Generalise 1st - 2nd for AR1.
Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Concrete
Description AR1’s peer has just said that he understands AR1 but does not see the link to the
practical implementation. AR1 describes the steps in very concrete terms: “Next thing
you do is you apply a macro that checks the column types”. Then he instantiates using
a chest of drawers as a metaphor for actual column types: “in the first drawer it has all
been chaos, but you have to check column 1 is a date, column 2 is a character, column
3 is a number, you want to have checked that, so you will see automatically if there is
something wrong”. All of this is part of a lengthy monologue, his peers provide confirmatory
backchannelling.
Reasoning codes -
Monitoring codes Reflect process flow, test proposition
Interpretation AR1’s instantiation explains what it means to ‘check column types’. He also
mentions a potential consequence as a verification. His point appears clear, the relations
and the form of the abstraction appear valid. However, his peers are still mostly listening
and trying to catch on. AR1 performs Instantiate 1st - concrete 10 times.
Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Abstract - Concrete
Description His peer is describing how they had formulated something in the functional design,
and how that is now different in the envisioned implementation by AR1. AR1 gives a
different view on his peer’s statement in terms of database implementation. He relates this
implementation option to the process step they were talking about: “Well this thing . . . it




this is the simplified version of your collectivity association”. Then he instantiates with
an exception: “but the address data in this process will not yet differ per collectivity”.
His peer confirms by stating the consequences. His other peer has trouble visualising the
solution.
Reasoning codes Analogy, Verify
Monitoring codes Scoping
Interpretation The statement by itself appears clear, but the context is complicated especially
since design ideas now have to be related to concrete implementation options. AR1 starts
on a 2nd level by relating implementation options and process steps they had been talking
about in earlier utterances. His instantiation takes the form of an exception, naming an
attribute that does not answer to the differentiation purpose. It is uncommon, but he
makes a more concrete mention of the entire dataset he is expecting to receive. AR1’s peers
have trouble catching on. AR1 takes a different approach to comprehension monitoring, it
appears. He notices his peers are having trouble, but tries to solve this problem by giving
even more detailed explanations. There are 8 instances of Instantiate 2nd - 1st for AR1.
Category Concrete - 1st with semantic Concrete
Description After a long discussion about whether something might or might not occur, AR1
relates the still undecided outcome to the position of the text that will describe it in the
functional design document they are writing: “so that would be paragraph 1.5? Because
it would be a copy of . . . ”. His peer confirms. His other peer is still in doubt.
Reasoning codes Inference
Monitoring codes Monitor model structure
Interpretation The essence of this abstraction has been formed way before this utterance, dur-
ing the lengthy feature discussion. Therefore, this abstraction serves practical progress on
the functional design document rather than comprehension or shaping a model structure.
Concrete terms are used to refer to paragraphs in the document. The abstraction is func-
tional, because it serves to remind AR1’s peers that the discussion has a context, and that
an outcome is needed to progress with their modelling session goal. AR1 has 5 instances of
Concrete - 1st.
Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium
Description AR1 is discussing different processes. He relates the process state ‘mutation’ to
database processing: “With mutation, you either have the same data, in the database, or
there is different data, but in any case I have to overwrite them”. He gives an example,
in which he relates the function of this process to the outcome of another process: “So
if the enterprise has the legal structure of sole proprietorship, and this new record says
I should mutate and that legal structure is proprietary limited company, I can just go
ahead because whether proprietary limited is justified has already been decided in the
other process”. His peer confirms, and his other peer writes it down in a functional design
document.
Reasoning codes Case discrimination, Inference, Verify
Monitoring codes Map process to model structure, Monitor model structure, Test proposition
Interpretation AR1 speaks on the same medium terms during this whole abstraction, but he
clearly builds on the first 1st-level relation of mutation - overwriting a record to draw a
2nd-level between this act of physically mutating a database record to the trigger to actually
perform the mutation based on an outcome of a different process. His peers are on par with
his explanation, it appears that AR1’s using business terms to explain what happens in
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BA3’s Abstraction Episodes
Category Generalise concrete - 1st with semantic Concrete - Medium
Description BA3 and her peer are talking about how they envision the process implementation
in terms of application screens. BA3 stops to reflect: “one step back, don’t you first want
to see if this AAD document has already been processed digitally? to see . . . if it is a
delta when compared to what we have already registered, so don’t you check first . . . with
the enterprise, the person, the income relation . . . and only after that when you know
. . . if not you can ignore it”. She relates the state of the process to what type of input is
needed, and justifies it with a generalisation to what data is available in the system already,
to see if it can be of help to make the process step more efficient. Her peer continues asking
questions, but furthers her line of reasoning.
Reasoning codes Case discrimination, Inference
Monitoring codes Refine peer, Reflect process flow, Scoping
Interpretation BA3 shows good monitoring here, going back to a concrete level to ensure whether
they are modelling the most efficient paths. She draws a relation between the process state
and what information they are working with, and then generalises several variables to a more
generic consequence. Concrete terms are first used to refer to a specific document type, and
medium terms are then used to describe the entities that should be checked. BA3 displays
good structural thinking, making a clear point. Her peer uses the information for further
reasoning, making the abstraction appear functional. There are 3 instances of Generalise
concrete - 1st for BA3.
Category Generalise 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description BA3s peer is imposing a certain structure on the document. BA3 is trying to de-
termine the scope of what she is writing in this functional design document. Her peer asks
a specific monitoring question: “what will you base that selection on?”. She begins to
answer: “Well you have indeed already checked if you know this person and if he has
an employment relationship with that specific enterprise”. Then she realises that this is
slightly in contrast with her earlier description of how the process should proceed: “yes
. . . in that case you are doing it twice . . . strange to do that”. Her peer continues to ask
monitoring questions and translates her answers into a potential process flow.
Reasoning codes -
Monitoring codes Inconsistency detection, Monitor model structure, Reflect process flow, Test
proposition
Interpretation This is another abstraction which builds on several earlier lines of reasoning. At
this point, the prompt by BA3’s peer makes BA3 realise an inconsistency. She first draws a
relation between his point and how this relates to what she is writing. By talking it through
she relates her writings to a generic process consequence. She describes the process steps
in medium terms, and concludes the consequence in abstract terms. Her point is clear, but
she needed a lot of help from her peer to make the abstraction. However, the abstraction
is functional because it helped her come to the inconsistency detection. BA3 performs
Generalise 1st - 2nd 4 times.
Category Instantiate 1st - concrete with semantic Concrete - Medium
Description BA3 is describing a new screen: New employment relationship. Her peer has just
refined her earlier reasoning. She agrees with him, and suggests another option: “okay,
only this one perhaps, you can employ someone who . . . so screen New employment re-
lationship is being filled out, I had thought up two checks for it, check existence of the
occupation code, so you don’t fill in 999 while it doesn’t exist, and if the occupation code
actually appears in the collectivity, so that you don’t have a CAO SAG code and then
fill in a CAO renovation code”. Her peer confirms and asks about potential alternative





Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Map process to model structure, Test proposition
Interpretation BA3 is drawing a relation between her new screen and the functionality that
should appear in it. She first relates it to the actual process flow and her peer’s input. She
uses a few scrambled medium terms for this, and then instantiates very concretely with
examples using domain jargon. It becomes a rather literal translation of concrete process
flow steps to envisioned implementation screen steps. The example is clear, well illustrated
and functional. BA3 has 9 instances of Instantiate 1st - concrete.
Category Instantiate 2nd - 1st with semantic Medium
Description BA3 is trying to understand when the attribute ‘relevance’ should be registered with
certain entities: “I just don’t understand . . . little detour, with employment relation you
may have no relevance, with ownership relevance you do want to register the relevance
for the moment so that an enterprise . . . or that the owner holds more than 50% of the
shares so you can send him the right letter. Well, then I think you should also, with a
new enterprise, and you ask for the state of shares and there is an owner holding more
than 50% of his own shares . . . then you should also register it with ‘not relevant’. But
in that case you don’t have to?” Her peer furthers her point, abstracting the principle and
thereby detecting an inconsistency in the process.
Reasoning codes Analogy, Explain, Inference
Monitoring codes Ask question others ideas, Inconsistency detection, Monitor own comprehen-
sion, Reflect process flow, Scoping
Interpretation BA3 uses an analogy with a process principle to illustrate what she does not
understand. She thus draws the complex relation between her perception of inconsistency
and a process flow. Then she instantiates for each of the three potential entities she has
described how she thinks the situation should proceed. All entities are described in medium
terms. Her point is clear and it allows her peer to continue her line of reasoning and detect
an inconsistency on a higher abstraction level. BA3 has 2 instances of Instantiate 2nd -
1st.
Category Concrete - 1st with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description BA3 is talking through a scenario. Her peer is listening, and confirming. He appears
to be thinking hard. BA3 relates an issue to a future feature: “we should keep it open here,
so that it can be filled in later”. She then relates the process flow directly to the screen
flow she is describing: “here we deal with income . . . okay . . . and here if employment
relation is unknown, or known, oh then you should just ask”. This is done in abstract
terms, with some medium terms to illustrate. They are thus used interchangeably. Her
peer offers additional information.
Reasoning codes Summarise
Monitoring codes Monitor model structure
Interpretation First BA3 relates her functional design description to future acts. Then she makes
quite a literal translation from process flow steps to screen flow. These two relations appear
unrelated in terms of content, but both have their functions. This utterance is meant to
gain overview of what is written and what still has to be done. Her peer understands and
is still thinking very hard himself about how things should be implemented. BA3 has 9
instances of Concrete - 1st.
Category 1st - 2nd with semantic Medium - Abstract
Description BA3 and her peer are getting started with the session, busy determining what will
and will not be relevant for their starting point. BA3 first relates 2 different open questions
to what has to happen in the process, and relates that to their relevance: “this one? yes
it is no longer relevant because indeed it has already become part of . . . but then this one
will become relevant!” She justifies it: “you will now add an employment relationship
and you don’t find the entrepreneur”. Her peer confirms.
Reasoning codes Case discrimination
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Monitoring codes Confirm peer, Monitor model structure, Scoping
Interpretation BA3 is talking on an abstract level about two scenarios projected on a large
screen. Her reasoning focuses mostly on the consequence of their choice for the process
flow. She describes her justification in medium terms. Her point is clear, although not
very illustrative. However we may assume that the scenarios are clear to both participants,











































































































































Figure 7.4: Generalise concrete - 1st for all modellers.
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Figure 7.6: Instantiate 1st - concrete for all modellers.
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Figure 7.8: Concrete - 1st without generalise or instantiate for all modellers.
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Figure 7.13: Co-occurrences between Monitoring processes and the abstraction






Application of Process Mining to the
Analysis of Executive Functioning in
Modelling Practice
“Life is a travelling to the edge of knowledge, then a leap taken.”
D. H. Lawrence (1885 - 1930)
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Abstract
Problem In our qualitative modelling process analysis, temporal pat-
terns are difficult to describe in prose. Yet it will be very meaningful if
we can visualise a qualitative process more objectively. In this study, we
explore whether process mining can fill this gap.
Research Question How can an individual’s modelling flow be profiled
using a temporal perspective on executive function use?
Method We analyse video observations of 13 modelling sessions, per-
formed by 7 modellers in different configurations, recorded in industrial
settings according to a coding scheme for behavioural observation of ex-
ecutive control, reasoning and abstraction. We use the coded dataset in
the process mining tool Disco to generate animated process maps for each
observed modeller, which we analyse based on frequency and duration of
activity occurrence, and process structure and dynamics.
Results The use of Executive control processes differs only subtly
between modellers in terms of frequency, but in terms of duration the
more verbally fluent modellers clearly take more time. The process maps,
however, show that the order and combinations in which executive con-
trol is used differs widely between modellers. One commonality, though,
is that for all modellers except one, Reasoning processes often precede
Monitoring processes.
Conclusions The process mining results support the behavioural trends
we have observed and described in the two previous chapters, and yield
interesting additional insights. However, several issues remain with re-





In the previous chapter we discussed abstraction flows for individual modellers,
and observed different modelling behaviours. Additionally, we mentioned in
the Discussion how adding a qualitative temporal aspect can be helpful to
determine the more precise dynamics of abstractions flows, in particular if
they go wrong and how they are consecutively resolved. However, temporal
patterns are difficult to describe in words.
In this chapter, we take one further step in profiling the individual mod-
eller’s style, by examining if adding an automated temporal aspect will provide
additional insights in the individual’s modelling flow. For this, we apply pro-
cess mining to the same coded dataset as used in Chapter 7. Process mining
refers to a set of techniques used among others for process discovery based on
a series of events, in our case occurrences of reasoning and executive control.
We study the relative occurrence frequency of reasoning and executive control
processes in relation to the mean duration of process engagement, as well as
the pathway dynamics of the emerging modelling flows. It should be noted
that abstraction levels play no significant role in this particular analysis.
Using the additional temporal aspect, we further investigate Pattern 2 (P2)
“The use of Executive Control alone does not necessarily correlate with mod-
elling progress” and Pattern 3 (P3) “There appears to be an implicit order in
the use of Executive Control”, as we formulated them in Chapter 6. P3 is par-
ticularly interesting to examine in the context of usage patterns across a larger
sample of sessions, and for P2 it will be insightful to combine the resulting usage
patterns with the thick description outcomes from Chapter 7. We emphasise
that this exploratory addition to our main analysis is aimed at refinement of
our earlier findings. We describe observable trends, precise numbers have no
meaning in this context.
Research Question
In this study we aim to answer subquestion 7:
How can an individual’s modelling flow be profiled using a
temporal perspective on executive function use?
8.2 Process Mining for Qualitative Pattern Analysis
We have discussed in Chapter 6 that model quality is embedded in the actual
modelling process, not only in the final product. The final product, at best, is
simply a reflection of a long series of interactive events. We have elaborately
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discussed the importance of shared understanding and consent, as well as rea-
soning and executive control as factors contributing to model quality. We have
found that the way in which reasoning and executive control are used are much
more important determinants for model quality than simply the use of them.
We also found that those who have the mental capacity to monitor peers and
goals on top of monitoring themselves have a tendency to focus more strongly
on creating shared understanding for the entire group. This process has not
always appeared to be very efficient in our observations.
Efficiency is a modelling process quality goal mentioned by Ross et al.
(1975) that merits further investigation in this context. It is described as
being achieved through working with the right level of abstraction and having
uniformity in the model. However, efficiency is a dangerous term when used
out of context. Let us examine it in the light of, for example, the amount of
progress being made during the session. Progress can be seen as any work that
takes modellers closer to their goal. But, if all the modelling work of the past
15 minutes has to be undone because it turned out not to relate to the mod-
elling goal, it might appear to be a set-back, but may also be called progress
because an error was eliminated and heightened awareness of the goal created.
Or a modeller who needs to have issues explained to him several times. As
long as this helps the participant to understand the problem, it still has to be
classified as progress no matter how inefficient the process. Therefore, it might
be better to talk about efficient modelling behaviours. Characteristics of effi-
cient modelling performance are a systematic approach, elaborate reasoning,
critical discussions, considering the semantics of variables and relations and
model behaviour, proper scoping, use of prior domain knowledge and experi-
ential knowledge as justification for model revision, hypothesis testing, a focus
on how different relations affect model output and keeping the model structure
as a whole in mind (Sutcliffe & Maiden, 1992; Sins et al., 2005). Thus, those
behaviours related to reasoning and executive control.
By adding a temporal aspect to modelling behaviour analysis, to comple-
ment the analyses we have performed in Chapters 6 and 7, we may gain more
insight in ‘efficiency’ by studying how long modellers engage in certain be-
haviours, and how behaviours follow up on each other. This dataset may then
be compared to thick description data to assign more meaning to the results
of the analysis. That is, we may be able to better argue how duration and
progress interact in relation to efficiency. That is why we apply process min-
ing to our dataset. Process mining forms a bridge between data mining and
process modelling analysis, and aims to “provide insights, identify bottlenecks,
anticipate problems, record policy violations, recommend countermeasures, and
streamline processes” (van der Aalst et al., 2012). One of the goals of process
mining is to automatically discover processes from events, recorded in event
logs, which contain sequentially recorded events. Each event is assumed to
refer to an activity and to be related to a certain case. Additional information




be used in the analysis. The application of process mining to qualitative data
is relatively novel, and therefore this study is highly exploratory.
8.3 Method
For this study, we used the same dataset as in Chapter 7. To study the way
individual modellers use executive control and reasoning, we generated process
maps using the process mining tool Disco for each modeller across all cases.
The process maps show the average order in which cognitive processes are used
during the modelling sessions. We profile each modeller’s style according to
3 aspects: the relative ratios of executive control/reasoning process use, how
long they engage in each process on average, and the structure and dynamics
of their process maps.
Data Collection
Data for this study was collected within a Dutch organisation in the collec-
tive sector. The organisation’s task was to monitor retirement funds. The
researcher spent time at the company both during and outside of the mod-
elling sessions, to get to know the participants and observe them in different
settings. Observations were entirely passive, no interventions were done.
The modelling sessions all took place in rooms equipped with a beamer
and a flip chart board. Sessions of interest were initially only recorded in
audio format. As the participants became accustomed to the presence of the
researcher, a camcorder was unobtrusively installed in a corner of the workshop
room, with the participants’ consent. They indicated not to be bothered by
its presence. Furthermore, written documentation resulting from sessions was
collected and photos of the final models were taken to complement the session
recordings.
Participants and Sessions
Two consecutive, three-month projects were observed, led by two different
project leaders. Project goals were to chart the organisation’s business pro-
cesses, currently executed mostly by hand, and to design new ones for the
purpose of automation. All included modelling sessions were performed by
modelling experts, lasting for 1-2 hours each, with a minimum group size of
two.
We observed seven modellers: a project leader (PL), three business analysts
(BA1, BA2 and BA3), a technical architect (AR1), a lead architect (AR2) and
a change manager (CM). All participants were externally hired from different
companies and had between 2 - 5 years of relevant experience in business anal-
ysis. Each individual was followed for three months working with the same
group of people throughout a series of sessions, allowing us to determine the
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consistency of behaviour. Only BA1 participated in both projects and was thus
followed for six months.
Data Clustering
In order to account for the observed behaviour in as much detail as possible,
we devised a richly detailed coding scheme in Chapter 5. However, for the
purpose of a pattern analysis this level of detail proved impossible to work
with, leading to unreadable process maps. Therefore, we manually clustered
our coding scheme. An overview of the Reasoning clusters can be found in
Table 8.1, the other Executive Control clusters in Table 8.2 on page 234.
Cluster Original codes Explanation
Categorisation Categorisation;
Case discrimination
All codes related to assigning com-




All codes related to clarifying ideas










Table 8.1: An overview of the Reasoning clusters in our coding scheme.
Cluster Original codes Explanation





All codes related to acts of initi-
ation, which can in the abstract
form be seen as tasks. Acts
that were immediately performed,
such as model edits, drawing new














All codes related to acts of plan-
ning, as well as Formulate unan-
swered issue from the Monitoring
group because this also refers to






All codes related to acts of switch-











All codes relating to the direct in-
volvement of Working memory, in
the sense that capacity is available











This is a large cluster containing
all Monitoring codes related to re-
flecting on process flow and goals.
The Reasoning code Weigh pros
cons is also included because it









All codes related to asking ques-
tions, both about one’s own ideas,
others’ ideas and existing content.
Confirm Confirm peer;
Approve model




Map model to stakeholder
input;
Map process to model
structure;
Monitor model structure
All codes related to mapping in-
formation, both from external




All codes related to contradicting















All codes related to further re-
finement of modellers’ actions, by
means of corrections or related in-
put.
Scoping Remained intact
Table 8.2: An overview of the Monitoring clusters in our coding scheme.
Data Analysis
The transcribed and coded dataset from Atlas.ti used in Chapter 7 was first
converted, using a specially written Perl script, into a .csv file containing the
following columns:
• Case ID (Modelling session ID)
• Timestamp start
• Timestamp end
• Actor (Modeller ID)
• Executive control (Reasoning and other Executive control processes)
This .csv file was loaded into the process mining tool Disco, with which the
entire analysis was conducted. First we plotted the relative occurrence frequen-
cies of all processes against the mean duration per process for each modeller.
Then, we generated process maps for each modeller, with which we could see
the most frequently travelled paths between the executive control activities.
Animations of these paths provided additional insights in the relation between
frequency of use and duration. These trends were then compared to the thick
description outcomes from Chapter 7.
Method Validity
The validity of the data gathering process is discussed in Chapter 7. We rely
on naturalistic observation to include all the richness of real behaviour, yet it is
exactly this richness that poses a threat to validity because it makes behaviour
very difficult to disentangle. The inclusion of process mining as a further
validation of the behavioural trends observed in Chapters 6 and 7 contributes





All full-page figures referenced in this chapter can be found in the
chapter appendix (Section 8.7 on page 253).
First of all, we assess the relative occurrence frequencies of executive control
processes against their mean duration per modeller, and then for all modellers
put together. All executive control processes are shown in one single graph so
that usage and duration trends can be optimally compared. From left to right,
Reasoning is printed first, followed by the other Executive control processes.
We emphasise again that this exploration is not about precise numbers, only
visually observable trends. Additionally, we assess the process dynamics of an
individual’s modelling flow, and discuss the results in the light of the thick
description results from Chapter 7.
Frequency of Use and Duration Patterns
To begin with, we look at the frequency distributions and mean process dura-
tion of executive control and reasoning processes for all observed modellers. All
modellers used the complete set of executive control and reasoning processes,
with the exception of CM, who did not use Analogy and Summarise. However,
given that he participated only shortly during a single session, we do not con-
sider this significant. We first describe the trends per modeller, and then give
an overview of modeller trends compared.
Individual Trends
PL shows a rather balanced picture when it comes to overall occurrence fre-
quencies (Figure 8.1 on the following page). Only Inference, Confirm and
Reflect process stand out as being used more often. PL makes minimal use of
Analogy, Integrate, Summarise and Contradict. He also makes relatively little
use of Initiate task, Switch related aspect and Plan actions goals progress. PL
thus seems to have an emphasis on the processes which may directly manipulate
the business process content, rather than taking a metacognitive perspective.
It is interesting to see that he engages slightly longer in the Reasoning processes
than in the other Executive control processes, save for Reflect process, Resolve
inconsistency and Scoping. Some of the processes he engages in longest, such
as Analogy, Integrate and Resolve inconsistency, are the processes he uses least,
and are also among the most complex in terms of cognitive load.
BA1 shows a very balanced use of Reasoning processes (Figure 8.2 on the
next page). He uses Inference and Instantiate most, followed by Categorisation,
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Rel occurrence freq (%) Mean duration (sec)
Figure 8.1: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and
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Figure 8.2: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and
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Figure 8.3: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and




































































































































































Rel occurrence freq (%) Mean duration (sec)
Figure 8.4: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and
reasoning processes for CM.
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Figure 8.5: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and
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Figure 8.6: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and








































































































































































Rel occurrence freq (%) Mean duration (sec)
Figure 8.7: Relative frequencies versus duration of all executive control and
reasoning processes for BA3.
Explain and Verify. His average use for the other Executive control processes
appears to be slightly higher. The top processes are Reflect process and Con-
firm. His durations are in the high range, also nicely balanced. Processes like
Ask questions, Confirm, Contradict and Refine peer/self take shorter, which
might be expected given that they are the results of longer acts of reasoning
and monitoring that have previously been engaged in. However, it is interest-
ing to see that Resolve inconsistency is also in the lower duration range, for
BA1 always takes his time to test and verify his propositions thoroughly.
AR2 mostly uses Explain, Inference and Instantiate from the Reasoning pro-
cesses, and from the other processes mostly Initiate task, Confirm and Reflect
process (Figure 8.3 on page 237). He uses the other processes much less fre-
quently. However, he does have an overall longer process duration except for
Confirm. This is interesting, potentially suggesting that AR2 is more capable
than the other modellers of doing a lot of reasoning work in single utterances,
suggesting a more efficient modelling process.
CM is the only participant in the sample who does not make use of all the
executive control processes: he excludes Analogy and Summarise (Figure 8.4 on
page 237). Other than that, his use of Reasoning processes is rather balanced,
with Integrate and Rephrase being used most. For the other Executive control
processes, he scores very low on Initiate task, very high on Confirm, Refine
peer/self and Reflect process, and in the middle for the other processes. His
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goal in the single discussion in which he participated was to help his peer get a
clear understanding of a process, and his strategy seemed to be to continuously
rephrase what his peer said, give it back to the other and use refining and a lot
of explicit confirmation to monitor and encourage his peer, which appears to
be reflected in his usage pattern. In terms of duration, CM is in the low range.
He takes more time for Assume, Instantiate, Plan actions goals progress and
Reflect process.
BA2 shows a relatively low usage of Reasoning processes, making the most
use of Categorisation, Inference, Verify and Instantiate (Figure 8.5 on page 238).
The other Executive control processes are being used slightly more, in partic-
ular Initiate task, Ask questions, Confirm, Map process to model and Reflect
process. BA2 engages in most processes rather shortly, only Assume and Sum-
marise show a peak in duration. Analogy and Initiate task follow. The du-
rations show a rather balanced pattern. BA2 showed an observable tendency
to listen more than he talked, which may be reflected in his relatively shorter
durations.
AR1 is in the high range for use of Reasoning processes except for Explain,
Rephrase and Summarise (Figure 8.6 on page 238). AR1 was viewed by his
peers as the technical expert, and many sessions conducted with him were
mostly to gather his opinion on the functional design. Therefore this may
explain why the Reasoning processes aimed at verifying one’s own comprehen-
sion are less frequently used. In terms of Executive control, AR1 uses Switch
related aspect, Map process to model and Reflect process most. For the Reason-
ing processes, AR1 has a high duration. The other Executive control processes
are used variably. Ask questions, Confirm and Monitor comprehension have
a much shorter duration than the other processes. These are processes that
require other forms of reasoning and monitoring as input, which might explain
this observation. Additionally, AR1 has a tendency to give lengthy explana-
tions.
BA3 uses Reasoning processes a lot less frequently than the other Executive
control processes (Figure 8.7 on the preceding page). She uses Initiate task,
Confirm, Map process to model and Reflect process most. She did show an ob-
servable tendency to combine Ask questions and Initiate task, turning answers
into questions of such form that they implied action. She seemed mostly con-
cerned with figuring out the meaning of the content itself rather than taking a
metacognitive perspective, which may be reflected in her low use of processes
like Monitor comprehension, Refine peer/self, Resolve inconsistency and Scop-
ing. BA3’s durations are relatively short, with the exception of Summarise.
She also takes her time for Analogy, Categorise, Inference, Generalise, Instan-









































































































































































PL BA1 AR2 CM BA2 AR1 BA3
Figure 8.8: Relative frequencies of all executive control and reasoning processes
for each modeller.
notion that she focuses mostly on the meaning of the process content to be
modelled.
Generic Trends
When looking at the relative usage frequencies (Figure 8.8) and mean durations
(Figure 8.9 on the following page) of all the modellers put together, we can see
several interesting things.
Confirm, Reflect process and Initiate task occur most frequently. In partic-
ular, BA3 shows a remarkable peak in use of Initiate task, far above the others.
This implies that after task initiation, mechanisms of reflection with explicit
confirmation happen substantially. If we also include in this consideration low
occurrence of the directly related cluster Contradict, this corresponds with our
observations that agreement between modellers occurs much more frequently
than disagreement. In terms of relative frequency, the use of Contradict con-
verges closely, whereas Confirm shows large variation.
When we take mean process duration into account, shown in Figure 8.9, we
can see that BA1, AR2 and AR1 have the longest overall process durations,
a trend that holds for most of the processes. During observation, we noticed
that these 3 modellers had the tendency to take leads, explain things and per-
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PL BA1 AR2 CM BA2 AR1 BA3
Figure 8.9: Mean process duration of all executive control and reasoning pro-
cesses for each modeller.
form thorough reasoning. This is reflected in their relatively high frequency
of use for the Reasoning processes Categorisation, Explain, Inference, Verify
and Instantiate. Additionally, they were viewed by the others as experts on
some part of the process, which either consciously or unconsciously bestows a
certain authority upon them. This behaviour appears to lead to others con-
firming them more often than they confirm those who are less of a prominent
influence in the session. Nevertheless, even for Confirm BA1, AR2 and AR1
show the longest duration, implying that their way of confirming includes more
reasoning than giving a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The same type of pattern seems
to be applicable to Ask questions.
Within the Reasoning group, modellers make the most use of Inference,
which is followed by Instantiate, Categorisation, Verify and Explain. It is
interesting to note that Instantiate is used significantly more often than Gen-
eralise. In Atlas.ti, Instantiate shows high co-occurrence counts with Inference
(199), Categorisation (139), Initiate task (146), Ask questions (131), Confirm
(232), Map process to model (137), Refine peer/self (130) and Reflect process
(348). Many of these processes include acts of reflection, hypothesis testing
and verification of propositions put forward by the modellers, for which instan-





The Reasoning processes Analogy, Assume, Integrate, Generalise and Sum-
marise have the lowest number of occurrences. Analogy and Integrate are
second-order abstraction processes which have been shown to be costly to en-
gage. It might therefore not be surprising that modellers would use these
processes least during modelling discourse, which already requires a lot of at-
tentional resources. It is interesting that Integrate shows a wide variety in
process duration, with AR2, the lead architect, taking ample time to integrate
information. For Assume, a lot of pre-existing knowledge is required, as well as
an additional abstraction step to relate what is plausible to how it might affect
a system scenario. Modellers might prefer reasoning based on factual knowl-
edge. Nor is it clear whether assumptions are always made explicit. It might
well be that modellers reason based on many implicit assumptions. Generalise
and Summarise are processes aiming to capture the essential message from a
lot of unstructured information. They are both costly, and taking a step back
from a potentially intensive discussion flow to reflect can be rather disruptive.
The Executive control processes Ask questions, Map process to model, Mon-
itor comprehension, Refine peer/self, Instantiate, Inference, and Initiate task
have comparable numbers of occurrences. Map process to model, Refine peer/self
and Initiate task show huge variation in terms of relative frequency and dura-
tion. It may be that these processes are just to a greater or lesser extent part
of an individual’s style or focus. Contradict and Scoping are used least, with
Resolve inconsistency not far behind. Scoping is another process that does
not directly contribute to the discussion flow, serving an indirect metacogni-
tive monitoring function. Resolve inconsistency is a monitoring function with
a more direct impact on the process flow. Nevertheless, it does require an
additional abstraction step to actually notice discrepancies.
When comparing overall relative frequencies, there is much more conver-
gence between modellers within Reasoning than within other Executive con-
trol groups. Within Reasoning, the largest variation occurs for Explain and
Rephrase, within Executive control for Initiate task, Confirm, Map process to
model and Refine peer/self. For process duration, the most interesting trend is
that BA1, AR2 and AR1, the aforementioned group of lead-takers, show the
longest process durations for all Reasoning processes except Summarise, for
which AR2 and AR1 are in the bottom half, as well as all other Executive con-
trol processes except Ask questions, for which AR1 actually takes the shortest
time. Out of all process durations, only Ask questions and Confirm converge.
All modellers engage shortly in these processes, potentially because they are
both the to-the-point result of a prior process of comprehension.
Process Map Structure and Dynamics
PL’s process map shows about 1/3 frequently followed paths, and the re-
maining paths are travelled occasionally (Figure 8.10 on page 254). There
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is only 1 entirely unique path, from Analogy to Map process to model. The
preferred pathways (top 6 frequency values) are:
1. Ask questions to Reflect process 28
2. Inference to Ask questions 16
3. Plan actions goals progress to Reflect process 15
4. Rephrase to Ask questions 12
5. Initiate task to Ask questions 11
6. Switch related aspect to Ask questions 10
7. Plan actions goals progress to Confirm 10
8. Inference to Inference 10
Most preferred pathways end with Reflect process or Ask questions. The
animation also shows remarkably fast transitions from Ask questions to Reflect
process. This implies that PL tends to immediately use the results of his
reasoning for testing the process or asking clarifications. He uses them much
less as input for processes related to more abstract overarching project goals,
such as Switch related aspect, Plan actions goals progress or Generalise. Also,
self and peer monitoring processes are rarely used. Interestingly, Inference is
the only process which is performed in a loop. Inference is also PL’s most
frequently used Reasoning process.
Slow transit times can be observed after many of the cognitive processes,
which implies that PL is slow to pick up a new set of activities after finishing
off one set. This is potentially reflective of his tendency to wait as other, more
verbally fluent session participants provided input, chipping in only every now
and then. However, there was also one session in which PL’s session partner
was still trying to figure things out in his head, and was very silent. During
that session PL did a lot of talking, which might explain some of the extremely
fast transitions showing up in between.
PL has an observable tendency to provide input, ask a question about it and
then look to his peers for confirmation. He also showed a particular tendency to
elaborate on details, and repeat what others had been saying. This is reflected
in his process pathways. When PL draws relations, for example between process
steps and examples, he often leaves them implicit, as though his peers need to
finish the abstraction building process for him. PL’s map also shows that he has
many different terminal activities, even including Scoping, Map process to model
and Inference, suggesting a more chaotic way of reasoning, with proneness to
breaking off halfway through a line of reasoning. The characteristics of a lower




his use of semantically abstract concepts when he intends to describe concrete
examples all invite shorter verbal utterances, which may help to explain his
mostly relatively short durations and the chaotic tendencies suggested by the
process map. These observations match well with the tendencies observed in
PL’s thick description results.
BA1’s process map shows fewer pathways which are used more frequently
(Figure 8.11 on page 255). There are no entirely unique pathways. Preferred
pathways (top 6 frequency values) are:
1. Confirm to Confirm 68
2. Reflect process to Inference 28
3. Map process to model to Refine peer/self 21
4. Verify to Refine peer/self 19
5. Explain to Reflect process 19
6. Plan actions goals progress to Monitor comprehension 19
7. Inference to Plan actions goals progress 15
8. Instantiate to Plan actions goals progress 15
9. Categorisation to Plan actions goals progress 15
10. Ask questions to Map process to model 15
11. Resolve inconsistency to Monitor comprehension 14
12. Scoping to Confirm 14
BA1’s preferred pathways are highly numerous and diverse. So whereas
he has relatively fewer pathways overall, he does use a much richer variety of
Executive control processes. Many preferred paths involve a Reasoning process
leading to a Monitoring process, which reflects his tendency to make well-
reasoned decisions. Remarkably, BA1 is the only one to have Scoping and
Resolve inconsistency in his preferred pathways. They are embedded in a path
from Resolve inconsistency, Monitor comprehension, Scoping to either Confirm
or Ask questions. This implies that BA1 has a special focus on ensuring the
correctness of the model content through a thorough process of monitoring and
reasoning.
In the process map, a lot of activity starts from Reflect process, which
all lead to content-related Reasoning processes, which in turn end in Refine
peer/self, like many other activities. It is a positive indicator for progress that
most activity ends in Refine peer/self. Also, many activities start from Plan
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actions goals progress, which lead to hypothesis-testing related processes like
Verify, Monitor comprehension, Contradict and Generalise. These, in turn,
also end either in Confirm or Refine peer/self, which are the two terminal
activities for BA1.
Another path runs from Initiate task to Explain to either Instantiate or
Reflect process. Transit times on this path are remarkably slow compared to
the rest of the process map. This implies that BA1 takes his time to get a clear
overview of things at the beginning of tasks, building solid comprehension,
which may pay off later on. These observations match with the trends from
the thick description outcomes.
AR2’s process map (Figure 8.12 on page 256) shows the following preferred
pathways (top 6 frequency values):
1. Initiate task to Reflect process 14
2. Reflect process to Reflect process 13
3. Initiate task to Initiate task 12
4. Reflect process to Categorisation 10
5. Confirm to Confirm 9
6. Inference to Confirm 8
AR2 shows a lot of initiation and reflection. Interestingly, the top three
most frequently used paths contain only these processes, with two loops and one
transition between them. Slow transit times can be observed between Instan-
tiate, Inference and Contradict, and between Ask questions, Refine peer/self
and Confirm, implying that AR2, before coming to a conclusion to confirm or
contradict something, takes his time with reasoning and reflection.
AR2’s initiation activities are Initiate task and Explain. From Initiate task,
a lot of activity goes in and out of Reflect process. Input comes from Reason-
ing processes, but also from Switch related aspect. Output from Reflect process
goes to Scoping and Explain. It is a positive trend that reasoning and switching
is followed by reflection, and that this in turn is used for progress-related pro-
cesses. AR2’s map is contains more pathways than BA1’s map, but also only
ends in two terminal activities, Inference and Summarise. However, AR2 does
not break off lines of reasoning prematurely in the thick description results.
We did see his implicit way of asking for confirmation by looking at his peers,
which may explain why Inference is one of his terminal activities.
We have also seen that AR2 is generally considered the expert by his peers,
that he often leads, takes initiatives, explains elaborately with lots of examples,
and is strong on monitoring everyone’s comprehension. He does not hesitate
to take a lot of time to make things absolutely clear. This behavioural pattern




CM’s process map is more compact, but he uses many pathways with similar
frequencies (Figure 8.13 on page 257). Therefore, we only show his preferred
pathways with top 5 frequency values, to prevent the list becoming needlessly
long:
1. Confirm to Confirm 13
2. Refine peer/self to Switch related aspect 6
3. Confirm to Plan actions goals progress 5
4. Confirm to Monitor comprehension 5
5. Reflect process to Ask questions 5
6. Inference to Refine peer/self 4
7. Switch related aspect to Confirm 4
8. Monitor comprehension to Reflect process 4
9. Rephrase to Resolve inconsistency 3
10. Reflect process to Assume 3
11. Explain to Reflect process 3
12. Switch related aspect to Explain 3
A lot of activity concentrates around Confirm, Assume, Reflect process and
Plan actions goals progress. Events take a noticeably long time to enter into
Assume and Plan actions goals progress, implying that thorough reasoning
precedes an assumption or an action. Instantiating and making assumptions,
as part of reflecting on the process, might be said to help him comprehend
the situation, and the use of planning acts would help to turn reflections into
actions. Given his role as a manager, this might bias him towards taking time
for planning.
CM’s process map starts with Reflect process or Confirm. Starting with
Confirm is rather unusual, but in the observations we saw, as mentioned above,
that CM merely wanted to help his peer, and started off with listening to his
peer’s situation, all the while confirming explicitly and frequently. From Reflect
process, a lot of outgoing activity goes to the Reasoning processes Assume,
Rephrase and Instantiate, and Ask questions. Interestingly, from Rephrase
many arrows branch out to other Reasoning processes, Monitoring processes
and Plan actions goals progress. Rephrase seems his way of translating his
peer’s input into his own words to ensure comprehension, and then to start
his own line of reasoning based on it, including Resolve consistency, Inference,
Generalise, Refine peer/self and Contradict. Confirm and Scoping form the
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two terminal processes into which all lines of reasoning and acts of planning
lead. We have the least observation data on CM, but he showed structured
reasoning which is well reflected by his process dynamics.
BA2, like BA1, shows a very orderly process map (Figure 8.14 on page 258).
The preferred pathways are:
1. Confirm to Confirm 84
2. Map process to model to Monitor comprehension 16
3. Map process to model to Refine peer/self 15
4. Plan actions goals progress to Reflect process 12
5. Switch related aspect to Confirm 11
6. Inference to Refine peer/self 10
7. Generalise to Confirm 10
Many activities converge around Refine peer/self. From Refine peer/self,
one slow and steady path seems to emerge, via Categorisation, Assume, Initiate
task, Verify to Plan actions goals progress. Reasoning here is combined with
task initiation and plans for further action in the modelling process. From
there, the path continues with several Monitoring processes, during which also
Instantiate and Generalise are used. This implies that BA2 uses reasoning
processes mostly to explore his statements, after which they are turned into
tasks and further refined via Monitoring and abstraction switches.
BA2’s process map both starts and terminates with Confirm. From Con-
firm, the outgoing pathways all lead to Reasoning processes, namely Contradict,
Summarise and Integrate. Contradict following directly from Confirm is a bit
peculiar. It is interesting to see that the main ‘hub’ of activity, Refine peer/self,
is connected to the initial state of Confirm mostly by complex paths involving
many reasoning and monitoring activities before arriving at Refine peer/self.
The only short pathway goes via Integrate. Output of Refine peer/self goes to
Categorisation and Explain. Additionally, BA2 has a compact process map,
and the paths travelled do not vary much throughout the sessions. This does
imply that BA2, despite his tendency to listen more when he works with more
outspoken peers, has an organised structure in his way of reasoning and pays
attention to the meaning of the content he discusses. The latter is reflected in
his most frequently travelled paths: structuring, reflection and planning pro-





AR1’s preferred pathways (Figure 8.15 on page 259) are:
1. Reflect process to Reflect process 22
2. Confirm to Confirm 15
3. Reflect process to Instantiate 10
4. Ask questions to Ask questions 9
5. Map process to model to Reflect process 8
6. Monitor comprehension to Monitor comprehension 7
7. Switch related aspect to Inference 7
8. Inference to Instantiate 7
For AR1, the process map starts with Generalise and Map process to model,
around which a lot of activities converge. Both processes lead either directly
or via one activity to Reflect process, the main output of which then leads
on to Instantiate, or back on itself. This implies that input from reflection is
frequently used to give examples. AR1’s process map is richly connected, with
a few frequently travelled pathways and multiple less travelled paths. Also,
there are many processes around which a lot of activity converges. His process
map animation is also noticeably different from the other modellers. AR1 has
considerably fewer simultaneously travelled paths, and completes them much
faster. Most Reasoning processes are embedded in between other Executive
control processes. This implies that his reasoning is well monitored, partly
also reflected by his Monitor comprehension loop. It is also remarkable that
he has several loops amongst the most frequently used paths, namely Reflect
process, Confirm, Ask questions and Monitor comprehension. AR1, like AR2,
also has a tendency to continue explaining in the form of lengthy monologues,
sometimes even multiple consecutive ones, if he deemed it necessary in order
to achieve shared understanding. The process map terminates with Inference
and Confirm. Like AR2, it is likely that AR1 implicitly asks for confirmation
by looking at his peers, because in the observations he did not break of lines
of reasoning halfway. AR1 shows structure and a rich use of reasoning and
monitoring in his behaviour, which matches well with the observations.
BA3 has a very elaborate set of paths in her process map (Figure 8.16 on
page 260). Preferred pathways are:
1. Confirm to Confirm 47
2. Initiate task to Initiate task 32
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3. Reflect process to Reflect process 20
4. Map process to model to Map process to model 14
5. Ask questions to Ask questions 7
6. Refine peer/self to Refine peer/self 5
7. Monitor comprehension to Ask questions 5
The first remarkable thing about BA3’s process map is the high number of
loops amongst the frequently used paths. Another interesting thing is that her
process map has an unusually high number of uniquely, or very infrequently,
used paths between all executive control processes. Like AR1, BA3 has very
few simultaneously travelled pathways, nor does she have paths that take a
long time. Also, a lot of activities converge around almost all of the executive
control processes. This implies that she finishes her line of reasoning and
moves on to the next, but with a style of focusing her reasoning around a few
continuously used processes, and using the other processes only sparsely when
needed. The process map initiates with Confirm and Initiate task, which is
reflected by her tendency to try and structure the modelling discussion, even
if she did not always comprehend immediately. The terminal activities are
Inference and Reflect process. This makes sense, as she would often turn to her
peer if she realised during her line of reasoning that she did not understand
things completely.
Validity
This chapter is a continuation of Chapter 7, and serves as an extra validation
for the executive control trends observed in both Chapters 6 and 7. For the
validity of the results achieved in this chapter, we again rely on triangulation
with thick description and discussions with an external expert in the field
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
8.5 Conclusion
In this study, we have examined how to characterise an individual’s modelling
flow using a temporal perspective on the use of executive functions. We have
explored the added value of using an automated process discovery method,
process mining, in the context of a qualitative behavioural analysis, and also
addressed additional insights in modellers’ behavioural flows during modelling
sessions. We first describe our findings, and then relate them to Pattern 2 and
Pattern 3, as described in Section 8.1.
Concerning characterisation of individual modelling flows, the process maps




which executive functions were frequently used, in which order they were likely
to be used, and how frequently similar pathways were used. Some modellers
used a smaller set of similar pathways, other modellers used a much larger set
of unique pathways. Examining process duration and the simulated process
dynamics gave interesting insights into how much time different modellers spent
on reasoning and monitoring in particular. The temporal perspective provided
valuable information to complement the static behavioural analyses reported
in Chapters 6 and 7.
The process mining results themselves very much support the aforemen-
tioned static behavioural analyses. All in all, it seemed as though the lead-
takers showed more compact process maps with a greater likelihood of using
the same frequently travelled pathways. Weaker modellers had a greater di-
versity of less-travelled or unique pathways. This might suggest that stronger
modellers simply have fixed patterns of reasoning and executive function use
which they apply frequently, allowing them improved focus on the content of
their reasoning. Weaker modellers may have to spend more effort both on the
reasoning process as well as the content, which would be consistent with the
findings from working memory research that those with the lowest capacity
process most information because they are less effective at filtering distracting
information.
We found more convergence between modellers within Reasoning than within
other Executive control processes, when comparing the overall relative fre-
quencies. Inference, Instantiate, Verify and, for some modellers, Explain and
Rephrase, are the most widely used, whereas the high-complexity processes
like Analogy and Integrate are used least. Also, many modellers have a ten-
dency to end their lines of reasoning with an inference. Finally, we found
that more withdrawn modellers appear to make less explicit use of Reasoning
processes. Concerning the use of different Executive control processes, most
modellers have a slight tendency to use more Monitoring and Initiate processes
than Reasoning, Switching and Planning processes. All modellers are found
to reflect extensively, and interestingly, the weaker modellers have a tendency
to ask more questions in their preferred pathways. This may be interpreted
as awareness of their potential mental model shortcomings. With regard to
process duration, the most verbally fluent modellers show the longest process
durations for all Reasoning processes except Summarise, as well as all other
Executive control processes except Ask questions. This may be because they
take their time to explain things and explicitly prioritise shared understanding.
These findings appear to relate to both P2 “The use of Executive Control
alone does not necessarily correlate with modelling progress” and P3 “There
appears to be an implicit order in the use of Executive Control”. In relation
to P2, we see that all modellers use executive control quite extensively. The
only differences we can see is that for most Reasoning processes, the strongest
modellers use them slightly more often than the weaker modellers, and that
these modellers certainly show significantly longer durations especially for the
251
8
CHAPTER 8. APPLICATION OF PROCESS MINING TO THE
ANALYSIS OF EF
Reasoning processes. For the other Executive control processes this trend holds,
but it is slightly less visible. This suggests that regardless whether the session
is in a set-back phase or a constructive progress phase, modellers will use
executive control, whether to build knowledge, to fix misunderstandings or as
a learned behavioural pattern. With regard to P3, it does appear that some
processes are used more frequently than other processes, and that in many
cases Reasoning precedes Monitoring, which in turn precede further decisive
acts like Switching or Planning. This implicit order appears to depend both on
the capacity and the goal of the modeller, although it is reflected more in the
process map structures considered in the light of the thick description results
than in simple relative frequency graphs. The temporal aspect does indeed
provide these additional insights.
However, problem issues like abstraction failures, the need for extra expla-
nations and getting lost in details, as we have seen in the thick description of
Session 2 in Chapter 6, cannot be detected on this level of granularity from
the process maps. We thus conclude that process mining can certainly provide
valuable additional insights to the traditional methods of analysis in qualitative
research, but that adaptations in the way of coding data will be required, and
that the link with the context should never be lost, which we will all discuss
in the next section.
8.6 Discussion
Process mining can provide valuable contributions to qualitative process anal-
ysis, but the latter should be specifically conducted from the very beginning in
such a way that it is suitable for process mining analysis. First of all, no two
or more activity codes should be assigned to the same utterance in Atlas.ti,
because this ruins the opportunity to see code interactions and code follow-ups
in Disco. All codes assigned to one utterance will get the same timestamp, and
given that for the greatest part of the discussion, turns between single utter-
ances switch, one cannot see how codes interact within a single line of reasoning
performed within one utterance, only how on a coarse level of detail, executive
control processes follow up on one another, utterance after utterance. In this
way, valuable information is lost. Secondly, it means that the level of detail of
the codebook must be very carefully designed. A smaller code set should be
used to keep the overview, and smaller cases, or sampled fragments of cases,
should be defined so that it is actually feasible in terms of researcher capacity
to perform an analysis in this way. This means that it is crucial to know what
the essential behaviours are that you want to observe, so that the codebook is
sufficiently inclusive yet comprehensive.
We encountered several issues during our process mining analysis. First is
that the current process maps do not allow one to see the interaction between




variables cannot be easily compared. The main reason abstraction level was
excluded from this analysis was because it is not possible to see how abstrac-
tion behaviour next to executive control. An abstraction activity could only
follow up on an executive control activity, which in this context is meaningless.
In both cases, parallel paths in process maps for either different modellers or
different variables would be valuable additions, provided that the cases them-
selves are of a sufficiently short duration so that the overview may be kept. A
second point of discussion is the placement of activities in the process maps.
When comparing two or more process maps, ideally the activities would be
printed in the same locations so that differences in occurrence frequency, paths
and durations are optimally visible. Currently the software decides optimal
placement, so that comparing several maps becomes much more difficult.
Overall, using process mining to enhance qualitative process analysis has
yielded interesting complementary insights. With a more careful codebook
design and several adaptations to the method of visualisation, process mining is



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“Education consists mainly of what we have unlearned.”
Mark Twain (1835 - 1910)
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CHAPTER 9. GENERAL DISCUSSION
9.1 Main Contributions
In this thesis, we have addressed the challenges in collaborative conceptual
modelling as practitioners experience it in daily practice. We considered it
necessary to take a step away from focusing on new modelling methods and
model quality, to study instead the cognitive aspects associated with a complex
skill like modelling. At the start of this research, only little research had been
done on the topic, and yet all acts of modelling result from an interplay of
cognitive processes.
Theoretical Findings
We found convincing evidence in the literature to conclude that modelling
significantly involves executive functions, a set of metacognitive control func-
tions (Chapter 2). These include the construction of functional abstractions
and relational reasoning, as well as more fundamental functions like inhibition,
switching and working memory (WM). All of these are essential to gather in-
formation, form a thorough understanding of the problem domain, maintain
overview of the modelling process and how its progress relates to the modelling
goals, and perhaps most importantly to form such a mental model that it can
easily be explained to other modellers to create shared understanding. In our
observations we saw that some modellers assign such importance to shared un-
derstanding that they will not continue until they feel certain that they have
achieved this goal.
We studied the involvement of WM, attention, goal psychology, uncon-
scious information processing and affective signals in the facilitation of execu-
tive control (Chapter 3). WM provides a workspace to construct, manipulate,
maintain and integrate relations. Attention filters the information coming in
from multiple input modalities, and interacts closely with goal processing to
prioritise which information is relevant enough to be processed in WM. Goals
are strengthened by affective signals, the latter helping relevant information to
overcome competition by distracting signals. Initially, this processing happens
unconsciously. The capacity of unconscious information processing is said to
be unlimited, which provides a lot of flexibility for the cognitive system, in
which capacity limits on conscious processing are inherent. If the activation
of attention reaches a threshold, the information moves on to conscious WM
processing, after which it may be stored in long term memory (LTM).
We hypothesised that modelling would have at least the unconscious re-
quirements of filtering and prioritising information. These are fulfilled by the
contributions of attention and goal processing, with its affective signals. We
further hypothesised that modelling would require a mechanism which would
perform maintenance, manipulation, switching and monitoring of information




in these processes which become overtly observable in the form of executive
control.
A point of interest in the study of modelling is the enormous diversity in
individual differences. Overtly, these differences may manifest as modellers’
abilities to inhibit distracting issues, switch attention between task foci or
abstraction levels, focus on the actual process they are modelling, test hy-
potheses, monitor both their own and their peers’ progress, or scope problems.
Literature review of neuropsychological mechanisms suggested that working
memory capacity (WMC) is the best predictor of performance in any complex
task (Chapter 4). A high WMC correlates with greater resistance to interfer-
ence and more efficient information processing, meaning that less information
is processed but more meaning is obtained overall. However, WMC can be
trained to a certain extent to optimise executive control. Strategies include
targeted WM training, such as number spans or n-back tasks, especially with
sufficiently challenging tasks. But these effects do not generalise well to other
tasks, hence they might well be attributed to a temporal learning effect instead
of to structural increase of WMC. The most benefits have been obtained with
strategies that aim to improve brain functioning as a whole, including problem
solving training, physical exercise, mindfulness, emotional development, cre-
ativity training and reduction of stress. Positive effects are likely obtained by
improving the balance between neurotransmitters which are also involved in
the facilitation of executive control.
Empirical Findings
The next step was to translate the theoretical findings into an observation
method to analyse our observations of modelling sessions. We integrated the lit-
erature findings with results from expert interviews on the nature of modelling
performance, pilot experiments and pilot observations into a coding scheme
based on executive control. The resulting categories, Abstraction, Reasoning,
Monitoring, Switching, Working memory, Initiation and Planning, were based
on existing executive control assessment methods, most notably the BRIEF-A.
They proved to be very consistent across our different interviews and obser-
vations. Most interviewees mentioned at least some of them, and observed
modellers engaged in overlapping subsets of them.
From the first study with our observation method, we discerned four main
patterns:
1. Semantic and Relational Abstraction do not necessarily correlate,
2. The use of Executive Control alone does not necessarily correlate with
modelling progress,
3. There appears to be an implicit order in the use of Executive Control,
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4. Shared understanding seems of primary importance to strong modellers.
We further examined them in consecutive studies and analyses, and most
of the findings continued to revolve around the four patterns.
Pattern 1: Semantic and Relational Abstraction do not necessarily
correlate There are two aspects to this pattern. The first is that there is
great variety in how relational and semantic abstraction are used together. The
second is that a high semantic abstraction level does not necessarily accom-
pany strong relational abstraction skills. For the stronger modellers, it appears
that when they instantiate or generalise, they tend to use the corresponding
semantic categories more often. In particular, this was visible when they gave
very concrete examples, both on a concrete relational level and using concrete
concepts that were easy to visualise. However, the more instances of a rela-
tional abstraction category a modeller uses, the greater the variety of semantic
categories used. This implies that more often than not, semantic and rela-
tional abstraction are completely independent. Interestingly, though, stronger
modellers make use of abstract and concrete levels more equally than weaker
modellers, who tend to use the concrete levels more often than the abstract
levels. One of the weaker modellers tended to use medium and abstract seman-
tic concepts elaborately, but was strongly biased to using concrete relational
levels. Additionally, he was continuously corrected by his peers with very ex-
plicit examples. Potentially, this may imply that abstract words are being used
without full awareness of their meaning. This might be a workaround to deal
with complex relations without fully understanding them, because so many
different instances might fit the relation if it is formulated on an abstract level.
Pattern 2: The use of Executive Control alone does not necessar-
ily correlate with modelling progress In educational frameworks, such
as (King, 1997; Sins et al., 2005), and other executive control observation
frameworks used in education like (McCloskey et al., 2009; Dawson & Guare,
2010), it appears to be enough to pinpoint the occurrence of the executive
function to conclude something about the quality of an individual’s entire
strategy. In our study, this was not the case. All modellers use all execu-
tive control functions extensively. For the stronger modellers their purposeful,
goal-oriented and well-structured behaviour was nicely reflected in their use of
executive control. A subtle difference with weaker modellers we observed was
that stronger modellers use most Reasoning processes more often and much
longer than weaker modellers. This trend could also be observed for the other
executive control functions, but less strongly so. For the weaker modellers, the
content to which the executive functions were applied often turned out to be
out of scope. Another issues was that their input was frequently refined or
corrected by peers, and was not being used to further the knowledge building




functions that are used differently, which might explain weaker modellers’ less
effective behaviour. This is thus an indication that simply using the coding
scheme without examining the actual context is not enough to pinpoint erratic
or undesirable behaviour. These results contradict findings from educational
studies. We speculate that this contradiction may partly be explained by the
notion that the use of executive functions in children, who are still developing
them, may be different than in adults. Potentially, adults know how to use
executive functions regardless of cognitive capacity, because they know that it
is desirable to test a proposition or to monitor a goal. Cognitive capacity may
thus be reflected more in the content of what they are saying than in executive
function use itself.
Pattern 3: There appears to be an implicit order in the use of Ex-
ecutive Control Some executive functions are used more frequently than
others, and there appears to be an implicit order in the use of the different
categories as well. Reasoning and Monitoring functions primarily contribute
to achieving shared understanding and to structure the business process being
modelled. Switching and Initiation were sporadically used during the discus-
sions when necessary, but mostly only after shared understanding had been
achieved about a topic. Especially if it was clear that there was no shared un-
derstanding, the stronger modellers kept their focus solely on Monitoring, with
the necessary Reasoning. Planning only appeared before or after discussions,
as the most metacognitive process of all, to set goals for the session in question
or decide about follow-ups for future sessions. However, to observe this, ex-
amination of detailed descriptions of modelling sessions created through thick
description was crucial. Process maps generated with process mining helped
to visualise this order for most modellers, but studying the content was still a
prerequisite.
Furthermore, Reasoning was less prominently used when modellers were still
in search of shared understanding, displaying indecisive and hesitant behaviour.
On these occasions, Instantiation was used in combination with Monitoring
processes to fix the gap in understanding. Monitoring, to find out about the
state of shared understanding, thus appears to be the most important function
category which is used to build a basis from which the model can then be built.
The Reasoning processes most frequently used are Explain, Inference, Verify
and Case discrimination, and the Monitoring processes used most were Reflect
process content, Reflect process flow and Test proposition. All of these relate
directly to building shared understanding.
Interestingly, though, the total use of executive control processes differs
only minimally between modellers. The order in which they are used varies
significantly between modellers. However, for all modellers except one, in a
discussion where shared understanding had been achieved, Reasoning processes
often preceded Monitoring processes.
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Pattern 4: Shared understanding seems of primary importance to
strong modellers Shared understanding appeared to be the most funda-
mental prerequisite during modelling sessions. Very frequently, shared under-
standing was prioritised over efficiency, even though efficiency is considered
a significant process quality goal (Ross et al., 1975). Prominent strategies
for working towards shared understanding include instantiation with concrete
examples, provided that the explainer has a well-structured mental model, re-
flection and inferencing. Rephrasing is also a good way to monitor shared
understanding. The search for shared understanding itself appeared less struc-
tured than regular discussion flows, which may follow from the fact that the
search imposes additional cognitive loads, such as searching for the best atten-
tional focus or monitoring whether the inconsistency in understanding is being
resolved. This prioritisation was most explicitly shown by the strongest mod-
ellers, who, by giving such detailed explanations about why irrelevant aspects
were irrelevant, appeared to see it as an investment in future progress if all
inconsistencies are thoroughly cleared away. However, weaker modellers also
seem to have their own ways of focusing on shared comprehension, for example
by focusing mostly on their own comprehension and asking more questions.
The catch here, though, is that a stronger modeller will always be needed to
answer the questions.
Shared consent, which should result from shared understanding, remained
implicit in most of the sessions. Participants either agree or disagree, and
sometimes when modellers contradict each other, it is because they disagree
with model content. These are clues of lack of shared consent, but otherwise the
only clues for shared consent are when the input of the model is used in further
abstraction building, or when it is used for planning consecutive actions.
9.2 Where Did the Neuropsychological Perspective Get
Us?
In this thesis, we examined the nature of cognitive processes involved in mod-
elling right down to the neuropsychological facilitation level. We purposely em-
phasised the cognitive psychology of modelling in order to better understand
the phenomenon we were researching and to help us reason about potential
explanations for the behaviour we were observing.
For example, Sutcliffe and Maiden (1992) found that when applying pre-
structured modelling support methods, they are most overtly used by weak
modellers. This is not surprising because in the capable modeller the method
steps are probably already internalized and explicit support would only dis-
tract them. Unfortunately, novices did not appear to radically improve their
performance even with guidance. Still, if support is to be provided, it should be




9.2. WHERE DID THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE GET
US?
If we reason about this issue in terms of WM involvement and attentional
capacity, we may infer that the WM burden, also known as cognitive load, for
inexperienced modellers is too great, and that they are helped by offloading
part of their cognitive load to the pre-structured method. However, the issue
that performance does not improve much with guidance remains. This implies
that there is a more fundamental issue with the type of reasoning involved in
modelling that is not solved simply by giving methodical instructions. We saw
similar things in our own observations with one of the weaker modellers.
At this point, we can begin to assess this modeller’s behaviour in a top-
down fashion. First, we examine his use of executive control functions and
abstraction in modelling sessions. This yields a rather chaotic pattern of be-
haviour, in which concrete abstraction levels are overrepresented in relation
to more complex Reasoning and Monitoring functions, and most importantly,
correction by peers happens continuously. Knowing about the nature of the
effort involved in reasoning on different levels of abstraction (Christoff et al.,
2009), we could infer that it costs this modeller more effort to achieve second-
level abstraction, if he manages to achieve it at all, than his peers. We could
infer that his facilitatory mechanisms work less efficiently, and that therefore,
goal processing within the limits of attention span is suboptimal. In terms of
the A. Baddeley (2000) model, there could be interference within or between
the information streams coming into the phonological loop or the visuospatial
sketchpad, or perhaps there is interference with the integration of this informa-
tion in the domain-general component of WM, as both A. Baddeley (2000) and
Cowan (1999)’s models describe. Or perhaps the integration between new in-
formation and that available in long term memory is not happening efficiently.
For example, literature suggest that individuals with a lower WMC process
more information, but that they get less meaning out of it (Vogel et al., 2005).
Further testing in terms of neuropsychological constructs on such an individ-
ual could be helpful to pinpoint where the main problem lies, to provide more
targeted training. From our point of view, the ability to individualise training
is the most valuable contribution of the neuropsychological perspective.
We have not done any research yet on what type of training would work
best, but we may infer that a combination of broad WM training, awareness
of the existence of executive control and certain workarounds might help to
improve performance. For example, taking more time to process information,
trying to test oneself with concrete examples, focusing explicitly on trying to
find counter-examples, occasional reminders to refer back to the modelling goal
and asking more questions during the process could be helpful. Thus, many
options for further research remain, which will be discussed in Section 9.7 on
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9.3 Observation Method Contributions
The neuropsychological perspective has granted us more insights into why ob-
servations of modelling behaviour and associated difficulties occur as they do.
The observation method we have subsequently designed in Chapter 5 is based
on this perspective and has yielded more detailed insights in the specific use
of the cognitive variables in the context of modelling sessions, which we now
continue to discuss.
First of all, we have applied the observation method to study the use and
flow of abstraction per person within the context of a modelling session, as well
as how the interaction between modellers was shaped in terms of abstraction
levels, as they were being used to achieve a certain goal. More specifically, we
could see for which modellers behaviour was stable, and for which modellers
behaviour fluctuated more and at which points. We saw that the balance of
concrete and abstract relational level use differs between stronger and weaker
modellers and that abstraction building happens on the concrete and medium
levels. The aspects of a modelling process that need to be understood are made
explicit on these levels, and are then related to other modelling process building
blocks to create more abstract relations. The coding results show that stronger
modellers perform these tasks much more often, hence the more balanced use
between concrete and abstract levels for them. In terms of modeller interaction,
we can deduce that the patterns of abstraction level use are strongly shaped
by the goal of achieving shared understanding.
With regard to executive functions, the coding results show very interest-
ing patterns concerning in particular the use of Reasoning, Monitoring and
Initiation. Initiation, be it of tasks, making notes, sketches or looking up in-
formation, was mostly associated with stronger modellers. We have seen which
Reasoning processes are used most often, and the context illustrated for what
purposes they were used. Interactions with Monitoring processes can be de-
duced from the same results. Monitoring processes often serve either to test
lines of reasoning, or to find a shared basis of comprehension from which to
start if modellers are at a loss.
Another aspect which the coding results, complemented by relevant contex-
tual data, showed us is that stronger modellers make much more purposeful use
of their abstractions. They generalise when they want to relate to a modelling
goal, to integrate certain aspects or to monitor the overview. They instantiate
elaborately when they want to make things clear, both for themselves and for
peers. And most of all, their abstractions are almost always input for fur-
ther knowledge building. Potentially, this may be reflective of efficient WMC
processing, with a focus only on what is relevant and inhibiting distractions,
leaving valuable space for metacognitive processes such as goal and compre-
hension monitoring. Use of semantically abstract terminology in reasoning is
an important issue to consider in its context. It could simply be reflective of a
shared understanding of the meaning of the word, but it could also be a sign
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that modellers are compensating for lack of understanding by using words into
which any example will fit.
For research purposes, the most valuable contributions of our method have
been to elucidate the process of modelling in terms of interactions between
modellers, and how cognitive processes such as abstraction and executive con-
trol are being used by modellers who have different styles and in the context
of different goals. Emphasising the cognitive variables in particular has given
an impression of the tremendously prominent role they play in shaping how a
model is created, which has been vastly underappreciated in IS research efforts
to date. These insights shed new light on questions such as where individual
differences in modelling behaviour might come from, and why modellers dis-
play the behaviour they do. Further investigations into the fundamentals and
mechanisms of modelling behaviours can be facilitated through these insights.
In terms of practical contributions, the types of results we have gained us-
ing this method have the potential to be instructive for modellers, to make
the modeller aware of his own style, strengths and weaknesses, which can pro-
vide valuable contributions for training purposes. Knowing about the different
behaviours taken up in the coding scheme can provide modellers with ideas
of what to focus on before they even start the modelling session. The same
goes for analysing a session involving modellers with different styles, so that
modellers can see how different behaviours influence the entire modelling flow.
Modellers can discuss these things with peers, or coaches, to improve them-
selves. The main value of this method thus lies in the optimisation of modelling
skills rather than providing definitive truths about modelling behaviour.
9.4 Comparison with Existing Modelling Frameworks
We developed our own perspective on assessment of modelling behaviour dur-
ing the course of this research. Now that we have completed our studies, we
will examine the findings, in particular the involvement of executive control,
in the light of three existing modelling frameworks, namely Persson’s Mod-
elling Competences (Persson, 2001), Gemino & Wand’s Evaluation Framework
for Conceptual Modelling (Gemino & Wand, 2004) and Moody’s Physics of
Notation (Moody, 2009). Of course, the modelling literature, which we have
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, is much more elaborate than these three frame-
works, but we chose to discuss them because they all have a set of readily
formulated guidelines.
Persson’s Modelling Competences One of the early descriptions of what
a modelling process actually is and what competences are required is Persson
(2001)’s work on the situational factors influencing the modelling process. The
four main areas of human competence are: Knowledge, one’s factual knowl-
edge about a subject matter; Skills, one’s ability to use knowledge in order
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to achieve goals; Individual properties, or personality traits; and Willingness
to contribute competency, which has to do with one’s attitude and motivation
towards contributing to goals other than one’s own. These can be divided over
two roles: the domain expert and the method provider. An overview is given
in Table 9.1 on the facing page.
This is a high-level description of an interesting mix of practical modelling
skills, executive functions, psychological skills, problem solving skills and per-
sonality traits. Most relevant for our work is the Ability to model skills. The
fact that abstract reasoning is implied for both domain expert and modeller is
completely in line with our results. However, it is strange that the other skills
listed for the domain expert should not be required for the modeller. In our
observations, it became clear that all four of these were highly prominent be-
haviours especially by our strongest modellers. In support of this, Gemino and
Wand (2004) describe how the task of conveying a message to the other party
as well as interpreting that message and translating it into modelling formal-
ism is essential for all involved parties. They use Norman’s Theory of Action
(Norman, 1986) to express how there is a ‘gulf of execution’ if the modeller’s
intention is not conveyed in his speech or model, and a ‘gulf of evaluation’ if
the model’s intention is not comprehended by the viewer. However, the roles
of modeller and viewer are not fixed, and any modeller can become a viewer
especially in collaborative settings if peers provide input.
The Ability to facilitate behaviours were most strongly shown by two mod-
ellers in our sample. Even though they were not officially assigned the role
of facilitator, they took the lead and performed these behaviours. Also, they
showed individual properties like communicativeness and creativity. The Abil-
ity to lead behaviours were out of scope in our study. All in all, the skills
described assume that the executive functions we have studied are working
optimally. Our work is thus complementary, examining in more detail the
preconditions for being able to display the stated modelling competences.
Gemino & Wand’s Evaluation Framework for Conceptual Modelling
Gemino and Wand (2004) present a framework for the evaluation of both the
physical model as well as the modelling process. For the product of model cre-
ation, they use such criteria as Accuracy, Correctness, Completeness, Discrep-
ancies, Quality and Detail, as well as an quantifiable criterion for comparison,
namely Jaccard Similarity. For the product of model interpretation, they as-
sess a viewer’s Comprehension, Items recalled, Problem solving and Semantic
recall. For efficiency in both cases, they measure Ease of use, Ease of learning
and Elapsed time. For both the processes of creation and interpretation, they
assess Errors and Confidence in correctness.
Their holistic view is shown by taking creation and interpretation of both
the model and the process into account. We have taken great inspiration from
their discussion of the cognitive components in terms of the modeller and the
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Domain Expert Method Provider
Knowledge Relevant to the problem at
hand
Know the current state of af-
fairs OR
Envision the future
Ideas behind conceptual mod-
elling
Effects and consequences of
modelling
Principles of human commu-
nication





Ability to go into detail OR











Motivate and keep partici-
pants interested
Detect and solve conflicts



















Interest in problem domain
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viewer. To recap, the modeller is the active role, translating knowledge input
into model output. Knowledge must be gathered, both from external sources
and experience, related to a modelling goal, translated into the modelling for-
malism with regard to meaning and intention, and be made explicitly visible.
The viewer is a passive role, concerned with constructing an understanding
of the domain based on the information contained in the model, the specifics
of the modelling language’s grammar and symbols, and his own previous ex-
periences and available knowledge. For all these tasks, again reasoning and
executive control are imperative and we further elaborate in our research on
the details of this.
We are more critical about certain aspects of the framework itself, also in
relation to our observations. The first aspect is the emphasis on the time it
took to create the model, and the computed similarity to other models. We
have already discussed in Chapter 1 that we consider the final model to be
a poor reflection of the process of model creation, which is the main focus of
our research. It is certainly useful to assess whether the product is correct,
complete and easy to understand. If the stakeholders agree that it is, the
model has most likely fulfilled its goal. That is, under the assumption that the
correct and complete information represented was also meaningful. However,
we cannot see the added value of quantifying this in terms of Jaccard Similarity
and elapsed time. What does it mean if a model is similar to another one and
created in a short period of time? Does this contribute to correctness? It
is tempting to think that whenever an individual can do something quickly, it
must be because he/she is a skilled person. While this holds true in the context
of physical labour, it is not always so in the context of cognitive tasks. What if
a longer duration is due to a discussion about some discrepancy, and resolving
it actually improves the quality of the model? What if a short creation time
reflects only that a person has not considered marginal cases and counter-
examples? In fact, in our observations, longer durations were only a sign of
thorough discussions, performed by the strongest modellers.
The second aspect is the focus on the number of errors. Concerning the
process, counting errors has proven of very limited value to our assessment of
modelling processes, because it is extremely difficult to define in practice what
constitutes an error and what not. Most of the time they are not outright
errors, but subtle misunderstandings that nevertheless require clarification in
order to proceed on a basis of shared understanding. Investing time in resolv-
ing such discrepancies has turned out to be an indicator of progress. Mostly
the stronger modellers detect inconsistencies, and the additional explanations
they give are helpful to all session participants. As potential causes for inef-
ficiencies in the modelling process, Gemino and Wand (2004) mention lack of
structured knowledge, skill and experience, which are definitely of influence,
but do not directly connect to our cognitive variables. Lack of structure and
organisation in knowledge, though, has been connected to executive control
deficits in education (Meltzer et al., 2007).
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Moody’s Physics of Notation Moody (2009) builds on dual-coding theory,
cognitive load theory and Gestalt psychology to specify 9 principles according
to which models should be designed to allow for easiest comprehension. The
main message is to offload WM as much as possible by reducing the number of
symbols in a diagram (Graphic Economy) and increasing their expressiveness.
This is achieved by ensuring that symbols are unambiguous (Semiotic Clarity)
and that their appearance matches the meaning or message they are trying to
convey (Semantic Transparency). Symbols must provide sufficient perceptual
contrast so that it is easy to distinguish them (Perceptual Discriminability).
A modeller must use the full range of symbols available in a notation (Visual
Expressiveness) and employ both visual and textual information to exploit
dual input modalities (Dual Coding). Finally, the symbols used must match
the experience level of the viewer (Cognitive Fit). So, using a minimal set
of symbols, the aim is to provide explicit support for integration of informa-
tion across different diagrams (Cognitive Integration), and explicit support for
how to deal with complexity (Complexity Management). Interestingly, Moody
(2009) uses two phases in human information processing, encode and decode,
which is analogous to Gemino and Wand (2004)’s write-read distinction.
Moody (2009) does express that the amount of experience is a significant
modulating factor in the ability to comprehend models, which is confirmed by
Mendling et al. (2012), who find that the degree of modelling expertise con-
tributes positively to the efficiency with which a modeller can comprehend a
model. Additionally, experience may determine what a modeller expects of his
modelling language (van der Linden et al., 2019). This expertise can be either
theoretical knowledge, prior modelling experience or being in a situation in
which modelling is frequently performed. Theoretical knowledge turns out to
be the most influential on comprehension, as it eases syntax comprehension.
Expertise is a factor we have controlled for in our observations by observing
modellers who all had between 2-5 years of experience. Nevertheless, there
is enough evidence that executive functions are trainable, and it is very well
possible that as experience increases, the use of different executive functions
may become more automatic as the processing demands on WM decrease and
begin to make more use of LTM. For example, Kalyuga (2006) describes how
people’s available knowledge schemas and strategies in LTM are rapidly acti-
vated upon encountering a problem which has a certain degree of familiarity to
the individual. Also, the different executive functions need not all be equally
well developed within a single individual. Each modeller may have his stronger
and weaker functions.
Most of these principles are based on cognitive load theory, which is well
established. It makes sense not to overburden any model viewer with unnec-
essary distractors, whether experienced or inexperienced. Even though WMC
may be more or less efficient in different individuals, it is still a limited pro-
cessing resource. These guiding principles are a good practice to follow also
to limit the demands on executive control while modelling, which may help to
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optimise performance.
However, dual-coding theory is still being debated, and the question is if
it is being used here in the right context. Dual-coding theory postulates that
learning concepts can be enhanced by providing the learner with input through
different modalities, namely verbal associations and visual imagery, and that
both visual and verbal information is used to represent any concept (Paivio,
1990). However, dual-coding has been found to work better for concrete con-
cepts than for abstract concepts, and it also does not account for the fact that
other associations may become linked to concepts, such as emotions, which are
perceived and stored immediately upon perception and may significantly influ-
ence cognition (e.g., L. F. Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Clore & Huntsinger,
2009; Blanchette & Richards, 2010). When a child learns the concept of a cat,
it follows logically that showing a picture of a cat and associating it with the
word ‘cat’ will help the child assign meaning to what was initially a random
sequence of sounds. However, does an additional explanatory description in a
model which already contains a lot of information help the modeller to assign
meaning to the model? Mendling et al. (2012) found the opposite; additional
semantic information, in the form of elaborate textual labels in the model,
impedes syntax comprehension in a sample of both students and experienced
practitioners. Applied in this case, it thus raises a question about the validity
of the expertise reversal effect (Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003).
The expertise reversal effect describes the phenomenon that novices benefit
from guidance to compensate for their lack of relevant knowledge schemas in
LTM. Experts do have these schemas and they are activated upon being con-
fronted with a relevant task. When experts see guidelines, they thus provide
an additional WM processing load upon their schema, leaving them with a
double burden. Indeed, for experts, explanatory texts integrated in diagrams
or an auditory and textual representation of identical information proved less
effective than simply the diagram, or auditory information alone (Chandler
& Sweller, 1991; Craig, Gholson, & Driscoll, 2002). It is interesting that in
Mendling et al. (2012)’s study, students were also found not to benefit from
additional semantic information. Perhaps one has to be an absolute beginner
to benefit from such additions, and perhaps the beneficial effect vanishes rather
quickly as students learn. However, one could ask how likely it is that someone
who knows neither the modelling notation nor the domain should be required
to comprehend the model in question without having an expert at hand to
explain, which does seem to be the assumption underlying the Dual Coding
principle.
References to Executive Control in Existing Frameworks
In modelling literature, many authors have made reference to either executive
control or working memory in attempts to understand and support modelling,




Maiden (1992) describe both the metacognitive executive control processes and
the overarching processes such as reasoning and relational integration, which
have all been linked to problem solving. Implicitly, they identify differences in
executive control processes in weak and strong novices. Pinggera, Soffer, et al.
(2012) relate the use of structure during modelling to higher quality models.
They also describe a modelling process consisting of comprehension, modelling
and reconciliation, which is quite analogous to the description by Hayes and
Flower (1986) of the writing process, namely planning, sentence generation and
revision. Gemino and Wand (2004) explicitly label writing as a core process
in modelling, next to interpretation, or encoding, as Moody (2009) calls it.
Persson (2001) takes a slightly different focus by concentrating on modelling
skills, but those labelled as crucial for modelling relate to abstraction and exec-
utive control. Pinggera, Soffer, et al. (2012) and Moody (2009) also observe the
influence of the self-regulatory variables WM and attention shifting. A later
study, which came out long after we had written our theoretical reviews, also
explicitly confirmed the role of WM in modelling (Martini et al., 2016). How-
ever, none of the existing modelling frameworks elaborate on the mechanism
of how the variables could function as sources of individual differences. Still,
in general, problems in modelling are uniformly assigned to a lack of execu-
tive control engagement, and solutions are sought in decreasing the total WM
load. Additionally, Gemino and Wand (2004) also mention the limitations of
the modelling technique as a constraint.
9.5 Methodological Issues
We performed a small, exploratory, in-depth study of modelling behaviours. As
discussed in Chapter 1, we use Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s criteria for trustwor-
thiness in qualitative research as our primary methods to safeguard validity. To
recap, Credibility describes the confidence in the ‘truth’ value of the findings,
Transferability refers to the transparency of the findings and the level of detail
of the data descriptions, allowing researchers to judge the applicability in their
own contexts, Dependability shows that the findings are consistent and could
be repeated and Confirmability is the extent to which findings possess a degree
of neutrality.
Credibility, Dependability and Confirmability
We applied thick description to observations, and made extensive use of peer
debriefing, reviews with external experts and triangulation of different data
sources. We chose to conduct prolonged observations and to observe the mod-
ellers in different settings without intervening, to get an accurate impression of
their overall behaviour in the work setting and their relations with colleagues.
From these different perspectives, we gathered congruent and complementary
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results. However, as with any interpretivist study, the assigning of codes to
video data remains an act of interpretation by the researcher, and we did not
have time and budget to train additional coders. This is mainly due to the
enormous body of data and the elaborateness of the coding scheme. The main
issue with regard to dependability and confirmability is thus that we have not
been able to compute inter-rater reliability scores for the coding of all inter-
view and observation data. Given the small, exploratory nature of this study, it
might seem ambitious to apply what is actually a positivist reliability criterion,
but if this observation method is to be applied in condensed form on a larger
scale, whether it be in research or practice conditions, inter-rater reliability will
become crucial.
Transferability
In this study, we used a sample of n=7. Our modellers were all Dutch, well-
educated and with comparable levels of modelling experience in the Dutch IT
industry. We used thick description to provide detailed accounts of the results
per modeller, which has allowed us to gain in-depth insights into the behaviour
of this small sample. The four patterns we discerned in this study were very
stable across our sample. The mechanism of executive control, the evidence
for individual differences therein and potential performance improvements by
creating awareness of them are well established in the literature. Combined
with the stability of our results, we believe that it may provide added value
in any modelling setting to assess executive functioning, and to keep the four
patterns in mind because they may help to provide a focus when looking for
potential difficulties.
Visibility of Modelling Difficulties
One of the most surprising findings was that the modelling difficulties, de-
scribed so elaborately in the literature, were not nearly as overtly visible as
we had expected. Because we expected these difficulties to be reflected in use
or lack of use of certain executive functions, we designed our coding scheme
to include only positive instances of behaviour. It turns out that this way of
coding yields more accurate behavioural descriptions for strong modellers than
for weaker modellers.
In combination with process mining, our observation method gives insight
in all modellers’ behavioural trends, we know how much time they spend on
reasoning versus monitoring, and in which order they do so. But the advan-
tage of strong modellers is that they are explicit both about when they are
right and when they are wrong. Weaker modellers leave much implicit. We
reasoned that for weaker modellers, absence of certain behaviours, or a high
concentration of behaviours from peers like repeating information, rejecting




and abstraction, but this turned out not to be the case. Firstly because there
is no noticeable absence of executive control, all modellers use executive con-
trol extensively. Secondly because there are no high concentrations of reject or
resolve inconsistency behaviours. When dealing with problems, stronger mod-
ellers in our sample often did not reject proposals outright. They considered
the other’s input, and started providing counterexamples, explaining again in
a different way or instantiating even further. However, these behaviours are
also extensively used when there are no problems. Deviating behaviour can
up to now only be observed through interpretation of thick description results.
Third, to analyse where and how an act of abstraction building fails, a tem-
poral aspect is needed, especially if abstraction building fails between several
modellers. Process mining can give some additional insight here, but only if
the issues we discussed in Chapter 8 are resolved first. And even then, context
cannot simply be ignored.
Still, outside of formal sessions during coffee break talk, it became clear that
some people were not happy about the performance of some of our modellers.
Thus, it is not purely our judgement that there are weaker modellers in our
sample. As discussed in the presentation of Pattern 2, adults may use executive
functions very differently from children, and that the meaning of what they are
saying is much more important than the actual use of executive functions.
For analysis, an option may be to create special codes to annotate potential
deviating behaviour, or to formulate negative variants of codes. A major threat
to objectivity here is that the researcher will then need to create a coding
scheme based on his or her interpretation of good behaviour, thereby engaging
in the role of ‘supermodeller’, because he or she will ultimately decide what is
good and what is not. A workaround might be to keep assigning the positive
behavioural codes, but to assign deviating behaviour codes as well. Afterwards,
these episodes can then be analysed in relation to a detailed description of the
episode to catch the true nature of the event.
In terms of practical usability, the limited visibility of difficulties implies
that the method cannot be seen as an objective assessment scheme which is
entirely independent of its context. Context provides many valuable insights.
In our observations, context showed that some modellers were very clearly
in the lead, they had a vision and a goal and their input had a significantly
greater impact on the final result than that of others. It also showed that some
modellers performed in a chaotic way and stood corrected quite frequently.
However, this was rarely captured by the coding scheme alone. Only the chaotic
performance became visible to a certain degree after applying process mining,
but only when compared to the structured processes of the stronger modellers.
Thus, for any modeller being assessed, the codes provide guidelines, but how
they are being used must be explained within the context of his modelling
behaviour. For example, if an act of monitoring is performed, but it is then
rejected by peers, one could look at why this is so and how monitoring can be
done better in the future.
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The Need for Temporal Analysis
At this moment, our results do not allow us to say anything about the relation
between the variables Abstraction, and Reasoning and Monitoring. We only
know how modellers use Abstraction, and how they use Reasoning and Mon-
itoring, but not how they interact. This is because we assigned the codes for
these three variables to the same utterance in Atlas.ti, which disregards the
fact that these variables all have their own temporal flow. It makes it impossi-
ble to disentangle them. An abstraction usually does not happen in one single
utterance, but in the way we have currently coded our data this is the under-
lying assumption. We can therefore only see which variables co-occur within
the context of one single utterance. This is an important lesson we learned for
future work. Another issue is that neither Atlas.ti nor Disco currently supports
the temporal analysis of different variable flows in comparison. The ingredients
are certainly there, but not yet the integration. Yet the idea of creating pro-
cess maps for individual modellers and to be able to show them animations of
their own behaviour are very compelling. Again we need to address the issues
discussed in Chapter 8 to take us one step closer to creating better insights in
modelling behaviour.
9.6 Implications for Practice
The most important implication for practice is the application of this method
for teaching modelling, both in educational and industrial settings. We have
explicitly chosen not to attempt to design another set of guidelines explaining
how to adapt model syntax or layout to make it easy to understand for novices.
Instead, we have chosen to focus on how best to create awareness of one’s
existing modelling skills with regard to what is considered ‘good’ modelling
behaviour, and to explain this in terms of generic cognitive processes that
anyone can learn. Metacognitive awareness of one’s reasoning may lead to
greater focus on pursuing a single strategy, simply because reasoners are aware
of what they are doing and less likely to make irrelevant shifts (Goodwin &
Johnson-Laird, 2006). With regard to this, we will discuss two important
aspects: the usability of the observation method, and how to integrate it in a
modelling environment conducive to learning.
Usability of the Observation Method
Before we will be able to apply the observation method to direct observation
of modelling behaviour in practice, several issues concerning the usability of
the method will have to be addressed. Most importantly, the codebook needs
to be made more concise to keep it comprehensible, and potentially, discourse
patterns may have to be integrated to help learners build a strategy of their
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own. Finally, we can ask whether formal WM testing would be of added value
in this context. These issues are discussed below.
Condensing the Codebook The method as it currently exists, in the form
of an elaborate codebook, is not immediately usable. The number of codes
included would be overwhelming for an individual unfamiliar with the psychol-
ogy of executive functions, and it would be difficult to assign them to modelling
behaviour in real-time on such a fine level of detail. Thus, the codebook first
needs to be condensed into a more comprehensible set of codes. This means
formulating the codebook on a coarser level of granularity. Related behaviours
may be merged into one code, and the level of detail should be worked into the
descriptions explaining the codes. Secondly, the format needs to be changed
into the form of a checklist which a trainer or coach can use while observing the
modeller, with room for notes which can be discussed afterwards. Thirdly, the
method needs a comprehensible introduction into the psychology of executive
functions and how to view them in a modelling context. Thankfully, the con-
cept of executive control as a set of monitoring functions governing behaviour
is very intuitive to most people. It should be clear how the fundamental func-
tions work implicitly and ‘feed’ input to the higher-level functions. Also, people
should know that the higher-complexity functions will be more overtly visible,
that primary feedback will be focused on these, and that relating this back to
one’s own experience of how the load on fundamental functions including WM
can be minimised is a secondary inference which they will have to experiment
with to find out if it works for them.
After these adaptations, teams of modellers can take turns in observing each
other according to the checklist, and finding out their strengths and weaknesses.
They can experiment with intervention strategies together. Also it will be
insightful for the team to know of each others’ strengths and weaknesses. We
also expect that this way of reflecting will bypass the expertise reversal effect,
because everyone can benefit from feedback on his executive functioning. At
best, modellers will only find out that they are doing a great job, which may
boost their self-confidence. It should be noted that the method is currently
best suited for use in collaborative settings, but even an individual could reflect
on his own modelling skills by being aware of how this complex behaviour is
facilitated.
Integrating Discourse Patterns In cases where monitoring behaviour does
not come naturally, integrating the notion of Discourse patterns (King, 1997,
1999) into a recommended set of intervention strategies may be helpful. Dis-
course patterns prompt students to ask questions and give explanations to
consolidate their knowledge base. They can be as prescriptive as providing an
entire problem-solving phase plan for the session, or simply to give a set of
prompts including review, probing, hint, thinking and metacognitive reflection
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questions for people to use. The art is then for the modeller to become aware
of when he needs to consolidate his knowledge base, and which questions to
ask to do so. These questions can also be used to create an internal reasoning
pattern to build and integrate knowledge. If this becomes routine, reasoning
will improve.
Is There a Role for Formal WM Testing?
A possibility is the inclusion of formal WM testing to complement the obser-
vation results. Individual strategies can then perhaps be even more precisely
tailored to the needs of the individual. However, it is very much the question
how helpful this will be, and how much it may even socially undermine the
lower capacity individual. If colleagues know of it, they may start to behave
differently towards the individual. The knowledge may also reduce the indi-
vidual’s self-confidence, which in and by itself can impair performance. And
finally, it is by no means a fact that WMC can be trained or increased. Thus,
it is probably more useful to focus on the modellers’ behaviours in terms of ex-
ecutive functions, and to create an environment which is conducive to learning
and low in distractions.
Improving Abstraction Learning
By creating awareness of modellers’ abstract reasoning, they may be able to
improve it using our method. Thus, the way in which people learn abstractions
deserves special attention in this context. We discuss our proposed strategy for
learning abstraction in the light of how abstraction develops in young children.
Following the ideas of embodied cognition (Lakoff, 1999, 2012; Barsalou,
2003), Williams et al. (2009) examine social psychological evidence to propose
that abstract concepts and experiences in adult life are shaped by and grounded
in experiences from infancy and early childhood. They assume that humans
easily integrate incoming information with existent knowledge structures. The
passive, natural integration process that forms new concepts in childhood is
referred to as scaffolding. Scaffolding can also be applied to goals and goal
responses. Newer, potentially abstract concepts are scaffolded on top of exist-
ing, well-understood concepts, with retention of the structure of the existing
concept in the new concept, and they become associated. The new addition
enriches the meaning of the earlier concept.
Feldman (2003) shows that the least complex concepts are most easily ab-
stracted, and also the easiest to learn. For another, concrete language is viewed
as much more accessible than abstract language (DeVito, 1967). In order to
maintain simple, elegant abstractions at every possible level in the generic
model structure, a balance between level of detail, relevance and simplicity is
required (Zucker, 2003). If we move down a level, describing concrete instances,
knowledge becomes much more specialised. Details become voluminous and
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minutely distinguishable as they may be semantically or visually related. Con-
sidering them all would lead to an attention overload. On the other hand,
if detailed information is lacking, grasping the meaning of an abstraction be-
comes impossible. Before being able to see high-level structures and generalities
which can be used in productive thinking, a whole range of behaviours a con-
cept may exhibit have to be well understood (Arnheim, 1969; Medin & Ross,
1989; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002).
Both psychological and neuroscientific accounts demonstrate that abstrac-
tion is strongly grounded in concrete experience. From a psychological per-
spective, for example, Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) demonstrate that ab-
stract knowledge is built through analogy from experience-based knowledge.
Along the same lines, Lakoff (1999) describes how we possess image schemas,
which are abstract structures representing the most generic properties of a
concept and are formed by concrete experience. Whatever an individual per-
ceives is given meaning by being fitted into the image schema. Imaginative
processes form abstract models, and executive processes act on existing knowl-
edge (Lakoff, 1988). In terms of mental model theory, Johnson-Laird (1985)
states that mental models are being further elaborated if attention is paid to
features that were still missing. Additional details make the mental models
more complete, and possibly, more concrete. Similarly, Wharton et al. (1993)
find that collecting complementary goal information induces more complete
processing, leading subjects to avoid drawing incorrect conclusions based on
overly narrow hypotheses. Finally, Barsalou (2003) proposes that abstractions
result from the interaction between perceptual systems, which receive direct
perceptual input, and association systems, which form associations between
perceived input.
Thus, we need to focus modellers’ attention to always going back to a
concrete level to ensure whether they can envision what they are modelling,
or whether that concrete basis needs refining. It will help them to find out
whether they are using semantically abstract concepts with or without know-
ing the true meaning. The modeller then needs to find his own sweet spot at
which his mental model is sufficiently detailed. If modellers make it a habit
to continuously switch back to concrete levels whenever they are building ab-
stractions, it may help to improve correctness and accuracy as well as make
them more flexible in working with abstraction on the whole.
A Conducive Working Environment
We have discussed an elaborate set of generic strategies to optimise executive
control in Chapter 4. We covered problem solving strategy training, which
creates awareness of behaviour, improves analytic processing and even appears
to transfer its benefits to general fluid intelligence; practice, which primes the
frontostriatal areas mediating attentional control to maintain their activity if
practice is done diligently and continuously; mindfulness training, which even
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though we do not know exactly how it works, appears to prime attention and
leads to measurable executive control improvements; physical exercise, which
is assumed to increase in blood flow to the prefrontal cortex, thereby increasing
oxygenation and stimulating the repair and plasticity of the brain architecture,
and eventually upregulating the metabolism of relevant neurotransmitters, such
as dopamine and norepinephrine; emotional training, which improves inhibitory
control and cognitive flexibility; stress reduction, to avoid impairing WMC;
creativity training, which also has been shown to improve executive control,
verbal intelligence and emotional control; and priming, with which individuals
can unconsciously be guided towards desirable goals.
Modelling environments can thus be designed with considerations of health
and support in mind. Distractions should be minimised, and facilities should
also focus on allowing modellers’ creativity to develop. For instance, a lot of
emphasis is placed on providing fancy computer-mediated facilities like inter-
active whiteboards in modelling environments. However, do they truly im-
prove efficiency, or are they simply another distraction because it forces the
modeller into a prescribed way of working rather than allowing his creativity
to flow while scribbling on brown paper? Straus and McGrath (1994) found
that there was no significant difference in quality of completed work between
computer-mediated and face-to-face environments, but that productivity was
significantly greater in face-to-face environments. Of course, this is an older
study and computer-mediated environments have developed very much since
then. Nevertheless, we should not simply assume that using digital media is
always better. Also, offices in general should have facilities to let workers re-
cover mentally, exercise, eat healthfully and create an open culture in which
they can support each other and discuss emotional issues. The impacts of
well-being on performance are significant, probably greater than any form of
executive control training will ever be able to achieve. A happy, healthy and
satisfied workforce is a productive workforce, and we should make every possi-
ble effort to accomplish this.
9.7 Recommendations for Further Research
A first step for future research would be to test whether the method can truly
be made usable in practice, whether modellers would perceive the feedback as
valuable, and whether they actually improve with it. The format of observation
should be tested, as well as the way the discourse patterns should be integrated
into the method. Structured interventions in practical modelling settings would
be a good set-up for such a study. Directly related to this is the further
verification of whether the observation method accurately describes modelling
skills, for which application to a larger sample is needed.
In addition to this, the aspect of individual differences has remained rather
elusive in our research. We have observed differences in behaviour, but apart
286
9
9.7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
from describing them per individual we have not been able to quantify them.
Performing structured observations in which WM and attention span tests are
conducted among a larger sample of modellers before observing them at work
in practice would provide measurable baselines, which is a first step towards
quantifying individual differences. It will help to explain whether modellers
who can be labelled as ’weaker’ based on observed behaviour truly have lower
WM spans.
Methodologically, further investigating how to include a temporal aspect
into complex behavioural analysis promises to provide valuable additional in-
sights. The most important prerequisites for this is to reduce the complexity
of the codebook, and to code the dataset such that each behavioural code gets
its own unique timestamp. These modifications will make it significantly easier
to compare modelling processes from different modellers. Ultimately, too, each
modeller will be represented on his own timeline, which would allow us to study
very precisely how modellers interact given a certain goal. Process mining is
a promising technique to achieve this, but context-specific modifications will
have to be implemented.
Theoretically, further research will have to show what explanations under-
lie our observations and their potential relations with WMC. Testing in which
part of the WM models proposed by A. Baddeley (2000) and Cowan (1999)
interference takes place, or whether information and goal processing is subop-
timal, would provide insights which will help us to understand more about the
fundamentals of modelling. Furthermore, such insights are helpful to determine
and test what training strategy would be most effective for a modeller.
Finally, the use of abstraction needs further investigation. We still do not
know why modellers use abstraction as they do. Is it because of awareness that
some modellers are more consistent and coherent than others, or should the
answer be sought on a deeper, neuropsychological level? We can ask whether
individual differences are observable if we measured brain activity during the
performance of a realistic modelling task. A key aspect in this context would
be to investigate which modellers are able to activate the RLPFC, the second-
level abstraction area, when necessary. We may investigate if there are different
activation pathways which correspond with different modelling styles. It will be
of vital importance to perform such experiments with realistic modelling tasks
in order to link neurocognitive theory to practice. Yet, getting to the bottom
of the facilitating mechanisms would provide an additional step towards the
quantification of individual differences, how to account for these differences in
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In information systems analysis and design, models are used as the blueprints
for system development. They may, for example, serve to visualise information
flows, represent business domains as conceptual structures or simulate complex
systems. The use of modelling techniques in organisations is increasing, yet
modelling is perceived to be difficult by practitioners. Among the greatest
challenges are:
• achieving the right level of abstraction to convey the meaning of the
model,
• retaining an overview of the many different fragments of information that
have to be integrated into a coherent whole,
• ensuring that all participants in a modelling session as well as future
users of the model achieve shared understanding about what is being
represented.
However, many individual differences can be observed in modelling skills. In
this thesis, a cognitive perspective is taken on the process of process modelling
to explore which cognitive factors are essential to engage during modelling, and
how to potentially train them.
Process models are abstract, diagrammatic representations of knowledge
about a system of interest, which should not allow ambiguous interpretations.
The constituent parts of the system can have many interrelations, which are
represented by concepts and relations. Modellers create the final products
based on the mental models they form of their domain of interest, using what
is essentially a creative problem solving process.
When examining what modelling truly constitutes in terms of cognitive
processes, our findings suggest that it relies heavily on relational reasoning and
the ability to form abstract representations. These crucial processes are guided
by executive control functions; a set of metacognitive behaviours controlling
and coordinating an individual’s performance on complex cognitive tasks, as




Relational reasoning is associated with success in problem solving and mod-
elling. It facilitates the construction of relations between relevant variables,
analogies between models, monitoring of model structure, awareness of domain
knowledge and decision-making based on domain knowledge. Additionally, it
increases mutual understanding. Abstraction allows the modeller to view a
problem on different levels of detail, each level providing its own set of in-
sights. By flexibly switching between these levels, it becomes possible to see
interrelationships between aspects, and test generic propositions by associat-
ing them with concrete instances and vice versa. Executive functions such as
response inhibition, task initiation, monitoring, planning and goal setting play
more covert roles, facilitating reasoning and abstraction during modelling.
A critical system to facilitate these cognitive processes is the working mem-
ory (WM) system. It filters input through a narrow window of attention span.
Goal-relevant information is prioritised, which begins unconsciously, and this
process can be enhanced by affective signals, both from the environment or from
within the individual. Goals and WM input must be shielded from distrac-
tions, which may continuously arise during modelling. Individual differences
in modelling performance can best be described in terms of the different exec-
utive functions involved. For most executive functions, the concept of working
memory capacity (WMC) is the best predictor of performance. Targeted WM
training can improve performance temporarily, but generic strategies to op-
timise brain functioning as a whole may have a more lasting positive impact
on executive control. Examples are physical exercise, mindfulness, emotional
development, creativity training and reduction of stress. The greatest benefits
appear to be achieved by those who started off with the greatest deficits in
executive control. Therefore, a broad training strategy appears promising to
reduce individual differences between modellers.
To test the whether the hypothesised cognitive processes were indeed vis-
ibly being used, modellers were observed in practice. A prerequisite for this
was to structure the observations systematically so that valid and reliable rep-
resentations of the influence of executive functions on the modelling process
could be inferred.
In order to achieve this, firstly interviews were conducted with modelling
experts, followed by observations of several sessions with modelling experts
at work. Qualitative coding was applied to this dataset, the results of which
were compared to existing models of executive functioning so as to construct
a coding scheme for consecutive analysis. This pilot scheme was applied to
four independent modelling sessions until theoretical saturation was achieved.
The resulting categories were Abstraction, Reasoning, Monitoring, Switching,
Working memory, Initiation and Planning. The categories were remarkably
consistent across our different data sources.
A total of seven modellers were analysed in different group configurations
across 13 modelling sessions. The coding scheme was complemented with in-
depth contextual thick descriptions. Additionally, process mining was applied
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to the coded dataset to generate process maps for each modeller’s executive
function flow, adding a temporal aspect to the otherwise static qualitative
analysis. Modellers appear to have unique styles of executive control use. In
particular, four main patterns emerged:
Pattern 1: Semantic and Relational Abstraction do not necessarily cor-
relate. First of all, there is great variety in how relational and semantic ab-
straction are used in combination. Secondly, a high semantic abstraction level
does not necessarily accompany strong relational abstraction skills. Thus, the
assessment of abstraction level use must be accompanied by in-depth analysis
of the content and context of the modelling session and the influences of the
other participants.
Pattern 2: The use of Executive Control alone does not necessarily cor-
relate with modelling progress. In existing executive control frameworks, such
as those used in educational settings, pinpointing the use of executive func-
tions indicates something about the quality of the individual’s learning process.
However, we found all modellers to use all executive functions quite extensively.
The main difference is that stronger modellers make more purposeful use of ex-
ecutive functions than weaker modellers. Additionally, stronger modellers use
reasoning more frequently and elaborately than weaker modellers.
Pattern 3: There appears to be an implicit order in the use of Executive
Control. Some executive functions are used more frequently than others, and
there appears to be an implicit order in the use of the different categories. Rea-
soning and Monitoring primarily contribute to achieving shared understanding
and structure. Switching and Initiation were sporadically used during the dis-
cussions when necessary, but mostly only after shared understanding had been
achieved. Especially if it was clear that there was no shared understanding, the
stronger modellers kept their focus solely on Monitoring, with the necessary
Reasoning. Planning only appeared before or after discussions, as the most
metacognitive process of all, to set goals for the session in question or decide
about follow-ups for future sessions.
Pattern 4: Shared understanding seems of primary importance to strong
modellers. Shared understanding appears to be the most fundamental prereq-
uisite for modelling progress. Frequently, strong modellers prioritised it over
efficiency, even though efficiency is considered a significant process quality goal.
Applying a cognitive psychological perspective to the description of mod-
elling behaviour has yielded valuable insights in where difficulties arise during
modelling, and in what potential strategies might be used to improve such diffi-
culties. To begin with, increasing awareness of a modeller’s own strengths and
weaknesses in terms of executive functions, as well as the consequences of these
strengths and weaknesses, provides a promising starting point for skill optimi-
sation. For this purpose, problem solving training, which creates behavioural
awareness, has been shown to be an effective intervention. For modelling in
particular, abstraction and relational reasoning require attention. Abstraction
is strongly grounded in concrete experience, thus the ability to switch between
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SUMMARY
concrete and generic levels of abstraction to test propositions should be priori-
tised. Once such relations between abstraction levels within a single concept
have been created, relational reasoning across different concepts can be initi-
ated. The effectiveness of the different executive functions in terms of their
influence on monitoring the integrity of relational reasoning as well as shared
understanding should be specifically emphasised. Finally, providing a safe,
creativity-inducing and healthy working environment for the modellers may
also benefit their cognitive skills.
Future research should investigate the practical usability of our method of
analysis and the more precise description and quantification of individual dif-
ferences, so that the method can be more specifically tailored to each individual
modeller’s needs. Also, the use of abstraction as a facilitating mechanism mer-
its further study, as we still do not know why modellers use abstraction as they
do, and the extent to which this can be improved.
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Samenvatting
Tijdens het ontwerpen en analyseren van informatiesystemen wordt veel ge-
bruik gemaakt van procesmodellen, bijvoorbeeld om te visualiseren hoe infor-
matie door een systeem stroomt, hoe de conceptuele structuur van een bepaald
domein in elkaar zit of om complexe systemen te simuleren. Modelleertechnie-
ken worden steeds vaker ingezet binnen bedrijven, doch ervaren gebruikers het
modelleren vaak als ingewikkeld. Tot de grootste uitdagingen behoren:
• het vinden van het juiste abstractieniveau om de betekenis van het model
over te brengen,
• het behouden van een overzicht van informatiefragmenten die gëıntegreerd
moeten worden,
• het in de gaten houden dat zowel modelleurs als toekomstige gebruikers
van het model een gedeeld begrip van de representatie krijgen.
Aanzienlijke verschillen in modelleervaardigheden bestaan tussen indivi-
duen. In dit proefschrift wordt vanuit een cognitief-psychologisch perspectief
onderzocht welke cognitieve factoren van essentieel belang zijn voor procesmo-
delleren, en welke mogelijkheden er zijn om deze te trainen.
Procesmodellen zijn abstracte, diagrammatische, eenduidige kennisrepre-
sentaties van een bepaald systeem. De onderlinge samenhang tussen de onder-
delen van het systeem worden weergegeven door concepten en relaties. Model-
leurs vormen mentale modellen van het domein, en gebruiken deze middels een
creatief probleemoplossingsproces om tot een eindproduct te komen.
In termen van cognitieve processes bestaat het modelleerproces voorname-
lijk uit het vermogen om analytisch te redeneren en abstracte representaties
te vormen. Deze cruciale processen worden ondersteund door executieve func-
ties: metacognitieve controleprocessen die de operationele uitvoering van een
complexe taak coördineren en de progressie bewaken. Dit geldt evengoed voor
sociale aspecten, zodat de juiste reacties in de juiste context gegeven kunnen
worden.
Analytisch redeneren wordt als voorwaarde gezien om succesvol problemen
op te kunnen lossen. Het faciliteert het vermogen om verbanden te leggen
tussen relevante variabelen, om analogieën tussen modellen te maken, om een
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goede modelstructuur te waarborgen, om relevante domeinkennis in te zetten
bij besluitvorming, en om wederzijds begrip te vergroten.
Abstractievermogen stelt een modelleur in staat om een probleem op ver-
schillende detailniveaus te beschouwen, waarbij elk niveau unieke inzichten
verschaft. Het flexibel kunnen schakelen tussen deze niveaus maakt het mo-
gelijk om relaties tussen deze unieke inzichten te leggen, om generieke eigen-
schappen te verifiëren aan de hand van concrete voorbeelden, en vice versa.
Executieve functies zoals het onderdrukken van impulsieve uitingen, initiëren
van taken, bewaken van voortgang, plannen en doelen stellen spelen een indi-
recte rol tijdens het modelleren, door het analytisch redeneren en bijbehorende
abstractievermogen te faciliteren.
Het werkgeheugen is een onmisbaar, meer fundamenteel cognitief systeem
om de bovengenoemde processen te faciliteren. Als eerste gaan prikkels uit de
omgeving door een aandachtsfilter. Informatie die relevant is voor het doel dat
op dat moment actief is wordt geprioritiseerd, wat reeds in het onderbewuste
plaatsvindt. Dit proces kan versterkt worden door affectieve signalen. Deze
kunnen uit de omgeving komen, of vanuit het individu. Zowel doelen als an-
dere prikkels die het werkgeheugen moet verwerken moeten beschermd worden
tegen afleidende factoren tijdens het modelleren. Voorbeelden zijn discussies
en reacties van verschillende mensen. Individuele verschillen tussen modelleer-
prestaties kunnen het beste uitgedrukt worden in termen van de diverse be-
trokken executieve functies. Voor het grootste deel van de executieve functies
geldt werkgeheugencapaciteit als de beste voorspeller van prestaties. Gerichte
werkgeheugentraining kan tijdelijk de prestatie verhogen, maar generieke stra-
tegieën om het functioneren van de hersenen in hun geheel te optimaliseren
lijken een duurzamere positieve invloed te hebben op de kwaliteit van execu-
tieve controle. Voorbeelden zijn fysieke inspanning, mindfulness, emotionele
ontwikkeling, creativiteitstrainingen en het verminderen van stress. Over het
algemeen wordt de grootste winst behaald door diegenen die de minst sterke
prestaties leveren. Een breed ingestoken trainingsstrategie lijkt dus veelbelo-
vend om individuele verschillen tussen modelleurs te verkleinen.
Om de hypothese te toetsen of het gebruik van executieve functies ook daad-
werkelijk zichtbaar is tijdens een realistische modelleersessie zijn modelleurs in
de praktijk geobserveerd. Een vereiste daarvoor was het systematisch struc-
tureren van de observatieresultaten, zodanig dat ze de invloed van executieve
functies op het modelleerproces valide en betrouwbaar weer konden geven.
Om tot deze structuur te komen zijn er eerst interviews afgenomen met mo-
delleerexperts, gevolgd door een reeks observaties van modelleersessies waarin
enkel modelleerexperts aan het werk waren. Deze dataset is kwalitatief geco-
deerd, en het resultaat daarvan vergeleken met bestaande modellen van exe-
cutief functioneren om een codeerschema samen te stellen voor de vervolg-
analyse. Deze eerste versie is getoetst op vier onafhankelijke modelleersessies
totdat theoretische verzadiging bereikt werd. De resulterende categorieën wa-
ren Abstractie, Redeneren, Monitoren, Schakelen, Werkgeheugen, Initiatie en
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Planning. De categorieën waren opvallend consistent tussen de verschillende
databronnen.
In totaal zijn 7 modelleurs in verschillende groepssamenstellingen geobser-
veerd in 13 sessies. Het codeerschema is ingezet voor de analyse, aangevuld
door zogenaamde ‘thick descriptions’: diepgaande contextuele beschrijvingen
van de geobserveerde fenomenen. Daarnaast is process mining toegepast op de
gecodeerde dataset om voor elke modelleur een proceskaart te genereren van
het gebruik van executieve functies. Dit voegt een temporeel aspect toe aan de
statische kwalitatieve analyse. Modelleurs lijken unieke stijlen te hebben voor




Patroon 1: Semantische en Relationele Abstractie zijn niet noodzakelij-
kerwijs gecorreleerd. Ten eerste is er enorme variatie in hoe combinaties van
relationele en semantische abstractie gebruikt worden. Ten tweede, een hoog
semantisch abstractieniveau gaat niet altijd vergezeld van sterke relationele
abstractievaardigheden. Het beoordelen van het gebruik van abstractieniveaus
kan dus enkel gedaan worden middels een diepgaande analyse van de inhoud
en context van de modelleersessie, en de invloed van andere participanten.
Patroon 2: Het gebruik van executieve controle an sich correleert niet
noodzakelijkerwijs met progressie tijdens het modelleren. In bestaande execu-
tieve controleschema’s, zoals degenen die gebruikt worden in het onderwijs,
zegt het gebruik van executieve functies iets over de kwaliteit van het leerpro-
ces. Echter, onze bevindingen suggereren dat alle modelleurs uitvoerig gebruik
maken van executieve functies. Het belangrijkste verschil is dat sterkere mo-
delleurs ze meer doelgericht in weten te zetten dan zwakkere modelleurs. Daar
komt bij dat sterkere modelleurs vaker en uitgebreider hun redeneervaardighe-
den inzetten dan zwakkere modelleurs.
Patroon 3: Er lijkt een impliciete volgordelijkheid te bestaan in het gebruik
van executieve controle. Sommige executieve functies worden vaker gebruikt
dan anderen, en er lijkt een impliciete volgordelijkheid te bestaan in het ge-
bruik van de verschillende executieve functiecategorieën. Redeneren en Mo-
nitoren dragen primair bij aan het bereiken van gedeeld begrip en structuur.
Schakelen en Initiatie worden sporadisch gebruikt tijdens discussies waar nood-
zakelijk, maar meestal pas nadat gedeeld begrip vastgesteld was. Met name
wanneer het duidelijk werd dat er geen gedeeld begrip was, bleven de sterkere
modelleurs vasthouden aan Monitoren, met de nodige redeneringen. Plannen
kwam alleen voor of na de discussie aan bod. Dit proces is van alle functies
het meest metacognitief, en werd ingezet om doelen te stellen voor de sessie of
om vervolgacties te benoemen voor volgende sessies.
Patroon 4: Gedeeld begrip lijkt van primair belang voor sterke modelleurs.
Gedeeld begrip lijkt de meest fundamentele voorwaarde voor voortgang tij-
dens het modelleren. Vaak gaven sterkere modelleurs het een hogere prioriteit
dan efficiëntie, terwijl efficiëntie door velen wordt beschouwd als een van de
belangrijkste kwaliteitsdoelen van een modelleerproces.
Het cognitief-psychologisch perspectief op het beschrijven van modelleer-
gedrag heeft waardevolle inzichten opgeleverd, zoals waar moeilijkheden voor-
komen tijdens het modelleren, en welke potentiële strategieën ingezet kunnen
worden om deze moeilijkheden aan te pakken. Bewustwording van sterktes en
zwaktes ten aanzien van executieve functies, evenals van de consequenties van
deze sterktes en zwaktes, biedt een veelbelovend beginpunt voor het optimali-
seren van modelleervaardigheden. Een aangetoonde effectieve interventie hier-
voor is het trainen van probleemoplossend vermogen, hetgeen bewustwording
van eigen gedrag bewerkstelligt. Specifiek voor modelleren vergen abstractie-
en redeneervaardigheden extra aandacht. Abstracties zitten diep verankerd
in concrete ervaringen, dus het loont de moeite om modelleurs te stimuleren
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te schakelen tussen concrete en generieke abstractieniveaus wanneer zij hun
proposities willen toetsen. Zodra de nodige relaties tussen abstractieniveaus
vastgesteld zijn, kan het analytisch redeneren met concepten ingezet worden.
De effectiviteit van de verschillende executieve functies in termen van hun in-
vloed op het bewaken van de integriteit van relaties evenals het gedeeld begrip
moet expliciet benadrukt worden. Als laatste kan een veilige, creativiteits-
bevorderende en gezonde werkomgeving een positieve invloed hebben op de
cognitieve vaardigheden van de modelleurs.
Vervolgonderzoek kan zich richten op de praktische bruikbaarheid van het
codeerschema en de preciezere beschrijving en kwantificatie van individuele ver-
schillen, zodat de methode nauwkeurig aangepast kan worden aan de behoeftes
van elke individuele modelleur. Daarbij moet het gebruik van abstractie als
faciliterend mechanisme in meer detail onderzocht worden, aangezien we nog
steeds niet weten waarom modelleurs abstractie inzetten zoals ze dat nu doen,
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